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Introduction. 
"The metaphor of the home is really 'a 
metaphor for metaphor: expropriation, 
being-away-from-home, but still in a 
home but in someone's home, a place of 
self-recovery, self-recognition, self-
mustering, self-resemblance: it is itself. 
This philosophical metaphor as a detour 
in (or in view of) the reappropriation, the 
second coming, the self-presence of the 
idea in its light. A metaphorical journey 
from the Platonic eidos to the Hegelian 
Idea' " 
From: 3. Derrida, "La mythologie 
blanche" in: P. Ricoeur, The Rule of 
Metaphor, p.289. 
The conscious emergence of the human being as subject is 
central to the thrust of Western history. From Thomas Aquinas and the 
Nominalists through Leonardo da Vinci's discovery of perspective in painting 
and the exuberant celebration of humanism during the Renaissance period to 
Lévi-Strauss' programme of the 'dissolution of man',1 and Michel Foucault's 
sobering slogan of the death of the human subject in our time, the issue of 
human subjectivity has been dominant. Even though the 'haemorrhage of 
subjectivity' (Леап Beaufret) seems characteristic of our age, the concept of 
subjectivity holds modernity together to such an extent that it may be 
called the depth-movement of our time. Hegel attested to it in his famous 
aphorism, "substance is subject." And history subsequent to Hegel, while 
eschewing his mode of being as absolutist and idealistic, has not ceased to 
identify the truth and freedom of being with subjectivity. 
This book, presented as a doctoral dissertation to the Katholieke 
Universiteit of Nijmegen, will examine Paul Ricoeur's position on the human 
subject. A number of reasons can be brought forward to justify the choice 
of this French philosopher. Few among contemporary philosophers listen as 
avidly to the mainstream of modern philosophy as Paul Ricoeur does. As a 
historian of philosophy he is acutely aware not only of the contribution the 
'classical' philosophers have made to the shape of the world of our existence, 
but also of the contribution contemporary schools of philosophy are making. 
Indeed his philosophy takes the form of a history of philosophy. He reads 
existence and being through the texts of the great shapers of modern self-
consciousness. To engage the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur is to insert oneself 
into the complex history of Western thought and to be enticed into a reading 
of that history from a perspective of hermeneutical phenomenology - a 
position that Ricoeur embraces even as an historian of philosophy - with a 
horizon open to positions that are, in reality, counterpositions. Accordingly, 
1. La pensée sauvage, Paris, Pion, 1962, p.326-327. 
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the issue of human subjectivity offers itself as one of the central themes of 
Ricoeur's philosophy. 
But secondly, it is specifically Ricoeur's own grounding in the 
phenomenology of Husserl and the subsequent expansion of this 
phenomenology into the area of hermeneutics that justifies our choice of 
Ricoeur. The philosophy of Husserl was not the original philosophical 
position of Ricoeur. His earliest influence was the thought of Gabriel 
Marcel. He was attracted to Marcel's approach to the mystery of being. 
Ricoeur's introduction to the 'existentialism' of Gabriel Marcel in 193^ 
coincided with the emergence of the existentialist movement in France. 
The French search for a 'concrete' philosophy in the ІЭЗС з provoked a 
revival of the works of Kierkegaard and introduced the works of Karl 
3aspers2 and the existentially interpreted Sein und Zeit of Heidegger into 
France. Ricoeur, however, was somewhat disenchanted with existentialism's 
lack of method. The search for a more disciplined thinking brought Ricoeur 
into contact with the works of Edmund Husserl, whose phenomenology was 
introduced into France at about the same time as existentialism.3 
Husserl's phenomenology which is rooted in the movement of 
thought leading from Descartes by way of Kant, Hegel, and Fichte is the 
foremost contemporary statement of the transcendental subject. It is a 
philosophy that excludes the ontological question of being. Instead of asking 
the question of being, it seeks to relate the regions of reality such as things, 
animals, people, to the subjective processes of consciousness. In so doing it 
makes explicit that the appearance (phenomenon) of things is conditioned by 
the structures of human subjectivity. For that reason the subject is 
transcendental: the condition for the appearance of things. 
2. Ricoeur made his own contribution to the existentialist 
movement when, as a prisoner of war during World War II, he collaborated 
with Mikel Defrenne on a commentary of Karl 3aspers entitled, Karl Jaspers 
et la philosophie de l'existence (préface by К. Jaspers, Paris, Seuil, 19^7). 
After the war, while teaching the history of philosophy at the Collège 
Cévenol in Strasbourg, he wrote a book comparing Gabriel Marcel and Karl 
Jaspers (Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers. Philosophie du mystère et 
philosophie du paradoxe. Paris, Temps présent, 1948). In the comparison 
Ricoeur is clearly more drawn to Marcel's mystery than to Jasper's paradox. 
3. Ricoeur played a significant role in introducing Husserl's 
phenomenology to France. He is recognized as France's foremost 
interpreter of Husserl (See. H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological 
Movement, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, Vol.11, p.563-564). He 
translated and introduced Husserl's Ideen I (Idées directrices pour une 
phénoménologie (Bibliothèque de philosophie) Paris, Gallimard, 1950. 
Ricoeur's lengthy introduction is found from p. xi to xxxix). A collection of 
his articles on Husserl was translated and published in Husserl. An Analysis 
of His Phenomenology (Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy) 
translation and introduction by E.G. Ballard and L.E. Embree, Evanston, 
Northwestern University Press, 1967. 
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Despite Ricoeur's reservation and adaptations^ HussetTs 
phenomenology has become the foundation to which he has anchored his 
philosophy. Ricoeur's positioning of the human subject takes its point of 
departure f rom Edmund Husserl's meditation on the transcendental subject. 
Ricoeur's radical cr i t ique of the transcendental subject remains 
incomprehensible unless one takes into account that he regards Husserl as 
the contemporary representative of the Cartesian heritage. Despite the 
fatefu l challenge of Structuralism or Semiology to phenomenology and the 
subsequent fading away of the subject in French philosophy into a silent 
presence, Ricoeur has not ceased to break that silence. His philosophy 
constantly reverts t o i ts start ing point in order to overcome i t by redrawing 
the landscape of the human subject for our t i m e . 
But there is a t h i r d , more decisive, reason for turning to 
Ricoeur. Although Ricoeur's in i t ia l position was influenced by Husserl, his 
reading of the psychoanalytical theory of Sigmund Freud and of the works of 
Marx and Nietzsche - the philosophers of suspicion - and the sudden 
surfacing of Semiology in France forced him to radically rethink the 
Husserhan and Cartesian relationship between the subject and 
consciousness. Freud, Marx and Nietzsche propose that the subject's 
consciousness of him/herself is a false consciousness. Existence and 
thinking, according to these thinkers, do not enjoy an immediate presence to 
one another. This dissociation of the subject and consciousness - the subject 
is other than the immediate consciousness of him/herself - means in real i ty 
that the subject is not as primary and available a datum as Descartes' cogito 
suggests. The dissociation of subject and consciousness becomes, therefore, 
a dispossession and a dislocation of the subject. But, while such a painful 
breakdown of the subject's image of itself as a Promethean subject, could 
easily lead to nihil ism, the disjointing of the subject and consciousness does 
not necessarily mean the death of the subject. Freud sought the relocation 
of the subject in a therapy of consciousness. Ricoeur, for his part, 
undertakes a prolonged study of the wounded subject in an e f f o r t to heal and 
recuperate the subject in our t i m e . 
To understand his e f f o r t , one must locate Ricoeur's philosophy 
within the horizon of France's philosophical trends because the latter frame 
his scope. Ricoeur belongs to the generation of French philosophers who 
received their philosophical schooling during the ІЭЗО^ - one of the 
<>. One needs to constantly qualify Ricoeur's phenomenology w i t h 
labels such as existentialist or hermeneutical. In his e f f o r t to avoid the 
idealism of Husserl Ricoeur wishes to exercise phenomenology only as a 
methodical option. Whenever possible or necessary, he forces the 
phenomenological position to be confronted wi th non- or even a n t i -
phenomenological counterpositions. For an analysis of Ricoeur's 
philosophical style see the very informative work of D. Ihde, Hermeneutic 
Phenomenology. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, Evanston, Northwestern 
University Press, 1971. 
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watersheds of French philosophy.^ Ricoeur's unique position is best 
examplif ied by his own masterful reading of the history of this century's 
French philosophy.6 He perceives two trends in the early part of this 
century on the thorny issue of the subject's place in the world. Philosophers 
such as Lachelier, Lagneau, Alain and Brunschvicg, who were influenced by 
neo-Kantianism, gave a response that determined the subject's place in the 
world mainly on the basis of the act iv i ty of the intel lect . Ricoeur calls the 
movement intel lectualist.? The intel lectual ist trend believed that the 
power of the intel lect and wisdom would secure the betterment of society. 
I t instigated, for that reason, a broad ref lect ion on the intel lectual 
achievements of science and moral i ty. The members of this movement 
superseded the narrow neo-Kantian epistemologica! concern by 
concentrating instead upon the act iv i ty of the spirit through which the 
achievements of science and moral i ty were thought to come iryto being. In 
their analysis of the act of judgment as the core act iv i ty of the spirit they 
hoped to express not only the subject's proper identity but also to promote 
his/her well-being. Human l i fe was said to be promoted by a proper 
attention to the intel lectual heritage and to understanding and wisdom. 
But his pre-World War II type of philosophy could not exorcise 
the destructive forces that threatened and almost destroyed Western 
civ i l izat ion in this century. In France the intel lectualist trend co-existed 
wi th another trend which, for want of a better term, Ricoeur calls 
interiorist.8 The interiorist trend asked a new question about the human 
subject. I t looked for a source or the ground of the subject as i t surfaces in 
feelings, thoughts and aspirations. But in Bergson's philosophy the 
inter ior ist trend refuses or fai ls to link up wi th the intel lectualist trend and 
almost, therefore, sinks into irrat ional ism. 
5. Vincent Descombes' history of French philosophy says that the 
period between 1930 and 19^5 was dominated by the three H's: Hegel, 
Husserl and Heidegger. A l l three are present in Ricoeur's philosophy wi th a 
preponderant presence of Husserl. Heidegger had not yet exerted much 
influence upon Ricoeur. The Heidegger that was being propagated in France 
Was the existentially interpreted Heidegger of Sein und Zeit . Ricoeur's work 
also attests to the shift in perspective that took place between 1945 and 
1960 when the three masters of suspicion, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud 
dominated philosophical discourse. Af ter 1960 semiology held centre-stage. 
See Modern French Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1980. 
6. See Ricoeur's "L'humanité de l'homme. Contribution de la 
philosophie française contemporaine" in Studium Generale 15, 1962, p.309-
323. 
7. Idem, p.310. 
8. Idem, p.313. 
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In a similar vein post-war Existentialism's search for human 
existence is fundamentally anti-intellectualist. Schooled in Hegel's analysis 
of the negative dimensions of life such as struggle, conflict, and 
contradiction, existentialist philosophers sought to incorporate the tragic 
dimension of existence that had become so tangible in the first half of this 
century in their philosophy. But the failure to mediate between 
intellectualism and interiority, between judgment and life, between truth 
and existence, remained the weakness of Existentialism. 
In Ricoeur's opinion 3ean Nabert was the only French philosopher 
who succeeded in mediating these antithetical trends. Nabert did not 
dissociate truth and existence. Existence, according to Nabert, is a journey 
of meaning that is guided by an original act whose meaning humans seek to 
recuperate without ever succeeding in doing so. On the one hand, by 
positing an origin that is an act and not a consciousness or a judgment, 
Nabert stands on the side of interiority; on the other hand, by arguing that 
the originary act exteriorizes itself in signs and hence becomes subject to 
analysis, Nabert counters the irrationalism that threatened the philosophy of 
life and existentialism. Nabert's humanism accentuated the human desire to 
be and its mission - and its failure - to live up to this affirmation and desire 
at the root of human existence. 
Ricoeur was greatly influenced by Nabert's view of existence and 
being as the act of becoming and as the process of freedom. In seeking to 
be faithful to Nabert's achievement, he veers away from the theory of 
perception that dominates Husserl's phenomenology and seeks instead to 
bend the Husserlian intentionality analysis into a tool for investigating the 
structures and activity of the will. As a result, Ricoeur's phenomenology is 
not first of all a phenomenology of perception but a philosophy of the will 
which makes use of Husserl's intentionality analysis and the èpoche. The 
recovery and healing of the subject is not achieved by an intellectual or 
theoretical activity but through a healing of the will and of freedom. It 
takes place in a practical philosophy. This priority of praxis over theory 
remains a hallmark of Ricoeur's philosophy.9 To seek for a new basis of 
humanism in the will is not to say, however, that the will has an immediate 
access to the root of being and of existence. The dictum that one must first 
lose oneself before one finds oneself prevails. The will too must undergo a 
despoliation similar to that of consciousness in order for the subject to be 
truly healed. 
In the context of this philosophy of the will Ricoeur proposes 
that the fullest recovery of the subject lies in what he calls a 'poetics of the 
9. Despite the numerous detours into more theoretical areas such 
as his analysis of the theory of discourse and the theory of the text and 
related matters, they remain detours. The practical dimension of his 
philosophy laid out in his earliest works has not been discarded. Ricoeur's 
philosophy remains a philosophy of the will and of freedom. 
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will',I" in a radical origin of the 1 will'. This poetics of the will 
encompasses two basic dimensions which more than any others reveal the 
originality of Ricoeur's ontology of subjectivity. They are the relationship 
between freedom and evil and the relationship between freedom and 
transcendence. If Ricoeur laid the groundwork for a dialectic of freedom 
and nature in the first volume of his La philosophie de la volonté, ^  in the 
two-volume second part of this Philosophie de la volonte I. L'homme 
fail l ible^ and II. La symbolique du та! 1-* he began his engrossing study of 
the relationship between freedom and evil. In the experience of evil, he 
insists, the subject experiences his/her freedom both in the discovery of a 
freedom that could and should be other than it is (the dream of innocence 
amidst a guilty existence) and in the recognition that human freedom is a 
freedom in bondage. But this discovery would be groundless, according to 
Ricoeur, without an affirmation of transcendence. The self whose freedom 
is weighted down and made powerless by sin is a self that can be healed. 
Ricoeur proposes that the healing of the broken freedom of the subject, i.e., 
the recovery of the subject, is the gift of Transcendence, of God. 
Accordingly the dislocation of the subject is not only a cognitive 
process but equally a cultural, historical event that encounters us as the 
drama of evil and sin. But this practical dispossession, Ricoeur maintains, is 
only comprehensible in the face of a more original situation that speaks to 
us either of innocence or of a healing of our freedom. Ricoeur views this 
positing of an eschaton of freedom as the final measure of the subject. The 
subject's effort to be source of him/herself and of his/her freedom is 
disrupted most radically by Transcendence. Ricoeur insists that for freedom 
to be healed, freedom must live as a gifted freedom. 
Ricoeur refuses, therefore, to accept the Sartrean nothingness or 
void in answer to the contemporary failure of freedom and to the demons of 
our time. By taking up again the 3udaeo-Christian tradition of the symbols 
and myths of evil and redemption, he injects a dimension of hope into 
humanism. 
That certainly is the ultimate reason for choosing Ricoeur in our 
analysis of the present state of the human subject. His poetics of the will 
proposes to be a conjuring up of the world as created.M This injection of 
10. The philosophical project which is to lead up to his "poetics of 
the will" was announced in his doctoral dissertation, La philosophie de la 
volonté. I. Le volontaire et l'involontaire (Philosophie de l'esprit) Paris, 
Aubier, 1950, p. 30. To date this project has not yet been completed, 
although the basic contours of such a 'poetics' have begun to emerge. 
11. Op. cit. 
12. (Philosophie de l'esprit) Paris, Aubier, 1960. 
13. (Philosophie de l'esprit) Paris, Aubier, 1960. 
14. La philosophie de la volonté. I. Le volontaire et l'involontaire, 
op. cit., p.30. 
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the Name of God and of Jesus of Nazareth into a schema of hope is worth 
examining in a t ime, characterized by L. Althusser, as a t ime of ant i -
humanism. 
This third reason is also the major reason Ricoeur's treatment of 
the recovery of the subject is of interest not only to the philosopher but also 
to the theologian. The issue of Christian fa i th is never far removed from his 
works. He was raised in the Protestant fa i th and· even before he started his 
philosophical studies he had received a less than tasty dose of Kar l Barth's 
theology. As H. Spiegelberg reports, Ricoeur was at f i rs t repelled by the 
Barthian Krisis theology.15 But that distaste did not seem to af fect his 
conviction that a philosopher may not shunt aside his insertion in a fa i th 
t radi t ion. Gabriel Marcel, in whose thought, Ricoeur admits, he f i rst found 
himself set him an example.16 Marcel did not hide his Christian convictions 
in his philosophy. Moreover, Ricoeur was very active in the movement of 
'Christianisme social' and belonged and st i l l belongs to the circ le of friends 
of Emmanuel Mounier, the great Christian personalist.H The Christian 
fa i th and its art iculat ion in the text of the Bible have been for him sources 
that give rise to thinking. Thus, for example, in his philosophy of the 
subject the Pauline teaching of the just i f icat ion by fa i th is the highest 
expression of the recovery of the subject as g i f t and creation. 
In recent years Ricoeur's philosophy has generated a considerable 
interest among theologians, particularly in North America. 18 This is due 
part ly because of his sensitive reading of the symbols and myths of evil and 
salvation, part ly also because of his proposal for a theological hermeneutics 
as an extension - or more accurately, an inversion - of his philosophical 
hermeneutics. 
But, despite the warm reception theologians have given Ricoeur's 
philosophy because of his treatment of issues close to their heart, i t would 
be wrong to qualify Ricoeur as a theologian. He insists that he is a 
15. Op. c i t . , p.569. 
16. P. Ricoeur, "My Relation to the History of Philosophy" in The 
I l i f f Review 35, 1978, p.6. 
17. See Ricoeur's "Une philosophie personaliste" (E. Mounier) in 
Esprit 18, 1950, p. 860-887. 
18. Ricoeur's hermeneutics of the sacred text and his analysis of the 
confession of evil have at tracted the attention of a number of theologians. 
See for instance B. McDermott, "The Theology of Original Sin: Recent 
Developments" in Th.St., 38, 1977, p. (»78-512; G. Vandervelde, Original Sin. 
Two Major Trends in Contemporary Roman Catholic Reinterpretations, 
Amsterdam, Ropodi, 1975; 3. Boonen, "Erfzonde of mysterie van het kwaad" 
in Collationes 72, 1976, p. 289-311. Ricoeur's influence on North-American 
theologians is most in evidence in the Chicago Cluster, and among such 
theologians as David Tracy, David Pellauer, Mary Gerhart, and 3.D. Crossan. 
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philosopher, and that he reads existence as a believing philosopher. Only on 
a few occasions does Ricoeur step across the boundary between philosophy 
and proclamation.I' But those occasions are clearly intended transgressions 
which do not jeopardize his standing as a philosopher. 
Nor does Ricoeur's philosophy make philosophy into a new anelila 
oí theology. The relationship between theology and philosophy is more 
complex. It can be approached from the perspective of content and form. 
On the level of content it can be maintained that both a theology 
of justification and a poetics of the will seek one and the same healing of 
the subject. Ricoeur's poetics of the will and a theology of justification 
derive their thrust from the same source, namely, the biblical text. 
Moreover, the underlying interest of both is contiguous. The interest of a 
poetics of the will is practical and emancipatory. It seeks the liberation of 
the subject in transcendence or the sacred. The interest of a theology of 
justification which proclaims the God who justifies us in Christ Jesus is also 
practical and emancipatory. It proclaims salvation and freedom despite sin 
and death. This unity of the ultimate ground out of which one lives and out 
of which one reflects as a theologian and as a believing philosopher may be 
maintained without papering over the equally radical discontinuity that 
persists between the two. For theology reflects on the proclamation of its 
faith in a Saviour God as the hope of human existence, while a philosophical 
approach to this ground of existence can do no more than examine the 
reasonableness of the claims of the hope of the subject. But a philosophical 
hope is a hope without recourse. Ricoeur himself can ultimately do no more 
than search out a philosophical approximation of a hope for which there is 
no answering proclamation of a God who sets free our freedom. In itself 
this is, of course, a considerable achievement - and of interest to 
fundamental theology - but it serves as a warning not to confuse the lines 
19. See for example, "The Logic of Jesus: the Logic of God" in 
Anglican Theological Review 62, 1980, p. 37-^1; and "La logique de Jésus: 
Romains 5" in Et.théol. et rel., 55, 1980, ρΛ20-«5. Ricoeur's selection of 
proclamation as his basic theological paradigm is clearly inspired by the 
Reformed tradition. He rejects a theological paradigm, whose objective it 
is to manifest, to make epiphanous, charging with J. Moltmann that such a 
model is more Greek than Hebrew. See his "Manifestation et proclamation" 
in Le Sacré. Études et recherches. Actes du colloque organisé par le centre 
international d'études humanistes et par l'institut d'études philosophiques de 
Rome, edited by E. Castelli, Paris, Aubier, 1974, p.57-76. The model based 
on religion as epiphany corresponds more closely to the Roman Catholic 
paradigm of theology. This confirms the adherence of Ricoeur to the 
Reformed tradition in which he was brought up and his continued 
reservations about the Roman Catholic tradition. In one of his earlier 
reflections he stated with all due nuances that Catholic theology proposes a 
reason that precedes faith. See his "Le renouvellement du problème de la 
philosophie chrétienne par les philosophies de l'existence" in Le problème de 
la philosophie chrétienne (Les problèmes de la pensée chrétienne) edited by 
J. Boisset, Paris, P.U.F. 1ЭЧЭ, pAS. 
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between philosophy and theology. 
On the level of form the continuity and discontinuity between 
theology and philosophy are equally delicate. Although Ricoeur's grounding 
philosophy remains phenomenology, his interaction with the philosophies of 
language and with the philosophies of suspicion shift his phenomenology 
towards a hermeneutical phenomenology. It is on the level of hermeneutics 
that philosophy and theology encounter one another. Thus we can ask, to 
what extent a theological hermeneutics of the biblical text follows the form 
of a philosophical hermeneutics of the same text. Both a theological and a 
philosophical hermeneutics share an interest in a generalized theory of 
discourse which examines the properties of identification and predication, 
sense and reference, structural analysis, and the capacity of language to 
enunciate being. Both hermeneutical styles struggle with the issue of 
explanation and understanding, and of distanciation and appropriation. A 
theological hermeneutics cannot bypass a general theory of hermeneutics 
which Ricoeur defines as "an inquiry about the art of understanding involved 
in the interpretation of texts."™ 
Yet despite this similarity, theological hermeneutics is not just 
one hermeneutics alongside other hermeneutical enterprises. The intense 
concentration of theological hermeneutics upon the Name of God that draws 
all the biblical texts to itself gives a unique and privileged position to 
theological hermeneutics withdrawing it from the aegis of philosophical 
hermeneutics. God's Name re-organizes the whole field in such a manner 
that the general hermeneutics becomes an organon of the theological.21 
Although this inversion of the relationship of theological and philosophical 
hermeneutics operates under a unique organizing principle, it does not 
remove the theological hermeneutics from a general philosophy of language 
and of hermeneutics. 
This interlacing of form and content has also determined the 
form and content of my analysis of Ricoeur. Although I seek to determine 
the outcome of the human subject in the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur in the 
face of the proclamations of the death of the subject, I can only do so by 
retracing the long route which Ricoeur is constrained to take to back up his 
contention of a recovery of the human subject. The route of Ricoeur - and 
as a consequence it might appear also to be so of this book - seems 
interminable. That is perhaps the ultimate drawback of Ricoeur's approach. 
The process of a hermeneutical phenomenology is without outcome because 
it operates with a Kantian limit-concept or with an indefinite postponement 
of the ultimate recovery of the subject. This could well leave it open to the 
charge that it weighs itself down with an impossible aim, because a never-
ending journey to the promised land of the subject could ultimately lead 
20. "Philosophical Hermeneutics and Theological Hermeneutics" in 
Studies in Religion/Sciences religieuses 5, 1975, p. 16. 
21. Idem p.17. 
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nowhere. But before we examine the charge we must map the territory 
through which Ricoeur leads us in this never-to-be-completed journey. 
The route to be covered is complex because it also involves an 
amount of backtracking and rerouting. In Chapter One there is a sketch of 
the grounding position of Husserlian phenomenology and the perceived need 
to move from a transcendental subjectivity of phenomenology towards a new 
transcendental in the form of language. Since the destabilizers of 
phenomenology were the Freudian psychoanalysis of the unconscious and 
Structuralism, their deconstruction will be briefly introduced. Chapter Two 
begins the arduous journey of the reconstruction of the subject by means of 
the theory of discourse and the text. It is, however, in part a detour 
because the theory of discourse and the text are part of the process whereby 
the subject is dispossessed before it can be found again. The theory of 
discourse and the theory of the text provide the structure or form which, 
according to Ricoeur, a new philosophy of the subject must recognize. 
Chapter Three begins to explore the reference of the language of 
discourse and the language of the text. This world of the text is probed by 
means of an examination of the uniquely creative language of the metaphor 
and its ability to reach into the realm of the inexpressible. Since the home 
of the subject is located in this realm, the power of the poetic and the role 
of the imagination are introduced. 
Chapter Four takes account of the methodological repercussions 
of the previous chapters. If meaning and the subject must be sought in what 
is prior to language and sees the light of day in symbolic and poetic 
language, their emergence will be a hermeneutical exercise. This calls for a 
presentation of the larger tradition of contemporary hermeneutics indelibly 
stamped by the contributions of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, 
Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. Ricoeur's own hermeneutical 
style incorporates the intentions of that hermeneutical tradition and 
resolves some of its more critical impasses. 
Chapter Five and Chapter Six extend the examination of the 
ontology which hermeneutics explores. Chapter Five proposes the temporal 
dimension of meaning and of the subject by an examination of the symbol, 
the myth and the fictional and historical narrative. Chapter Six shows that 
there is also an ethical dimension to the recovery of the subject. Ricoeur's 
ontology is not to be limited to the level of perception but must be extended 
to the realm of praxis. 
Chapter Seven applies the phenomenological dictum that all 
understanding is in the final analysis self-understanding. It examines the 
process of appropriation of the world of the text to which the hermeneutical 
exercise leads. 
The final two chapters present Ricoeur's philosophy of religion as 
a hermeneutics of hope. If transcendence extends true subjectivity to us, a 
hermeneutics of the sacred text of the bible is the avenue open to the 
realization of our true freedom. Keeping in mind that the final text of the 
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poetics of the will has not as yet been written, we follow Ricoeur's own 
delicate extension of the Kantian philosophy of religion within the bounds of 
reason to his proposal of a subjectivity that is the gift of a God who justified 
us in Christ Jesus . 2 2 
The genre of interpretation that this work presents can best be 
described as a sympathetic reading of Ricoeur. It does not pretend to judge 
Ricoeur's work from some higher perspective nor to locate him critically 
among this contemporaries. In sympathy with the aim and the execution of 
the aim, I have read Ricoeur in order to understand him. And it is this 
understanding of his text that I here propose. In organizing the massive 
material of Ricoeur's writings, I have relied almost exclusively upon the 
writings of what might be called the second phase that began after his work 
on Freud. 2^ The material prior to 1965 has been incorporated to the extent 
that it has a bearing upon his linguistic philosophy of the second phase. The 
shift between the first and second stages of Ricoeur's philosophy was not 
radical. It was largely a methodological shift. It did not affect his basic 
aim of producing a philosophy of the will. This work attests to the 
continuity and traces the extensive detour that Ricoeur had to undertake in 
order to realize his original project. 
The difficulty one faces in a reading of Ricoeur's philosophy is 
compounded by the fact that Ricoeur has written relatively few books. 
Outside of the books written during the early part of his philosophical 
career,
2
* all other works are either compilations of articles or the result of 
lectures or seminars.2^ The articles and lectures found elsewhere were 
22. The basic structure of the more philosophical part of my analysis 
is suggested by Ricoeur himself in a number of articles. In the article 
"Philosophical Hermeneutics and Theological Hermeneutics" op. cit. Ricoeur 
draws the parallels between a philosophical hermeneutics and a theological 
hermeneutics by drawing on the four characteristics of a general 
hermeneutics. These are 0 ) the theory of discourse and of the text, (2) the 
text as production (composition, genre, style), (3) the world of the text as 
the object of hermeneutics, (Ό the appropriation of the world of the text: 
to understand oneself before the text. Similarly, the outline of this book 
summarizes the first two categories in Chapter Two, the third category (the 
world of the text) in Chapter Three to Chapter Six, and the final category in 
Chapter Seven. The same outline of a general hermeneutics is given in 
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, Fort Worth, 
The Texas Christian University Press, 1976. 
23. De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud (L'ordre philosophique) 
Paris, Seuil, 1965. 
24. Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers; Philosophie du mystère et 
philosophie du paradoxe, op. cit. and the first two parts of his Philosophie de 
la volonte, op. cit. 
25. Thus, for example, De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud, (op. cit.) 
grew out of the Terry Lectures which Ricoeur gave at Yale University in 
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generated by specific occasions to which Ricoeur was invited to contribute. 
As he himself acknowledges, this type of occasional writing hardly permits 
one to provide a genetic construct of his philosophical project.22 
I have called my reading of Ricoeur a sympathetic reading. It is 
not a critically analytic reading precisely because all the building blocks of 
a poetics of the will are not yet in place. Two points, however, must be 
made. First of all, it is of some importance to note Ricoeur's specific way 
of being a philosopher of history. His articles and lectures often take the 
method of an architectonic reading of a number of authors in which each 
author contributes to the total structure by the questions they resolve but 
also leave unanswered. It is a philosophical method dear to existentialist 
phenomenology. Although Ricoeur's approach is not as negative as, for 
example, Merleau-Ponty's so that it could be characterized as a 'neither-nor' 
philosophy (it is neither this nor that), he constructs his case with positions 
and counterpositions. The challenge of counterpositions affects his own 
position to such an extent that a solution 'between the two' is proposed. For 
Ricoeur this is part of his struggle against Hegelian absolutism. Ricoeur is 
after a finite synthesis: a synthesis that is never complete and ever 
precarious because of the possibility of further erosion by subsequent 
positions. A critical examination of Ricoeur's reading of these authors is 
hardly possible in the context of this work, and, except for his more 
extensive analysis of such authors as Sigmund Freud, hardly fruitful. Of 
greater significance is how his reading of these authors stimulates the 
construction of his own view of existence and being. The other authors are 
not proof texts but rather historical moments into which Ricoeur inserts 
himself for the sake of understanding and self-understanding. 
Secondly, this work is not meant to be a critique of the total 
project. It is true that one could contest the approach both of 
phenomenology and hermeneutics. Has Ricoeur avoided the pitfall of the 
absolute subject of phenomenology through the diversion of the 
hermeneutics of the subject? Is his return to the Aristotelian concept of 
being - being is said in many ways - sufficiently sensitive to the 
contemporary concern for identity and difference? Does his proposal of the 
subject as gift sufficiently counteract and resolve the critique of the subject 
of other thinkers? Does his project succeed? I have not attempted to 
answer these questions. These are matters of philosophical concern. As a 
theologian I have chosen to listen to a philosopher who as a philosopher has 
listened to the texts of faith. His attentiveness and the manner of his 
reading of the texts of faith for the sake of human liberation are of 
themselves worth interpreting in a continuous text. 
1961. Le conflit des interprétations (Essais d'herméneutique (L'ordre 
philosophique) Paris, Seuil, 1969) is a compilation of articles written in the 
1960's or given as conferences during that time. La métaphore vive (L'ordre 
philosophie) Paris, Seuil, 1975) grew out of a seminar given at the University 
of Toronto in 1971. 
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To avoid an excessive number of footnotes I have chosen to 
insert references into the text itself. By numbering the books and articles 
of Ricoeur chronologically and indicating the texts used in each chapter at 
the beginning of the chapter, I have reduced the number of footnotes and 
permitted the reader to perceive at which stage of Ricoeur's philosophy a 
particular text was written. 
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The isolation of the human subject from its environment and its 
emergence in the loneliness of doubt and in the clarity of its self-assertion 
found its first celebrated meditation in the philosophy of René Descartes. 
Descartes' methodical doubt and the search for a new certainty placed the 
1 
subject and the problem of subjectivity at the center of the modern 
philosophical project. For Ricoeur, the Cartesian coRito is the starting 
point of modern philosophy which has not yet been surpassed. And in a 
number of ways, he insists, this historical moment is not to be overcome. 
For him the Cartesian cogito is an indelible moment in the history of the 
emergence of being (375:285-286). And yet he also recognizes that a new 
relationship to the subject must be instituted in our time. This problematic 
pursues Ricoeur in adi his writings.^ In his earliest writings - he admits until 
his La symbolique du mal (153) - he had not yet liberated himself from the 
unique hold that Descartes' cogito has had upon Western consciousness and 
praxis (438:27). With La symbolique du mal and more consciously with De 
l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud (227) the hold is broken and Ricoeur begins 
the struggle against the vanity of the Cartesian heritage in earnest. It is 
this struggle of Ricoeur that we wish to record.^ 
Descartes' cogito, or, more to the point, his dubito was intended 
to be the first, indubitable truth of the I am. Descartes said of this truth 
that it was a conscious experience, and that its consciousness provided 
immediate certainty of the truth of the cogito. That it is a truth and a 
certainty can hardly be doubted. But, as Ricoeur says of it, 
(It) is a truth as vain as it is invincible... It is a truth which posits 
itself, and as such it can be neither verified nor deduced. It posits at 
once a being and an act, an existence and an operation of thought: I 
am, I think; to exist for me, is to think; I exist insofar as I think 
(320(229): 17). 
As a first truth this is an empty truth. It presupposes that the 
certainty of the cogito is also the truth of my consciousness. It also 
presupposes, therefore, that I am in immediate and certain possession of my 
consciousness. Existence is the thought and the consciousness of my 
existence. The I am is a truth, however, that posits itself. It is immediately 
and intuitively reflective. The I am follows ineluctably from the I think. 
This self-positing of the I am is reflection. 
1. Cf. A. Lavers, "Man, Meaning and Subject. A Current 
Reappraisal" in 3. Brit. Soc. Phenomenol. 1, 1970, p.W-49; 3. Lacroix, "Un 
philosophe du sens: P. Ricoeur" in Panorama de la philosophie française 
contemporaine, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1966. 
2. For a more detailed analysis of the early stages of Paul Ricoeur's 
philosophical itinerary see especially the very helpful work of D. Ihde, 
Hermeneutic Phenomenology. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Evanston, 
Northwestern University Press] 1971. See also D. Vansina, "Schets, 
oriëntatie en betekenis van Paul Ricoeurs wijsgerige onderneming" in 
Tijdschr. Filos. 25, 1963, p.109-178 (Summary p.178-182); D. Rasmussen, 
Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology. A Constructive 
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Now, it cannot be doubted that the cogito provides a certain 
evidence about the ego of the cogito. But one can hardly call this evidence 
and certainty a truth that can function as the starting-point of philosophy. 
The cogito gives no more than, what Kant would call, an apperception of 
myself and my acts. As Malebranche realized, this apperception is only a 
feeling and not an idea. I feel that I exist and that I think; I form no idea 
about the I of that existence and thinking. Kant recognized that such a 
feeling, this apperception, of the ego can accompany all my representations, 
but that does not mean that I have arrived at self-knowledge. In other 
words, reflection is not intuitive. The I that I feel is not an I that I know 
intuitively (320(191):329). 
Whatever our present reservations, it is the Cartesian cogito 
that set the groundwork for the subjective tradition of Continental European 
philosophy. With Kant, in particular, the self-knowledge of the ego that 
accompanies all my representations is subjected to the critique of reason. 
The reflection, which in Descartes1 philosophy is still intuitive, Kant draws 
into his epistemologica! concern. He elaborated the a priori structures of 
human knowledge upon which he founded the objectivity of the 
representations. 
A. THE PHENOMENOLOG1CAL OPTION. 
While Descartes' privileged access to existence is the cogito, 
thinking, Husserl and the phenomenological tradition does not ask the 
question of existence and being except by way of a consideration of 
perception. While Descartes supposed that there is an immediate and 
intuitive access to existence, phenomenology inserts its famous epoche 
between being and the subject. It acknowledges the validity of Kant's 
critique of the availability of the object in itself (Ding-an-sich) and insists 
that the question to ask is how reality relates to the subjective processes of 
consciousness. As a consequence the issue of being becomes the issue of its 
being-for-me. 
That is also Ricoeur's initial position. Unlike the French 
phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty who referred mainly to the later Husserl, 
Ricoeur based himself on a reading of the early Husserl, the Husserl of Ideen 
I and Ideen II and of the Cartesian Meditations (320(229): 17;398:224). 
Ricoeur justifies his own procedure by arguing that there is no radical break 
but rather a fundamental continuity between the early and later Husserl 
(263(5Ό:115).3 The early works of Husserl expressed the basic response of 
phenomenology to the issue of the subject in a more radical fashion than his 
Interpretation of the Thought of Paul Ricoeur, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1971, 
p.24-111; P.Bourgeois, Extension of Ricoeur's Hermeneutic, The Hague, 
Nijhoff, 1975, p.10-127; R. Bergeron, La vocation de la liberté dans la 
philosophie de Paul Ricoeur, Montréal, Les éditions Bellarmin, Freiburg, 
Editions universitaires, 197Ψ, p.17-116. 
3. Cf. H. Spiegelberg, op. cit., ρ.56Ψ. 
3 
later wri t ings. Ricoeur, at any rate, saw in Husserl's philosophy a 
radicalization of the Cartesian cogito, in which the theme of the cogito is 
transformed into a science and becomes the ground of a l l science. 
Let us brief ly examine how Ricoeur interprets Husserl's 
philosophy of the subject which he has assumed rather curiously as a point of 
departure that he consistently seeks to dislodge. Husserl's phenomenology is 
grounded in the transcendental subject to the point that i t is in fact an 
egology. In the words of Ricoeur, 
This is a philosophy where being not only never gives the force of 
reali ty to the object, but above all never founds the reali ty of the ego 
i tself . Thus, as an egology i t is a cogito without a "res cogitans". 
(263(76):S<0 
The ul t imate foundation of Husserl's philosophy is not real i ty or being. They 
recede behind a fog that so obscures them that they never re-appear except 
in the faintest outl ine. The real foundation is the ego, the subject. For that 
reason, Husserl's ego is an originary ego, a transcendental ego. 
Husserl does not go so far, however, as to admit to the 
coincidence of the subject's consciousness and this world for me. In his 
Crisis he gives this world in me the name of Lebenswelt. In his Cartesian 
Meditations, the originary ego, i f not identif ied wi th consciousness, is found 
at least within the realm of experience. And as an experience the cogito 
can be probed. What Husserl was after in his transcendental phenomenology 
is an elaboration of this experience toward the structure of the cogito. 
Reali ty is reduced to i ts performance in the ego. 
Husserl's egology cut itself off f rom ontology by way of the 
epoche. The methodological procedure of the epoche is never cancelled to 
re-open the ontological thrust. While Descartes has grounded the ego in a 
higher real i ty, namely, the veracity of God and retained an ontological 
strain by positing the ego cogitans as an ens creatum, Husserl has no such 
recourse. In an egology without an ontology, the only measure of object ivi ty 
can l ie in intersubjectivi ty inasmuch as the other is another I. Although 
meaning's source remains the subject, because of the apodictive evidence of 
the cogito, the link wi th the Other as another I is to guarantee its 
object iv i ty (263(76):90). 
But what sort of a subject is promoted by this type of egology of 
transcendental phenomenology? 
1. The ego is the f inal just i f icat ion of all object iv i ty. The ego is 
the quest for the ul t imate foundation of human knowledge and act iv i ty . I t is 
the foundation that is autonomous and without presupposition. For Husserl 
this foundation lies in the f ield of experience; i t has a certain relationship to 
the order of perception - of seeing. I t is not a speculative construction, but 
the foundational ego is an Erfahrungsfeld. And whatever procedures might 
be used to uncover the structure of this Erfahrungsfeld such as the 
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transcendental èpoche, or the imaginative variations of my own life, the 
cogito remains in the sight of an experience (398:224-225). 
2. This foundational ego is an idealistic ego. For Husserl, 
according to Ricoeur, the height of intuition, the place where intuition is 
most complete, is subjectivity. Subjectivity is not doubtful. In 
consequence, every transcendence is said to be doubtful while only 
immanence is indubitable (398:225). Since transcendence comes only in 
sketches or profiles, one can easily be deceived. But immanence does not 
operate with profiles, but allows a coincidence of reflection with what is 
lived. This subjectivity is not the empirical consciousness that can be 
investigated by psychology, but a transcendental subject, available only to 
philosophy (398:226). For Ricoeur, this is the core of Husserl's idealism. 
3. This work of reflection, whereby I become conscious of 
myself, also has ethical implications, for it is an act that is immediately 
responsible for itself. The ethical dimension is immediately bound up with 
the foundational act (398:226-227). 
4. The subject does not have an ontological depth. The subject 
is perceived as self-positing and as responsible to itself. This subject 
without an ontology is grounded only in itself and its act. The only 
equivalent to an ontology during this phase of Husserl's philosophy is his 
consideration of the Other in the establishment of intersubjective truth. 
The significance of Husserl's phenomenology lies in the shift 
from the Cartesian cogito with its unmediated access to the subject to the 
insertion of the distinction between the world in-itself and the world for-
me. He sought to bridge this non-coincidence of the 'in-itself' and the 'for-
me' by a philosophy of perception. Because he insists on the pre-eminence 
of the 'for-me' of reality, perception is placed at the center. And although 
phenomenology is not prepared to state that the world is as I perceive it to 
be, yet it cannot escape the conclusion that all perception is perspectival. 
Nor can it avoid stumbling over the necessary conclusion that truth's origin 
is but all too human and relative. Perception is limited by the perspective 
that the solipsist "I" can give it. The "I" is then the real source, the final 
foundation, of the truth of existence. 
From the beginning Ricoeur was cautious about replacing 
Descartes' cogito with Husserl's percipio and about the repercussions the 
replacement would have on the question of the human subject. He saw it as 
a dangerous reassertion of the absolute and self-constituting subject. In his 
Philosophie de la volonté I. Le volontaire et l'involontaire (29) he undertook, 
therefore, to transform Husserl's phenomenology of perception into a 
phenomenology of the will.* He used Husserl's intentionality analysis 
4. The fact that Ricoeur dedicated this work to Gabriel Marcel is 
instructive. Ricoeur's utilization of Husserl is basically a methodological 
decision. In Le volontaire et l'involontaire a number of existentialist themes 
recur. 
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(consciousness is a consciousness oí...) and applied it to the will: the will as 
deciding, acting, and consenting. He transferred the époché from the realm 
of perception, where it had reduced the question of being to the meaning of 
being, and applied it to the structure of the will. As applied to the will the 
époché abstracted the essential structures of the will from the taint of 
irrational evil and from the power of super-rational transcendence.' In this 
eidetic phenomenology the structures of the will show themselves to be not 
the result of the cogito but of an active participation in a prereflective 
existence. The cogito does not rule here; in fact, one may conclude that 
willing is dialectically determined by what precedes it and limits it, viz. 
nature. Subjectivity emerges as fundamentally bipolar. It is not the 
absolute source, but it makes the real a subjective real. 
The incorporation of a number of existentialist themes, that are 
reminiscent of Gabriel Marcel, made Ricoeur recognize the need to break 
down the theory of the absolutist subject even further. This theme becomes 
more pronounced in the second part of his Philosophie de la volonté; 
Finitude et culpabilité, especially in volume II: La symbolique du mal (1537 
and in De l'interprétation (227). Here the dispossessing of the subject as the 
source of meaning becomes a dominant theme. 
B. DECONSTRUCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE HOME OF 
MEANING. 
Ricoeur's major objection to the transcendental constitution of 
the subject is that it posits an immediate and intuitive consciousness of the 
self. For Ricoeur such an immediate and intuitive self-possession is not 
available. Reflection, he says, is not an intuition (320(191):327). "The home 
of meaning is not consciousness but something other than consciousness" 
(227:55). This is a conviction that colours Ricoeur's work throughout. The 
subject is not constitutive of meaning, because the subject is not to be 
identified with consciousness. For him that was the "infirmity of Descartes' 
Cogito" (436:27) (26í»:32). In other words, the 'I am' must not be identified 
with the 'I think'. To pierce the secret of the subject, one may not rely on 
intuition or on immediacy. 
1. The decentering of the subject: Marx, Nietzsche, Freud. 
Even though Husserl was also aware that the supremacy of 
consciousness must be critiqued and, therefore, as a consequence introduced 
the notion of Lebenswelt as the prereflected, Ricoeur recognizes that 
Husserl's phenomenology cannot accompany the failure of consciousness all 
the way (320(243): 102). For Ricoeur this deconstruction of the subject as 
consciousness was accomplished by the three philosophers, whom Ricoeur 
calls the philosophers of suspicion, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. The three 
5. The validity of this transfer is disputed by D. Vansina, "Schets, 
oriëntatie en betekenis van Paul Ricoeur's wijsgerige onderneming" in 
Tijdschrift voor filosofie 25, 1963, p. 109-178, esp. p. 112-119. 
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philosophers contested, each in their own manner, the primacy of 
consciousness by placing the principle of reality elsewhere. There is an 
equal recognition in each of these philosophers that the unmasking of the 
false and dissimulating cogito requires an arduous labour. The breach of the 
vanity of the subject will only come through struggle and conflict, just as 
historically Copernicus' demotion of the subject from the centre-stage of 
the universe, or Darwin's insertion of the subject within the great evolution 
of life was received with great opposition. The shattering of the vanity of 
the subject is a painful process. But Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud also 
realized that the shattering of the vanity of the subject is not a shattering 
of the subject. 
Of the three philosophers Ricoeur has written extensively only 
about Freud. We propose to follow the lead that Freud gave to Ricoeur in 
his meditation on the subject and to leave aside the infrequent references to 
Marx and Nietzsche.^ It was through a reading of Freud that Ricoeur 
deepened his awareness of the transcendental illusion. 
Freud's psychoanalytic theory reverses the phenomenological 
movement. In his discovery of the 'topography' and the 'economy' of the 
unconscious, Freud had shown that the self and consciousness are at odds 
with each other and even wage a struggle to keep their distance. This 
Freudian unconscious is a dimension of subjectivity.^ It is not conscious 
subjectivity but preconscious. And although seeking to come to language, 
the unconscious is only latent language (227:453). The place where this 
latent language discloses itself and where the key to an understanding of the 
unconscious is handed over is the dream. The dream brings to the surface 
what is prior to consciousness in the subject. By opening up this 'region' 
prior to consciousness, the dream gives entry to something that expresses 
6. Ricoeur came to undertake a study of Freud apparently through 
his interest in the power of symbolic expression. Having studied the 
symbolism of evil and the power of sacred symbolism to gather meaning, he 
also wanted to investigate the oneiric dimension of the symbol. In studying 
Freud's dream interpretation, he became conscious of the power of the 
symbol not only to reveal but also to hide and to dissimulate: hence a 
conflict of interpretation. But before one can come to the more 
hermeneutical dimension of Freud, one can see in Freud first of all the 
thinker who dislodged the subject from the central position on 
consciousness. 
7. It must be said that Husserl, too, did not identify the subject as 
totally self-constituting. However, he was incapable of going beyond 
considering the unconscious as the unreflected or as implicit consciousness. 
He could not give a realism to the unconscious in the way that Freud could. 
It is because of this failure that Freud offers a serious critique of the 
phenomenological presumption (320(243):101-102). 
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the subject more than the subject expresses it.* This 'region' becomes the 
puzzle of consciousness because it appears to express a more primordial self 
than the conscious subject. 
The dream, as we know it in our waking hours, is not the 
language of consciousness. The dream, which has become a text in our 
recollection, can be called a mixed discourse (320(246):160). The dream-
text is a mixture of meaning and desire, or, more accurately, the effect of 
desire upon meaning. Meaning and force interact here as a mixed discourse, 
it seeks to fuse into a semantics of desire both the force and desire that lie 
at the origin of our being (conflict, repression, and cathexis of the dream-
text) and meaning (the language dimension of the dream). Two 
characteristics of this semantics of desire ought to be highlighted. 
First, the dream-text is the language-expression of opaque 
desire. The desire and the effort to be does not express itself in an univocal 
language but in the ambiguity of multi-meaning language. A semantics of 
desire employs the strategy of metaphorical language. Just as in 
metaphorical language, the strategy of dream language is to forge an entry 
into the subsurface world of pre-linguistic desire. The desire and effort to 
be are given only in the ambiguity of the dream-text. But if the desire and 
effort to be, which constitutes our existence, is given only in ambiguous 
language, they are not directly available to human consciousness. Our only 
access to the primordial desire is by way of the interpretation of the 
ambiguous mixed discourse of the dream-text. Only an interpretation of the 
semantics of desire which turns to the psychic representations of desire in 
language can reveal the interaction (320(246): 168). According to Ricoeur, 
the problem is that the psychic representatives are neither biological nor 
semantic. "It is delegated by the instincts only in their derivatives while 
gaining access to language only by the twisted combinations of object 
cathexis which precede verbal representation" (320(246): 169). Reflection is 
not intuition but interpretation. This is Freud's first contribution. 
Freud's second contribution was his discovery that the mixed 
discourse of the dream-text has been tampered with. The interpretation of 
the dream-text is hampered not only by the type of metaphorical language 
of the dream-text but even more so by the attempt of the text to 
dissimulate, disguise or dissemble the desire and effort to be. According to 
Freud, neither the subject nor the object are as they present themselves in 
the dream-text. Both clothe themselves in a variety of disguises or 
8. Freud in discussing the unconscious used the spatial metaphor of 
topography. But the unconscious is, of course, not a region. Its reality must 
not be given existence outside of the hermeneutical process, outside of its 
representations. To predicate meaning to the unconscious leads to a naive 
realism (320(243):107-108). To predicate meaning to the unconscious would 
lead to the assertion that the unconscious is conscious. It is only in 
interlocution through the interpretations of the signs that come from the 
narrated dream that the unconscious attains reality. 
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psychological displacements. Thus, the object is not the object of 
consciousness but it must be sought in the economy of the instincts as a 
'mere variable of the aim of the instinct' (227:42*0. The genesis of the 
object lies not in consciousness but with the genesis of love and hate 
(227:425). The same holds true for the subject. Also the subject is a 
variable of the aim of the instinct (Ichtrieb). Instead of being the last 
bastion of certitude, the subject, according to Freud, is itself an object of 
desire. It is not what it thinks it is. Far from being the subject of the 
Cogito, the ego is the desired object. The ego is the aim of the instinct. 
For Ricoeur, this narcissism is the heart of the false cogito. 
Narcissism is the original form of desire, the child, the archaism, to which 
we always return. But it hides itself in the disguise of many other objects of 
desire with which the subject as object can be substituted. 
Narcissism itself, in its primary form, is always hidden behind its 
innumerable symptoms (perversion, the schizophrenic's loss of interest, 
the omnipotence of thought on the part of primitives and children, the 
withdrawal into sleep, the selling of the ego in hypochodria); one has 
the impression that if it were possible to pinpoint the nucleus of this 
Versagung, this withdrawal of the ego that shuns and refuses the risk 
of loving, one would have the key to many fantasy formations in which 
arises which might be called an egotistic archaism (227:446). 
This means for Ricoeur that Freud effectively destroyed two 
basic tenets of phenomenology: neither the object nor the subject are what 
they appear in their immediacy. As Ricoeur remarks, 
To raise this discovery to the reflective level is to make the 
dispossession of the subject of consciousness coequal with the 
dispossession ... of the intended object (227:425). 
Of Ricoeur's painstaking and often difficult analysis of Freud, I 
wish to retain three points. 
a. The humiliation of the ego. 
If one must relinquish immediate consciousness because it is a 
false consciousness, one must also break with the narcissism that resists this 
despoliation of the conscious subject. I must make myself homeless of the 
false illusion (227:422), and I must attack the masked enemy of my 
narcissism (227:427). The ego - more precisely the libido of the ego - must 
be humiliated. The unveiling, therefore, of the topography of the 
unconscious or the process whereby the Id becomes ego is a struggle, a work. 
Every analysis is a struggle against resistence (320(214): 179). It is the 
"wounding of our self-love" (227:428). Hence a hermeneutical praxis must 
be reminded of the ascesis or the arduous path of the unveiling. The process 
of becoming conscious, the process of the recuperation of the subject, is 
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itself a process of negation and of the painful loss of the master subject 
(320(228):151-152). It is a recentering of oneself in another home. "It finds 
itself by losing itself" (320(228): 153). 
b. The archaeology of the subject. 
This painful unveiling and the breakdown of our narcissism is at 
the same time a becoming conscious of our effort and desire to be. If there 
is a "displacement of the birthplace of meaning" (227:422), it is not a 
discountenancing of consciousness. If the home of meaning lies not in 
consciousness but elsewhere, it becomes the task of consciousness to go in 
search of its home, in order to liberate the subject so that it might become 
conscious of its home of meaning (320(228): 150). According to Ricoeur, as 
we shall see, this task pertains to reflection. Like Freud, Ricoeur proposes 
a recapture of consciousness in reflection by means of an arduous 
interpretative process, always keeping in mind that our consciousness will 
never attain the level of the instincts themselves but only their psychic 
representatives (227:<>34). The movement of the displacement of immediate 
consciousness towards the recapturing of consciousness at the point where it 
rejoins the authentic Cogito Ricoeur labels archaeology (227:439). 
According to Ricoeur, for reflection, psychoanalysis is an archaeology of the 
subject. This backward movement toward the subject is not a secret return 
to a self-constituting subject. The conscious subject remains wounded. It is 
"a Cogito that posits itself but does not possess itself; a Cogito that sees its 
original truth only in and through the avowal of the inadequacy, illusion, and 
lying of actual consciousness" (227:439). 
Freud's road to freedom, as Ricoeur perceives it, seeks a twofold 
outlet. Ricoeur calls them the ability to speak and the ability to love. At 
the end of the route to the arche of the subject is not a new domination of 
life by speech but a being set free to speak 'without end', i.e. to discourse 
(320(214): 193). Ricoeur recognizes in this not a domination of the desire and 
the effort to be but a "new orientation for his desire, a new power to live" 
or, a re-education of desire (320(214): 194). Desire requires a governance in 
order that one can regain a capacity to enjoy. 
This archaeology of the subject points to a Cogito that does not 
possess itself but which is rooted in an anterior, namely, the unsurpassable 
character of desire. The Cogito is secondary to the sum. It is rooted in 
existence itself which, according to Freud, is to be understood as desire and 
effort (227:458). It is this desire and effort that accompany all my 
exteriorizations. It is indestructible. It is irretrievable. This archaism is 
pre-linguistic: "the unnameable at the root of speech" (227:454). It is a 
substratum that strives toward language but which can itself never be 
named fully. The route back towards the substratum of desire as desire 
brings us to the lower limits of language. It becomes intelligible only in its 
derivatives at the borderline of language (227:454). Freud, in other words, 
leads us constantly back to the beginning, but the beginning never becomes 
transparent. It keeps beckoning us and its accompaniment to our existence 
never ceases. The infantile is like a fate whose necessity must become 
unmasked in order that we may become mature. 
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с The intersubjectivity of becoming-conscious. 
Another dimension of the process of becoming conscious in 
Freud's psychoanalysis is the intersubjective dimension of the process. For 
Ricoeur this is of considerable importance because of his own position 
concerning the intersubjective dimension of truth. The work of 
psychoanalysis is a hermeneutical technique that calls for the mediation of 
another consciousness: the analyst's. Because of the blockage of 
consciousness in its resistance to reality the analyst must guide the painful 
process towards the arche. Only the interlocution of the analyst and the 
analysand working through the signs emerging out of the mute chaos of our 
desire can break the resistance to the truth of the self (227:456). In fact, it 
is only through the analyst that I have an unconscious. The effort at 
dispossession is for that reason not into a void but into another person, into 
a witness-consciousness (320(243): 107). 
Having brought Freud's theory of the unconscious within 
dialectical range of phenomenology, Ricoeur has at once both decentered 
and re-oriented reflection.' The archaeology of the subject and its 
regression of consciousness towards the lower limit of the language of desire 
has deflected a reflection that considers consciousness as primary and 
radicalized it by making consciousness its task. 
The arduous self-knowledge that phenomenology goes on to 
articulate clearly shows that the first truth is also the last truth 
known; though the Cogito is the starting point, there is no end to 
reaching the starting point; you do not start from it, you proceed to it; 
the whole of phenomenology is a movement toward the starting point 
(227:377). 
But this radicalization forced on phenomenology by Freud calls 
for a re-interpretation of phenomenology that transcends the antithesis of 
9. Ricoeur's reading of Freud has been severely criticized. See, for 
instance, A. de Waelens, "La force du langage et le langage de la force", in 
Revue philosophique de Louvain 63, 1965, p.591-612; M. Tort, "De 
l'interprétation ou la machine herméneutique", in Les Temps Modernes 21, 
1966, p.1461-1493 and p.1629-1652. Both A. de Waelens and M. Tort, 
although with unequal intensity, find fault with the distinction that Ricoeur 
has made between an analytic reading of Freud and the philosophical 
interpretation. De Waelens' more sympathetic reading says that Ricoeur 
buried the historical Freud under his dialectical blanket. M. Tort's sharp 
critique enters into the debate by insisting that every reading of an author is 
of necessity an interpretation. This invalidates the distinction between an 
analytic and an interpretative reading which Ricoeur applies to Freud. See 
also M. Robert, "Remarque sur l'exégèse de Freud", in Les Temps Modernes 
20, 1965, p.66<f-681, and 3. Laplanche, "Interpréter (avec) Freud" in L'Arc 
34, 1968, p.37-46. 
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Husserl and Freud. As a philosophy of the subject phenomenology must 
abjure its status as a transcendental philosophy of consciousness. Ю 
2. The subject and the process of becominR conscious. 
But Freud's decentering of consciousness by means of the 
unconscious does not express the full extent of the displacement of the 
subject. Freud had probed the 'region' prior to consciousness, bringing us to 
the point of the emerging of desire, showing it to be the archaic form of the 
human. He had shown the character of life and of desire to be both 
unsurpassable and unintelligible. But, according to Ricoeur, one cannot 
remain at this abstract level of an archaeology of the subject. 
If the subject is to attain its true being, it is not enough for it to 
discover the inadequacy of its self-awareness, or even to discover the 
power of desire that posits it in existence. The subject must also 
discover that the process of "becoming conscious", through which it 
appropriates the meaning of its existence as desire and effort, does 
not belong to it. The subject must mediate self-consciousness through 
spirit or mind, that is, through the figures that give a telos to this 
"becoming conscious" (227:*59). 
His meditation on Freud, which coincided in point of time with 
the immence interest that French philosophers showed in the 1960's in the 
'masters of suspicion', does not mean that Ricoeur joined the massive 
desertion of the phenomenological scene. Freud, in particular, was thought 
to have effectively destroyed the foundations of phenomenology. The 
sovereign subject is declared dead and buried in the unconscious. Ricoeur 
refuses to abandon ship. In the quote above he forges a link between his 
interpretation of the psychoanalytic theory and phenomenological theory in 
its earliest from: Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes. The latter differs 
10. By applying Husserl's phenomenology to the will in Le volontaire 
et l'involontaire, Ricoeur implies that the structures of the will can be 
obtained by an immediate reflection. He obtains the eidetic structures of 
the will by resorting to an èpoche of both the issue of evil and 
transcendence. Consequently, the will assumes the same function as 
consciousness on the level of perception. The will becomes the source of 
meaning. In the face of evil, it takes on full responsibility because it alone 
is the origin of evil. When in La symbolique du mal he is confronted with a 
confession of an evil of which I am not the source, but which nevertheless 
adheres to me, Ricoeur is forced to reconsider his point of departure. 
However, Patrick Bourgeois (Extension of Ricoeur's Hermeneutic, op. cit.) 
has shown rather convincingly that implicit in the position of Le volontaire 
et l'involontaire, one finds the hermeneutical thrust of Ricoeur's later 
works. But he needed his interpretation of Freud to bring to the surface the 
full impact of the notion of the involontary as analogous to the Freudian 
conscious. 
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radically from Husserlian phenomenology, but its insistence on identifying 
substance with subject through a process of consciousness indicates a 
similarity despite a difference. 
According to Ricoeur the phenomenology of mind or spirit is an 
inversion of Freud's psychoanalytic theory (227·Α61). While Freud's theory 
of becoming conscious is a backward movement towards the archaism of 
desire, Hegel's philosophy of the spirit is a proleptic process homologous to 
the regression of the archaeology. By dialectically relating Freud's 
archaeology with Hegel's teleology, Ricoeur preserves the birthright of 
phenomenology, but the latter would, like Jacob, henceforth walk with a 
limp. 
Because Hegel's meditation on mind or spirit has a bearing on the 
issue of subjectivity, we must briefly indicate how Ricoeur works out the 
dialectic between Hegel and Freud.M 
Hegel recognized that the movement of consciousness to self-
consciousness is a dialectical movement. For that reason his 
'phenomenology' is not of consciousness but of the movement of the figures, 
categories and symbols that guide the movement of consciousness toward a 
synthesis of consciousness with self-consciousness. In other words, like 
Freud, Hegel allows that consciousness does not coincide with itself. The 
subject is not master over meaning. The home of meaning lies in the spirit. 
The spirit is for Hegel the dialectic of the figures that mediate the meaning 
and the process of self-consciousness. Consciousness itself can be called a 
movement. It is the movement in which the dialectic of the figures is 
appropriated. Consciousness is the movement of meaning. But the 
movement is not born through consciousness, but it is formed in it. 
Consciousness is the 'internalization of this movement' {227Ά63). It 
recaptures the spirit that dwells in it. 
a. The Progressive movement of consciousness. 
The form of the dialectic of the figures of the spirit is 
progressive. The figure receives its meaning from the subsequent figure 
11. For Ricoeur's presentation of Hegel, see (227Ά59-
472;320( 191 ):322-326;320(2«): 108-120;320(2'>6): 160-176j399). Ricoeur's 
relationship to other philosophers and to the history of philosophy is unique. 
He shows a deep respect for his fellow explorers of the issue of human 
existence. One might be tempted to call him a scavenger of the history of 
human thought. He forges a path through history as the pathway of 
humanity's search for truth. He reads human existence constantly through 
the text of his fellow philosophers. His philosophy is consistently a history 
of philosophy. See his "My Relation to the History of Philosophy" (451). See 
also M. Philibert, Paul Ricoeur ou la liberté selon l'espérance. Présentation, 
choix de textes. (Philosophes de tous les temps, 72) Paris, Seghers, 1971, 
p.5-40. 
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(227:46<0· The meaning of consciousness for that reason cannot be found in 
itself. Its truth lies ahead in the next form or figure. Accordingly the truth 
of consciousness lies latent in consciousness and can only be made to appear 
through a subsequent meaning, which reveals the truth of the previous 
meaning. It is the spirit which informs consciousness as its movement that 
makes explicit what previously was implicit. For Hegel consciousness does 
manifest the being of the world but without reflection (227:464). The 
exegesis of consciousness would disclose a world of the progression of "all 
spheres of meaning that a given consciousness must encounter and 
appropriate in order to reflect itself as a self, a human, adult, conscious 
self" (227:463). Consciousness is proleptic; it prefigures its goal but 
unreflectedly. 
b. Content of the movement of consciousness. 
What we might term the truth or real movement of 
consciousness Hegel labelled Geist, spirit. As Ricoeur says, for Hegel "spirit 
is the truth of life, a truth which is not yet aware of itself in the emergence 
of desire, but which becomes self-reflective in the life process of becoming 
conscious" (227:465). That non-coincidence of consciousness with its self, 
i.e., its truth, is life's restlessness (Unruhigkeit). The restlessness of life, 
the tension of consciousness and its truth, at first makes that truth the not-
self in order that in its otherness I can make it self. Because this is 
homologous to Freud let us explain this process in greater detail. 
Self-consciousness according to Hegel manifests itself as desire. 
Human desire is human inasmuch as it desires the desire of another. It is 
addressed to another's desire and for that reason it is a desire that reaches 
out to language. The desire is not intelligible until consciousness reaches 
beyond itself in addressing another human. It is only in the positing of itself 
as desire that reflection becomes possible (227:466). There is no 
intelligibility proper to desire as such. In its reaching out to things desire 
dissolves or negates the otherness of things and of the world and finds itself 
in the other. Humans do so particularly in their desire for the desire of 
another consciousness. In the desire for recognition by another the desire is 
both object (that is, the other) and self-consciousness. In other words 
"desire is desire only if life manifests itself as another desire" (227:467). 
One does not derive it from oneself; it can only be mediated in and through 
the desire of another. The desire of another is a new moment that makes 
the unknown of desire in me manifest. 
For Hegel the movement of consciousness is an infinite 
movement. Each figure takes one beyond the present limit and towards 
another in a never-ending progression. The self's struggle to be at one with 
consciousness is an infinite struggle. What it desires is itself as totally 
transparent communication. But its very openness, its infinity, reveals at 
the same time that the movement has a substrate that is never surpassed 
and is indestructible. Life and desire that are at the source of this 
movement, are a source to which one constantly returns. What life and 
desire pursue as other is in fact the mediation of life and desire itself. Life 
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and desire are the "substance constantly negated, but also constantly 
retained and re-affirmed" (227·Λ71). 
Hegel summed up this movement in the saying: "The substance 
is subject" (399:338-339). This aphorism states that the movement of 
consciousness proceeds from a substance that lacks consciousness to its 
negation or contradiction whereby it becomes conscious and can begin to 
reflect so that a mediation of the contradiction can take place. Hegel 
perceived his philosophy to be the point of highest mediation of the history 
of philosophy. It brought to reflection 'le fond non maîtrisable', the 
substance of life and desire (386:37). "That which is passes into that which 
it is not and from this passage is born the taking hold of the consciousness of 
being through itself" (399:339 my translation). The increase in subjectivity, 
in other words, goes hand in hand with an increase in reflection and 
meaning. Subjectivity is granted us in and through the great variety of 
experiences that have shaped a cultural heritage. 
C. REFLECTION AS INTERPRETATION. 
There is another interlocutor in addition to Freud and Hegel 
whose influence on the transformation of Ricoeur's phenomenology ought to 
be recorded. Freud and Hegel had dislodged the immediacy of 
consciousness. Consciousness and subjectivity are not immediately 
available. As the title of Ricoeur's series of lectures on Freud, De 
l'interprétation (227), intimates, the return of the subject is mediated by 
interpretation. This other interlocutor, Jean Nabert, whose premature 
death Ricoeur mourns on a number of occasions, was not a phenomenologist 
but a practical philosopher.12 His philosophy was not a philosophy of 
consciousness but a reflective philosophy whose aim was to appropriate in 
praxis an originary dynamism which grounds human existence and with which 
the conscious, practical self does not coincide. This movement of the 
appropriation of one's primary affirmation - the 'yes' of existence - is a 
reflective movement that is neither direct nor immediate. According to 
12. Despite the repeated expressions of his indebtedness to Леап 
Nabert (cf. e.g.,186:321-322;320(191):328-329;320(2*6):169-170;190:5-
16;320(259)) it is surprizing that in Ricoeur's account of his philosophical 
itinerary, "From Existentialism to the Philosophy of Language", (371:14-18), 
the name of Jean Nabert is not mentioned at all. However, in two accounts 
of the history of philosophy, both of which clearly reflect Ricoeur's reading 
of that history toward his own position, Nabert holds a place of honour 
(cf.451:8;186:321-322). J . Nabert published three books: L'Expérience 
intérieure de la liberté, Paris, P.U.F., 1924; Eléments pour une éthique, 
Paris, P.U.F., 1943; and Essai sur le mal, Paris, P.U.F., 1955. Another book 
bearing Nabert's name, Le désir de Dieu (Paris, Aubier, 1966) was 
reconstructed from his notes by Ricoeur and some others. Ricoeur wrote a 
preface to this book as well as to Eléments pour une éthique. It is to Леап 
Nabert that Ricoeur dedicated his La symbolique du mal. 
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Ricoeur's estimation, Зеап Nabert succeeded in linking this original desire to 
be and the signs in which that desire is expressed. 
While Freud and Hegel had effectively made a return to an 
unadulterated phenomenology impossible, Зеап Nabert's reflective 
philosophy offered a well-ordered retreat from the embarrassing linkage of 
the subject and consciousness. After the destruction of the direct, intuitive 
apprehension of the self by the self, Nabert comes to the rescue on a 
number of fronts. We shall mention four. 
1. Nabert's ethical philosophy does not operate on the narrow 
epistemologica! and psychological base of either Kant or Freud. Ricoeur 
finds in Nabert a practical philosophy, that, unlike Kant's, is not dependent 
upon the structure of theoretical reason. In the signs of the desire to be, 
Nabert seeks to recapture or to re-appropriate the primordial source of 
human existence. He promotes an ethics that in its itinerary seeks to 
appropriate in an ever fuller fashion an act that is ever prior and never 
given, which he calls the primary or originary affirmation (320(2*6): 169-
170). This primary affirmation is the source of the self. For Nabert, this 
primary affirmation reveals two dimensions of existence. First of all, it is 
an act, an affirmation, that institutes consciousness and, therefore, 
surpasses consciousness. But this act also manifests in the feeling of fault, 
failure and solitude that there is a lack of being, or better, a lack of identity 
with the originary act. As a consequence, Nabert perceives the task of 
philosophy as an ethical task of appropriating that form from which it is 
separated: the originary or primary affirmation (cf.320(185):219). The 
ethical reflection that Nabert proposes is fundamentally a mediated 
reflection. It takes the longer route that seeks to re-appropriate the self by 
way of the interpretation of the signs in which the desire to be - the primary 
affirmation - is inscribed. 
2. In this process of interpretation Nabert also asserts that 
there is a direct relationship between the understanding of the signs of the 
inscription of the desire to be and self-understanding. Accordingly, all 
understanding becomes self-understanding. To arrive at self-understanding 
one must pass through the signs in which the self inscribes itself. 
3. With the establishment of a primordial act of human 
existence in the primary affirmation, Nabert reintroduced an ontologica! 
motif into reflective thought. Husserl's egology was without em ontology. 
The theme of the primary affirmation offers a concrete ontology which 
Ricoeur along with Marcel sought without requiring the acceptance of the 
direct ontology of Heidegger (451:8). For Ricoeur, Nabert's indirect 
approach by way of the sign corrects the excessively lofty ontologica! 
approach of Heidegger.^ 
4. In the retracing of the trajectory of Ricoeur's phenomenology 
of the subject, the most significant contribution of Nabert is his thesis on 
13. See below, p.102-105. 
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the relationship between the act of the primary affirmation and the sign. 
At issue is the following. Between the act of existence and the signs in 
which this act is represented there exists a relationship that is often 
overlooked. Frequently, the primary act is subordinated to the sign and the 
sign is given an objectivity that does not at all reflect the relationship to 
the primary act. The representation or sign becomes then the primary 
datum and function. As the first known it becomes the only known 
(320(185):212). But once the bond between the sign or representation and 
the primary act is restored, the sign or representation takes on a different 
texture. It becomes secondary to the primary act. It takes on a mediating 
function. It is not itself the aim of understanding, but must be understood 
as a sign of the act that gave rise to it (320(185):214). But, in a view in 
which the sign is only a tracing of the act, the sign becomes a symbol of the 
natural desire (320(185):221). The sign becomes an issue then not so much of 
knowledge as of the imagination. To quote Ricoeur's text, "The phenomenon 
is the manifestation, in a 'graspable expression', 'of an inner operation, 
which can assure itself as to what it is only by forcing itself toward this 
expression'" (320(185):221). 
The phenomenon, representation, or sign, then, is the expression 
of the self, but the self in its objectification. Self-possession by way of this 
objectification is not immediate nor ever complete. According to Ricoeur, 
"We never produce the total act that we gather up and project in the ideal 
of an absolute choice; we must endlessly appropriate what we are through 
the mediations of the multiple expressions of our desire to be" 
(320(185):222). This reflection as interpretation needs to be made more 
precise, however. Through Nabert, Ricoeur is well on the way towards a 
hermeneutics. But Nabert's reflective philosophy has not yet tackled the 
question of language. With the question of language we arrive at the most 
recent stage of Ricoeur's itinerary. 1* 
1*. The real urgency for the introduction of language as the 
mediation must be sought in the fact that for both Nabert and Ricoeur the 
source and the origin of meaning, the originary act, cannot be grasped by 
pure reflection. From Husserl Ricoeur had already borrowed the idea that 
that to which all consciousness and all expressions of meaning tend does not 
have to be attained or fulfilled. The object of intentionality, in other words, 
does not have to be present, in order for consciousness to be a consciousness 
of... The language of intentionality can consequently be an empty language 
which seeks fulfillment without attaining it. For Ricoeur, therefore, both 
the Ursprung and the telos of meaning manifest themselves in ambiguity and 
in a metaphorical tension that is without surcease. Cf. P. Bourgeois, 
"Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: Paul Ricoeur" in 
Phil. Today 15, 1971, p.232-235. See also: Patrick Bourgeois, "Paul 
Ricoeur's Hermeneutical Phenomenology" in Phil. Today 16, 972, p.20-27, 
esp. p.24; P. Gisel, "Paul Ricoeur: Discourse between Speech and Language" 
in Phil. Today 21, 1977, p.W6-456; D. Charles, "Dire, entendre, parler. 
L'herméneutique et le langage selon P. Ricoeur" in Algemeen Nederlands 
Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 68, 1976, p.7*-98; P. Bourgeois, "From 
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D. LANGUAGE AND MEANING. 
Ricoeur's move toward language and a hermeneutical 
phenomenology began with his La symbolique du m a l . ^ The symbolism in 
which humanity expresses its contact and contamination with evil which this 
work examined threw Ricoeur into the midst of the problem of language. 
Evil resists a direct description and expression of itself and tends toward the 
symbolic, mythical and narrative expression (451:9). The ambiguity and the 
extravagance of the symbolic language in which evil is expressed in cultures 
demands an interpretative process of this double-meaning, ambiguous 
language. In La symbolique du mal and in his subsequent work on Freud, De 
l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud, Ricoeur defines hermeneutics and 
symbolism in terms of each other (371:88). Symbolism makes use of indirect 
language and, therefore, involves the art of decipherment of hermeneutics. 
Accordingly, at this phase of Ricoeur's philosophical development, 
hermeneutics unscrambles indirect meanings. 
But at this stage the study of language was still peripheral to 
Ricoeur's concerns. The question of evil and guilt in the context of a 
philosophy of the will still predominated. The reflection upon language was 
indirect. The external occasion that made the implicit concern with 
language an explicit one was the sudden prominence on the philosophical 
scene in France of Structural Linguistics or Semiotics. Also his interest in 
religious language was whetted by the theologies of Ebeling and Fuchs of the 
Post-Bultmannian School (371:88). 
What is at stake here? Beyond Nabert's preoccupation with the 
sign what is novel in Ricoeur's presentation? The home of meaning, we said, 
is not consciousness but something prior to consciousness. In his probing of 
the primary act that lies prior to consciousness, Nabert had insisted that 
this primary act does not release itself except through the signs and 
monuments in which that act is inscribed. With the advent of the strong 
linguistic currents, Ricoeur recognizes that the mediation of the primary 
act is a linguistic mediation. If Nabert linked meaning with the sign, 
Ricoeur, in the period subsequent to De l'interprétation, focussed upon the 
sign in terms of language and sought to relate meaning and language. 
In his contribution "Signe et sens" (378) Ricoeur provides an 
illuminating perspective of the relationship between meaning and language. 
In a few bold strokes he describes the history of that relationship as a 
constant shifting back and forth of accents. At certain moments in the 
Hermeneutics of Symbols to the Interpretation of Texts" in Studies in the 
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, ed. by Charles E. Reagan, Athens, Ohio, Ohio 
University Press, 1979, p.8*-95. 
15. See also P. Kemp, "Phänomenologie und Hermeneutik in der 
Philosophie Paul Ricoeurs" in Ζ. Theol. Kirche 67, 1970, ρ.335-347. 
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history of thought the accent fell upon the sign while at others the accent 
was placed upon the meaning. Either the sign is the sole support of meaning 
or the meaning pertains to an idea that is captured by thought to which 
convention attaches a certain word (378:1011). Ricoeur argues accordingly 
that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology follows the idealistic 
perspective where meaning is not attached to the sign but is objective and 
ideal, distinct from mental contents and, therefore, from linguistic signs.16 
The contribution of Structural Linguistics, on the other hand, represents the 
modern reversal of the relationship of meaning and language of 
transcendental phenomenology. It makes meaning once again subservient to 
language (378:1012). 
The founding father of French Structural Linguistics is the Swiss 
linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913).^ His presentation of the 
science of language represents a profound challenge to the 
phenomenological position. The semiotic challenge affects the major theses 
of phenomenology regarding meaning, the subject as the bearer of meaning, 
and the transcendental reduction whereby every question of being is reduced 
to the question of the meaning of being. The near identification of being 
with meaning which, in the final analysis, leads to the conclusion that being 
is no more than what human experience has brought to expression is severely 
'deconstructed'. Is it not an assumption of phenomenology, semiology asks, 
that being can only be 'for me' or a vécu, a lived experience? To break this 
supposed naivete of phenomenology, semiology proposes a radically 
incompatible series of propositions. As represented by the following four 
theses, semiology succeeded in considerably undermining the credibility and 
viability of the phenomenological movement in France.l* Ricoeur took up 
the challenge in 
16. This view must not be radicalized because a certain relationship 
between meaning and signs is accepted by Husserl. 
17. See his Cours de linguistique générale, Paris, Payot, 1971 (1916). 
De Saussure was not alone in his discovery. He perfected the theories of 
Jan Baudoin de Courtenai and of Kruszewski. Cf. P. Ricoeur, "Langage 
(Philosophie)" in Encyclopaedia Universalis, IX, Paris, Encyclopaedia 
Universalis France, 1979, p.771. De Saussure did not employ the word 
'structure'. Instead he used the word 'system'. The words 'structure' and 
'structuralism' were coined at the First International Congress of Linguists 
at The Hague in 1928. Cf. "Structure - Word -Event", in Philosophy Today 
12, 1968, p.116. 
18. Ricoeur's description of Saussurean linguistics varies little. The 
theses presented here are derived mainly from Interpretation Theory: 
Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, (Four Essays Comprising the 
Centennial Lectures Delivered at Texas Christian University 27-30 
November, 1973), Fort Worth, The Texas Christian University Press, 1976, 
р.З-*. For a more extensive treatment of the history of modern 
linguistics,see 475:229-2*2. The postulates were formulated by Louis 
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characteristic fashion. He allowed some of the basic tenets of semiology, 
but withstood the almost unbearable academic pressure to fall in line with 
the prevailing philosophy. He remained a phenomenologist, albeit a 
'deconstructed' one. 
1. The postulates of semiotics. 
a. Structural linguistics distinguishes between language as 
langue and language as parole (speech). The linguistics of de Saussure broke 
radically with the study of language of the 19th century, where the emphasis 
was on the historical roots of language and upon the evolution of the 
classical Indo-European languages (216:83). De Saussure set himself to study 
the code or set of codes that form the structure of the system of the various 
languages of the human community. By doing so, he discovered two aspects 
of language: language as a code or a lexical system, which studies in a 
semi-algebraic manner the combinations and oppositions of the component 
elements or units (phonemes, lexemes, morphemes and syntagma) of 
language (langue), and language as the activity of speaking subjects who 
intend to say something to someone about something (parole). De Saussure 
was particularly interested in language as langue. He has in fact little to 
say about language as parole. Linguistics has become primarily a linguistics 
of langue, that is, of the lexical system, and only derivatively of the parole. 
The core unit, studied by linguistics, is the sign or the sign 
system. The linguistic sign does not unite a 'thing' and a 'name', but it is a 
phenomenon which relates and opposes a signifier (a sound, a written 
pattern, a gesture...called signifiant in French)! ' and a signified (signifié). 
The signified is not a thing or an object outside of language but merely the 
differential values in the lexical system. At first, de Saussure explained 
these correlative terms as a relationship between the acoustic image of a 
word and its corresponding concept derived from linguistic community. In 
his later works this was considered too psychological and sociological an 
explanation. Yet, what must be retained is the correlation of the signifier 
and the signified. The signified remains within the bounds of language, 
because for linguistics the question of meaning cannot be detached from the 
intra-linguistic sign. Meaning results from the correlation of the signifier 
and the signified in the sign. No entity of the system has a meaning of its 
Hjelmslev of the linguistic school of Copenhagen in his Prolegomena to a 
Theory of Language (1943). 
19. By extension, the signifier includes also the written pattern and 
the gesture. It was the linguistic Circle of Prague (founded in 1926 at the 
initiative of V. Mathesius) which first recognized language as a functional 
system. The Circle is specifically known for its structural treatment of 
phonology. Phonology excludes from language the objective physiological 
factors to emphasize the phonemes and their interrelationship» 
(cf.345:771;<f73:231). 
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own. The sign-units relate to other signs purely by their oppositions and 
differences. Just as a sound can be defined only in relation to other sounds 
so a meaning is only a difference in a lexical system. A sign has meaning 
only by its place in the whole lexical system. In a system of signs we must 
not look for the proper existence of a word. The sign has no other existence 
than in the lexicon where it is defined by the opposition to other words 
(374:10). 
b. The distinction between langue and parole gives rise to 
another important distinction. Langue and parole operate in a different 
framework of time. Linguistics distinguishes sharply between the 
synchronie of the system of signs and the diachronie of discourse. Langue 
deals with the differences and the oppositions of the signs within the system 
of language at any given moment. It leaves aside any consideration of the 
process of the change of meaning in language. The system of signs is a-
historical while discourse incorporates the changes of meaning that 
characterize a living language. Linguistics gives priority to the synchronic 
system. It subordinates the historical process and the diachronie changes of 
meaning to the system underlying the changes. For linguistics a change of 
meaning is understood as two distinct states of a word. 
c. The most far-reaching consequence of synchronic linguistics 
is its relationship to reality. The units of language are enclosed in a finite 
set of discrete entities of the system. In other words the lexical system is 
to be considered finite. It contains only a limited number of phonemes, 
lexemes, morphemes and syntagma.20 This closure of the system must be 
expanded to include the thesis that all the relations between these units 
remain immanent to the system. For linguistics, langue is a self-sufficient 
system of inner relationships. As we said above, the signified does not refer 
to reality or to a thing. It is the counterpart of the signifier. The 
consequence of this is that this language has no outside. The words of a 
dictionary refer only to other words in the dictionary. The system is closed 
in on itself. As de Saussure expresses it, "Language is not a substance but a 
form" (275:117). A sign is defined in itself as a purely internal or immediate 
difference. The reference to reality is blocked by the imprisonment of the 
sign within the system. 
d. The fourth thesis resumes the other three. For linguistics 
language has become, as Hjelmslev describes it, "an autonomous entity of 
internal dependencies, in a word, a structure" (320(278):250). It is a closed 
system of signs, existing only for itself. With no outside, language is not a 
mediation of reality, but a circumscribable entity that is self-enclosed. As 
a consequence, language becomes a homogeneous object of science because 
of the closure of the system. 
20. Thus, for example, the English language has № or 45 phonemes, 
and the Oxford Dictionary contains some 45,000 words. 
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2. Language without a subject. 
The critique of Ricoeur oí a language with only an inside takes a 
familiar route. Instead of juxtaposing Saussurean linguistics with 
phenomenology, he investigates the possibility of a dialectic between 
linguistics and phenomenology. He chooses to examine the basic distinctions 
between langue and parole, synchronie and diachronie, closed and open 
system of linguistics in the light of the phenomenological theories of 
meaning, of the subject, and the phenomenological reduction 
(cf.320(278):251). He accepts the necessity of the semiotic challenge to the 
question of the subject and to consciousness. The transcendental reduction 
of Husserl's phenomenology which made consciousness absolutely primordial 
by reducing the question of being to the question of the meaning of being for 
consciousness, is deeply affected by this acceptance. 
Consciousness, buffeted already by Freud's unconscious and 
further reduced by semiotics, cannot retain its primordial transcendental 
position. As Ricoeur says, "In the eyes of structuralism, this absolute 
privilege is the absolute prejudice of phenomenology" (320(278):257). 
Phenomenology had attempted to work out the difference between the 
human being and nature by reducing nature to the consciousness of that 
nature. Ricoeur now perceives that this reduction of nature to the 
consciousness of nature is too direct and immediate. He realizes that the 
subject does not emerge that easily and almost intuitively from the nature 
that surrounds it. Consciousness is not the transcendental, the condition of 
the possibility of meaning. In the challenge of semiotics Ricoeur opts to 
take the route that iMerleau-Ponty had already taken before him.21 He 
designates language as the new transcendental, that is, as the primordial 
difference between the human being and nature. What differentiates 
humans is perceived to be their capacity to relate to the real by signifying it 
through language (320(278):258). 
But at the same time he realizes that the challenge of semiology 
must itself be challenged. A language that is closed in upon itself, a 
language without an outside, and a language without a subject cannot be 
incorporated within a phenomenology of the subject. It does not relate to 
the real because it signifies only differences. For this reason Ricoeur does 
not want to fall into the trap of canonizing Structuralism as the sole 
philosophy of language. Ricoeur will seek to broaden the structuralist 
theory of language into a theory of discourse that will try to overcome the 
shortcomings of a theory of signs and open up the philosophy of language to 
the concerns of phenomenology regarding the human subject. 
The repercussions of this 'deconstruction' of phenomenology's 
prejudice will occupy us in the next chapters. Ricoeur's conversion to a 
linguistic-style phenomenology is a lengthy process. 
21. The philosophy of Merleau-Ponty devolves more from the later 
Husserl. Ricoeur faults Merleau-Ponty, however, for moving too quickly to a 
phenomenology of speech. He insists that only after having listened to 
Structural Linguistics is it possible to construct an adequate phenomenology 
of speech. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE THEORY OF THE TEXT. 
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With the new transcendental in Ricoeur's philosophy being 
language, what happens to the two other basic notions of phenomenology, 
meaning and the subject? How do meaning and the subject relate to a 
transcendental language? Phenomenology as a theory of generalized 
language (320(278):258) will not let go of the subject as easily and radically 
as structuralism. The new linkage of language and meaning cannot take 
place at the expense of the subject. And for Ricoeur the subject will remain 
dead as long as meaning remains indistinguishable from the signified of the 
sign. That extinction is not a mirage. Within the Structuralist schools one 
can detect two enlargements of the thesis of meaning which if successful 
would reinforce such a death. The first enlargement, inspired by 
C.S. Peirce, seeks to make all of existence subject to a science of signs, 
called semiotics. It would include not only linguistic signs but all other 
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structuralizable dimensions oí human life such as rituals, clothing, 
architecture, social etiquette, economic exchange. Its presupposition is that 
all realms of life are structured homologously to the laws of the sign. The 
second extension of the thesis of meaning by Structuralists involves 
language itself. It hypothesizes that the laws that apply to the larger units 
of language such as the sentence, the story, the poem, and the essay are 
homologous to the laws of the sign. That would imprison meaning 
completely within the sign and would effectively spell the end of the subject 
(Cf. 378:1013). The success of the hypothesis of Structuralism in its analysis 
of the larger units of language can serve as a warning not to dismiss their 
thesis too lightly. But for Ricoeur the linguistics of Structuralism retains 
its validity and cannot be removed through some type of dialectic with 
another philosophy of language. The linguistics of langue is a genuine 
cultural acquisition. 
What Ricoeur questions, however, is Structuralism's exclusive 
linkage of meaning and the sign by Structuralism. Is meaning solely to be 
linked to the sign or is there something else in language to which meaning 
can be attached? De Saussure had distinguished another linguistic level in 
the parole but he had hardly investigated the question of meaning on the 
level of speech. Is there also a signifier and signified that are irreducible to 
the relationship of the signifier and the signified in the sign? This is 
Ricoeur's conviction which we must now investigate. 
One can distinguish three phases in Ricoeur's investigation. It 
must start with an examination of the theory of parole, or, in Ricoeur's 
terms, a theory of discourse. Then, this theory of discourse must undertake 
to study the changes that discourse undergoes when oral discourse becomes 
written discourse. Finally, the theory of written discourse must be 
expanded to include the composed and stylized discourse of the text. This 
chapter will examine mainly the logical contours of the theory of discourse. 
Subsequent chapters will search out the ontological and religious dimensions. 
A. THE THEORY OF DISCOURSE. 
Two basic criticisms characterize Ricoeur's evaluation of 
Saussurean Structuralism (275:118). The first criticism concerns de 
Saussure's methodical exclusion of the capacity of language to say 
something about something to someone. Language is not closed off in a 
universe of signs, but intends to mediate reality. The second criticism 
which will be the concern of the next chapter is that Structuralism cannot 
account for the creation or the innovation of meaning. Language possesses 
a creative power and a symbolic function which a structural, synchronic 
linguistics cannot account for except as a passage from one state of the 
system of signs to another (416:119-125). 
For Ricoeur the theory of discourse has two sources. From the 
French Sanskritist E. Benveniste* he derived a theory of discourse based not 
1. In his article "Philosophie et langage", art, cit., p.455, Ricoeur 
acknowledges his "dette immense" to Benveniste for both his Le Conflit des 
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on the linguistics of the sign but on the linguistics of the sentence. From 
English-language philosophy and from Frege and Husserl he took over the 
reflections on the logic of meaning and of reference. We shall look at each 
in turn. 
1. The linguistics of discourse. 
a. Semiotics and semantics. 
Benveniste's theory of discourse starts where de Saussure left 
off: the residual concept of parole.2 For de Saussure parole was an 
execution of the free combination of language by individuals, unrestricted 
by the laws of langue. Benveniste, however, holds that parole also has a 
structure which is as rigorous as the structure of langue, but irreducible to 
it. To express this trait of parole, Benveniste replaces the Saussurean term 
parole with discours (discourse). His theory of discourse makes, therefore, a 
distinction between two functionings of language, each dependent upon a 
specific unit of language, but irreducible to one another. The semiotic 
function of language is based on the unit of the sign, while the semantic 
function of language is based on the unit of the sentence. ' 
Interpretations and La métaphore vive. Ricoeur draws mostly from 
Benveniste's Problèmes de Linguistique Genérale. Paris, Gallimard, 1966 and 
"La forme et le sens dans le langage", in La Langage H, Actes des 
xiiie Congrès des Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française, Neuchâtel, 
Baconniere, 1967, p ^ - ^ O . 
2. The discussion of the linguistic theory of E. Benveniste by 
Ricoeur differs little in the great number of articles in which he turns to 
him. Because of Ricoeur's primarily methodological concern the texts are 
brief. My presentation is derived from the following texts: "Événement et 
sens", (362), p.15-22; Cours sur l'herméneutique, (374), p.13-16; Langage 
(Philosophie), (355:772); "Discours et communication", (376:27-30); Signe et 
sens, (378), p.1013; "Creativity in Language: Word, Polysemy, Metaphor", 
(387), p.121-123; La métaphore vive, (410), p.88-100; Interpretation Theory: 
Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning, (423), p.6-22; "Philosophie et 
langage", (458), p.453-458. According to Ricoeur, the phenomenology of 
Husserl does not possess adequate tools to cope with linguistics without a 
subject (275:121). That is the reason for Ricoeur turning elsewhere. The 
linguistics of Benveniste provides the tool. But also Benveniste's theory 
needs to be complemented. Ricoeur will do so by turning to three other 
approaches to language; namely, (1) the theory of propositions of the English 
language analytic philosophy derived from the works of G. Frege, 
L. Wittgenstein, and B. Russell, (2) the theory of speech-acts of J.L. Austin 
and Л. Searle, and (3) the theory of intention of P. Grice. Wherever possible, 
Ricoeur will link these theories with the work of E. Benveniste and 
E. Husserl. 
3. The distinction between semiotics and semantics goes back to 
the earliest works of Benveniste but the terminology is of a later date. 
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What repercussion does this new unit of language have upon the 
question of meaning? It is Benveniste's theory that the communicative 
dimension of language must be given priority over the code. In other words 
the emphasis is displaced from semiotics to semantics. Hence, meaning is 
also dislodged from the sign to the sentence. Although the sentence is 
composed of signs it is not itself a sign. It is irreducible to the sign and 
constitutes the highest order of language. The question of meaning shifts, 
therefore, towards the sentence and away from the signified of the sign. 
The sign's function is to be distinctive from other signs. A sign 
is defined by its difference from and opposition to other signs within the 
lexical system. It has no intrinsic or immanent definition. It is sufficient 
for a sign to exist in opposition to other signs that delimit its position in 
language. In other words, the sign is defined by its form. For a sign to have 
meaning it must achieve distinctiveness in relationship to other signs. The 
major trait of the sign is difference (457:W6). 
The function of the sentence, on the other hand, is synthetic. It 
seeks the integration of the lower units into a composition that makes it 
irreducible to its component units. With the sentence, a boundary is crossed 
into a new domain: the domain where things are said by someone to 
another. The life of human discourse in action is portrayed by the limitless 
variety of human synthetic compositions. The sign has only a 'form'; it is 
the sentence which has meaning. 
By linking meaning with discourse, meaning also assumes a 
temporal dimension. An act of discourse is an event that takes place 
between people. Benveniste calls it an instance de discours, an occurrence 
of discourse. As an event it appears and it disappears. As an event, 
discourse has an actual existence. On the other hand, the sign and the 
system of signs is a-temporal. It has only a virtual existence (^ОЗ^Зб). 
The event of discourse is founded upon the unique operation of 
the sentence, namely, predication. By means of predication discourse has 
the unique ability to say something about something. To it alone can be 
attributed the giving of meaning to an occurrence of discourse. We must 
return below to the place that Ordinary Language Philosophy gives to 
predication. Predication has little in common with the signified of 
semiotics. Whereas the signified of the sign remains within language, it 
cannot be transferred to another language. The signified remains unique in 
its difference and opposition and, hence, is not translatable. The meaning of 
a sentence in its predication is eminently translatable into another language 
(378:1013). 
b. The dialectic of event and meaning. 
What has been described above as the occurrence of discourse 
can be formulated by what Ricoeur calls the dialectic of event and meaning 
(416:70). What he means by this is that the evanescent event of speech 
somehow does not disappear but is captured and repeatable. Discourse is 
the singular event whereby the linguistic signs of language are combined in 
26 
such a unique fashion that something occurs between two speakers. It is not 
just that the material aspect, the words, of the discourse can be repeated, 
but also the event. Its character of event does not derive however from the 
signs. Discourse actualizes language and gives it existence. 
But how can meaning capture the event? An event eis an event is 
incommunicable. It is fleeting and transitory. Ricoeur calls the event a 
monad (365:33). It is individual, unique, unrepeatable, and hence 
incommunicable. 
And yet, and this is the enigma of discourse, the event-character 
does not pass into oblivion. The event can be repeated and recognized as 
the same. The sublation of the event of speech into something enduring is 
called the meaning of discourse. The event is rescued in its meaning. 
Hence, the aphorism that discourse occurs as an event but is to be 
understood as meaning (^17:70). For Ricoeur this sublation of the event in 
meaning is the foundation of communication (374:30). 
But what is this enduring something of discourse? For 
Benveniste meaning is constituted by the sentence, more specifically, by the 
predicative power of the sentence. The meaning of the sentence, however, 
no longer is confined to opposition and difference of the signs of the 
sentence but has broken the bonds of language to penetrate something 
beyond language. Language has become mediation. 
2. Philosophical semantics. 
Philosophical semantics has gained its greatest impulse from the 
work of English philosophers. Their theory of meaning devolved from the 
attempts to reformulate ordinary language according to the maxims of 
artificial, scientific language. The originators were Whitehead and Russell 
and Wittgenstein (at the time of his Tractatus) and Carnap. The hold of 
logical and mathematical language upon ordinary language was shed in the 
second phase of Ordinary Language Philosophy, mainly through the influence 
of Ryle, Wittgenstein (at the time of his Philosophical Investigations), 
3.L. Austin and P.F. Strawson. The reflections on meaning by this School 
have been immense and impressive. Because their contribution to the 
question of meaning has also influenced Ricoeur we must examine their 
position. 
a. Potential and actual meaning. 
A debate about meaning similar to the debate in France about 
the linkage of meaning to the sign or to discourse surfaced in England. The 
debate centred on whether meaning should be attached to the word or to the 
sentence. But if the debate is similar, it is also radically dissimilar. English 
language philosophy knows no equivalent of the Structuralist signe.* It 
4. The English language Ordinary-Language Philosophy has largely 
ignored the semiotic and semantic linguistics. Its emphasis is upon the 
performance of ordinary language, to the exclusion of artificial language. 
For Ricoeur's critique of this philosophy cf. 365:775-776. 
27 
speaks of the word. And there is no direct l ink between the signe and the 
word. In discourse the signe becomes a word (mot) (417:125). The formal 
Structuralists speak of signe, lexeme, phoneme, because they abstract f rom 
any use in discourse and refer only to a code. I t is for that reason that a 
word, as a unit of discourse, that contributes to an outside of language, must 
be distinguished clearly f rom the sign (365:58-60). In discourse a word is a 
noun or a verb or an adjective and not merely a lexical difference. 
That raises the issue anew whether in this new context meaning 
attaches itself pr imari ly to the word or to the sentence? Or, to state i t in 
other words, is meaning an issue of predication (i.e., a function of the 
sentence) or an issue of denomination (i.e., a function of the word)? 
What is the thesis of denomination? I t postulates that a certain 
name is attached properly to a thing, so that a word is said to have a proper 
meaning. The proper meaning is opposed to an improper meaning or a 
f igurat ive meaning that also may be attached to the word. I t maintains, 
therefore, that essentially one name belongs to a thing. There is a 
fundamental l ink between this name and this thing. Meaning consists then in 
the proper naming of a thing. I t is the position of nominalism (417:45). 
According to Ricoeur the art of rhetoric deteriorated into a senseless word-
game precisely because of the "tyranny of the word" (417:45) in the struggle 
for meaning. From the high art of persuasion in the areas of human public 
l i fe in Greece, rhetoric declined f i rst to a theory of style and f inal ly to a 
theory of tropes, i.e., to word-focussed figures of speech. Its bond wi th 
philosophy was broken and rhetoric became the archivist of the figures of 
speech (417:7-13). Because every other meaning attached to the word 
outside of i ts so-called essential denomination was called improper, i ts 
ef fect could only be declared styl ist ic or f igurat ive. The aim of seeking 
another word can only be to please, or in the worst case, to seduce. 
English language philosophy rejects such a nominalism. Ryle 
emphasized that words have meaning only to the extent that they are used. 
A word has no proper meaning. According to a dictum of Wittgenstein, 'The 
meaning of a word is its use in the language" (417:128).5 Words have a use 
precisely in the sentence so that their meaning is derived f rom the sentence 
or from the discourse situation. If a word has a meaning, i t is because of i ts 
use in discourse. English Language Philosophy tends toward the tota l 
subordination of the meaning of words to the over-all meaning of the 
sentence (378:1014). 
But does this mean that the meaning of the sentence so 
dominates that the word in fact dissolves into the sentence? Are words 
meaningul only in and through the context of discourse, as I.A. Richards 
maintains in The Philosophy of Rhetoric?^ He argues that the meaning of a 
5. Wittgenstein's dictum is found in his Philosophical Investigations, 
New York, MacMil lan, 1953, par. 43. 
6. London, Oxford University Press, 1936 (1971). 
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sentence is due, not to the meaning of words, but to the interanimation of 
words in a sentence. It is the interanimation of words in a sentence, 
according to Richards, that allow us to stabilize or to guess the meaning of 
individual words (417:79). 
Ricoeur finds that such a contextual theory of meaning goes too 
far in denying a proper identity to words. He seeks to forge a different link 
between the semantics of the sentence and a possible semantics of the word. 
He accepts that there is an interplay of meaning between the sentence and 
the word. As such he recognizes with Richards the contextual functioning 
of the word. The word receives the 'imprint' of predication (417:125). But 
this contextual functioning of a word does not lead to the dissipation of the 
meaning of the word. A word does possess a semantic autonomy. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the operation of naming in certain areas exists 
independently of predication. The very existence of dictionaries indicates 
that the game of naming is not meaningless (417:11-112). But it is not the 
most important language game. That is played out in the realm of discourse 
at the level of predication. At the level of the word, Ricoeur holds, the 
context sits right within the perimeter of the word. The various 
acceptances of a word are so many 'contextual classes', that is, so many 
usages of words in different contexts. The use in a sentence, then, is more 
determinative of the meaning of a word than the denominative function 
(417:128). 
For that reason the isolated word has only a potential meaning. 
The word is a series of possible meanings in a variety of possible contexts 
(417:129). A word has only a semantic potential or kernel, but it is not real 
or actual. The word has ал actual meaning only in a sentence. Only a 
sentence can induce the passage from the potential to the actual meaning of 
a word. In a sentence, the meaning of the totality reverts to and inhabits 
the word, allowing it to refer to a specified object. Hence a difference 
exists between the meaning of a sentence and the meaning of a word. 
Wittgenstein called the meaning of a sentence a 'state of affairs', while the 
meaning of a word he called an 'object' (417:129).^ 
The meaning of discourse issues, therefore, from the interplay 
between the word and the sentence. The word brings to the sentence the 
variety of contexts in which it has functioned, and which Ricoeur calls its 
'semantic capital' (417:130). It is this multiplicity, this semantic capital, 
that the sentence manages and sorts out to actualize meaning in a certain 
manner. A word is, therefore, identifiable not merely in the context of a 
sentence. It possesses a proper identity, which allows us to use it again and 
again as the same word, but in a different context. But its proper 
framework is provided by the sentence. 
7. Cf. also "Discours et communication: La communication 
problématique" art, cit., p.56. 
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b. Predication and identification. 
Ordinary Language Philosophy defines the sentence logically by 
its functions.* Reducing the sentence to its bare essentials, it has two basic 
functions: identification and predication.' The dictum, 'meaning is use' 
becomes operational, according to Strawson, in the interrelationship of 
identification and predication. 
The identifying function of the sentence bears on the subject of 
a proposition. Every proposition identifies the 'bodies' or 'persons' about 
which something is said. These are the logically proper subject of the 
proposition. The subject is individual and specifies as closely as possible 
that about which something is said. Each proposition clearly identifies the 
singular existents that are the subject of a statement. 
The predicative function links the logically proper subject with 
universal qualities or classes or actions or relations. Because they are 
universal they are predicable to a series of subjects. The sentence interlinks 
this universal predicate with a logically proper subject. The function of 
predication and identification are interrelated to the point that, in 
discourse, a predicate logically presupposes the subject and the subject 
presupposes the predicate. 
Now it is to the identifying function of language that the reality 
of existence must be attached. What is identified is said to exist. In other 
words, according to Strawson, the logically proper subjects are potential 
existents. Here, language attaches itself to things. Predicates, on the other 
hand, are not potential existents. The predicate deals with universal 
qualities and actions and as such does not exist.Ю 
8. The main contributor is P.F. Strawson in his work Individuals. 
An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London, Methuen, 1959, part II. Cf. La 
métaphore vive, (416), p.92-95. 
9. The suggestion that Benveniste considered only the predicative 
function essential and not the identifying function is refuted by Ricoeur in 
La métaphore vive, (*17), p.9¡>-95. The predicate by itself can hardly be the 
sole determinant of the sentence. The sentence as a whole carries the 
particular application of a generic predicate. 
10. It is 3ohn Searle in his Speech Acts (Cambridge University Press, 
1969) who identified the ontological trait of the identifying function. If the 
subject is the bearer of existence, it must be remembered that, by itself, it 
has only a potential, virtual existence. The subject must become actualized 
in a full proposition. Ricoeur sees in this the modern solution to the 
question that plagued the Medievale, when they asked whether universels 
existed (378:1011). 
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с. The 'force' oí the sentence. 
Ordinary Language Philosophy proposes also another dimension 
of the semantics of discourse. It is what is called the 'force' of the 
sentence. Acts of discourse do things with words. They state; they order; 
they wish; they promise. The propositional content packs an additional 
punch. This theory of the acts of discourse was first proposed by J.L. Austin 
in his theory of Speech-Act.H Ricoeur adopts this theory to advance a 
deepening of the question of meaning through the power of words to do 
something in the very saying. Language according to Austin is 
performative. When someone says, "Jane, I take you as my wife", language 
is given a thrust that gives 'force' to the statement. Austin recognized 
three levels where that force is operative. 
The first performative level Austin calls the locutionary act. 
The locutionary act involves that which is said in each instance. It is 
language at its logical level. Searle in his Speech-Acts^ calls it the 
propositional act . The locutionary act is the basic act of discourse, where 
someone states what is the case. Every statement, even a mere 
observation, is a performative act. 
The second performative level Austin calls the illocutionary act. 
Certain propositions do something in the very saying (hence, illocutionary). 
Besides possessing the properties of a proposition, discourse cannot 
predicate or refer without doing so in an assertive or commanding fashion. 
In the stating, promising, or commanding, language breaks through its 
boundaries to an outside through the force that lies in the statement. What 
I say is said with the force of a promise or of an order (*17:72-73). For the 
Philosophy of Mind the illocutionary act is the act of total discourse. This 
philosophy examines and charts, therefore, the verbs for their performative 
f a c t o r . " Each class of verbs has its own type of language game with its 
own internal rules. The Philosophy of Mind seeks to uncover these rules and 
apply them to the acts of discourse. The illocutionary act of what one does 
in saying has certain other marks whereby it embeds itself in language. 
11. How to Do Things with Words? (Oxford Conferences), Oxford, 
The Clarendon Press, 1962. Ordinary Language Philosophy credits its origin 
to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, with its famous aphorism, 
"Meaning is use". Ricoeur perceives this movement as a protest against any 
Platonic idealization of meaning (378:1013-101*), as well as against the 
attempt by Russell and Whitehead (Principia mathematica) to reduce 
language to the rules of symbolic logic (373), p.29. 
12. An Essay In the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1969. 3ohn Searle, a pupil of 3.L. Austin, brought more 
system into the variety of the acts of discourse as analysed by Austin. 
13. Austin lists at least five classes of performatives: the 
verdictives, the exercitives, the promissives, the comportamentatives, and 
the expositives. 
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These marks are certain grammatical and lexical devices such as verb-
moods (subjunctive, imperative, optative...), the exclamation mark, and the 
question mark. These marks allow for the identification of the force of the 
proposition (365:40-41). Moreover, for the Philosophy of Mind predication 
and reference are meaningful only in an illocutionary act. It is the 
illocutionary act that is the speech-act proper (362:47). 
The third performative level Austin calls the perlocutionary act. 
The perlocutionary act is what the speaker achieves by saying. The speech-
act can also lead to effects, to acts, that take place because of a wish, a 
promise or a persuasion. Thus, for instance, a threat can induce fear. 
Discourse can become a stimulus effecting certain results in the hearer. 
The perlocutionary act is the act that is least embedded in linguistic traces 
(365:44; 423: lb)№ 
3. The dialectic of sense and reference. 
We have already noted a number of times that Ricoeur's theory 
of discourse is built upon the common experience of speech as a saying of 
something about something to someone. This saying of something about 
something is expressed in linguistic philosophy by sense and reference. The 
discussion of the dialectical pair of sense and reference was introduced into 
philosophy by Gottlob Frege in his famous article, "Über Sinn und 
Bedeutung".!' The distinction validates itself in the proposition where a 
differentiation can be made between what is said (sense) and that of which 
it is said (reference). 
In semiotics, the question of reference is automatically 
excluded. The sign constituted by the signifier and the signified remains 
within the confines of language. Signs refer only to other signs within the 
system in their difference or opposition.16 The contribution of Frege lies 
14. Ricoeur has no difficulty in incorporating the theory of speech 
acts into a theory of discourse. The theory of speech acts provides a more 
encompassing model of discourse than the French linguistic theory. 
Moreover, it clearly concretizes the phenomenological model. The speech 
acts are hierarchically ordered in such a fashion that the locutionary act 
founds the illocutionary act and the illocutionary act founds the 
perlocutionary act. This permits the distinctions of semiotics and semantics 
to be introduced into the analysis of speech acts. 
15. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100 (1892). 
Ricoeur accepts the translation in English of the title by Peter Geach as 
most appropriate. Geach translates "Sinn" as "sense" and "Bedeutung" as 
"reference". (423:19). 
16. The 'signified' of semiotics is not to be confused with the 
'intended1 of Benveniste or with the concept of intentionality of Husserlian 
phenomenology. The signified is the counterpart of the sign but it does not 
reach beyond language. Benveniste's intended and Husserl's fulfilment 
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precisely in his situating of sense. In singular fashion, he showed that sense 
must not be identi f ied wi th psychological meaning. He divorced sense from 
subjectivity and aff i rmed that sense does not exist in nature or in the spir i t . 
And yet sense is objective. That is, sense is ideally objective. It is not a 
representation that varies wi th each subject, but informs identically in a 
mult i tude of psychic events. 
Reference, on the other hand, adds to sense the grasp towards 
real i ty. There is in discourse a breaking through the barriers of the sign 
system in a creative process that gives form to the human mind - the 
German word Bildung expresses i t well - and to the world. What this 
reference takes into account is the vast f ie ld of real i ty outside of language 
that is brought near and overcome in language. Reference, then, relates 
language to the world.17 
Again, i t is not the word but the sentence in use that gives 
access to reference. As Strawson says, " to refer is what a sentence does in 
a certain situation and according to a certain use."18 The real i ty referred 
to by the speaker does not escape the structure of the sense. The speech-
event even in i ts reali ty-reference is structured by its intertwining of 
subject and predicate. The ideal structure of sense forms the basic 
reference (423:20). 
I t is this ontological thrust of reference that has the most far-
reaching consequences for a theory of discourse. The language of reference 
says something, not only about things, but also about the ontological 
condition of our being in the world. That world is not language i tself . But 
language brings the world of our experience into focus. I t is our experience, 
our feeling of part icipation in real i ty, that is brought to language. If the 
identifying function of the sentence presupposes existence, as we saw, this 
(remplissement) of the ideal empty aim (la visée vide) corresponds to Frege's 
Bedeutung. See also 475:119-120. 
17. In l inguistics, a clear distinction must be maintained between the 
predicate and the reference. To predicate is not to at t r ibute existence. 
This function pertains to the identifying function within a proposition. 
Things are singular identit ies while concepts are predicatives. The lat ter 
sorts objects into a class, a quality, a relation or an act ion. They are 
universals and as such they do not exist and have no need to exist in order to 
have meaning. "Beaut i ful" as a qualitative predicate 'refers' to nothing in 
real i ty. The anchoring of language in real i ty is achieved by its reference 
and not by its predication. Predication is an intra-l inguist ic device, 
operative as a semiotic sign except that the frame within which i t is 
operative is not the lexical code as code but as a word wi th in a sentence. In 
his discussion of this question, Ricoeur relies on the analysis of 3ohn Searle's 
Speech-Acts. Cf . 374:53-55. 
18. P.F. Strawson, "On Referr ing", Mind, 59 (1950), quoted by 
Ricoeur in Interpretation Theory, (423), p.20. 
33 
identification of singular things as existent has significance only if these 
singular things are rooted in an even more originary experience of being in 
the world. Ricoeur holds that it is this originary rootedness, this ontological 
condition, that moves to expression in language: "It is because there is first 
something to say, because we have an experience to bring to language, that 
conversely, language is not only directed towards ideal meanings but also 
refers to what is" №23t2l). 
For Ricoeur, the dialectic of sense and reference is such that it 
becomes the fundamental rule of the theory of language as discourse 
(423:21). It founds the dialectic of event and meaning; even semiotics must 
pay prior tribute to the capacity of language to refer. For Ricoeur, 
discourse's dialectic of sense and reference provides the foundation for 
linguistics. 
Ψ. The subject in the logic of meaning. 
Has the subject, so central to phenomenology, disappeared in the 
dialectic of sense and meaning and of sense and reference? Are subject and 
meaning still the correlatives of phenomenology? We indicated above that 
this correlation was definitively broken. But is there no place for the 
subject in a theory of discourse? Ricoeur denies that the subject is totally 
absent but admits at the same time that, "This subject might not be me or 
who I think I am; in any case, the question 'Who is speaking?' has a sense at 
this level, even if it must remain a question without an answer" 
(320(278):254). 
For the philosophy of language the subject surfaces again in the 
phenomenon of reference. Reference is dialectical in the sense that it 
refers both to a 'worlcf and to a speaker. It refers to the speaker by a 
number of grammatical procedures which linguists call shifters (423:13). 
These shifters are personal pronouns, certain verb forms, proper nouns, verb 
tenses, demonstrative pronouns, etc., that refer to the world of the speaker. 
The personal pronoun 'I', for instance, is a self-referent of the sentence. It 
is an asemic reality, having no meaning by itself. Its sole function is to 
refer the discourse to the one who is speaking. Shifters in fact indicate a 
different reality in each speech-event. Similarly the verb-tense is an 
auto-referent. Grammatically, the tenses constitute different systems, but 
they must be seen as anchored in the present tense. The present tense is 
auto-designative because it is the very moment of the utterance of the 
discourse. It is the temporal qualifier of discourse. Also the adverbs of 
space and time, 'here' and 'now', and the demonstrative, 'this' and 'that' 
function as an auto-reference. 
The significance of this auto-referential character of discourse 
may not appear at first glance. But, in a discussion of the meaning, a 
distinction must be made between the meaning of the speaker and the 
meaning of the proposition. The meaning of the proposition we have 
identified formally as the intertwining of the twofold functions of 
identification and predication. This meaning of the proposition may not be 
identified with the meaning of the speaker. What I say is not necessarily 
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identical with what I intend to say. In other words, one must not identify 
the meaning of a proposition with the psychic meaning of the speaker. As a 
matter of fact, for Ricoeur the psychic dimension is an incommunicable 
dimension of life (ЗбЗі^в). If the proposition expresses the utterer's meaning 
it is not a psychic meaning but rather a noetic or intentional meaning. The 
psychic is, by definition, the non-intentional part of life. The psychic is 
'life's solitude' because it cannot be communicated (365:48). The meaning of 
the speaker does not control the meaning of the proposition. But that 
prohibition against identifying the speaker and the meaning does not mean 
that the speaker must be excluded altogether. The speaker is part of the 
text. The speaker is part of the semantics of the text. The utterer's 
meaning has found its inscription in the text itself. One does not have to 
look beyond or behind what is said in order to uncover the meaning of the 
speaker but one must look for it within what is said (423:13, see also 417:75). 
B. WRITTEN DISCOURSE. 
Thus far no distinction has been made between oral and written 
discourse. What happens, however, to the question of meaning and the 
subject when oral discourse becomes written discourse? For Ricoeur this 
shift to writing is highly significant, since he calls writing the complete 
measure of discourse (423:25). 
It is Ricoeur's thesis that written discourse is grounded in oral 
discourse but that it obtains a new type of objectivity which oral discourse 
does not possess (370:546). In this, he differs both from the Romanticist 
hermeneutics and from Jacques Derrida. Romanticist hermeneutics does 
not distinguish sufficiently between oral discourse and written discourse. It 
takes oral discourse and the type of understanding and interpretation that 
flows from orality as its paradigm (370:546). The two are thought to be the 
same. On the other hand, Jacques Derrida's distinction of the written and 
spoken word is judged as too radical (Э62:18).19 For Derrida writing is not 
founded on the spoken language but writing is the direct source of the traits 
of language. 
Although oral discourse is not always at the origin of writing, 
e.g., in literature where human thought is immediately committed to 
inscription (423:28-29), a text is a discourse about something addressed to 
an audience. However, a written text is not merely a transcription of oral 
discourse. Rather, it is a direct inscription of discourse. Technically 
speaking, a text is a substitution of oral discourse, not an appendix. Or, as 
Ricoeur says, "One writes precisely because one does not speak" (337:136). 
With the introduction of writing, a decisive shift takes place. Speech is 
preserved and snatched from forgetfulness. The exchange of the viva vox 
for the linguistic marks has brought with it a series of political, economic 
19. Cf. his following works: La voix et le phénomène, Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1967: L'écriture et la difference, Paris, Seuil, 
1967; De la grammatologie, Paris, Ed. de minuit, 1967. 
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and juridical repercussions that have extended not only the range of 
communication but also the power of communication within the human 
linguistic community (^23:28). 
The exteriorization and objectification that the graphic 
inscription permits has been considered at several periods in history as a 
grave threat to our humanity. To understand that threat, but also the 
response that Ricoeur gives to it, allows us to understand Ricoeur's own plea 
for a culture of the written text. 
The warning against writing is found as early as in Plato's 
Phaedrus (423:38-39). The exteriority of writing, he thought, would destroy 
the immediacy that hearing and authentic meaning bring to the human 
community. Writing is not a real remedy against forgetfulness because it 
remains external. It does not possess the flexibility of discourse to respond 
to the questioner and to the circumstance. It is, therefore, a threat to 
wisdom and to education. Writing promotes forgetfulness, or, as 
Л.З. Rousseau said later, it encourages distance and division within the 
human community (423:39). 
The issue raised by Plato's Phaedrus is the issue that might be 
raised against all of modernity. It is the challenge that the massive 
objectification of reality in all its forms addresses to humanity's desire for 
immediacy. Ricoeur's response to Plato's plea against writing equally 
reveals his basic response to the current critique of objectification. 
The objectivation that writing brings about, according to Plato, 
is comparable to the objectivation of the eikon, a painting. To Plato, an 
eikon is a weakened representation, a mere shadow, of reality. As a shadow, 
it is only an impression, a vague outline. Ricoeur's theory of art rejects 
such a view. Building on a theory of François Dagognet concerning painting, 
he holds that painting - and in a similar fashion, writing - is not an attempt 
to duplicate reality but to augment the real.20 François Dagognet 
conceives the strategy of painting to be that of contracting and 
miniaturizing reality. But in the very abbreviation of the time-space 
dimension, it enlarges our vision of reality. The painter, like the writer, 
works with an 'optic' alphabet: two-dimensionality, centering, the use of 
colour pigments and contrasts. These are his materials with which he writes 
"a new text of reality" (423:41). As Ricoeur comments, "Painting for the 
Dutch masters was neither the reproduction nor the production of the 
universe, but its metamorphosis" (423:41). Instead of being only an aide-de-
mémoire of the real thing, the eikon opens up a reality that is more real 
than the ordinary real. 
This iconic property of written characters is perhaps not clearly 
evident in the Western phonetic alphabet. Western culture, more than other 
cultures, has used sound or dialogue as the basis for inscription. But the 
20. The text referred to by Ricoeur is Dagognet's Ecriture et 
Iconographie, Paris, Vrin, 1973. 
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phonetic inscription, as well as the pictogram, but even more clearly the 
ideogram, which directly inscribes thought-meanings, also reveals a novelty 
in reality. We could point to the space-structure of the linguistic marks, the 
ordering of the linguistic marks in a linear fashion, the spacing of the 
linguistic marks in a specific form, etc. These characteristics proper to 
writing - whether in a phonetic alphabet or in an ideogram - bring writing to 
a form that is analogous to painting and its more obvious capacity to refocus 
reality. 
The capacity of writing to redescribe reality is focal to Ricoeur's 
hermeneutics of the text.21 But it achieves this redescription by means of 
the transformations that oral discourse undergoes when it becomes 
inscribed. It is this transformation that needs to be specified. Ricoeur 
indicates four areas in which writing changes the relationships operative in 
speech. 
1. Fixation of discourse. 
In a first approximation of the problem of writing, one is 
tempted to view writing as a graphic inscription of oral discourse. This 
would assign to writing the same properties as to orality. This is, however, 
not the case. It is obvious that the written text even as a transcription of 
an original speech event is not the speech event itself. The speech event is 
a temporal event. It takes place in the present. It is evanescent, dying with 
the passing sound. Writing cannot save that event. The event fades, to be 
survived only by its sense. In its attempt to rescue the event, writing fixes 
the sense with the alphabetical, lexical and syntactical inscription. Hence, 
the temporality of the event is replaced by the spaciality of the inscription. 
Writing accentuates what in oral discourse itself is fixed or objectified; 
namely, the sense of discourse. In fact, writing is activated precisely by the 
type of objectivation that takes place when in discourse the event is 
suppressed in the sense. It is not the saying-event of speaking but the 'said' 
that is conserved in the sense but more decisively in writing. By applying to 
our discussion the traits of communicability, we can say that "what we write 
is the noema of the speaking" (370:532). 
The first characteristic of writing, then, is its fixation of 
discourse. For Ricoeur, the link with discourse is not obliterated in the 
written text. The condition of the possibility of writing lies in the structure 
that precedes any split between oral and written discourse. Discourse itself 
is already a form of exteriorization. Writing is the material support or 
exterior mark of that exteriorization. If discourse becomes exterior in 
propositions, writing engraves those propositions. Ricoeur's example says it 
well: "I say: it is day-break. But when the day is over that which was 
designated, opined, or meant in my saying, remains as the said. That is why 
it can be written" (^13:35). Before anything can be written, it is 
presupposed that it can be said. 
21. The redescription of reality will be taken up again in Chapter 
Three. See below p.79-83. 
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But once the substitution from oral to written discourse has 
taken place, the written text becomes a system of signs all its own. 
According to Ricoeur, what was virtually, inchoatively manifest in the living 
word becomes apparent in writing. The accentuation of the sense has in 
writing become full-fledged to the point that the written combinations of 
the sign-system are no longer reducible to the oral. Graphism gives to signs 
a substance similar to the phonic substance of signs. But in graphics the 
signs are more objectified, and hence alienated, than in phonics. This 
accentuation of the sense in the icon of writing has a number of other 
consequences that affect Ricoeur's relating of language and meaning. These 
we will now examine. 
2. The autonomy from the speaker; the author. 
The radicalization of the alienation of discourse in writing is 
most apparent in the disjunction of the written text from the immediate 
presence of the speaker of the spoken discourse. In writing, the speaker has 
become the author and assumes a different relationship to his/her discourse 
than in speech. 
In the spoken discourse, there is an overlapping of the subjective 
intention of the speaker (Paul Grice's 'utterer's meaning') and the verbal 
meaning of the proposition (Paul Grice's 'utterance meaning'). The speaker 
intends to say what s/he means. The amount of self-effacement - Ricoeur 
says that a speaker dies a little in his/her speaking for the benefit of what is 
said - remains within limits in speech. In the written text, the speaker's 
immediacy is dissolved and what remains is the text and its meaning. The 
text becomes autonomous. It becomes an object of reading and no longer of 
listening. 
Having broken away from the immediacy of the speaker, the text 
achieves a freedom to roam beyond the historical, psychological and 
sociological confines that impose themselves upon the speaker-hearer 
situation. With the speaker absent, the emphasis falls upon the text and 
what it says, rather than what the author intended to say. 
This leads to a further spiritualization of the sense. It has 
achieved a higher form of alienation of the meaning because the psycho-
physical presence of the author ceases to concretize the meaning in the 
temporal, spatial circumstances of the author. But since the author is not 
there to guide the understanding of what s/he says, the text falls under the 
protection of interpretation. For Ricoeur, the interpretation is required 
because of the weakness of discourse in the absence of the author. But here 
he insists upon two caveats (^23:30). Interpretation must be guarded against 
two excesses. 
The first excess is called the fallacy of the absolute text. It 
would maintain that the author and the author's intention are entirely 
excluded from the process of interpretation. The text is the thing. This 
'fallacy of the hypothesized text' replaced an earlier view which Ricoeur 
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(following W.K. Wimsatt)22 calls the 'intentional fallacy'. This is the thesis 
of Romanticist hermeneutics. It held that the author's intention is the 
source to be approximated in any valid interpretation. 
Ricoeur maintains an intermediate position. Because of the 
auto-designative traces in the text itself, the author is not totally absent 
from the text. The author's meaning must therefore not be sought outside 
of the text - as Romanticist hermeneutics does - but as the property of the 
text. The author's unavailability for guidance leaves the reader only with 
the verbal meaning in which the psychic intention has found its 
exteriorization. Ricoeur appears to call for a dialectical relationship 
between the author's meaning and the verbal meaning. For him these are 
dependent upon each other (Ψ23:30).23 
3. Autonomy from the listener. 
The 'interlocutor' is constitutive for oral discourse. When I 
speak, I speak with and to a 'you'. The second person is present to the 
speaker. Because of the fixation of discourse in the autonomous text with 
the author absent, the listener/reader is also released from the here and now 
situation and becomes public property. Ricoeur calls this trait "the most 
exemplary achievement of discourse in writing" (360:28). The written 
discourse as an autonomous text is addressed to an audience that the text 
itself creates. Here, discourse attains a potential universality. Its public is 
potentially all who can read.2*» That, in fact, social factors limit the 
audience and create distinctions and classes is not due to the text itself. 
However, the text and its public cannot be totally divorced. The 
significance and the importance of a text are derived from the dialectic 
between the text and its audience. If a text is written for a public, it is the 
public's response to the text that determines its acceptance and its role in 
22. See W.K. Wimsatt and M. Beardsley, The Verbal Icon, Lexington, 
University of Kentucky Press, 1954. 
23. This is further evidence of Ricoeur's anti-psychologizing 
attitude. It may be questioned, however, whether the verbal traces of the 
author's intention could not be clarified further by extra-textual research. 
Are the frequent auditory references in James Joyce's Finnegan's Wake not 
more comprehensible when the critic knows that Joyce wrote Finnegan's 
Wake when he was almost completely blind? The critic's knowledge that 
Joyce's heightened hearing because of his blindness has become accentuated 
in the text, is an extra-textual aid to the interpretation of the auditory 
traces. Furthermore, will not the resolve of the critic to continue the 
effort of interpreting the extreme complex references of Finnegan's Wake 
be strengthened if s/he knows that Joyce spent seventeen years composing 
the work and completed it only shortly before his death? 
24. In this section, and in the following, Ricoeur draws upon the 
work of H.G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1960. 
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the human community (423:31). Furthermore, it is the acclaim granted a 
text that equally determines its survival. A text, for that reason, can break 
open the dialogal situation not only in the present but also to new 
circumstances beyond its time. This semantic autonomy of the text from 
the contemporaneous readers in different cultural and historical constructs 
opens up the text to a greater variety of readings. This also suggests that 
the reader enjoys a new type of autonomy vis-à-vis the text. The text can 
be read in a variety of ways and a critical hermeneutics will be forced to 
determine how it elaborates the dialectical relationship of the right of the 
reader and the right of the text. "Where dialogue ends, hermeneutics 
begins" (423:32). 
4. Autonomy from estensive reference. 
Finally, the reference of discourse is affected by the shift from 
the dialogal situation to the written disourse. In oral discourse a common 
situation (Gadamer's Umwelt) is created by the speakers so that the 
reference locks into that situation. The speaker can point out the reference 
physically by gestures, or linguistically by such speech indicators as, for 
example, the demonstratives. 
But once again the semantic autonomy of the text breaks apart 
this immediacy of the dialogal situation. What happens to the 'this', 'here', 
and 'now' of the two speakers? The estensive reference is unmoored and set 
adrift. Ricoeur calls it "the suspension of ostensive or demonstrative 
reference" (376(377):1014). But the suspension is not an abolition of 
reference. Instead of giving entry to the Umwelt of the author, the written 
text enlarges the Umwelt into a world. This world is not the sum of the 
presences of the Umwelt, but, one might say, the horizon of presences 
(374:36). This is the world of the text. It reflects that the human being can 
be unbound from a situation and be released to inhabit a world beyond 
his/her immediate Umwelt. This world, Ricoeur contends, is "the ensemble 
of references opened up by the text" (370:535). 
The references of the text are no longer ostensive references. 
Writing has the power to open up a 'world' in which we can dwell that is not 
bound by our immediate situation. "To understand a text is at the same 
time to light up our own situation, or, if you will, to interpolate among the 
predicates of our situation all the significations which make a Welt of our 
Umwelt" (370:536). Once again, the text spiritualizes. It suspends the 
immediate materiality to open up another vision of reality, or, to use 
Heidegger's phrase, a new dimension of our being-in-the-world. In his Sein 
und Zeit, Heidegger had already indicated that what is first understood in 
discourse is not another person but a project. That project is an outline of a 
new being-in-the-world (370:536). It is the destiny of writing in its 
autonomy to project that wor ld . " 
25. For a more detailed discussion of the world of the text see below 
p.118. 
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In unmooring the discourse from an immediate situation and 
turning it towards the origin of our being-in-the-world, the written text 
gravitates towards that body of texts that opens up the world of 
possibilities, the world of our project. Together these texts form the world 
of literature, a world, in which "words become words for their own sake" 
(337:139). Because of the importance of this project for hermeneutics, I will 
return to Ricoeur's analysis of this later. 
With the conversion of oral discourse into writing, the question 
of meaning as well as the fate of the speaking subject undergoes a radical 
shift. The fixation of meaning in the fixation of discourse allows it to be 
identified again and again. The objectivation of the original event of 
discourse in the durable form of writing permits meaning to be stored in 
archives and to be transmitted in a written tradition. Meaning takes on a 
different temporal dimension because, in its fixation, it can be inserted 
somewhere in humanity's history. Moreover, the speaking subject or the 
author is available only in his or her noetic presence and not in his or her 
psychic presence. The author is absent except through the indices of the 
text itself. But it is the bonding of meaning to reference that is most 
affected by this conversion. To Ricoeur this shift from the estensive 
reference towards the 'world' of meaning is so central that we shall reserve 
its discussion until the next chapter. 
C. THE TEXT. 
Ricoeur's theory of discourse, as we have examined it in the two 
previous paragraphs, is applicable equally to individual sentences and to a 
sequence of sentences. In shifting the quest for meaning and the subject to 
the area of written discourse, he had accepted the wager that the process of 
objectification that writing had introduced was not a harmful but a 
necessary process. But the focussing of the quest is not just upon any 
writing or any random sequence of sentences. If we ask, from which 
writings do we seek to recover meaning, Ricoeur would point to the written 
discourse as text. On a formal level, for Ricoeur the mediation of meaning 
must be sought in the text.26 
1. Three categories of the text. 
At its most general level, a text is a particular sequence of 
sentences which in their configuration form a totality that is irreducible to 
the individual sentences. One can study the text like a literary critic who 
deals with completed texts and composes a taxonomy of texts. Ricoeur, 
however, is concerned less with the finished product than with the process 
through which the text comes into being. His approach focusses on the 
production of the text. For him the text is a work of discourse. The text is 
26. For the centrality of the notion of the text in Ricoeur's 
philosophy see D. Pellauer, "The Significance of the Text in Paul Ricoeur's 
Hermeneutical Theory" in Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, op. cit., 
p.98-114. 
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the production of a particular, ordered, sequence of sentences: it is an 
oeuvre, a work (370:9*). Ricoeur insists that a text is only a text when it is 
considered from the perspective of production (417:219).· Beside the trait of 
the inscription of discourse the text carries the trait of work (423:33). 
Let us look briefly at the three criteria of the text as Ricoeur 
proposes them. 
a. Composition. 
The text is, first of all, a work of composition or 'disposition'.27 
It consists of a unique arrangement or configuration of a sequence of 
sentences. Its uniqueness makes the totality of the text to be irreducible to 
the sum of the individual sentences. The text is, for that reason, usually 
longer than a sentence. The composition of the totality is subject to 
closure. Every composition is a finite, closed whole (417:219). 
b. Literary genre. 
Literary genres are the generative devices that preside over the 
production of discourse (423:33). Every text is produced as a type of 
discourse. These generative devices can be compared, as Ricoeur does, to 
the code that underlies the structure of the sentence. Literary genres, one 
might say, codify the composition of the text. The genre varies according 
to the type of composition. Whereas in literary criticism the genres are 
perceived as taxonomie devices to categorize literary works, Ricoeur 
perceives the genres as rules of craftsmanship (379:135). Genres, such as 
narratives, essays, novels, poems, are not mere classifications; they are 
generative devices, applied to language. From discourse is fashioned a 
poem, a novel, an essay, a parable. 
Accordingly, the text is a work of discourse that is recognizable 
in the forms. The recognition of the forms can proffer a decisive aid to 
interpretion of the text. This is so because the genres carry traits that have 
become traditional. The use of these traditional genres to encode a new 
message facilitates the interpretation because it unites the novel with the 
established. Because of the encodement in an established form, the message 
is not as easily distorted. Moreover, the form safeguards the message from 
dissolution after the loss of the original Sitz im Leben. In the encodement 
of the genre, it allows the message to find a new reference (411:71). 
27. Ricoeur accepts a similarity between composition and the 
ancient rhetorical term 'dispositio', or Aristotle's 'taxis'. Aristotle divided 
rhetoric into three parts: taxis, that is, the composition of the discourse of 
persuasion, heuresis, that is, the invention of arguments which precedes the 
taxis, and lexis, a word which could perhaps best be rendered by the word 
diction. Lexis follows upon taxis. Cf. "Philosophy and Religious Language", 
Journal of Religion, 54 (1974), p.74. 
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с. Style. 
The third and most important trait of the production of a text is 
style. Every work of discourse is a production that is both individual and 
unique. It is style that makes a text this poem or novel and the work of this 
poet. Ricoeur elaborates the theme of style through the work of 
Gilles-Gaston Granger.28 His philosophy of praxis develops style not as a 
fact of the text but as a process and production within a social context. 
Style is a praxis of the organization of language in a given social 
configuration. But as a praxis its primary function is the practical 
determination of the individual. What Granger means by this is that all 
work, including the aesthetic creation, is an attempt at shaping 
individuality. Work tends to recuperate, to bring into focus, the individual 
as this individual. Consequently, Granger defines a philosophy of style as a 
"modality of the integration of the individual in a concrete process which is 
work and which is present of necessity in all the forms of praxis" (374:39, 
my translation).^ 
But the structuring of style also fulfills another function. In a 
text the structuring is inserted in a singular situation, in an individual 
praxis. But by inserting this structuring into this individual, unique situation 
the author releases that situation from its singularity, in much the same way 
that a predicate in a sentence releases the individuality of the subject. The 
situation cannot be understood in its singularity. Through the insertion of 
the structure, the situation is opened for understanding. The aesthetic style 
creates the conditions of this insertion of structure in singular situations. 
This praxis of style assigns style not to the realm of facts, but to 
the realm of significations. Style produces singularities, but it does so at 
the point where structures touch the singularities of a lived situation. In 
that fashion style becomes a production of meaning despite the fact that as 
a work it creates the individual at the same time. Style continues to bear 
an individual signature. Style, as a philosophical discipline, is a meditation 
on human work (374:40). 
This philosophy of style affects the previous analysis of discourse 
at three points: (1) the relationship of event and meaning, (2) the notion of 
author, and (3) the notion of reference. 
In a philosophy of style the event of discourse has its parallel in 
the event of a production of a text. When we speak of a literary event, we 
generally refer to the publication of a literary work. The publication is in 
fact a mode of production, because in publishing a literary work one 
structures a situation by means of language. It is historical because 
28. Essai d'une philosophie de style, Paris, A. Colin, 1968. 
29. "Modalité d'intégration de l'individuel dans un processus concret 
qui est travail et qui se presente nécessairement dans toutes les formes de 
la pratique." 
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language in and through a literary work enters into the history of works or, 
more precisely, into "a history of the events of the production of works" 
(374:<H). A literary work is an event precisely in its structuring of a 
situation. It is through style that this event-making survives. The praxis of 
style inscribes this structuring of a situation into the materiality of 
language (374:42). 
Within this perspective the author becomes the actor or agent of 
style. It is the author who discovers the situation and structures it. He or 
she is the craftsman of language. Through style a new perspective is placed 
upon the relationship of author and text. The author is to be correlated with 
the process of individuality of work (374:43). The author is the artisan of a 
specific work of discourse, which, because of its style, now bears his or her 
signature. The text points back to its author. For that reason, the category 
of author is a category of interpretation of the text. Through the text as 
work the author must be correlated to the text. The author is individualized 
precisely in his or her production of a singular, individual work. But the 
presence of the author in the work is not the psychological presence but the 
stylistic presence. The name of the author is the name of the style. It is 
through the style that the author becomes a category of interpretation and 
not as a psychic presence behind the work. Plato's style, for example, is 
unique. But even though its uniqueness is not recognizable except through 
comparison with another author's style, Plato's uniqueness is part of the text 
and to be interpreted from the text (388:21). 
A third area to be affected by style is the notion of reference. 
By applying the category of work to the reference of the text one may give 
the impression that the text becomes even more closed off from reality. 
But if it closes off the text from one dimension of reality, Ricoeur suggests, 
that is only the condition of the possibility of opening up another dimension 
of reality. For Ricoeur, the reference of a text in a practical philosophy of 
style accentuates even more strongly the capacity of the text to open up the 
world of the text. In the written text, it was stated above, '" the estensive 
reference is abolished to make way for the world of the text. The work of 
reference is precisely this fashioning of the world of the text. Nowhere is 
this more apparent - as we shall see in greater detail in the next 
chapter - than in the poetic text. No literary creation appears more 
structured than poetic language. By fusing sense and sound, the poet 
fashions a particular identity. The poem is pure poiesis, a new fashioning of 
reality by interlacing sense and sound (374:50). 
2. Meaning and the structural analysis of narrative texts. 
The approach of Ricoeur to the text is rather unique. In fact he 
proposes two correlated approaches which are extensions of the dialectic of 
meaning in the theory of discourse. 3ust as in the theory of discourse he 
maintains that there is a semiotics of meaning and a semantics of meaning, 
so too in the text he distinguishes between form and content (411:30). The 
30. Cf. above p.38-39. 
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question of meaning raises its head again in a manner similar to the way 
that Structuralism and the philosophy of language raised it earlier. Can a 
closure similar to the closure of signs in semiotics be imposed upon the 
text? Can meaning remain immanent to the text so that the text is without 
an outside? 
The success of the schools of Structuralism imposes itself here. 
These schools have extrapolated the hypothesis of the theory of the sign of 
semiology to apply also to the larger units of language, postulating an 
homology of structure of the larger units to the smallest units. It has been 
most successfully and most widely applied to the narrative genre. Because 
of its effectiveness it cannot be dismissed. It must be incorporated within a 
comprehensive theory of meaning. In other words, the same works can be 
considered both as extensions of the theory of the sign and as extensions of 
the theory of discourse. The two theories of meaning that confront 
themselves here correspond to two attitudes before the text. The attitude 
of explanation covers the semiological treatment. It suggests that meaning 
is immanent to the text. The attitude of understanding covers the semantic 
treatment. For Ricoeur, as we shall see in greater detail below, these two 
attitudes have become inseparable today and are required for any 
contemporary recuperation of meaning.^l 
a. Meaning as the deep structure of the narrative. 
Ricoeur's sources for the structural analysis of narratives have 
been on the one side the Russian formalist of the folktale, V. P r o p p , ^ and 
on the other side the French-language structuralists Α-J. Greimas,33 
R. Barthes,^* Cl. Brémont ,^ and CI. Lévi-Strauss.^ Ricoeur does not 
31. Ricoeur has not worked out any text with the methods of 
structuralism. He has continuously relied on the work of others. Cf. "Sur 
l'exégèse de Genèse 1, 1-2, 4a", in Exégèse et herméneutique (Parole de 
Dieu), Paris, Seuil, 1971, p.67-Z<t, and "Biblical Hermeneutics", Semeia, 13 
ÍT975), p.29-148. 
32. Morphology of the Folktale, Austin, University of Texas Press, 
second rev. ed., 1968. 
33. Ricoeur acknowledges a degree of philosophical affinity to 
A. Greimas. Chapter Five of La métaphore vive is dedicated to Greimas. 
Greimas is best known for his work Sémantique structurale, Paris, Larousse, 
1966. 
3f. Cf. Barthes' "Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits", 
Communications, 8 (1966), p. 1-27. 
35. Cf. Cl. Brémond, "Le message narratif" in Communications * 
(196Ό, p.4-32, and "La logique des possibles narratifs" in Communications 8 
(1966), p.69-76. 
36. Structural Anthropology, New York, Doubleday. 
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provide an extensive analysis of their findings, because his interest lies more 
in the underlying thesis of Structuralism. I will present these here to the 
extent that they affect Ricoeur's theory of meaning. 
(1) Vladimir Propp. 
The Russian Formalists of the School of V. Propp set the tone 
with their study of the Russian folktale. In his analysis of Propp's work, 
Ricoeur finds three principles that have become generally acceptable to all 
Structuralists of the narrative. We present these common principles first 
and then the points of divergence. 
1. It was Propp's intention to discover a descriptive model of the 
Russian folktale to uncover the unity in the multiplicity of the variations of 
the folktale. In order to discover this unity, he postulated that units larger 
than a sentence are composed according to the same laws as units that 
compose the sentence. Hence, a structural homology is said to exist 
between a text and a sentence (332:67). 
2. The diachronic aspects of the story are subordinated to the 
synchronic, structural level of the story. Λ structural analysis searches 
primarily for the depth-structure of a story, and only secondarily for 
questions relating to the genesis or history of the story. The latter only 
enters into the analysis to the extent that they are determined by the 
formal structure (411:39). 
3. In a text one can apply a twofold law of operation, called the 
syntagmatic and the paradigmatic. The paradigmatic law governs the 
operation of the distribution and the segmentation of the units and of their 
classification. The syntagmatic law governs the operation of the integration 
of the units. In the language of Benveniste, the two operations are called 
'form' and 'sense'. The operations are completely immanent to the text. 
The sense of text is the internal integration of the units and the sub-units. 
It is the sense of the story that is the object of structural analysis (332:67). 
For that reason in structural analysis, on the one hand an attempt is made to 
provide an exhaustive description of all the constituent parts of the story. 
These are placed in a series of general classifications which offer the 
constants of the story. On the other hand, the syntagmatic task of 
integration seeks to discern the interrelation of these constants. This is the 
depth-structure of a text. It is the depth-structure that is the source of the 
meaning of a text. To understand a story is, therefore, not simply to follow 
a sequence (the 'and then...') of the story, but the structural constants and 
their interrelationship or distribution. 
Up to this point structuralists generally agree. To the three 
positions of V. Propp we must add the following points, to which less general 
agreement is given. The differences apply principally to the third thesis. 
According to Propp, the constant of a story is provided by the 
functions in the story and not by the characters of the story. The functions 
are fundamental and constitutive of the story, because by the functions are 
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meant the actions of a character that are essential for the unfolding of a 
plot (411:40^ The number of functions is limited and finite. In fact, 
according to Propp, the number of functions is limited to thirty-one. He 
arrived at this limited number by stripping the great variety of actions of a 
character of its various modalities, so that only a defined number of 
processes were left. It is this limited number of processes that function as 
the constants that support the great variety of actions. 
To this centrad position of Propp two subsidiary postulates must 
be added. 
1. According to Propp, the functions follow a specific sequence 
(411:41). In a story, there is a logic of narration in which particular 
functions will always relate to other functions in terms of a prior and a 
posterior. The succession of the functions is always identical. The story 
first proceeds from a description of an initial situation to the description of 
a lack either in the form of an internal lack (poverty) or an external lack 
(brought about through mischief, such as kidnapping, robbery, murder). 
Second in the succession of functions is the quest by a hero-seeker or hero-
victim. And the final moment of the succession is the resolution or 
reintegration. The composition of a story must follow this process. The 
only freedom in the story lies in the expansion or omission of functions at a 
particular stage of the story but not in the order. It is the type of freedom 
exhibited in the story that differentiates the folktales from one another. 
This point becomes accentuated if we remember that Propp 
postulated that, underlying the great variety of the Russian folktales, there 
is a single story: the Russian folktale.^ This means, according to 
Lévi-Strauss, that Propp must distinguish the functions from the original 
story. The original story is the deep structure or the form of the folktale, 
while the functions are the structure.38 The one story is ruled by the 
specific order of the functions. That is why all folktales are only variations 
of this one story and why it cannot deviate from the order of the original 
folktale (411:44-45). 
2. The characters of the story, which are delineated by the 
spheres of action, are the actors. Propp identified seven characters: the 
villain, the donor, the helper, the sought-for person, the dispatcher, the 
hero, and the false hero. A sphere of action may pertain to one character or 
to several, and one character can be engaged in more than one sphere of 
action. It is the relationship of the character and the function that is 
essential to the story. The attributes of the character, such as features, 
name, and locale, are considered variants and for that reason, secondary to 
the story (411:45). 
37. Propp's source of the Russian folktale, Afanas 'ev, had 
accumulated one hundred such tales. 
38. Cf. "Biblical Hermeneutics", Semeia, 13 (1975), p.45. 
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(2) The French-language Structiralists of the Narrative. 
Algirdas Julien Greimas and Roland Barthes parted ways with 
Propp on the question of the functions and the sequence of functions. They 
considered Propp's structure of functions to be too rigid. Instead, they built 
up the structure of the story upon the basis of the spheres of action. This 
meant an inversion of the order of Propp, for whom the constants were 
provided by the functions and the sequence of the functions. Greimas, in 
particular, sought the constants of the story in the interrelationship of the 
characters and the spheres of action. Using Lucien Tesnière's work, 
Greimas discovered that every sentence is a drama involving three syntactic 
components. These are the processes (that is, the classes of verbs), the 
actors (called 'actants'), and the circumstances (called 'circumstants'). 
Instead of accepting Propp's seven character-types, which Propp 
had derived from the inventory of the Russian folktales, Greimas sought to 
discover, in a more a priori fashion, the matrix of 'actants'. This he found 
by applying Jakobson's theory of binary opposites to the 'actants'. This led 
him to six roles: lord versus sought person, dispatcher versus addressee, and 
helper versus opponent. 
This position affects Propp's thesis of the sequential structure of 
the folktale. Greimas holds that what rules the story is an actantial logic. 
The quest of the story follows a schema of human action "in which (a) an 
object of desire, aimed at by a subject (b) is situated, as object of 
communication, between a 'destinateur' (dispatcher) and a 'destinatoire' (the 
one who benefits from the action of the hero), and (c) is either 'helped' or 
'harmed' by the desire of other beings" (ММ?). The sequence of the story, 
Greimas maintains, is not as rigid as Propp would have it. Instead of an 
unchangeable sequence, Greimas applies a binary principle. Units of a story 
unfold within an alternative, for example, injunction versus acceptance, or 
confrontation versus success. These pairs form a depth-structure of the 
story, or, in the words of Greimas, a 'semic basis' (411:48). At this semic 
level, the structure is achronical. The temporal order of the sequence is 
dissipated. But, for Greimas, this does not mean that the surface structure, 
the semantic level, is totally encompassed by the semic basis. Greimas 
retains a diachronicity of the story as a residue to the semic basis. The 
comparison of the achronic deep structure with the diachronic surface 
structure, that remains as a residue in any semic analysis, enlarges the 
dramatic quality of the story. 
For Ricoeur, this diachronic residue becomes central to his 
attempt to link this Structuralist approach to a more hermeneutical one. In 
fact, he suggests that it must be the goal of structural analysis to single out 
the diachronic kernel. This diachronic kernel constitutes the depth-
semantics of the story. Greimas does not take that step because his concern 
lies in uncovering the actantial model of the text, i.e., its semic basis. For 
Ricoeur, however, this opening towards the diachronicity of a narrative, 
released by the structure of the story, provides the possibility of a twofold 
analysis of the narrative: an achronical structural analysis and a diachronic 
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interpretation. As he suggests, it is the narrative itself that mediates the 
two interpretations (411:60). 
Claude Lévi-Strauss' analysis of the mythic narrative follows a 
somewhat different route from Greimas CHhSl-SO.^9 He, too, drops the 
sequential order of the functions as the constant of the narrative. But he 
takes the additional step of depriving the narrative of all chronological and, 
therefore, narrative, characteristics. The story as a narrative sequence is 
only the surface that reveals a depth-structure. Lévi-Strauss sacrifices the 
narrative completely to a code. For Lévi-Strauss as for Roland Barthes "the 
message is the mere quotation of its underlying codes".*" 
Lévi-Strauss proposes, therefore, a radical application of the 
principles of semiotics, outlined by de Saussure, not just to the linguistic 
signs but also to texts. Mythic texts, accordingly, are composed of units 
that exhibit properties similar to the phonemes and morphemes of semiotics. 
The mythic units (Lévi-Strauss characteristically calls these units 
'mythemes') can be subjected to the semiotic rules of linguistics. In the 
same way that phonemes are not concrete sounds, mythemes are not 
messages but oppositive differences or interplays of relationships. The 
meaning of the myth lies in the arrangement of the mythemes. Thus, for 
example, in his analysis of the Oedipus Rex myth, Lévi-Strauss discovered 
four packets of relationships (mythemes): the over-esteemed parental 
relation (e.g. Oedipus marries his mother), the under-esteemed parental 
relation (e.g. Oedipus kills his father), the negation of human autochthony 
(e.g. Oedipus kills the Sphinx), and the persistence of human autochthony 
(e.g. Oedipus has a swollen foot). These packets, he says, are interrelated. 
"The overrating of blood relations is to the underrating of blood relations as 
the attempt to escape autochthony is to the impossibility to succeed in 
it."*l Instead of its narrative structure, the myth displays an achronical 
logical structure that interrelates its component units in such a fashion that 
the underlying contradictions are superceded into a harmony (332:39). 
Ricoeur's evaluation of this analysis of Lévi-Strauss is quite 
harsh. When language is no longer discourse, when the referential function 
of a narrative is abolished, linguistic analysis - particularly when elevated to 
39. Cf. his Anthropologie structurale (Paris), Pion, 1958, and La 
pensée sauvage, (Paris), Pion, (1963, СІ962)). 
40. This statement is derived from Roland Barthes' "L'analyse 
structurale du récit. A propos d'Actes X-XI", Recherches de Sciences 
Religieuses, 58 (1970). Cf. "Biblical Hermeneutics", art, cit., p.51. For a 
further discussion of the structuralism of R. Barthes see "Biblical 
Hermeneutics", art, cit., p.71-72, and Les incidences théologiques de 
recherches actuelles concernant le langage, (Paris), Institut d'Etudes 
oecuméniques, (1968), (ronéotypé). 
ΦΙ. Anthropologie structurale, (Paris), Pion, 1958. Cf. "Biblical 
Hermeneutics" Semeia, 13 (1975), p.54. 
49 
a philosophy - becomes ideological (411:51). At the point where narrative 
remains only intra-textual, the meaning and the sense coincide. Ricoeur 
applies to this structuralism the same critique that he passed over de 
Saussure's linguistics.^ Without its referential function, the literary form 
of narrative becomes a 'mirror-game' (411:62), that reflects nothing but 
"language alone, the adventure of language, the advent of which keeps being 
celebrated".*3 
b. Ricoeur's evaluation of the Structuralist Method. 
Despite the validity and even the necessity of the method of 
structuralism, Ricoeur refuses to isolate method from content to such an 
extent that the structure exists for its own sake at the expense of the 
reference. For Ricoeur, every text, beside having a sense, must also possess 
a reference. Structure must move for process. The necessity to go beyond 
sense to reference lies, according to Ricoeur, within the narrative text 
itself. He accepts from Greimas that a text contains a residue, which 
demands another kind of interpretation. This interpretation would respect 
the "movement of transcendence of the text beyond itself" (411:63). 
Ricoeur insists that it must be possible to return from the deep structures to 
the surface structures, that is, to language as discourse or as communication 
(411:65).** 
This warning, however, does not remove the possibility and, at 
times, the necessity, of a structural analysis of texts. For Ricoeur, the 
possibility of such an analysis lies first of all in the gap between form and 
content. On the level of the form, the possibility of a structural analysis is 
accentuated by Ricoeur's own consideration of the form as a structuration. 
Textual discourse is structured according to certain modalities. These 
modes or genres, as the work of discourse, or as the specific fashioning of 
the text, enhance the possibility of a structural approach to the text. The 
form imposed upon the matter of language can be 'decoded' because the 
42. See p.22 of Chapter One. 
43. The quote regarding the celebration of language for its own sake 
comes from R. Barthes, "Introduction à l'analyse structurale des récits", 
Communications, 8, 1966, p.27. See "Biblical Hermeneutics", Sem eia, 13, 
1975, p.51. 
44. From his earliest writings on the merits and demerits of 
structuralism, Ricoeur has held that a structural analysis is both 
indispensible and subordinate to the process of communication. In 
"Symbolique et temporalité" he writes, "Structuralism's raison d'être would 
then be to rebuild this full understanding, but only after having first stripped 
it, objectified it , and replaced it with structural understanding. Thus 
mediated by the structural form, the semantic base would become 
accessible to an understanding which, although more indirect, would be more 
certain." See "Structure and Hermeneutics", in The Conflict of 
Interpretations. Essays in Hermeneutics, (320), p.37. 
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discourse was first of all 'encoded'. That is why Ricoeur can write, "A 
structural approach is not only possible, it is necessary, to the extent that 
the codification at work belongs to the production of discourse as a poem, or 
as a narrative, an essay, etc." (* 11:68-69). This trait of disclosure indicates 
rather precisely how far Ricoeur will go along the structuralist path. The 
codification, or the literary genre, that is at work in discourse as a text, is 
not the message itself, but "a means to produce similar messages" (411:69, 
emphasis mine). It is a generative code to produce a discourse, and the 
function of discourse is to say. 
The function of structural analysis is to aid in the decoding of 
the message. When it stops at the code itself and identifies the message 
with the code, it fails to understand that the code is only a means of the 
production of discourse. The code is not the discourse itself. 
It is the task of hermeneutics to identify the individual discourse 
(the "message") through the modes of discourse (the "codes") which 
generate it as a work of discourse. In other words, it is the task of 
hermeneutics to use the dialectics of discourse and work, or 
performance and competence, as a mediation at the service not of the 
code, but of the message (411:70). 
A structural analysis proves itself when it permits a better 
understanding of the message than a first surface reading. It becomes 
ideological when it refuses to go beyond the text and falls into the "for-the-
sake-of-the-code" fallacy (011:69).*5 
Ricoeur is careful to preserve the function of structural analysis 
in the quest for meaning. But the quest for meaning through the use of this 
analysis must remain within a dialectical relationship with the capacity of 
the text to break beyond the boundaries of the language of the text to an 
outside of the text. It is this world of the text that we must now examine 
because it introduces another dimension of meaning, of which language is 
only the mediation, namely, the ontologica! dimension of the Being-in-the-
world. 
U5. It is against the power of the structuralist ideology that Ricoeur 
addresses some of his strongest words. In "Structure, Word, Event", he rails 
against the "more or less terroristic prohibitions" that structuralists impose. 
Cf. The Conflict of Interpretations, (320), p.90. 
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We have arrived at the point where we can begin to "pour 
language back into the universe" (328:148). We have seen that, according to 
Ricoeur, there is a twofold drive to meaning in language. The first is the 
drive to ¡deal meanings that is examined by an immanent study of language. 
The second is the drive to what is, to an outside reality. With Frege, 
Ricoeur maintains that it is the mind's drive to truth that forces us to 
advance beyond the ideal meaning - beyond sense - to reference (423:21). 
The drive to go beyond sense to a reference lies not within the structure but 
in the subject's intentionality and ultimately in the very being of the 
subject. This is what Ricoeur has identified as the "ontological vehemence" 
(417:21). 
53 
The immanent structure does not manifest the bond of language 
with the outside. But language in use makes explicit the awesome capacity 
of language to reveal the ontological condition of being in the world. And 
thus, after having examined linguistic meaning at the logical and semiotic 
level in the previous chapter, we must take Ricoeur's theory of discourse 
and the text one step further and relate it to reality or to an ontology. For 
Ricoeur this relationship to reality, as we saw above, is made by way of 
Frege's notion of reference. It is this power of reference of language 
towards an ontology of language that we wish to examine in this chapter. 
A. FROM THE REFERENCE OF LANGUAGE TO AN ONTOLOGY OF 
LANGUAGE. 
What we have accomplished thus far is to establish a linkage 
between language and meaning on a twofold level. We have also considered 
the linkage between discourse and reference. All discourse, we saw, is 
saying something about something to someone. But what is the relationship 
between the reference and existence? When we say something about 
something, we presuppose after all that what we refer to exists. 
On the logical level we indicated that for Ricoeur the function 
of referring to reality lay with the asymetrical relationship between the 
identifying and predicative functions of a proposition. He placed the 
ontological commitment with the function of identification. But the 
ontological commitment of identification is insufficient to resolve the 
difficulties raised by the identifications found in fictive writings or in the 
theatre. According to Ricoeur, linguistic philosophy does not have the 
resources to adequately explain the distinction between fictive and 'true' 
identifications (373:99). 
But if the logical functions of identification and predication 
cannot explain the linkage between reference and existence, we cannot turn 
to the speaker to release us from the impasse. In the theory of speech-act 
of Austin and Searle the illocutionary force of a sentence ('I assert that...' 'I 
believe that... ' 'I state that...') affirms that for the speaker something is, but 
what is asserted or believed may not necessarily be the case. Moreover, the 
illocutionary force was said to pervade the act of discourse, and the 
speaker's presence was in the force of the proposition. In other words, the 
ontological commitment is not derived from the speaker. 
But that state of affairs brings us to a totally different 
constellation of things. If the ontological does not come from the logical 
functions nor from the speaker, it must come from the object. And that has 
a number of repercussions. It inverts the perspective. It draws the point of 
gravity away from language and the speaker of language towards something 
that lies outside of language. Not language, but reality takes over the focal 
position. A question of Ricoeur sums up this perspective quite accurately, 
"What must be the structure of reality for signs to appear which represent 
and designate it" (321:282, my translation)? Having been pushed into a 
central position, language cannot become the first and last reality (321:291). 
5* 
It is that through which we refer to reality, but it is not the sole reality. 
From the perspective of reality, language is clearly secondary. Ricoeur's 
aphorism expresses it well, "Language only captures the foam on the surface 
of life" (423:63). 
A linguistic philosophy must cede here to a phenomenology of 
language which is better endowed to provide access to ontology. For 
Ricoeur, the French phenomenological tradition which, more than any other 
tradition, tried to combine the phenomenological method with the problem 
of existence, shows a rare capacity to bring forward the ontological 
dimension of language. For Ricoeur himself, it meant, that he could assume 
once again the ontological concern of Gabriel Marcel and link it with a 
concern of Husserl (278:9). Like Marcel, Ricoeur's concern is the mystery of 
existence as it surrounds us and encompasses us. Marcel had not linked 
being and the phenomenon, or being and language as Ricoeur attempts to do, 
but rather being and existence. For him, it was existence that opened up 
the realm of mystery. And existence revealed itself in the interpersonal 
relationships of which the theatre provided the most adequate witness 
(373:101). This concern for existence serves as a backdrop to Ricoeur's own 
concern for language and phenomenology. Marcel's relationship of existence 
and being was too close for Ricoeur; Husserl's phenomenological reduction 
and the intermediation of language, for which phenomenology gives space, 
were for Ricoeur more adequate means to arrive at a contemporary 
perception of existence. 
Husserl's phenomenology was transcendental before being 
existentiell. In essence this means that phenomenology comes upon the 
scene by means of a reduction which transforms the question of being into a 
question of the meaning of being. The relationship to existence is 
intercepted by the reduction in order to permit our relationship to existence 
to appear. And by making it appear, the reduction shows humanity to be 
other than nature. The function of phenomenology becomes precisely to 
disclose our bond with reality. We relate to reality by signifying it 
(320(278):258). For phenomenology the fact that language refers to reality 
can only mean that we are already turned towards reality and linked with 
reality. For it language is a mediation and an expression of that bond with 
reality (373:100). In other words, in the movement toward existence, toward 
what lies at the origin, language is not the aim of the movement but the 
privileged medium (321:282;325:282). Language is not primary but 
secondary. Because Ricoeur searches for the meaning of something in order 
to arrive at the being of something, language returns to a central position, 
for as Ricoeur says, "With the search for the original, the question of 
meaning becomes a total one" (278:10;285:10). The question of language 
belongs to this environment of meaning as its most significant mediation. 
The position of language is paradoxical, therefore. It is by 
means of language that we apprehend what lies before language or at the 
origin of language. We attend to language but at the same time we 
acknowledge that language is not primary. It is only a secondary expression 
of our apprehension of reality. This suggests that there is meaning before 
there is language. But Ricoeur is careful not to be drawn into idealism. He 
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stipulates therefore, "Language thus appears not only as a mediator between 
man and the world, but more precisely as a shifter (échangeur) between two 
exigencies, an exigency of logicity which gives it a telos, and an exigency of 
foundation in the prepredicative which gives it an arche" (355:776). But how 
can one transfer from reference, which is a fact of language, to reality 
which is outside of language? 
In his last works Husserl provides some hints about the operation 
whereby language returns to the experience that lies prior to language. 
Husserl calls the world of experience prior to language, Lebenswelt. This 
Lebenswelt is a reality that is not immediately available. For him it comes 
into sight in the operation of language. As a matter of fact, it is as much 
something that happens in language as something that happens to language. 
For Husserl it is an operation of language in reverse. Language is sent back 
by means of what Husserl calls the Ruckfrage to its origin. The Rückfrage 
proposes that language itself designates what within it enables it to exist as 
language. The Rückfrage, however, does not operate on the level of 
semantics. Rather, it is a transcendental quest. It seeks to designate the 
conditions of the possibility of the whole symbolic function (355:776). 
But the route from reference to reality and back to language 
again is best expressed for Ricoeur in the phenomenology of perception of 
Merleau-Ponty, who succeeded in bridging several Heideggerean themes 
with Husserl's phenomenology.^ Merleau-Ponty made an express point of 
linking the Lebenswelt with language. For him language flowed out of the 
Lebenswelt. In Le visible et l'invisible he writes, "This is an act of creation 
called for and engendered by the Lebenswelt as operant, latent historicity, 
extending that Lebenswelt and bearing witness to it"2 (475:252). The 
Lebenswelt is like a power for Merleau-Ponty. It is an act cutting a swath 
before it by means of language. Language articulates and opens up the 
Lebenswelt. The link between the reference of language to the extra-
linguistic reality is therefore not direct but indirect. The Lebenswelt that 
lies before the verbal and logical world always remains anterior. The 
Rückfrage is never ending: it is never given. It is made available only in 
the operation of language that bears witness to it (321:284-286). 
For Ricoeur too, language is not the first reality. Language 
manifests what lies prior to it. In language what lies prior to it receives a 
name and achieves an identity (277:95). As Ricoeur writes in the article 
"Volonte", 
Experience is articulated in a discourse from which philosophy 
extracts its logic. It is philosophy's task then to indicate that this 
1. The works to which Ricoeur refers are Le visible et l'invisible, 
Paris, Gallimard, 1963; Signes, Paris, Gallimard, 1960; L'oeil et l'esprit, 
Paris, Gallimard, 1964. 
2. Op. cit., p.228. 
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logic is not a formal, empty structure, but the logic of being itself, in 
the final analysis, the discourse of experience (385:946, my 
translation). ' 
For Ricoeur what lies prior to language is not a mute or thingified reality, 
as Sartre perceived it (278:9). It is not merely an expérience vécu, but an 
experience that is a dynamic act, surrounded by language. It adheres to 
discourse (2*7:68). And it is ultimately brought to the surface in the 
movement of language (186:55-56).* But it will have to be a language that 
has spoken us more than we have spoken it. 
B. THE TEXT AND METAPHORICAL LANGUAGE. 
Not every language, however, is equally capable of bringing the 
Lebenswelt to the surface. Neither scientific language nor the language of 
description are devoid of ontologica! import, but they operate on a level of 
knowledge which attempts to manipulate and control language. It seems 
less capable of bringing us in touch with a language that is discontinuous 
with the human project, a language that creates us rather than a language 
that we create (320(278):258). For Ricoeur, as it is for Heidegger, that 
symbolic function of language is reserved to the poets. 
It is significant that Ricoeur undertook his earliest studies of 
semiotics and semantics to get a better grasp of language in its highest form 
and its greatest density, namely, the symbol.5 Here we return to the wager 
that he made in La symbolique du mal that "I shall have a better 
understanding of man and the bond between the being of man and the being 
of all beings if I follow the indication of symbolic thought" (153:355). In this 
chapter we shall follow that indication of symbolic thought, for there one 
may hope to manifest the real power of language (220:16). 
3. "L'expérience est articulée par un discours, dont la philosophie 
extrait la logique, pour montrer ensuite que cet te logique n'est pas une 
structure formelle et vide, mais bien la logique de l'être, c'est-à-dire 
finallement le discours de l'expérience." 
4. For Ricoeur, experience is a dialectical moment of human 
consciousness. The dialectical poles comprise the cognitive process on the 
one hand and the object of knowledge on the other. While knowledge 
reaches out to the object, consciousness turns it back to the self. 
Experience is the result of this dialectical movement (395:105-106). 
5. See, for example, "Structure et herméneutique" and "Le 
problème de double-sens, comme problème herméneutique et comme 
problème sémantique" in Le conflit des interprétations, op. cit., p.31-63, and 
p.6*-79. 
57 
1. The metaphor: the poetic text in tniniatire. 
But where do we have access to this power of language, so that 
we can perceive the operation of poetic language at the level of the text? 
Together with a number of literary critics, Ricoeur does not think it 
necessary to turn to a lengthy poem, novel or essay to exemplify the 
symbolic function of language. The properties and characteristics of the 
symbolic function of language are found in all its intensity in the jewel of 
language, called the metaphor. Monroe Beardsley has called the metaphor a 
poem in miniature (417:93-9*0.6 The metaphor possesses a structure that is 
homogeneous to the basic structure of literary works. For that reason the 
metaphor has become in Ricoeur's later works "the touchstone of the 
cognitive value of literary works" (423:45). 
It is for that reason that in the later works of Paul Ricoeur there 
is a shift away from symbols and myths which he had studied in his earlier 
works such as La symbolique du mal (153) and De l'interprétation. Essai sur 
Freud. (227) These studies, as he acknowledges in his later works, were not, 
properly speaking, linguistic studies. In the linguistic phase of his philosophy 
Ricoeur recognizes that the symbol has both a verbal and a non-verbal 
dimension. The non-verbal dimension becomes evident, however, only in the 
verbal. But of greatest significance for Ricoeur is the fact that a semantic 
analysis of the verbal dimension of the symbol reveals it to have the saine 
structure as the metaphor. A theory of the metaphor provides the linguistic 
framework for a semantic approach to the symbol (423:45-46). 
If we exhaustively trace Ricoeur's theory of metaphor in this 
Chapter, it is precisely to permit a perception of the power of the poetic 
text to say out our being. Meaning for Ricoeur has become concentrated in 
the power of the poetic text to bring the ground of our existence to us in 
language. A study of the semantics of the metaphor can bring this power to 
vision.' 
Historically, the metaphor was first wrestled with in the art of 
rhetoric. Aristotle, for instance, placed the metaphor under the heading of 
lexis.* This places the metaphor alongside the letter, the syllable, the 
conjunction, the noun and the verb, as that part of speech that classifies the 
changes in meaning in the use of words (417:14). Consequently, the 
6. Aesthetics, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958. 
7. For a review of Ricoeur's theory of metaphor see G. Vincent, 
" 'La métaphore vive' de P. Ricoeur" in Rev. Hist. Philos, relig. 56, 1976, 
p.567-582. See also M. Gerhart, "La métaphore vive" in Religious Studies 
Review 2, 1976, p.23-30. 
8. Lexis is difficult to translate. Ricoeur provides the following 
synonyms, derived from a variety of translations of Aristotle's works: 
discours, elocution, style, diction. Lexis concerns the area of the use of 
words in language expressions. Cf. La métaphore vive, (417:19, footnote 4). 
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metaphor became classified in Western tradition as a trope, concerned with 
the transfer of the meaning of nouns or names. By retaining it only on the 
level of the word and not of the sentence, Western tradition left the 
metaphor on the level of denomination. Thus, in Aristotle's Poetics (1457Ь 
6-9) the metaphor is defined as "giving the thing a name that belongs to 
something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from 
species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy" (see 
417:13). 
Ricoeur's theory of metaphor is one lengthy contestation of this 
reduction of the metaphor to denomination. Not only does he blame the 
death of rhetoric in the 19th century on this reduction of the metaphor to 
the tyranny of the word, but also our blindness to the symbolic function. 
The function of the metaphor became twofold. It received as its first task 
to express an idea or an experience which did not as yet have a name in the 
lexical code. This filling of the semantic lacuna took place by means of a 
name, derived from the current stock of words, and applying that name to 
the new object or person. This filling of the semantic lacuna is known as 
catechresis. The second task of the metaphor, when left at the level of 
denomination, is the decorative one. In these cases the object has a proper 
name but a metaphor replaces or substitutes the proper name with a 
figurative one for the sake of pleasing, or, in the case of the decrepid 
rhetoric, of seducing the audience. Ricoeur contests this theory of 
metaphor precisely because it presupposes that a name properly and 
essentially belongs to a thing and is not primarily a function of the sentence. 
In both instances the figurative word makes no cognitive contribution to the 
subject at hand (411:76;421:48). For Ricoeur, the production and the change 
of meaning is a predicative function and not a denominative function. He 
proposes, therefore, a semantic approach to the metaphor based not on the 
semantics of the word but on the semantics of the sentence. He places the 
metaphor between the sentence and the word, between predication and 
denomination (417:125). It is this new theory of metaphor that we must 
explore here. 
2. The semantic theory of the metaphor. 
The new semantics of the metaphor, based on a theory of 
discourse, is endebted to The Philosophy of Rhetoric of I.A. Richards.' He 
pioneered the renewed study of rhetoric as a study of verbal understanding 
and misunderstanding. His new rhetoric does not explicitly develop a 
semantics of the sentence, but it presupposes one. Filling out the terrain 
which Richards had cleared, are the works of other authors who are more 
explicitly semantic. Ricoeur has turned to Max Black^ (see 417:107-
9. Op. cit. 
10. "Metaphor", in Models and Metaphors, Ithica, Cornell University 
Press, 1962, Chapter Three. 
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116;302-310), Colin Turbayne*1 (see (»16:316-320), and Philip Wheelwright12 
(417:316-320) to complete the contours of a semantics of metaphor. 
According to Richards the metaphorical pervades our language. 
All language expresses the attempt to grasp the relations between things 
that hitherto had not been perceived. Metaphor is a specific manner of 
interrelating two thoughts of different things in a simple expression or word, 
e.g., "blue angelus" or "green night". The meaning of the expression or of 
the word results from the interaction of two thoughts. A metaphor holds 
these thoughts together in tension with one another without dissolving the 
one into the other. A metaphor, therefore, is not a mere transfer of words 
but an interaction between thoughts. But not every pair of thoughts which 
come together in a simple expression is a metaphor. Only those which 
express one thought by means of the features of the other is properly a 
metaphor. Richards calls the underlying idea, the 'tenor', while that idea by 
whose features the first idea is apprehended he calls the 'vehicle' (417:80). 
For Richards, a metaphor calls for the coincidence of both the tenor and the 
vehicle. It is their interaction, which makes the metaphor (417:81). Their 
interaction founds the structure of the metaphorical statement. 
Max Black's logical grammar1^ of the metaphor is able to bring 
more precision to the vehicle-tenor relationship Richards had proposed. 
Black focusses more directly than Richards did upon not just any two ideas 
but upon two features in the sentence that interact, one of which is taken 
literally while the other is taken metaphorically. Black insists, that, 
although the whole statement constitutes the metaphor, it is one word in 
that statement which makes it a metaphorical statement. In the statement, 
"The chairman plowed through the discussion", it is the word 'plowed', which 
is taken metaphorically, while the rest of the sentence is taken literally. 
Black calls the metaphorical word the 'focus', the rest of the 
sentence he calls the 'frame' (cf. see 417:85). The focus falls upon a 
particular word precisely because of its interaction with the frame, which 
consists of the rest of the sentence. A metaphor is the interaction of some 
words that are taken metaphorically with the rest of the sentence, which is 
taken non-metaphorically (417:84). 
How does this interaction function? In two ways. First of all, 
the 'frame' or context acts upon the 'focus'. Let us use, as Ricoeur does, the 
example of Black, "Man is a wolf". To call man a wolf is to evoke in the 
11. The Myth of Metaphors, Yale University Press, 1962. 
12. The Burning Fountain, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 
1968, rev.ed. 
13. Ricoeur questions whether Max Black's approach can properly be 
called a logical grammar. The possibility of translating a metaphor into 
another language sets the metaphor free from its particular grammatical 
form. Cf. La métaphore vive, (417:89). 
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focus, wolf , a series of opinions and preconceptions, which a linguistic 
community associates wi th the word 'wolf'. These opinions and 
preconceptions, which Black calls the "system of associated 
commonplaces",^* attach themselves to the l i tera l meaning of the word 
'wolf'. The 'frame' not only evokes this system of associated commonplaces, 
but screens or f i l ters out some of the details and emphasizes others. 
Secondly, the focus also acts on the frame. The metaphor 'wolf' "organizes 
our view of man" (417:87). It gives an 'insight'; i t informs by having the 
wolf-metaphor - the subsidiary subject - applied t o the principal subject. In 
its own fashion, the application of the metaphor "selects, emphasizes, 
suppresses, and organizes features of the principal subject" (Black, op. c i t . 
p.Ut-U5; see 417:89). 
Ricoeur finds a suggestion in Black, that , if better exploited, 
would have allowed Black to extend the creative act iv i ty of the metaphor. 
Black refers not only to the system of associated commonplaces, but also to 
"specially constructed systems of implications" (Black, op. c i t . рЛЗ; see 
417:88). The system of associated commonplaces, as attached t o words, 
l i m i t s , according to Ricoeur, the work of the metaphorical interaction to 
already established connotations. Consequently, i t is hardly creative of new 
meaning. In this sense, Ricoeur calls the metaphor, "Man is a wolf" merely 
t r i v i a l (417:88). But, by adding specially constructed implications, Black 
opens up possibilities of truly innovative metaphors. I t is this creative 
act iv i ty , leading to novel meaning, which Ricoeur seeks out specifically. 
Monroe Beardsley's cr i t ica l l i terary theory of metaphor brings 
Ricoeur one step closer t o an apprehension of the innovative, creative 
character of the metaphor (417:90-100). We select two points f rom 
Beardsley's analysis. First of a l l , Beardsley points out that the strategy of 
metaphorical discourse in the creation of meaning is that of logical 
absurdity. The interaction within the metaphorical discourse, he maintains, 
involves a coincidence in one statement of a primary level and a secondary 
level of meaning at the same t i m e . Their interaction produces a logical 
absurdity if accepted only on the primary level of meaning. The absurdity 
forces the l iberation of a second level of meaning without destroying the 
f i r s t . The logical absurdity indicates that in a metaphor there exists a 
fundamental incompatibi l i ty. The characteristics of the primary meaning of 
the 'modifier', which is Beardsley's equivalent to Black's 'focus' or Richards' 
'tenor', is incompatible w i t h the characteristics of the primary meaning of 
the 'subject' (Beardsley's equivalent of 'frame' and 'vehicle'). Because of the 
confl ictual tension between the primary meanings, the reader is forced to 
draw upon the secondary meanings in order to make meaningful the logical 
absurdity at the primary level. 
14. Because the associated commonplaces are non-lexical 
implications of words, Ricoeur hesitates to call Black's theory semantic. 
The associated commonplaces of words are properly speaking psychological 
connotations of words. Cf. La métaphore vive, (417:89-90) (E). Once again, 
Ricoeur attempts to tread around a psychological interpretat ion in the 
direct ion of a semantic interpretat ion. 
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A second contribution of Beardsley is built upon the first. The 
activity of resolving the logical absurdity at the primary level belongs to the 
reader. The reader has to search among the range of connotations of the 
modifier in order to make the absurd statement meaningful. The emergence 
of new meaning is the very work of the hearer or reader in the act of 
hearing and reading. What is most striking in Beardsley's theory of 
metaphor is that it is not an event which takes place between two terms but 
between two interpretations of the statement. One reading takes place at 
the primary level of meaning, which is logically absurd. This is followed by 
a second reading, which leads to a meaningful resolution of the absurdity. 
But Beardsley is not yet able to account adequately for the level 
of innovation in the metaphor. Like Black, who spoke of the associated 
commonplaces, Beardsley's connotations, which are linguistic, and not 
psychological as Black's commonplaces are, hardly go beyond the present 
storehouse of meanings. Beardsley attempts to circumvent this by speaking 
of connotations, which "wait, so to speak, lurking in the nature of things, for 
actualization - wait to be captured by the word... as part of its meaning in 
some future context"^ (cf. see <H7:97). But an already existing connotation 
is not truly novel. Like Black, who spoke of the specially constructed 
systems, Beardsley admits that the interaction transforms both the subject 
and the modifier to such an extent that, through it, a new event in language 
takes place. The first time a poet describes virginity as the 'enamel of the 
soul', a property of enamel was brought to language that had not been 
expressed before. 
The question raised here, namely, where does that previously 
unexpressed property come from, is not adequately answered by Beardsley. 
The notion of meaning, now expanded to include secondary meanings, is still 
within the range of the present perimeter of language. Only the notion of 
the properties of a thing that have not as yet found expression in language 
can help us forward. The properties are not yet linguistic. It is the 
metaphor which transforms them into a sense, i.e., brings them to language. 
If such be the case, one must speak of a true semantic innovation. The 
property, which had no previous status in language, and which was not part 
of the designation or connotation of the word, achieves a place in language 
by means of the metaphor. 
Ricoeur concludes from the work of Richards, Black, and 
Beardsley that a metaphorical attribution is the work of a network of 
interactions, which makes a certain context a unique context (^17:127). The 
interaction of these several intersecting semantic fields is a semantic event. 
The semantic event is brought about by what Ricoeur aptly calls the 
metaphorical twist (417:127). The metaphor is the embodiment of the event 
of interaction. The interaction event is given durability and repeatability in 
a specific linguistic construction. The metaphor is then both event and 
meaning. It is an event that means and a meaning created by language 
(* 17:99). The metaphor exists only in this context. 
15. Beardsley, op. cit., p.300. 
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We will hold in reserve, for the moment, the question of the 
reference of the metaphorical statement. First we must carefully examine 
how Ricoeur envisages the semantic status of the word in the metaphorical 
statement and in the process of the work of resemblance. 
3. The metaphor and the semantics of the word. 
The interaction theory of metaphor incorporates the theory of 
the reciprocal interplay between the word and the sentence discussed above. 
If the initiative of meaning lies with the sentence, meaning discovers itself 
sedimented in the word. Thus if the word is the "institutionalization of 
previous contextual values" (^17:130), our quest for the production process 
of novel meaning cannot bypass an examination of the metaphorical word. 
We saw above that Ricoeur rejected the essential linking of a 
name with a thing. He maintains that in natural languages, as opposed to 
artificial languages, it is a distinctive trait of the word that it has more 
than one meaning. In technical terms, words in common speech are 
polysemie. Polysemy is a key characteristic of the word and essential to the 
understanding of the symbolic function of language.'^ 
a. The polysemy of words. 
Stephen Ullmann^ defined polysemy as the phenomenon 
according to which a name has more than one 'sense'. Polysemy refers to 
the vagueness and lack of precise identification of most of the words of our 
language. They have no definite frontiers. Words in living language have an 
open texture. Polysemy indicates that words can have more than one 
'sense', but it also suggests that words have a cumulative power. They can 
draw new meanings within their sphere, without, at the same time, losing 
the old meanings (^17:127).** Words can invade each other's territory. 
16. The polysemy of natural languages is an indispensable feature of 
language. It is demanded by the principle of economy because otherwise the 
lexicon would be infinite. It is also demanded by the rule of communication. 
Without polysemy every experience would demand a proper designation 
which would cripple communication. See also "Puissance de la parole: 
science et poesie", (403:159-170). 
17. Stephen Ullmann's three successive versions of semantics are 
found in his The Principle of Semantics, Glasgow, Glasgow University 
Publication, 1951; Precis de sémantique française, Berne, A. Francke, 1952; 
Semantics. An Introduction to the Science of Meaning. Oxford, Blackwell, 
1962, 1967. Ricoeur uses Ullmann's analysis as an example of a Post-
Saussurean linguistics with its major emphasis upon the word. We borrow 
here Ricoeur's analysis of Ullmann's notion of polysemy. 
18. This also means that words are not to be defined solely by their 
differences and their oppositions to one another. 
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Opposed to polysemy is synonomy: the same 'sense' for several names.*' 
Because of the open texture of words and the vagueness of the 
semantic boundaries, words can acquire new meanings. It is this cumulative 
character of words that opens language to innovation. Corresponding to the 
infinite variations of the use of language in its capacity to say, there is the 
flexibility of words to respond to contexts in the gathering of new meaning. 
It is to this cumulative power of the word that we must attach the notion of 
the metaphor. 
b. The metaphorical enrichment. 
The metaphor implies all the present acceptations of a word plus 
one. This novel meaning is the one that, in the collision of interpretations, 
rescues the statement from being self-contradictory, and, therefore, 
meaningless. The metaphor has as task to establish meaning, where at the 
primary level there is only self-contradiction. With reference to this, 3ean 
Cohen maintains that statements are governed by a code of pertinence. 
Where such a code of pertinence is abused, such as in poetic messages or 
metaphors, a syntactically correct sentence may be absurd literally, that is, 
semantically impertinent, or incorrect, with respect to meaning. In these 
instances, the predicate is not pertinent in relation to the subject. It failed 
the law of semantic pertinence, which stipulates which type of combinations 
are intelligible (417:151-152). In the very establishment of this semantic 
pertinence out of the impertinence at the literal level, the metaphorical 
word plays a focal role. The metaphorical word is the reduction of the 
impertinence. The operation of meaning of the two colliding interpretations 
condenses itself, or becomes crystalized in the word. In other words, the 
metaphor occurs between the word and the sentence, between denomination 
and predication (417:130-131). However, in contradistinction to the normal 
interchange of word and sentence, the metaphorical word is not a potential 
meaning. It establishes meaning. Metaphorical meaning comes from 
nowhere. It emerges out of the interplay (see 370:104). A metaphor is a 
change of meaning, or more exactly, to use Aristotle's word, an epiphora, a 
transfer of meaning. 
Thus, corresponding to the new pertinence at the predicative 
level, there is also a transfer of meaning, a change of meaning at the lexical 
19. Artificial languages, on the other hand, require univocity: one 
name for one sense. Context matters little because a name is to retain its 
sense in whatever context it is used. Scientific language functions as a 
corrective of ordinary language. Its goal to define reality relies on a 
precision in language that excludes all ambiguity. The pressure of scientific 
language upon the other language games seeks to exclude ambiguity in 
language. This had led to the rationalization of the language-games. The 
attempt to apply this rationalization universally by Leibniz, Russell (at least 
in his Principia mathematica) and Wittgenstein (in his Tractatus logico-
philosophicus) failed because it faltered in all language games that had to 
account for its context. 
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level. Besides the semantic innovation at the level of the sentence, there is 
equally a change at the level of the word. This latter change describes the 
impact of the interaction upon the lexical code (417:157). We can say that 
the intersection of semantic fields jerks or twists the word in a certain 
direction. A new meaning is twisted out of a word - Ricoeur calls it a 
"labour of meaning" (411:78) - in order that a statement may make sense, 
whereas a literal interpretation is absurd (417:99). 
The open texture of the word is the condition for the acquisition 
of new meaning. But novel meaning is primarily a predicative creation. A 
metaphor is not derived, therefore, from the polysemie character of words. 
But it is in constant movement toward polysemy. At a certain moment the 
metaphor ceases to be the tension of two interpretations. At that moment 
the metaphorical word assumes a standard linguistic identity. As a 
metaphor, it has died. As a new lexical entity, it enters into the dictionary 
and becomes an enrichment of the polysemy of words (417:170). 
The semantic enrichment is not confined, however, only to the 
lexical level. It must be extended to include innovation and enrichment on 
the level of the sentence and beyond the sentence to the text. The 
polysemie character of words has a corresponding trait on the level of the 
sentence and the text. While normally it is the task of the sentence to 
reduce the polysemy of the word by means of the identifying and predicative 
functions of the sentence, not all textual compositions seek to reduce the 
polysemy. In certain cases instead of screening out polysemie contexts, 
discourse promotes and encourages more than one interpretation. On the 
level of the sentence and the text Ricoeur calls this coincidence of more 
than one semantic value ambiguity.20 Ambiguity at the level of discourse is 
what polysemy is at the level of the word (376:62). In scientific discourse 
ambiguous discourse is anathema and assiduously excluded. In ordinary 
language too, homology is the ideal. But there are modes of discourse where 
ambiguity is the work of discourse, the work of its style.^l The literary 
work is such a mode of discourse. Ambiguity is one of its criteria (376:63). 
20. By proposing an ambiguity that is a constructed, intended 
ambiguity, Ricoeur parts ways with Husserl. Husserl's phenomenology is not 
hermeneutical, because he excluded the intentional ambiguity in his search 
for univocal meaning. But the parting of ways is only partial. Ricoeur 
introduces ambiguity within the framework of Husserl's theory of 
signification. It is one further example of Ricoeur's non-idealistic use of 
Husserl's philosophy. See 320(228):15. 
21. This is not the first time that the notion of ambiguity arises in 
Ricoeur's hermeneutical phenomenology. In La symbolique du mal, 
ambiguity had been linked with equivocal expression. But the ambiguity of 
expression is almost immediately linked to the ambiguity of the experience 
itself. Experience is said to be available mediately rather than 
immediately. It is made available indirectly by means of language. 
Language expressions thematize these pre-linguistic experiences. Ricoeur 
postulates that this pre-linguistic experience is a "blind experience" that is 
65 
In the case of literary works Ricoeur points to two criteria in 
order that the characteristic of ambiguity may apply. The first condition is 
that the ambiguity be truly intended and hence is a constructed ambiguity. 
The second condition is that the intended ambiguity evinces as its aim to say 
a reality that could not have been said with a homological, descriptive, or 
didactic discourse (376:63). 
Let us examine these two conditions in more detail. 
(a) Ricoeur turns to Monroe Beardsley's semantic analysis of 
literary works to exemplify the first condition of intended ambiguity.22 
Although ambiguity is a criterion of the literary work as a whole, Beardsley 
examines it principally at the level of the sentence on the presupposition 
that the sentence is homogeneous in structure to the literary work as a 
whole. According to Beardsley, just as a sentence has a sense and 
reference, so does a literary work. The sense of the work is its verbal 
design. Its reference is the world of the work, i.e., the projection by means 
of the work of discourse of a possible, inhabitable world (417:91-93). 
Ricoeur makes grateful use of this thesis of homogeneity. 
Now, in a sentence there is operative a signification at two 
levels. A sentence, first of all, states something to be such and such. That 
is its primary signification. But, in that very statement, there is also a 
suggestion of something else. The sentence may imply in the very 
statement why the statement was made, or why a certain decision was 
reached, or why a certain action was undertaken. This is its secondary 
signification. To varying degrees, every sentence has both a primary, 
explicit, signification and a secondary, suggested, implicit, signification. 
The explicit signification Beardsley calls denotation, i.e., that which is 
designated. The implicit signification he calls connotation. In ordinary 
discourse, but even more stringently in scientific discourse, there is a 
control exercised over the connotations. In literature, especially in the 
poem, this control is lifted, so that both the primary and the secondary 
levels of meaning operate at the same time. The intended ambiguity, 
because it is intended, becomes in fact multiple meaning: both the primary 
and the secondary significations are intended. 
Beardsley's approach provides Ricoeur with an avenue to 
examine the multiple meanings, manifested in literary works. Being freed 
"embedded in the matrix of emotion, fear, anguish" (op. cit., p.7). Emotions 
push this experience to the surface in discourse when it reveals the 
experience to be clothed in the ambiguity and equivocity of a "multiplicity 
of meanings" (idem, p.9). The semantic approach, which Ricoeur favours in 
La métaphore vive, is more reserved in the establishment of the nexus 
between language and pre-linguistic experience. Only after the detour of 
the semantics of double-meaning language does Ricoeur return to the 
ontological question. 
22. Idem. 
66 
from directly examining the poem, the essay, or the prose fiction to detail 
the functioning of multiple meaning, Beardsley has turned to the sentence-
type, in which this intended ambiguity is operative. And this again is the 
metaphor. The metaphor -for Beardsley and for Ricoeur - becomes the test-
case of ambiguous discourse. An analysis of its sense and reference can 
serve as model for the analysis of works of discourse, such as the poem, 
where a discussion of the semantics of multiple-meaning discourse might not 
be as directly accessible. This is the avenue which Ricoeur has chosen and 
which we must pursue in the next paragraphs. 
(b) The aim of calculated ambiguity must differ from the aim of 
discourse that seeks to reduce the polysemy of words and the ambiguity of 
discourse. If sentences describe a 'state of affairs' and words designate 
'objects', intended ambiguity must suspend this description, this primary 
signification, and call for a new mode of reference. Beardsley proposes that 
this suspension of the primary signification and the novel reference takes 
place through the liberating presence of the secondary levels of 
significations (376:65; <H 7:94-95). 
4. The ground of the metaphor: resemblance. 
In the preceding sections it was argued that Ricoeur advanced a 
theory of metaphor in which, through a clash of semantic fields, a leap in 
meaning or a semantic innovation was brought about. Ricoeur grounds this 
semantic innovation upon resemblance. To do so, however, he must 
undertake to loosen the bond that existed in classical rhetoric between 
resemblance and the metaphor as a trope. In a tropologica! approach to 
metaphor, the metaphorical activity consists only of a substitution of terms. 
It precludes novelty of meaning because the figurative meaning of a word 
merely replaces the literal meaning, which could have been used in its stead. 
In classical rhetoric the basis for the substitution of the figurative for the 
literal was their underlying resemblance. Ricoeur undertakes, therefore, to 
dissolve the exdusiveness of the bond between substitution and resemblance 
and will insist on a semantic theory of metaphor, in which resemblance will 
still be the ground (417:173). 
Ricoeur, therefore, takes the question of resemblance and 
generalizes its meaning so that it applies not only to the substitution theory 
of metaphor, i.e., metaphor at the level of the sign and word^î but also to 
the interaction theory of metaphor. The semantic theory of metaphor of 
Richards, Black and Beardsley largely ignored the grounds for the shifts of 
meaning from a literal to a figurative sense (417:188-191). With Beardsley 
in particular, the issue had become logical absurdity in the clash of two 
meanings, which forced one to pass from a plane of primary meaning to a 
new meaning. But the question remains whether an aptness or suitability 
exists between the primary and the novel meaning. According to Beardsley, 
23. This is the approach of R. Jakobson in his "Two Aspects of 
Language and Two Types of Aphasie Disturbances", in Fundamentals of 
Language, The Hague, 1956. 
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there is no analogy that pre-exists the metaphor. The metaphor brings 
about the alliance between two fields. In that case, the resemblance would 
not be the cause, but the consequence, of the metaphor. But what, then, 
constitutes the metaphoricity of the metaphor? 
For Ricoeur, it is resemblance. Resemblance is central to his 
explanation of the metaphorical process. The resemblance is not only 
fashioned by the metaphorical statement but it also "guides and produces 
this statement" (416:193). How? In the attribution of a predicate, the 
metaphor, in fashioning a "meaningful self-contradictory statement from a 
self-destructive self-contradictory statement" (Beardsley, see 417:194), 
brings near what previously was distant. But what is brought near must 
have, as Aristotle remarked, the 'virtue' of being 'appropriate' (Rhetoric 
3:1404b3¡ see 417:194). The impertinent made pertinent cannot be too 'far-
fetched'. It must be derived from 'kindred' material (Aristotle see 417:194). 
But how is the distant proximated? Applying a suggestion of 
Ph. Wheelwright,^ Ricoeur proposes that two processes take place. The 
first process is what unites or assimilates the contradictory ideas. Aristotle 
described it beautifully when he stated, "To metaphorize well is to see - to 
contemplate, to have the right eye for - the similar" (see 417:195). It is an 
intuitive moment of the genius, an apperception, a seeing, of the similar in 
the dissimilar. But his intuitive moment of the genius cannot be had without 
a discursive moment. There is no seeing of the similar in the dissimilar 
without at the same time a constructing of the similar in the dissimilar. 
The kinship between things is not perceivable through ordinary vision. It 
must be made to appear. The resemblance is a constructed resemblance as 
much as it is an intuitive glance. The predicate chooses and organizes 
certain aspects of the principal subject (417:195). The metaphorical 
expression of N. Goodman captures well both the glance and the discursive 
moment. Metaphor is the "reassignment of labels", but the figure of the 
reassignment is fashioned by "an affair between a predicate with a past and 
an object that yields while protesting" (see 417:196). The glance that sees 
the similar in the protesting dissimilar, is fashioned into a yielding object in 
the discursive moment. 
The metaphor of N. Goodman equally captures the unrelenting 
tension in the living metaphor between the similar and the dissimilar. In a 
living metaphor the similar remains visible despite difference, in spite of 
the contradiction. The contradictory usage of a literal meaning remains 
intact, so that a metaphor retains the clash of the 'same' and the 'different' 
(417:196). The site of the clash of the 'same' and the 'different' in metaphor 
is resemblance. Therefore, Ricoeur applies to metaphor the concept of 
Gilbert Ryle who described metaphor as a planned 'category mistake', 
because a metaphor is an intentional speaking of one thing in the terms and 
idioms which apply to another thing that resembles it (417:197). A metaphor 
is a 'calculated error', bringing together two ideas previously thought 
incompatible (423:55). 
24. Metaphor and Reality, Indiana University Press, 1962, 1968. 
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If metaphor is not merely intuited but also constructed, might it 
not be possible then to conceive the strategy at work in the metaphor, as 
Ricoeur proposes, to be the "obliterating (of) the logical and established 
frontiers of language, in order to bring to light new resemblances the 
previous classification kept us from seeing" (417:197)? Ricoeur sees in this 
relating of previously unrelated things the eruption of new possible meanings 
which previously had been ignored or forbidden (423:51). 
At this point Ricoeur provides an enlightening hypothesis, which 
clarifies a position that appears to be an undercurrent to his whole study of 
creative language. He hypothesizes that the dynamic of thought, which 
brings resemblance to light, stands at the generative origin of all 
classifications, of all genera. This could mean that the metaphorical 
process, which, at the semantic level appears as a deviation, is homogeneous 
with the process at the root of all semantic fields including the literal 
meaning from which the figurative meaning deviates. Of this he says, 
"A family resemblance first brings individuals together before 
the rule of a logical class dominates them. Metaphor, a figure of 
speech, presents in an open fashion, by means of a conflict between 
identity and difference, the process that, in a covert manner, 
generates semantic grids by fusion of differences into identity" 
(417:198). 
Metaphor, according to this view, would pertain to the heuristics 
of new semantic fields. The metaphor, by fusing differences does not 
operate wholly within the presently constituted order of language but 
creates a new order by creating rifts in the old. Assuming Gadamer's view 
that the metaphoric is at the origin of all logical thought, Ricoeur also 
postulates that the order of language is born in the same way that it changes 
(417:22). The resolution of the conflict of similarity and difference brings 
about new semantic fields. By creating new kinships, it discovers novel 
ways of bypassing the inadequacies of the conventional categories to express 
a new experience (386:109-110). 
C. THE TEXT AND REFERENCE: THE 'WORLD' OF THE TEXT. 
1. Poetic texts and the thesis of the suspension of reference. 
Ricoeur notes a large degree of consensus regarding the non-
referential character of poetic language among literary critics. Literary 
criticism postulates that, in literature, there is a suspension of the 
relationship between sense and reference. For some, this lack of reference 
is perceived primarily in the restricted literary genre of the poem. For 
others, this non-reference is extended to the whole field of literature. 
Ricoeur holds that there is a suspension of reference, but that that 
suspension applies only to a certain type of reference and not to all 
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reference. To accentuate Ricoeur's position, I shed! first present the anti-
reference thesis of literary criticism, as Ricoeur summarizes it.25 
The dominant thesis of literary criticism is that the production 
of literary discourse suspends the relationship of sense to reference and, 
consequently, of sense to 'reality' or truth. Literature accomplishes this 
suspension, it is claimed, by a sort of reversion of meaning. The poetic text, 
for example, does not seek an eruption beyond the text, but remains 
narcissistically within the confines of the text. The literary poetic text is 
said to resemble an icon, or sculpture-like thing, that is admired for its 
unique configuration of sense and sound (Jakobson 410:83). In Ricoeur's 
words 
"Like sculpture, poetry converts language into matter, worked 
for its own sake. This solid object is not the representation of some 
thing, but an expression of itself" (417:224). 
This interplay of sense and sound exhausts the force of the poem. It plays 
itself out solely within the confines of itself. The orientation of the poetic 
discourse is, therefore, not a centrifugal, i.e., an outward, movement, but a 
centripetal movement of words into a literary configuration (Northrop 
Frye). It is a language satisfied in itself (New Rhetoric of France), not 
denotative but only connotative (Le Guern). 
The palpability of the signs, according to Jakobson, is affected 
by the recurrence of certain phonic figures in rhyme, alliteration, 
parallelism, repetition of similar or opposing sounds. The recurrence in 
poetry is a case of the principle of equivalence, which is operative in non-
poetic language as a rule of the selection of more or less similar terms. 
Together with combination, selection is the fundamental mode of arranging 
verbal behaviour. In speaking, I choose among a series of existent names, 
which are more or less similar (for example, I choose among the following: 
child, youth, youngster, infant, kid, gamin) and among a series of verbs (such 
as, sleep, slumber, doze ...), which I combine into a continuous chain of 
speech. As Jakobson says, "The selection is produced on the basis of 
equivalence, of similarity and dissimilarity, synonymity and antinomy, while 
the combination, the construction of the sequence, relies on continuity"26 
(see 408:170). It is Jakobson's thesis that in poetry a transfer takes place. 
The principle of equivalence which pertains to the axis of selection, is 
25. Ricoeur finds this position in the linguistic work of Roman 
Jakobson (La métaphore vive, 417:222-224), and in the "dominant current" of 
European and American literary criticism: Hester (417:225), Northrop Frye 
(417:225-226), Suzanne Langer (417:227), The New Rhetoric of e.g., Todorov 
(417:227), Jean Cohen (417:227-228), Le Groupe de Liège (417:228), and Le 
Guern (417 p.228). 
26. Essais de linguistique générale, Paris, Ed. de Minuit, 1963, p.220. 
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projected, according to Jakobson, upon the axis of combination. In poetry 
the equivalence, which governs the selection of words on the basis of their 
similarity for ordinary language, is promoted to govern also the combination 
of words into a sequence. Similarity in poetry then governs not only 
selection but also combination. That is how sonic recurrences such as rhyme 
affect the meaning and create novel semantic parentages - Ricoeur uses the 
apt metaphor of 'semantic contamination' (W)8:170). Through the 
combination of similars, poetic meanings are mutually contaminated. They 
are displaced or transported (to translate Aristotle's epiphora) (408:170). 
Recurrent sounds lead then not only to a semantic proximation but also to 
semantic equivalence, creating a parallel meaning. Sound becomes an 
instigator of meaning (376:185). 
Without rejecting this thesis of literary criticism, Ricoeur 
nevertheless wishes to strip it of the positivistic bias that underlies it. The 
function of the fusion of sense and sound in poetic discourse, if no longer 
referential, that is, object oriented, must be typified as emotional, that is, 
as only subjective. Ricoeur argues that by falling prey to this spirit of 
subject and object, the literary critics have fallen into the trap of 
positivism. Reference, then, appears only in scientific, descriptive 
language, while poetic language as 'feeling'-language (Cohen) or 'mood'-
language (N. Frye), remains capsulated by its sense. Emotion, feeling, mood 
are purely subjective according to this view, i.e., they do not adhere to an 
object or to an outside. Feelings describe only the state of the subject 
0U7:lf7-lit8). 
2. Inverted reference. 
To counter the positivistic threat of literary criticism, Ricoeur 
turns to some powerful suggestions of Nelson Goodman's theory of 
metaphor. Goodman makes a good case for a mode of referring that is more 
fundamental than the descriptive, didactic reference of scientific language 
(417:231-239). 
Ricoeur insists that the reference of poetic language, if such 
there be, must be established within the very analysis of that poetic 
language. We have already established that, for Ricoeur, the meaning of a 
metaphorical statement emerges out of the impasse of a literal 
interpretation of the statement. The literal meaning breaks apart under the 
force of the clash of the tenor with the vehicle. The literal meaning's 
destruction is equally the loss of the reference of the literal meaning. As a 
matter of fact, the whole strategy of the metaphorical statement is 
directed to the abolition of this reference. But the abolition of the primary 
reference is only the negative side of the coin. We noted that the 
destruction of the literal meaning was the condition for the emergence of 
the metaphorical meaning. Does this emergence of the metaphorical 
meaning indicate in parallel fashion the emergence of a reference, which 
can be called analogously a metaphorical reference? Does the failed 
reference become the condition for a successful metaphorical reference? 
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This is Ricoeur's thesis (i»I7:230;407:87). However, he wants to 
show how such a metaphorical reference works. He discovers a basis in the 
fact that the foundation of the metaphorical or of semantic innovation lies 
in resemblance, in the seeing of similars in dissimilars. Is this new seeing, 
by making proximate two previously remote meanings through a category 
mistake, a real seeing? The function of resemblance would indicate that the 
seeing is a case of 'seeing-as'. It is not a direct seeing but a sort of 
stereoscopic vision (417:231). Something new is perceived in the very 
blending of two dissimilars through a category mistake. This novel 
perception indicates in fact a new reference. But it is a reference that is 
different from a descriptive, didactic reference. This emergence of a new 
reference takes place in a manner parallel to the emergence of new 
meaning, of metaphorical meaning. 
The contribution of Nelson Goodman lies precisely in his 
expansion of the theory of metaphor to the point where it clearly includes 
the metaphorical reference. N. Goodman's LanguaRes of Art^^ approaches 
all symbolic operations such as music, painting, literature, dance and 
architecture from the perspective of their referential function. All these 
activities 'stand for' or 'refer to' the organization of the world. The 
symbolic systems of music and painting, etc. 'make' and 'remake' the world 
according to Goodman. They are part of the great work of creating and 
recreating the world. 
Nelson distinguishes the function of linguistic symbols from 
artistic symbols by assigning to the former the function of description and 
to the latter the function of representation. The purpose of both symbolic 
operations must not be sought, however, at the emotive or affective level, 
but at the cognitive level. As he remarks, "Aesthetic excellence is a 
cognitive excellence" (see 417:232). 
The metaphor stands as paradigm of this cognitive reference. 
What then is the truth of the metaphor? And, how does this metaphorical 
truth relate to literal truth? Goodman proposes to link the organizing and 
re-organizing talents of the symbolic operation of metaphor with the 
operation of denotation, which, at a primary level, is synonymous with 
reference. The denotation in metaphorical truth takes place through the 
transference of predicates or properties from one realm to another, e.g., the 
application of sound to colour.^ Such a transference is a type of remaking, 
refashioning, organizing and re-organizing. 
The application of a predicate, according to Goodman, can 
assume two orientations. It can first of all take the direction from the 
symbol to the thing. In this direction, one applies a predicate - Goodman's 
27. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis, The Bobbs-
Merrill Co., 1968. 
28. Goodman gave the chapter dealing with transference the apt 
title, "The Sounds of Pictures". 
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word is 'label' - to denote a thing. On the verbal level, to 'label' something 
is to describe something. On the non-verbal level, such as in painting, the 
'label' represents something. The denotation, at this level, can be multiple, 
singular, or zero. That is, a 'label' can denote many things, one thing, or no 
thing (for example, a painting of a unicorn). What is denoted in this 
application of a symbol to a thing are objects and events. Goodman is 
careful to note that this representation is not an imitation or a copy of 
nature. For him, it is a denoting of nature in the sense that it remakes 
reality. Nature here becomes a product of art and discourse. In the 
direction of the application of a predicate to a thing, we are, however, still 
in the realm of the literal reference of a symbol without implying a 
metaphorical reference. 
But a predicate can also go from the thing to the symbol. Here, 
a thing is presented as an example of a meaning or of a property that 
something or someone 'possess'. Goodman's word for this is 'sample', that is, 
the tailor's booklet of swatches of cloth. Since this type of use of a 
predicate takes place in a metaphor, this orientation from the thing to the 
symbol must be examined more carefully. Goodman demonstrates this use 
of the predicate with the example of a picture painted in dull grays and 
expressing great sadness. The painting of trees and cliffs does not, however, 
denote trees or cliffs by representing them. In fact, according to Goodman, 
the process reverses itself. The reference is not a denoting but a being-
denoted. To say it another way: the predicate here does not denote but 
exemplifies. The picture possesses a certain property or quality: it is a dull 
gray picture. This does not mean, however, that the picture denotes that 
property of grayness. It is more accurate to say that the picture is denoted 
by the predicate 'gray'. In the gray picture, the label gray is like a sample. 
The picture, like the tailor's sample, possesses not only the quality gray, but 
it also 'stands for' something by means of the quality of gray. 
This coincidence of a possession of a property and of a reference 
Goodman calls exemplification. When one exemplifies, one points to a 
property, which something possesses. But at the same time, one refers like 
the tailor's swatch to the properties of colour, weave, texture, and pattern 
and ultimately to the bolt of cloth. So the dull gray picture exemplifies. It 
possesses grayness, but it is denoted by the property gray to express sadness. 
Goodman calls the exemplification type of reference a reverse reference. 
Through Goodman's analysis, Ricoeur finds the metaphor firmly 
implanted in the domain of reference. A metaphor for Goodman is a case of 
a 'possession', which is transferred from one realm to another. In other 
words, a metaphor is a type of exemplification. Itç reference would be then 
an inverted reference. To return to the dull gray picture, we might say that 
the sadness that the picture expresses is a metaphor. The label sadness, 
drawn from familiar usage, is applied to a new object "that resists at first 
and then gives in" (Ψ17:235).2' The property of sadness, by its being 
29. Goodman's own turn of phrase is more colourful: "(it) is a matter 
of teaching an old word new tricks... Metaphor is an affair between a 
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assigned to the picture, becomes a possession of the picture not literally, 
but metaphorically or figuratively. The re-assignment of the label has a 
ring of truth to it. In the case of the picture, the metaphor 'sad' is more 
appropriate than the metaphor 'gay'. Literally false, metaphorically it is 
true because of the re-assignment of labels CU 7:235). 
With reference implanted in the metaphor, we can return to the 
question of the truth of metaphor. Here again, Goodman provides some 
helpful hints. He suggests that the label 'sad' is not an isolated predicate 
but is derived from a schema, that is, from a group of labels, which operates 
in a particular realm. In the case of the 'sad' picture, that realm is the 
realm of feeling. It was said above that the transfer of predicates from one 
realm to another is a type of organizing and re-organizing reality. The 
transference of the predicate 'sad' from the realm of feeling to the visual 
realm of painting means at the same time the transporting of the whole 
schema of feeling into the visual realm. That emigration brings about a re­
organizing of the adopted realm by means of the entire network of feeling. 
It is, therefore, not the label which forces the re-organization, but the 
schema, a whole group of labels (Ы7і237).Ю 
Let us summarize briefly what Riceour has gained from the 
analysis of N. Goodman. 
(1) The metaphor has a referential function, albeit a reversed 
reference. Poetic discourse is no less deprived of reference than descriptive 
discourse. 
(2) The sensa (the images, sounds, and feelings) which, we said 
above, adhered to the verbal meaning in metaphorical statements are, to 
interject Goodman's analysis, representations (not descriptions), which 
exemplify (possession and reference), and transfer possession. The 
transferred qualities are real. They belong to things, even if simultaneously 
they are feelings experienced by the reader or viewer. 
(3) Metaphorical qualities or poetic qualities contribute in the 
shaping of the world. Their truth lies in their appropriateness (^17:238). 
predicate with a past and an object that yields while protesting". Op. cit., 
p.69. 
30. But, according to Goodman, the truth of the metaphor cannot be 
justified. Ricoeur says that this is due to Goodman's nominalism (if 17:236). 
The literal usage of a label is only justified by its usage, he maintains. He 
considers the same to be true of the metaphorical label. The only 
difference is that the metaphor is a label that has not yet been endorsed by 
usage. Metaphorical usage merely underlines or accentuates what already 
takes place in literal usage. The truth quality of the metaphor is described 
by Goodman in terms such as 'appropriate', 'fitting', 'evident', and 
'satisfying'. This nominalism is not satisfactory to Ricoeur. 
7* 
On two points Ricoeur will go beyond the notion of truth and 
reality, which Goodman opened up but could not complete. The first area of 
expansion is the examination of the activity of poetic discourse in the 
fashioning of the world. How does poetic discourse 're-describe' or 're-
organize' the world? Nelson Goodman pointed out one way through his 
theory of transference. To Ricoeur, a theory of models appears a more 
appropriate avenue. The second area of expansion will be the area of 
metaphorical truth. Nelson Goodman's notion of appropriateness can be 
taken as a lead. Ricoeur maintains that one predicate is more appropriate 
than another because it is a truer manifestation of the 'way of being of 
things' (417:239). But how does semantic innovation "discover what it 
creates, and invent what it finds" (417:239, emphasis mine)? 
3. The role of the imagination. 
To perceive an identity between dissimilars is a type of 'seeing 
as'. This apperception is unlike a concept, because the dissimilars are not 
united into a genus, but they are resolved into an identity within the very 
differences (417:198). The metaphor, according to Ricoeur, intercepts such 
a movement towards a similar, which would unite the dissimilars under a 
common genus. Of this he says, "To contemplate the similar or the same... 
is to grasp the genus, but not yet as genus, to grasp the same in the 
difference, and not yet as above or beside the difference" (373:109). The 
difference only yields under protest. In other words, the work of 
resemblance operates within the differences without going as far as the 
unitive concept. 
If the playing space of the concept is speculative thought, 
Ricoeur postulates that the work towards figurative meaning in the 
metaphor pertains to the imagination (417:199). The 'seeing as', thematized 
in the metaphor in a "figurative presentation" or "as an image depicting 
abstract relationships" (417:198), is the work of imagination. The figurative, 
or, to use an image of Paul Henle,31 the icon, has its own level and its own 
order of discourse. It is the discourse of the imagination (417:302). 
The theory of the imagination, according to Ricoeur, admits of 
two traits, both of which require clarification. Ricoeur maintains that the 
imagination has both a linguistic, semantic dimension and a pre-Iinguistic, 
sensible dimension. 
a. The semantics of the imagination. 
Ricoeur's philosophy of the imagination attempts to avoid the 
present impasse of this philosophy by inserting it in a semantic theory of the 
metaphor.32 The stumbling block of the classical theory of imagination has 
31. "Metaphor, in Language, Thought and Culture, Ann Arbor, 
University of Michigan Press, 1958, p. 
32. With Mary Schaldenbrand I would assign a pivotal role to the 
imagination in the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. As we shall see, the 
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been the abusive use of the term 'image'. Image was perceived either as a 
mental impression, or mental copy, of the real thing, or as the stuff which 
tailors our abstract ideas (424:211). It is perceived as a weakened, mental 
copy of reality. To avoid the impasse of the watered-down reality of the 
image, Ricoeur insists first of all that the imagination is a certain way of 
using language. It is only secondarily that he will turn to its non-linguistic 
dimension. For him, our images are spoken before they are seen, i.e., our 
images are not derived from perception but from language. 
The prime source for such a theory of productive imagination is 
Kant's theory of the schema (see 424:214f;157:393-396;152:63f). The theory 
of the schema attempts to discover a mediation or synthesis in a philosophy 
of pure reason between understanding and sensibility. Or, to say it in other 
words, the theory of the schema seeks to mediate between the rules of 
expressibility and the conditions of appearance, between intellection and 
reception. It is suggested by Kant that the duality of mediation is overcome 
in the object itself, but that the unity is available to us only in an enigmatic 
transcendental imagination. Transcendental imagination bonds the two 
powers of understanding and sensibility, without ever being able to reflect 
that unity (152:64). 
For Kant, the transcendental schematism is first of all a method 
or an act. With Kant, one could call it an art - a hidden art which mediates 
in us the intellectual and the sensible (160:395). It is not a content. But it 
is a method for giving an image to a concept, or a method for opening up 
meaning.33 This productive imagination in Kant, Ricoeur says, is operative 
in language, specifically in metaphorical language. In metaphorical 
language, through the interplay of identity and difference, the imagination 
produces a semantic innovation by producing the figurative meaning 
(417:199). The figurative meaning, the image, is therefore first of all a 
work of discourse. The discourse is made to resonate, to vibrate, with the 
image according to the strategy of discourse, which is operative in 
metaphorical statements. Precisely in the clash of two interpretations the 
imagination mediates. Upon the ruins of a literal interpretation, the 
imagination mediates the emergence of a new meaning. As Ricoeur says, 
"The imagination is the apperception, the sudden glimpse, of a new 
predicative pertinence, that is, a way of constructing pertinence in the 
impertinence... To imagine is first of all to restructure the semantic fields" 
imagination is the mediating function inthe probing of the possible and, in 
the final analysis, in the appropriation of an existence that is truly human. 
See her "Metaphoric Imagination: Kinship Through Conflict" in Studies in the 
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, op. cit., p.57-81. See also M. Gerhart, 
"Imagination and History in Ricoeur's Interpretation Theory" in Phil. Today 
23, 1979, p.51-68. 
33. In a suggestive turn of phrase, Ricoeur defines the human subject 
as a "power of anticipation of the realm of the object." "Philosophie, 
sentiment et poésie. La notion d'à priori selon Mikel Dufrenne", Esprit, 
29(1961), p.512. 
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(424:212). The images are, for that reason, products of language. They are 
emergent meanings (417:199). 
b. The non-linRuistic dimension of the imagination. 
But Ricoeur also points to another dimension of the imagination, 
which is non-verbal and sensible. The image is also quasi-visual, quasi-
auditory, quasi-olfactory (416:199). This aspect of the image, which the 
semantic theory of the metaphor seems to have excluded, brings into play 
the non-verbal ability of the image to make-see, or to use Aristotle's 
expression, 'to set before the eyes'. An image is also figurative. Paul Henle 
calls the image 'ісопісаГ.З* This iconical character is a consequence of 
seeing one thing through the medium of another term. He calls it ¡con, 
following Charles Sanders Peirce, because the icon has the distinct ability to 
contain within it an internal duality that it overcomes at the same time 
(417:189). 
It is ironic that, in his diligent effort to tame the metaphor 
within a semantic theory, Ricoeur arrives finally at a non-verbal image. 
However, he will not let the image escape language too easily. 
His guide in this area is Marcus Hester's The Meaning of Poetic 
Metaphor .35 Hester proposes that the imaginary is rooted in a semantic 
theory of metaphor (417:208). He exemplifies it in the usage of poetic 
metaphors. He subscribes to the theory of literary criticism which states 
that in poetic language there is a fusion of meaning and the senses. Poetic 
language, according to this theory, appears to seek out the sensible rather 
than exclude it, as conventional signs do. This fusion of meaning and the 
sensible condenses this poetic language into a sculpture-like object, which 
focusses full attention upon itself. Poetic language takes on the form of an 
icon, that forces one to look at it and not beyond it to an outside. Like a 
sculpture or an icon, poetic language becomes a contoured object. 
Hester clarifies this fusion of language and the sensible in a 
theory of reading. In the reading of this sculpture-like language, as in every 
reading, something like a Husserlian epoche takes place. There is a 
suspension of our ordinary stance in reality. But the suspension sets free at 
the same time all the resonances, reverberations and echoes, which the 
liberated data can evoke. To read is to suspend reality and to open oneself 
to the text (417:266). In the suspension of reality in the act of reading, the 
imagination breaks free in every direction, awakening previous experiences 
and dormant memories. In this manner, the imagination is directed to the 
adjacent sensorial fields. Imagination is a free plav with possibilities, 
opening up the no-where of everyday reality.^*» It is free in 
34. Op. cit., p. 177. 
35. The Hague, Mouton, 1967. 
36. The 'no-where' of the imagination - Utopia - will be examined in 
Chapter Six. See below p. 176-181. 
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that in it there is no commitment to the world of perception. It is the free 
space for new ideas, new values, new ways of being in the world (42^:213-
214). The diffusion of the "wave of evoked or aroused images" (417:210) is 
bound only by the fact that it takes place within 'poetic diction': "The poet 
is the artisan in language, generating and shaping images by the sole medium 
of language" (424:213). The free space within which the imagination can 
play has as its sole barrier the limits, which the utmost possibilities of 
language impose. If it is true that in reading, reality exterior to the verbal 
icon is suspended, it does not mean that this petrifaction freezes reality. 
The text 'lets see' despite the suspension of the estensive reference. This is 
basically the openness of the text (417:210). 
Because of the close interrelationship between meaning and 
image, Hester maintains that the images are not totally 'free' images. The 
images are controlled by meaning, i.e., language places limits or closure 
upon the images. Hence, the non-verbal dimension of imagination does not 
lead to unlimited associations of images. The image remains tied to 
meaning. This creates the dialectic between the verbal and the non-verbal. 
The verbal icon is perceived as a method of constructing images (417:211). 
This relationship of the verbal and the non-verbal in poetic 
language is best explained by the notion of 'seeing as'. This 'seeing as' is 
exposed in the act of reading. In the act of reading, the 'vehicle' discloses 
itself to be like the 'tenor' but only from a certain perspective. The vehicle 
is 'seen as' the tenor. The sense and the image are held together by seeing 
the one as the other from one point of view. This point of view is the proper 
and appropriate sense of the metaphor. To 'see as' is to have this image. It 
is half-thought and half-experience. In the example, "time is a beggar", 
time is seen imagistically, or pictorially, or sensibly. Two things happen. 
One constructs, first of all, in a living metaphor what one 'sees as'. It is the 
mixture of thought and experience, which 'seeing as' holds together. But an 
amount of closure is imposed upon the act. Time is not beggar-like under all 
the aspects which a beggar denotes in a literal sense. As Ricoeur says, 
" 'Seeing as' orders the flux and governs iconic deployment" (459:213). But, 
secondly, this act, this construction, is also intuitive. Ricoeur says, "The 
image arises, occurs, and there is no rule to be learned for 'having images'. 
One sees, or one does not see" (417:213). 'Seeing as' is, therefore, both an 
experience and an act of understanding. 
By way of Hester's analysis, Ricoeur comes to express 'seeing as' 
in reading as a joining of verbal meaning with the fullness of imagery. 
Seeing-as takes place in language. Its ground lies in resemblance - not a 
resemblance between two ideas - but the resemblance between a verbal 
meaning and the image. The resemblance is the result of the experience. It 
did not exist before. 'Seeing as' instituted the resemblance aiid not vice 
versa. At times, the resemblance fails, such as in forced or inconsistent 
metaphors. It succeeds in living metaphors (417:213). Bringing the Kantian 
schematism into play Ricoeur resumes: 
78 
Thus 'seeing as' quite precisely plays the role of the schema that 
unites the empty concept and the blind impression; thanks to its 
character as half thought and half experience, it joins the light of 
sense with the fullness of the image. In this way, the non-verbal and 
the verbal are firmly united at the core of the image-ing function of 
language (417:213). 
For Ricoeur, this iconical interpretation of imagination, in which 
there is a fusion of sense and the imagination, is essential to the interaction 
theory of metaphor. The release of a new semantic pertinence takes place 
at the scene of the interaction of the vehicle and tenor, at the intuitive 
fusion of sense and the imaginary: "Metaphorical meeting as such feeds on 
the density of imagery released by the poem" (417:214). 
It is obvious that at this point the relationship of the verbal to 
the non-verbal is such that the non-verbal must be given priority. The 
imagery may be set free by the verbal, but its very activity discloses the 
limits of language. We reach here what Ricoeur calls the 'frontier' of 
semantics (417:214). The region beyond is best secured by a phenomenology 
of imagination, "where the verbal is vassal to the non-verbal" (417:214). 
However, the region beyond the verbal is still serviced by the verbal. The 
image remains word-bound. In the words of Bachelard, whose 
phenomenology of imagination inspires Ricoeur here,37 the image remains 
an 'aura surrounding speech' (417:214). Ricoeur sums up his thought by 
saying, 'The poem gives birth to the image: the poetic image 'becomes a 
new being in our language, expressing us by making us what it expresses; in 
other words, it is at once a becoming of expression, and a becoming of our 
being'" (417:214-215). But this region of being needs to be explored at 
greater length in its proper place. 
с Reference as redescription of reality. 
Taking his cue once again from Nelson Goodman, Ricoeur gives 
the following elaboration of the referential quality of the poetic and 
metaphorical expression as a power to give shape to reality. Once the 
conditioned perception of the world, the world of our manipulation, the 
world of our control, is jolted, our vision of things, Ricoeur suggests, is 
actually increased (424:215). Its language, although centripetal, breaks 
through to reality, even to the very origin of reality. The concerns of this 
language are not to describe reality, but to organize and even to re-organize 
reality. 
In this paragraph, we will examine how Ricoeur presents this 
power of the metaphor to redescribe reality. In a following paragraph, the 
truth of that redescribed reality will be tested. We must bracket 
provisionally the discussion of the referent of poetic texts. Ricoeur, 
37. La Poétique de l'espace, P.U.F., 1957; La Poétique de la rêverie, 
P.U.F., 1960. 
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following Heidegger, calls the referent the 'world' of the text, as we saw 
аЬо е.Э* The present paragraph deploys the strategy and the process of 
that language alone. The world of the text is displayed only in the strategy 
of the language of the text. The task of opening up that world, as the world 
of my possibilities, belongs to hermeneutics, which we will examine in the 
next chapter. 
The relationship of metaphor to reality is described in terms of 
Max Black's theory of models^ and of Mary Hesse's theory of metaphor as 
redescription.*0 A metaphor is said to have the same function in poetic 
language as a model has in scientific language. Now, in the sciences, a 
model has a heuristic function. It is a cognitive fictional device in the 
discovery of a scientific theory. 
The scientific model referred to is not the scale model, used, for 
example, in an architectural presentation or in mapping. Nor is it the 
analogue model used to indicate structural rather than visual or sensible 
relationships. Rather, the model is known as a theoretical model operative 
in the logic of scientific discovery (417:2^1). The model attempts to 
represent one field of scientific endeavour in the terms and language of 
another, which is better known or organized. Clark Maxwell's 
representation of an electrical field in terms of an imaginary incompressible 
fluid is such a theoretical model. In other words, the model is not visual or 
sensible. The model cannot even be constructed. It is a heuristic device, an 
imaginary medium. Its properties are derived from language and the 
conventions of language. The model is fruitful, if one knows how to make 
use of the correlations, which apply between the domain that one seeks to 
understand and the domain 'described' in the model. Via the detour of the 
described model, the imagination perceives new relationships. 
The achievement of the model is that it opens up a new domain 
through a familiar theory. Mary Hesse calls this theoretical opening up of 
the new domain both an explanation and a metaphorical redescription. It is 
an explanation because, by introducing new language, it describes the less 
accessible domain through a more accessible domain. In other words, the 
theoretical model of Maxwell does not function as if the electrical field has 
properties similar to the incompressible fluid, but as though it possesses 
these properties. 
This does not mean that one may conclude to a theory of 
deduction between the two domains. The less accessible is not deduced 
38. See above p.<t(Ml of Chapter Two. 
39. "Models and Archetypes", in Models and Metaphors, op. cit., 
p.219-243. See La métaphore vive, (417;239-2»2). 
40. "The Explanatory Function of Metaphor", in Logic, Methodology 
and Philosophy of Science, ed. by Bar-Hillel, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 
1965. 
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from the more accessible domain. The rules of correspondence between the 
domains cannot rationally be set to function in a deductive manner. The 
description of the new domain through another is best called, according to 
Mary Hesse, a metaphorical re-description (see 417:2^2). The new domain is 
'seen as' the model. The new domain itself is not described - that route is 
blocked. In having destroyed the descriptive power of language in the 
strategy of the metaphor, the metaphor puts one in touch with a deeper 
level of language: a language that opens reality at the level of what Husserl 
called the Lebenswelt, or of Heidegger's being-in-the-world (*11:87). 
Two repercussions for the theory of the text must be touched on 
here before proceeding to an analysis of the power of the metaphor to 
express things at their core. 
(1) The metaphor, as analogous to the model, is not a simple 
one-liner but the extended metaphor, such as the tale, the allegory, or the 
poem. The referential character of the metaphor is bound up with the work 
of discourse, requiring composition, a literary form, and style. A work of 
discourse will bring into play not just an isolated metaphor but a metaphoric 
network. It is not one metaphor that projects a world, but the whole poem, 
as an expanded metaphor, which gives foundation to a "metaphoric universe 
as a network" (ИПЖЗ-2М)Л1 
(2) Mary Hesse and Max Black both maintain that models have a 
heuristic function since they describe one region or field through another. 
This linkage between heuristic function and description is a barkening back, 
according to Ricoeur, to Aristotle's theory of tragedy as an imitation of 
nature. 
Because of the importance of this detail for Ricoeur, we must 
introduce his analysis of Aristotle's concepts of mimesis and muthos in 
tragic poetry (417:34-40). 
For Aristotle, poetry, particularly in its highest form of the 
tragic poem, is defined as an "imitation (mimesis) of human action" (Poetics 
1448al,29). The mimesis of human action in tragedy has six parts, which we 
enumerate here for the sake of clarity: 1. the fable or the plot (muthos), 2. 
characters (êthê), 3. diction (lexis), 4. thought or theme (dianoia), 5. the 
spectacle (opsis), and 6. the melody (melopoia). The dominant factor of the 
tragic poem is the muthos, the plot or the fable. This trait is so central that 
Aristotle maintains that the imitation of human action (mimesis) must be 
derived or pass through the fable or plot (muthos) and that the other parts 
all converge on the muthos. The muthos is achieved through three 
instrumental factors, the spectacle, the melody and the diction (lexis). 
Thought and character are seen as the natural causes of the action (416:36). 
41. This point was also made by Nelson Goodman, who placed the 
'figure' in a 'schema', which, in the case of a transfer of figures, allowed the 
transporting of the whole region of feeling into the visual realm. 
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The muthos brings to the tragic poem its character of order, 
organization and composition. The order of the muthos invades all the other 
factors. It shapes the spectacle. It gives coherence to the characters. It 
orders the sequence of thought and the arrangement of the verses. The 
creation of tragic poetry is, therefore, an ordering, an arranging, a bringing 
into coherence of human action. In what sense, then, is the muthos a real 
mimesis, a real imitation, of human action? 
To translate mimesis by imitation is more apt to confuse than 
clarify. Aristotle's mimesis is a far throw from the Platonic imitation. 
Plato's imitation covers all areas of existence, because all areas are 
considered to be imitations of an ideal model. All areas reflect well or 
poorly that which may be considered the principle of things. Aristotle's 
mimesis exists only where there is a 'making'. Mimesis is not a proximate or 
remote resemblance but a production. And production, as we saw above, is 
always of individuals. An 'imitation' is a making of one thing. Imitation is a 
form of process. This process or production of mimesis is, however, the 
process of the formation of the six parts of the tragic poem from plot to 
spectacle. In other words, mimesis is the process whereby, in the variety of 
poetic creations (epic poetry, tragedy, and comedy), the six traits of poetry 
combine to make what Aristotle called the "imitation of nobler actions" (see 
^17:38). Mimesis is, therefore, a poiêsis, a making. It is a poiêsis, because 
it composes, structures, constructs the fable, plot, or muthos. This leads to 
the paradoxical situation where Aristotle's mimesis composes and constructs 
the poem which it imitates (417:39). Mimesis can hardly be called, then, a 
duplication of reality. It is closer to what Mary Hesse, in the theory of 
models, called a redescription of reality. And since mimesis accomplishes 
this redescription by means of the muthos, the relationship between mimesis 
and muthos in poiêsis resembles the relationship between heuristic fiction 
and redescription in the theory of models. 
Now, a tension exists between the muthos and the mimesis that 
resembles the tension between heuristic fiction and redescription. It is the 
tension, according to Ricoeur, between the submission to reality and 
creativity (417:39). To accentuate this tension one must recall that 
Aristotle's mimesis, his redescription of human action, is one that ennobles, 
magnifies, and enhances human action. As Ricoeur says, 
Muthos is not just a rearrangement of human action into a more 
coherent form, but a structuring that elevates this action; thus 
mimesis preserves and represents that which is human, not just in its 
essential features, but in a way that makes it greater and nobler. 
There is thus a double tension proper to mimesis: on the one hand, the 
imitation is at once a portrayal of human reality and an original 
creation; on the other, it is faithful to things as they are and it depicts 
them as higher and greater than they are (417:40). 
The metaphorical activity at the level of the whole composition 
lies in the description of the less accessible domain - human reality - by a 
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more accessible domain - the fictitious tragic poem. This metaphorical 
activity is a trait of the muthos, the plot.*2 It is a fictional organization of 
human actions in a tragic poem, placing human action into the whole 
schema, or, to use Ricoeur's terminology, into the whole metaphoric 
network, of the tragic poem. "Tragedy teaches us to 'see' human life, 'as' 
that which the muthos displays" «H 7:245). 
The truth of the reality of the muthos is attached, however, to 
mimesis. The muthos must remain at the service of mimesis, of 
redescription, which retains its reference to reality, even though it is 
metaphorical reality. The redescription of reality takes the long route of 
the muthos or the heuristic fiction. 
Ricoeur extrapolates this relationship of muthos and mimesis in 
tragic and lyric poetry. Using Northrop Frye's centripetal analysis of 
poetry, he argues that poetry produces a mood, attached to the poem itself. 
If the poem creates mood, cannot this mood be conceived as the reference 
of the poem? Does the mood in some sense not redescribe reality, not so 
that it is seen as another, but so that it is felt as another? Ricoeur insists 
that such is the case: "The feeling articulated by the poem is not less 
heuristic than the tragic tale" (417:245). In a lyric poem, we may speak of a 
creation of an affective fiction. 
Once again the question of truth looms up. But for the moment 
let us retain that, for Ricoeur, feeling is not an emotional state of the 
subject. As he affirms in his L'homme faillible (152:122-202), feeling has an 
intentionality that attaches to things, persons and the wor ld / " This implies 
that the mood says something about the being of things and not merely 
about the subject. Feeling is that which prefigures the reconciliation of 
subject and object. 
d. The truth of metaphorical and poetic reference. 
We must now turn to Ricoeur's approach to the issue of the truth 
42. Muthos shares the metaphor with lexis. According to Aristotle, 
the metaphor pertains to two areas of life - to rhetoric and to poetry. What 
binds it to both is lexis, a word impossible to render accurately in English, 
but generally translated by diction. Lexis provides the language dimension 
to the ordering of thought in both rhetoric and poetry. Lexis is the 
coherence of thought in words, or more accurately, the ordering of thought 
in the process of coming into language. The function of lexis is, therefore, 
to exteriorize, to make explicit the interned order of the muthos. The 
language dimension of the metaphor pertains to the lexis with its task of 
interpreting in language the internal order of human action of muthos. Cf. 
La métaphore vive, (417:37). 
43. To borrow a phrase of Mikel Dufrenne, "To feel is to experience 
a feeling as a property of the object, not as a state of my being." Cf. La 
métaphore vive, (417:227). 
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of redescription and of mood. The semantics of reference has deposited the 
metaphor and poetic texts at the threshold of the sphere of truth. The first 
aspect of the discussion is provided by the status and the function of the 
copula 'is' in a metaphorical statement (see 417:2^7-256; 411:88). 
(1) The existential commitment of the copula 'is'. 
In the metaphorical statement, "Old age is a withered flower", 
the copula 'is' is not merely relational; that is, it is not a mere predicative 
link between 'old age' and 'withered flower'. The 'is' also intends a 
reference. Through it, reality is redescribed: things are as said. What is 
meant here? The use of the verb 'to be' has not only a literal meaning but 
also a metaphorical meaning. Ricoeur introduces in the verb 'to be' the 
same tension as is found between the tenor and the vehicle or between two 
interpretations (literal and metaphorical), or between identity and 
difference. He proposes to show that, within the verb 'to be', there is 
expressed at the same time an 'is not' and an 'is'. The 'is' marks an 
existential judgment. 
This is an interesting extension of the metaphorical into the 
copula. In the tension of the comparison of terms there is a rebound upon 
the verb 'to be'. According to Ricoeur, to understand how the existential 
function of the verb 'to be' is affected by the tension is to have access to 
the notion of metaphorical truth (417:248). For Ricoeur the 'is' does not 
indicate complete identity between the two terms. It is not truth as found 
in the mathematical sciences. The 'is' is a metaphorical 'is'. This 
metaphorical 'to be', Ricoeur suggests, puts us in touch with language at "a 
pre-scientific, ante-predicative level, where the very notions of fact, 
object, reality, and truth, as delimited by epistemology, are called into 
question (417:254).** Like Douglas Berggren, Ricoeur insists on the truth 
value of poetic assertions.*-5 The lead comes from the poets themselves, 
who think that their assertions are true in a certain sense. That certain 
sense is that poetic or metaphorical truth is a tensional truth. Within the 'is' 
of the metaphorical statement lies the 'is not' of a literal interpretation. As 
Ricoeur says, "There is no other way to do justice to the notion of 
metaphorical truth than to include the critical incision of the (literal) 'is not' 
within the ontologica! vehemence of the (metaphorical) 'is'" (417:255). The 
simile, which is a weakened metaphor, expresses this grammatically by 
44. In his very asking of the question of metaphorical truth, Ricoeur 
brings back into focus his early concern with the second naivete, which can 
only be built upon the ruins of the Cartesian naivete. The meaning that is 
'radical', the meaning that touches the root of existence, can only emerge 
out of and upon the ruins of the bankruptcy of a literal, manipulative 
approach to reality. Here something other than the authoritative subject or 
poet speaks. Here something beyond the control of the poet comes to 
language. 
45. "The Use and Abuse of Metaphor", Rev, of Metaphysics, 16(1962-
1963), p.227-258. 
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stating, 'it is like', that is, 'it is' but simultaneously by only being 'like' it 
says also 'it is not'. 
(2) Metaphorical discourse and speculative discourse. 
The question of truth and being is held to be the reserve of 
speculative thought. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the relationship 
between the speculative and the metaphorical in order to investigate the 
ontology that is implied in metaphorical discourse. The question is not an 
easy one because it has dominated philosophy and theology for a long 
time.*6 In its modern dress L. Wittgenstein proposed in his earlier 
philosophy that the variety of language games are so radically disparate or 
heterogeneous that communication between, for instance, the speculative 
and the poetic is to be excluded. In classical philosophy this discontinuity 
between the poetic and philosophical discourse was first proposed by 
Aristotle in the Categories and the Metaphysics. On the other hand, Thomas 
Aquinas in his doctrine of the analogy of being discovered a principle of 
mediation between modes of discourse. Since this issue is of some 
importance both to Ricoeur and to the development of this work, let us 
examine the position of Aristotle and Aquinas before proposing Ricoeur's 
own solution. 
In his philosophy of being Aristotle maintained that "being is said 
in many ways" (417:260). That is, being is not said univocally, but 
polyvalently.*' But if being is said in many ways, one must wonder whether 
the meaning of being does not dissolve in equivocity. How can the 
breakdown of communication among the multiple meanings of being be 
avoided? 
The position of Aristotle in the Categories and in the 
Metaphysics maintains the impossibility of finding a principle of mediation 
linking the multiple ways of saying being. If the Metaphysics asks the 
question, What is being? and answers that being is said in many ways, it is in 
46. At issue here is the possibility of one language game to express 
all of reality. In De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud, (227) Ricoeur raises 
the issue of the unity of human discourse: "How can language be put to such 
diverse uses as mathematics and myth, physics and art?" p.3. "The 
dismemberment of that discourse" ipA) in the contemporary context 
requires a mediation. But, as he suggests there, "the problem of the unity of 
language cannot validly be posed until a fixed status has been assigned to a 
group of expressions that share the peculiarity of designating ein indirect 
meaning in and through a direct meaning." (p. 12). The entry into Freudian 
psychoanalytical discourse provided an opportunity not only to discover 
humanity as desire but also to exemplify the interanimation of the discourse 
of psychoanalysis and of hermeneutics in order to enrich phenomenology. 
47. Plato and Aristotle's philosophy of being is worked out more 
extensively in Platon et Aristote. Etre, Essence et Substance chez Platon et 
Aristote, (82). 
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the treatise on the Categories that Ar is tot le seeks to safeguard the 
plurivocity of being f rom irretr ievable scattering. Ar istot le refuses to 
fol low the path of Plato, who held that the mult iple meanings were held 
together by their participation in the eidos, the f i rs t form (see 417:261). 
Instead, he argues that being is not a genus, nor a mere equivocal word. In 
the Categories he proposes an order among the mult iple meanings. The 
order is one of categories as they relate to a f i rst term (ousia). The 
categories, such as action, passion, quantity, quali ty, other than the 
substance, can be predicated of the substance and can be ranged according 
to their distance from the substance. I t is the task of philosophy to stand 
guard over the ordering of meaning according to the categories. 
But what is the philosophical principle which oversees the series 
of meanings of the term 'to be'? Aristot le suggests,** that the organizing 
principle of being is analogy. The table of categories is said to be formed by 
adding to or subtracting f rom the meaning of 'is'. Hence, the varied modes 
of being are said to weaken as they progressively recede from a primordial 
essential predication towards a derived accidental predication. The relation 
one to another is said to be governed by analogy. But what sort of analogy 
is predicated? I t is not an analogy, as 3. Vuil lemin says,* ' governing, "the 
relation of element to set" or "the relation of part to whole". He calls the 
analogy, as applied to the mult iple meanings of being, an " intui t ive given" 
(417:263), whose meaning shifts f rom inherence to proportion, from 
proportion to proportionality. 
Ar is tot le , however, hesitated to call this reference to essential 
predication an analogy. A t the same t ime, he denied that the mult iple 
meanings converge into a system. And yet, despite this, he did admit to a 
single science of the mult iple meanings of being. 
Ricoeur interprets this hesitancy of Ar is tot le ult imately as an 
inabi l i ty to order the many ways of saying being by means of analogy. The 
mult ivoci ty of being resists a univocal organizing principle. This has some 
interesting consequences. On the one hand, i t confirms for Ricoeur the 
heterogeneity of the modes of discourse. That means that, fundamentally, 
the speculative discourse is irreducible to poetic discourse (417:265). On the 
other hand, the search since Ar istot le for an organizing principle, which 
would unify the various discourses, but which ran into an aporie, reveals at 
least what Ricoeur calls a "semantic a im" (417:266). In other words, 
Ricoeur holds that the heterogeneity of discourse is tempered by a semantic 
aim - tradit ional ly expressed in terms of analogy. The semantic aim implies 
at least a level of communicabil ity between the various discourses. He 
invokes for his argument the conceptual labour, which has entered into the 
48. In La métaphore vive, Ricoeur is less quick to introduce the 
notion of analogy into Aristotle's philosophy of being inasmuch as being than 
he was in Platon et Ar istote, (417:106). 
49. De la logique à la théologie. Cinq études sur Ar istote, Paris, 
Flammarion, 1967, p. 110. See La métaphore vive. (417:263). 
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into the search for a unity along the many meanings of being, rather than 
the transcendental solution that analogy was to provide (<> 17:272). It might, 
therefore, be necessary to think of the non-generic (that is, non-scientific) 
bond of being in a way that bypasses analogy. It is significant how Ricoeur 
expresses this: 
But this step beyond analogy was possible only because analogy 
itself had been a step beyond metaphor. It will thus have proved 
decisive for thought that a segment of equivocalness was wrested once 
from poetry and incorporated into philosophical discourse, just at the 
time when philosophical discourse was forced to disengage itself from 
the sway of pure univocity (^  17:272). 
In other words, Ricoeur here recalls the historic event in which 
speculative thought fought itself free from the domain of poetry. It is that 
victory which speculative thought now seeks to protect. Ricoeur goes so far 
as to say that the semantic aim of speculative thought is precisely the 
refusal of speculative thought to enter into a compromise with poetic 
discourse (<> 17:277). But this defensive action of speculative thought did not 
prevent medieval theologians -especially Thomas Aquinas - from 
determining the point of intersection between poetic and speculative 
discourse more precisely. Analogy, which for Aristotle had been a tentative 
principle, becomes in medieval theology a generally accepted bonding 
principle of being. But particularly the acceptance and the usage of the 
analogia entis by Thomas Aquinas reveals both the semantic aim of the 
search and the point of intersection of the metaphorical and speculative 
discourse. 
Theology, in its doctrine of creation, aggravates the need for a 
point at which the ways of saying being converge. As a communication of 
being, creation theology re-introduced the concept of participation, which 
Aristotle had explicitly rejected. And with participation, the spectre of 
metaphor is thrown right back into the midst of speculative thought. For 
Aquinas, in the relation of creature to Creator - "the bond of participation" 
(417:276) - the creative causality is made ontologically possible by analogy: 
"The most heterogeneous cause (God) must therefore remain analogous 
cause" (417:277). But the application of the notion of analogy to the area of 
theology demanded an ever greater refinement of the concept, bringing 
analogy, especially the analogy of proportionality, in close proximity to 
metaphor. Once again, the intention is to safeguard reality from the Scylla 
and Charybdis of univocity and the complete dislocation of equivocity. 
Only in the Summa Theologiae, where he asks whether names 
predicated of God are said principally of creatures (I a , q.13, art.6), does 
Aquinas indicate a point of intersection for discourse. He says there that 
names essentially predicated of God, such as goodness and wisdom, apply 
primarily to God, and through Him, to creatures. At this level, which we 
can call the level of the thing, analogy applies. However, on the level of 
signification - at the level of the imposition of a name - Aquinas says, one 
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must begin with what is best known to us as creatures. Here the process can 
only be called metaphorical.^ Ricoeur concludes from this that an 
intersecting of discourses takes place here: the discourse of the order of 
being descending from God to creatures and the discourse on the level of 
signification ascending from creatures to God. In the intersecting, "the 
speculative verticalizes metaphor, while the poetic dresses speculative 
analogy in iconic garb" (417:279). Thus, the word 'wise' is applied to God 
analogously without leading to a univocal application of that word to God 
and human beings because the signification presents different features in 
both. In human beings, the perfections are distinct, and wise 'circumscribes' 
and 'comprehends'. In God, 'wise' does not 'circumscribe' nor does it 
'comprehend', because wisdom is essentially God and wise exceeds the 
signification of the name. The excess of meaning of 'wise' in God does not 
prevent it, however, from signifying, but it does not create distinctions in 
God. Name and signification break apart here, just as in metaphorical 
statements, in which an unusual attribution can be applied to a word. In 
their predication of 'wise', analogical and metaphorical discourse remain 
distinct, although they intersect. The analogical rests on the predication of 
transcendental terms, while the metaphorical is founded on the predication 
of meanings that are not divested of their material content. 
If the analogia entis reveals only the semantic aim, without 
itself being capable of mediating the interanimation of discourse, are there 
other mediations which might accomplish the task? 
Ricoeur bypasses as seductive but not earth-shaking (417:291) 
the position of Л. Derrida, which takes up the Heideggerean assertion that 
"the metaphorical exists only inside the metaphysical" (see М7і21і2).51 
Derrida's search for the point of intersection takes him away from the 
stated intentions of the modes of discourse, but, following the philosophies 
of suspicion, he turns to the level of the unconscious presuppositions of the 
discourses (417:280). Derrida's search leads to an investigation of the unsaid 
of the metaphor, i.e., the dead metaphor.52 Concept, he maintains, is the 
'raising'53 of the dead metaphor. In other words, underlying the concept, 
there is a dead metaphor that has been 'raised'. Hence the slogan, the 
metaphorical exists only inside the metaphysical. The task of thinkers, 
according to Derrida, is to unmask the metaphorical that underlies all 
reality and to show that all reality shares the circularity of the 
metaphorical. All discourse according to this vision is condemned to remain 
in the terrifying void of circular metaphoricity. 
50. In the same article, Aquinas had already indicated that this type 
of metaphorical attribution places the discourse about God at the level of 
signification close to poetic discourse. 
51. Der Satz vom Grund, Pfullingen, Neske, 1957, p.89. 
52. "Mythologie blanche (La métaphore dans le texte philosophique)", 
Poétique, 5(1971), p.1-52. 
53. "Relève" (raising) is Derrida's translation of Hegel's Aufhebung. 
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But, according to Ricoeur, this degree of fusion of the 
metaphorical and the metaphysical overlooks one thing. The transgression 
in metaphors from the literal to the figurative, and the transgression in 
metaphysics from the visible to the invisible world, may appear as one and 
the same transgression. But that does not necessarily fuse the two 
discourses. The metaphorical transgression, as Hegel saw already, is a 
transfer from one region to the next, from the literal to the figurative. It 
brings the whole network of intersignifications with it into the new region. 
This operation is, however, quite distinct from the metaphysical operation. 
The metaphysical transgression from the visible to the invisible is a true 
Aufhebung, a true sublation or 'raising'. It creates as Ricoeur says, "a 
proper sense in the spiritual order out of an improper sense coming from the 
sensible order" (417:292). In other words, it is an inverse operation to the 
metaphorical: it does not transport the whole realm of the 
intersignifications of the sensible into the concept, but the metaphysical 
'suppresses' it only to preserve it at a proper level in a conceptual 
expression. Thus, 'insight' is philosophical because we no longer hear 'sight' 
in it. As Derrida remarks the 'seeing' has worn away into thought to the 
point that "the meaning aimed at through these figures is an essence 
rigorously independent of that which carries it over' (see 417:293).^ 
It is this insight that guides Ricoeur to his position that "the act 
of positing the concept proceeds dialectically from metaphor" (459:293, 
emphasis mine), i.e., that the relationship between metaphorical discourse 
and philosophical discourse is dialectical. The interanimation, which he 
proposes, is not a collusion between the discourses, where the one discourse 
dissolves or wears away into the other. Instead, Ricoeur says that 
"metaphysics ... seizes the metaphorical process in order to make it work to 
the benefit of metaphysics" (417:294-295). It is this intersecting that needs 
to be determined more exactly to clarify the gathering of the truth of the 
metaphorical reference. 
(3) The truth of metaphorical reference. 
The section of Study Eight of La métaphore vive dealing with 
"the intersection of spheres of discourse" (417:295-303) is pivotal for the 
understanding not only of the referential mode of the metaphor, but also of 
the interrelationship between biblical discourse and theology which we must 
consider below.55 Aided by the research of Леап Ladrière,56 Ricoeur 
considers the semantic aim and semantic dynamism of metaphorical 
discourse in some detail in this section. He shows it to be the condition of 
the possibility of speculative discourse. But he also shows that this 
dynamism of the metaphorical expression towards the concept can be 
examined by speculative thought only with the resources that are proper to 
54. Art, cit., p.29. Cf. La métaphore vive, (417:293). 
55. See below p.251-253. 
56. "Discours théologique et symbole", Rev.Sc.relig.49, 1975, p.29. 
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speculative thought. This transfer of the metaphorical expression into the 
domain of speculative thought takes place, therefore, at the price of the 
transmutation of the metaphorical. 
Let us examine these positions in greater detail. 
(a) From metaphor to concept. 
Ricoeur asserts that the condition of the possibility of 
conceptualization in discourse lies in the semantic dynamism of 
metaphorical utterance (Ψ17:296). In other words, the structure of meaning 
of the metaphorical utterance itself calls for, or urges, the "passage to the 
concept" (<H7:29i») of whatever novelty of meaning that has emerged 
through the clash of semantic impertinence. What the metaphor allows to 
be seen as..., the dynamism of meaning seeks to grasp, no longer in its 
similarity, but through the concept. Now, it is Ricoeur's contention that 
"every gain in meaning is at one and the same time a gain in sense and a 
gain in reference" (417:297). Ricoeur admits that this contention is a 
refinement of what we have stated earlier concerning his theory of sense 
and reference.-'? He says that the dynamism of meaning functions as a 
criss-crossing of the acts of sense (predication) and of reference.^ in 
discourse, the process of meaning follows a course, whose dynamism moves 
in two intersecting directions. It moves toward concept, but in its very 
pasage towards the concept, it broadens its referential scope. 
Ladrière explains the dynamic interplay of sense and reference 
as follows. He says that in ordinary language, abstract predicates are 
mastered only by relating them to a specific, concrete object. Since the 
lexical term represents only a rule for its use in a sentence context, by 
creating variations in usage towards different referents, one can master the 
sense of a sentence. In other words, the gain in meaning through the 
variations of usage is also a gain in sense. Conversely, new referents can be 
explored by seeking to describe them as accurately as possible. In the 
process, the referential field is extended by the more and more refined 
abstract predicates. Thus, predication and reference mutually support and 
interact upon a process of meaning, either as new predicates in a familiar 
referential field, or as familiar predicates in a new referential field. The 
power of signifying lies then in the intersection of two movements. One 
movement expends its energy by determining the abstract, conceptual traits 
of reality. The other movement works with these predicates towards 
making new referents appear. Thus, the power of signifying, by means of 
the criss-crossing of the predicative and referential acts, is unlimited. 
These processes also bring into play an historical dimension. 
New experiences find their expression by delving into the treasury of 
57. See above, p.32-3*. 
58. Ricoeur leans heavily on the study of Jean Ladrière in the 
statement of his position. 
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historically established meanings. Because meanings are never firmly 
established in their use, it is possible for new experiences to find a new 
outlet by means of accepted meanings. The accepted meanings function 
then as a guide for new meanings (^17:297-298). 
If this dual process is valid for ordinary language, in 
metaphorical discourse, Ricoeur says, this semantic dynamism is carried to 
an extreme (417:299). Metaphorical utterance operates simultaneously in 
two referential fields. It links together two levels of meaning: a known 
field of established meanings and an unexplored field, for which no 
appropriate predicates exist. For that reason, in order to explore the new 
field of reference, the semantic aim reverts to the network of familiar 
predicates and places them in the new field to help explore it. Presupposed 
in this effort is the existence of the new field of reference and the 
attraction which its existence exerts upon already established predicates to 
emigrate to the new field. Earlier, we referred to Ricoeur's position that 
the metaphor both creates and reveals meaning (,Ί 17:239,2^6). Here, he 
explains that process in which invention and discovery are not opposite. He 
insists that the energy for the discovery resides in the semantic aim, which 
is generated by the new field. The new field of reference gives rise to the 
uprooting and the transferring of current predicates. But, for Ricoeur, this 
has an interesting repercussion for meaning. Meaning is not a stable staple, 
but a "dynamic, directional, vectoral" (417:299) form, which links up with 
the semantic aim of the sentence to forge towards its fulfilment. Hence, 
there are two energies, two dynamisms, at work. On the one hand, there is 
the gravitational dynamism of the new field of reference upon meaning. On 
the other, there is the dynamism of meaning itself as "the inductive 
principle of sense" (417:299). These two energies are placed in relation to 
one another by the semantic aim of the metaphorical utterance, so that a 
semantic potential will insert itself in the movement of the second 
referential field. 
The new meaning, which emerges through the introduction of 
this semantic potential into the second referential field, is not yet a 
conceptual meaning. It is not a firmly established meaning, for it can be 
regained only by reliving the shock of the semantic impertinence. The 
shock, which makes us see reality as..., seeks to gain, however, the stability 
of the concept. But it is not as yet a knowledge by means of concepts 
(417:296). Ricoeur calls the new knowledge a "semantic sketch" (417:299). 
The metaphorical utterance is sketchy both on the level of sense and on the 
level of reference. 
On the level of sense, the metaphorical utterance can only 
sketch the new referential field by means of a familiar referential field by 
reproducing it in the as yet unknown area. On the level of reference, the 
semantic aim can only provide a sketch insofar as it draws the unknown 
referential field into the ambit of language through similarity or 
resemblance. 
At the origin of the whole metaphorical process - as well as of 
ordinary language - Ricoeur posits what he calls "the ontologica! vehemence 
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of a semantic aim" within an unknown field (417:299). The ontological 
vehemence is the activator of the field. It kidnaps a meaning from another 
field, takes its sense-movement, and activates that sense-movement in the 
new field. Hence, we are presented with a split sense and a split reference. 
The meaning released in the second field, however, hardly exceeds the 
figurative. Speculative thought will delve into this figurative sketch to 
evolve the concept. 
(b) Speculative thought and metaphorical discotgse. 
If the metaphorical process has been shown to be the origin of all 
semantic fields, how does it relate to speculative discourse? The 
ontological vehemence of the semantic aim, which generated the 
metaphorical utterance, also generates the energy, which seeks the concept. 
But, according to Ricoeur, it is not the metaphorical process that generates 
the concept. This task is reserved to speculative discourse. Speculative 
discourse, drawing on its own reserves and resources - driven by the very 
structure of the mind - explores the space of the metaphor by means of 
notions and principles, which it derives from itself. For that reason there is 
no automatic progression from one discourse to another. "One can pass 
from one discourse to the other only by an èpoche" (417:300). In this 
context, speculative discourse will determine the conceptual field by means 
of its independently established primary notions and principles. 
With these resources, speculative thought will tackle the 
semantic sketch provided by the metaphorical utterance. Speculative 
thought draws the semantic sketch into the new space of the concept. 
Speculative discourse is, therefore, the discourse which regulates and 
systematizes the concept by means of its own primary notions and principles 
and forms it into a second-order discourse. It grounds the conceptual 
discourse. The concept is not derived from perception or from images, as in 
the case of the imagination, but it is supplied by the speculative field or 
horizon. The speculative is not based on the similar - as the imagination is -
but upon an understanding of the same. The speculative seeks from its own 
angle to ground the similar of metaphorical utterance into the same, 
knowing that where things are similar there is also identity. Hence, the two 
levels of discourse, the level of the imagination and the level of the 
speculative, remain distinct. In fact, it can be said the speculative 
discourse is the upper limit of metaphorical discourse. 
According to Ricoeur, the concept must function in a proper 
order of discourse if it is to be free of perceptual images.^' Within the 
discourse of the speculative logos, the concept can begin to function with 
the resources provided it by the speculative discourse. In this way, it can 
59. Ricoeur introduces here Husserl's critique of the image in the 
conceptual order in order to delineate more clearly the two discourses. Cf. 
La métaphore vive, (417:302). See also Л. Greisch, "Bulletin de philosophie. 
La tradition herméneutique aujourd'hui: H.G. Gadamer, P. Ricoeur, 
G. Steiner" in Rev. Sc.ph.th. 61, 1977, p.296. 
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leave behind the type of schematization, such as double-meaning language 
and image-work, proper to the imaginative level. 
(c) Hermeneutical interpretation; the composite discourse. 
The previous discussion ought not to lead to the conclusion that 
Ricoeur's conceptual order abolishes the metaphorical. His 'inclination', he 
says, is to posit a constant interanimation and interplay of the order of 
discourses. The attracting and repelling cannot cease because the one can 
never dissolve into the other. That which organizes the discourses is 'off-
centred' in relation to both of them. This disallows any attempt to establish 
an absolute knowledge, which would amalgamate the various discourses. It 
should also be noted that the Kantian concept of the limit, which has 
governed Ricoeur's philosophy from the beginning,60 has not been shelved. 
The activity and work of the concept is a work of interpretation. 
By means of the primary notions and principles of the speculative order, the 
concept interprets the metaphorical sketch. In accordance with the 
semantic aim of speculative discourse, the concept will elucidate this sketch 
and seek to arrive at a univocal statement. The suspension and the tension 
will be dissolved, as will the experience of the metaphorical utterance. As 
such, the concept is a reduction. But, it may be asked, is it not possible to 
have a non-reductive interpretation beside the reductive one? Ricoeur 
thinks that this is possible through the discipline of hermeneutics. 
Hermeneutics, which we shall examine in greater detail in the next chapter, 
is a type of interpretation which respects both the conceptual aim and the 
experience seeking to be expressed in the metaphorical aim (^17:303). 
Interpretation functions at the threshold of two areas: the 
speculative and the metaphorical. It seeks to respect both the clarity of the 
concept and the dynamism of the metaphorical meaning. A metaphor "is 
living by virtue of the fact that it introduces the spark of imagination into a 
'thinking more' (Kant) at the conceptual level" (<H 7:303). Interpretation is 
the 'soul' of this activity. 
60. Cf. Don Ihde, op. cit., p.59-80. 
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With the ground and the source of meaning no longer immediate 
and intuitive, but mediated by the language of the poetic text, Ricoeur can 
return to the perception of 3ean Nabert, that reflection is interpretation. 
But what type of interpretation? If reflection is interpretation, Ricoeur 
must enter into the hermeneutical debate and forge an alliance between 
hermeneutics and phenomenology. This develops in two phases. 
In the first texts where the need for a hermeneutics arose, 
namely, La symbolique du mal (153) and De l'interprétation. Essai sur 
Freud, (227) Ricoeur gave a restricted range to the theory of hermeneutics. 
His more immediate concern with the symbol as the bond with being led him 
to insist that the symbol and interpretation were co-extensive. The symbol 
was perceived as a figure of double-meaning language which required 
interpretation. The symbol contains a surplus of meaning or, in 
psychological terms, an overdetermination, which would release itself to 
understanding only by way of the interpretation of that surplus. That 
perception of hermeneutics also underlies the articles collected in Le conflit 
des interprétations, (320) where the surplus of meaning is interpreted as 
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containing conflicting interpretations. However, in the same collection one 
can notice a new orientation which gains the upperhand in his Cours sur 
l'herméneutique (37Ό and in his Interpretation Theory, (Ψ23). 
In these latter texts, Ricoeur incorporates a discovery about the 
symbol that his study of linguistics had provided. While his earlier works 
recognized that symbols were linguistic, Ricoeur had not sought to uncover 
the semantics of the symbol. Through his introduction into linguistics, he 
came to see that the symbol, like the metaphor, has a semantic and also a 
non-semantic moment with the semantic moment as the point of access to 
the non-semantic moment. With that, the point of gravity of his research 
became more and more located in the hermeneutics of the language of 
poetic expressions. 
In his quest for a hermeneutics of the language of poetic 
expressions Ricoeur looks for two dimensions. The hermeneutics is to fulfill 
the exigency of an ontology and of an epistemology. In other words, the 
hermeneutics is to assure that the interpretation of the language of poetic 
texts does not dissolve the bond between language and being, and ultimately 
the phenomenological concern with the subject. But, at the same time, the 
ontologica! thrust may not bypass the epistemologica!. The understanding 
and self-understanding through the poetic text may not be isolated from the 
struggle - so predominant in our culture - between explanation and 
understanding. The conflict between explanation and understanding was 
first diagnosed by Kant. His epistemologica! distinction between 
explanation and understanding led to the assignment of explanation to the 
realm of pure reason and understanding to the realm of practical reason. 
For Ricoeur, a contemporary hermenéutica! theory must overcome the 
dichotomous relationship between understanding and explanation in a 
dialectical relationship. The hermeneutics of the text must incorporate 
both a scientific study of the linguistic structures of the text and an 
existential appropriation of the world of the text (Ί64:χΐ). 
This dual concern aligns Ricoeur's hermeneutics with the 
mainstream of modern hermeneutics, in which the basic vectors have been 
the ontological and epistemologica! axes. To grasp Ricoeur's hermeneutics, 
one is forced to retrace the outlines of the hermeneutics of the major 
modern proponents: Fr. Schleiermacher, W. Dilthey, M. Heidegger, and 
H.G. Gadamer. Only in understanding Ricoeur's reading of that history, can 
one begin to appreciate his own contribution to the hermeneutical theory 
and his orientation to the question of meaning and the subject. 
A. FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER. 1 
Fr. Schleiermacher is the father of modern hermeneutics. It is 
not that there was no hermeneutics prior to him, but Fr. Schleiermacher 
1. See 37*:69-80;*33:187-197; and 388:1*3-1*«. 
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gave it its specific modern quality. He achieved this by interlinking two 
cultural movements of his time: Kantianism and Romanticism. 
At the beginning of the 19th century, there was a growing split 
between the two major regions of interpretation: the exegesis of the Bible 
and the philology of ancient texts. The thinkers of the Enlightenment had 
succeeded in creating a wedge between exegesis and dogma by the insertion 
of philology into the exegetical process. The text of the Bible became a 
profane text, like any other text. Moreover, philology separated the sense 
of the text from the truth of the text. Kant, who inverted the relationship 
between the sign and the thing canonized this situation. He set the priority 
of the theory of knowledge, the condition of things in the mind, over the 
theory of being. For a hermenéutica! theory this reversal is central. By 
giving priority to the capacity of knowledge that governs the operation of 
interpretation, Kant divorced the operation of interpretation from the text 
itself. Instead of remaining the search for the hidden meaning of the text -
since the Middle Ages the task of exegesis - Kant reversed interpretation 
toward a search for the security of the cognitional operations. 
Unfortunately, Kant hardly passed beyond the conditions of knowledge of 
the physical sciences. This will have its effect on subsequent hermeneutical 
theory, because, in the search for an adequate interpretation, the conditions 
of theoretical knowledge will govern the operations. 
Romanticism, on the other hand, went in search of the conditions 
of the knowledge of the spirit. In its reaction to rationalism. Romanticism 
looked not to the conditions of human knowledge, but to the force of the 
spirit as the source of the creative process. The spirit is the unconscious 
creator within a human genius (388:1ÍO, who is the great creator of human 
culture. Life, for Romanticism, means to have a living relation to the 
creative process of the genius. Interpretation in this context loses its 
epistemologica! concern and seeks a way to be at one with the creative 
process. Romanticism has expressed its aim in the hermeneutical slogan: 
To understand an author as well as and even better than he understood 
himself (388:1**). 
Fr. Schleiermacher combined the critical concerns of Kant and 
the genial concerns of Romanticism. Through them he sought a theory of 
interpretation that could reconcile the goals of both philology and exegesis. 
But the resulting Kunstlehre subordinated philology to the problem of 
understanding. There is a hermeneutics, not because of the diversity or 
antiquity of the texts, but because there is a misunderstanding. The goal of 
hermeneutics is to overcome misunderstanding by leading one to the source 
of the thought that is expressed in language. Schleiermacher's theory of 
interpretation attempted - without fuily succeeding - to show how thought 
and its linguistic expression were interrelated. Through, on the one hand, a 
linguistic, grammatical interpretation of the text and, on the other hand, a 
psychological, technical interpretation of the singularity of another (the 
genius), he sought to link expression and thought, or Kantianism and 
Romanticism. When thought and expression have been interlinked, it can be 
said that one understands the author as well as or better than he or she 
understands him/herself (374:7*). 
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After a fashion, then, Schleiermacher succeeded in isolating the 
two major concerns of modern hermeneutics. First, he recognized the need 
to consolidate the variety of hermeneutical objects into a general 
hermeneutics governed by understanding. Secondly, he also recognized that 
the process of understanding involved a divinatory (guessing) aspect and a 
methodical aspect (grammatical, philological analysis). Both of these gains 
must not be lost sight of in a current hermeneneutics. 
B. WILHELM DILTHEY. 
Although Ricoeur mentions that he wishes to remain true to the 
intention of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics (^23:93), the coloration and 
orientation of his hermeneutics are equally determined by W. Dilthey. 
Working towards the end of the 19th century, when history had replaced 
philology as the darling discipline, Dilthey's hermeneutics struggled to 
discover how one historical individual can understand another. He sought to 
discover how historical knowledge can exceed intuition and achieve a 
scientific status. In the understanding of historical reality and of another 
person, he sought to supply historical knowledge with an equivalent of the 
experimental sciences' successful theory of explanation. Because of this 
overriding concern with the scientific status of history, Dilthey's 
hermeneutics, unfortunately, did not rise beyond the epistemologica! level. 
According to Dilthey - and here he is clearly influenced by Hegel 
-history is the manifestation or the expression of the movement of the 
Spirit. It is the deposit of experience, the objectivation of humanity 
(374:94). The figures of the Spirit, the fundamental expressions of life, form 
a structured and coherent chain of events (Dilthey's Zusammenhang) that in 
their objectivation and their coherence are snatched from an irretrievable 
individuality into the realm of knowledge. It is into this great chain of 
events that the individual and his works must be inserted in order to gain 
meaning. Meaning is derived from the Zusammenhang. Through the signs 
that emanate from the individual, the individual links up with the objective 
spirit of history. However, while for Hegel the Spirit or mind was not 
individual, for Dilthey Spirit is first of all individual. From the individual 
and the works of the individual, Dilthey views the total cultural and 
historical construct. It is not the objective Spirit but the life-expressions of 
the individual that constitute the great interlinking of history. And, 
inversely, because the fundamental expressions of life in history are 
productions of individuals, one individual has access to the understanding of 
another (388:147). The great Zusammenhang of history is a form of the 
individual, and the objectivity of its expression allows us to understand the 
other. Its manifestation is the objectified product of psychic life. 
For Dilthey, hermeneutics is the discipline that delves into the 
psychic life of another by reproducing the Zusammenhang of the objectified 
signs of that psychic life. Hermeneutics is a Nachbildung, a recreation of 
another's life. This hermeneutics can only be undertaken if these 
manifestations of life assume a durable form. That durable form is writing. 
Only writing, a text, permits the recreation of another, an entry into the 
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psychic state of another.2 Only in the durable form of wr i t ing can I 
recreate the process whereby another has become. The psychic, one might 
say, becomes f ixed. Hermeneutics becomes the discipline of the 
understanding of another through the w r i t t e n text of the psychic l i fe of 
another. For Dilthey hermeneutics is basically a psychology: a science of 
empathy into the state of another.3 
But, and here we introduce Dilthey's second concern, the 
discipline must be clothed wi th the respectabil ity of object iv i ty. This, he 
sought to accomplish by means of the scientif ic methods of philology. 
Philology is the science that rules understanding (374:90-91). Since 
hermeneutics was to be an interpretation of the wr i t ten texts of l i f e , 
philology was the science of the reading of these texts. But this close 
ident i f icat ion of philology and understanding forced Dilthey t o form a 
theory of understanding that could atta in a level of object iv i ty that 
approximated that of the physical sciences. Dilthey never ceased searching 
for ways to increase its object iv i ty. But he could only do so by making 
understanding the equivalent of interpretat ion as a mode of knowing. 
Understanding then suffers f rom being approached only epistemologically 
according to the level of the object iv i ty that i t obtains. 
Dilthey's major contribution to hermeneutics consists in his 
insistence that l i f e can only be grasped in its mediations. The f leet ing 
moments of history are transcended by the textual expressions of l i f e . 
Historical understanding does not have to resort to the absolute Spirit of 
Hegel. Instead i t can turn to interpretat ion. However, Di lthey, according 
to Ricoeur, destroys what he has gained by determining that understanding 
does not seek to interpret what the text says but delves behind the t e x t . 
Hermeneutics seeks to gain an empathetic understanding of the individual 
behind the text who has expressed him/herself іл the text . It is the l i f e of 
another that is sought. Also Dilthey did not escape the attempt t o reduce 
interpretat ion to a psychological concern. Understanding is basically the 
empathetic reproduction of the structured, l iv ing dynamism of another. The 
fusion of this psychological interest and the scientif ic intent of the 
interpretat ion of the text led to an aporie. What was sought was l i f e and 
not the meaning of the text of l i f e . Hermeneutics remained the 
transference into the psychic l i f e of another. I t sought a real i ty behind or 
before the text : the illusive psychic real i ty that, according t o Ricoeur, does 
not communicate i tself. 
2. A f t e r 1900 Dilthey tr ied to restate this theory in terms of 
Husserl's theory of intent ional i ty. He saw the psychic as intentional, i.e., as 
intending a meaning that can be identif ied again and again. He realized that 
the psychic itself could not be reached but that one can grasp what the 
psychic intended. Cf. 499:147. 
3. In his later works Dilthey generalized hermeneutics to coincide 
w i t h interpretat ion. The later Dilthey textualized al l real i ty. A l l real i ty is 
a text to be interpreted. Cf. 374:92. 
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Schleier mâcher and Dilthey represent the first phase of modern 
hermeneutics. They succeeded in bringing hermeneutics under the aegis of 
understanding as the human sciences' mode of knowing. 
This epistemology of the human sciences is sharply contrasted 
with the explanatory approach that dominates the physical sciences. 
Accordingly, hermeneutics was accepted as a discipline of interpretation 
employed in the human sciences, whenever these examine life-expressions in 
the written form. 
With Heidegger and later with Gadamer, a radical re-orientation 
of hermeneutics takes place. With them hermeneutics moves out of the 
orbit of the Methodenstreit with its epistemologica! overtones into the area 
of a fundamental ontology. Although the historical referent of their 
philosophy remains the epistemologica! debacle, hermeneutics does not ask, 
"How do we know a text or history or another?" but rather, "What is the 
mode of being of that being who only exists through understanding?" 
(388:151). Their approach takes one beyond the split of subject and object, 
that dominates epistemology, to the question of Being. With Heidegger and 
Gadamer we enter a region prior to epistemology which they have mapped 
out in an ontology of understanding. 
C. MARTIN HEIDEGGER. 
Martin Heidegger has been Ricoeur's sparring partner in the 
development of his hermeneutics more than he appears to be willing to 
acknowledge. Heidegger appears as the goad of his vision, as his silent 
interlocutor, in his search for the recovery of the subject. Ricoeur's 
hermeneutics of the subject is comprehensible only in the light of 
Heidegger's ontology of understanding. 
According to Ricoeur, Heidegger's ontology of understanding 
undertakes two fundamental shifts in the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher 
and Dilthey. 
1. From epistemology to ontology. 
The first shift, to which we alluded above, is the Heideggerean 
reversal of epistemology and ontology. As Ricoeur says, Heidegger "wanted 
to retrain our eye and to redirect our gaze" (320(229): 10). In Sein und Zeit,^ 
he refused to enter into the methodological debate, saying, that prior to any 
theory of knowledge, prior to the opposition between subject and object, 
there is a type of inquiry into Being that is more primordial than the 
epistemologica! one. For Heidegger Being is Ground. But Being as Ground 
is not transparent or immediately available. However, Being as Ground does 
manifest itself. It does so in the being where the question of Being arises. 
^. Tübingen, Max Niemaeyer Verlag, 1926. See also F. Seeburger, 
"Ricoeur on Heidegger" in The Iliff Review, 35, 1978, p.49-57. 
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This being in Being is a being oí understanding. This inquirer of Being, for 
whom Being arises as a question, Heidegger calls Dasein, being-there. 
Dasein is the subject that is totally open to the question and the 
manifestation of Being (377:100). Dasein is not only the inquirer of Being, 
but the very question of Being. Hence, it not only questions Being, but it is 
also the mode of being guided by the question of Being (320(286):225). In 
addition, the question of the subject is not primary for Heidegger. The 
subject must respect the question which it is. 
To the extent that I recover myself as the questor of Being, I 
retrieve, in Heidegger's view, the 'forgotten' center of myself. Hence, by 
asking about Being, I ask simultaneously about the inquiry which is the mode 
of Being of the inquirer (320(278):227). Understanding is, therefore, not a 
mode of knowing, but the mode of being of the being that questions. Or, as 
Heidegger expresses it, "understanding of Being is itself a definitive 
characteristic of Dasein's being" (320(278):226). 
Implied in this investigation is the priority that Being has over 
any method of exploration of Being. The neo-Kantian order of method over 
content is reversed. It is the mode of being that determines the method 
(374:101-102). For hermeneutics, the consequences are significant. 
Hermeneutics is the theory that accompanies the process of the unveiling of 
the Sein of Dasein through all the dissimulations that have led to the 
forgetfulness of Being. If Being is forgotten, the being in whom Being is 
understanding must be safeguarded against forgetfulness. For Heidegger, 
hermeneutics is the guide of the manifestation of being for the being who is 
the inquirer of Being (388:151). 
2. From the understanding of the other to the understanding of 
the world. 
A second reversal of Heidegger's hermeneutics concerns the 
depsychologization of hermeneutics. Heidegger shifted away from Dilthey's 
hermeneutics of the understanding of the psyche of another through 
empathy towards a hermeneutics of the relation of being with the world. 
According to Heidegger, hermeneutics seeks to understand my position in 
Being. Consequently, Heidegger's hermeneutics deals with the 
understanding not of the other but of being-in, more specifically, being-in-
the-world. Instead of a concern with the other, Heidegger focusses on the 
question of the world (388:152). 
Heidegger's starting point in Sein und Zeit is the grounding 
relation of every subject in the being-in-the-world. For Heidegger, a 
subject must first find him/herself 'there'. One must first feel the world, 
before one can begin to find one's way. In other words, Heidegger does not 
start with understanding, but with 'world' and from the 'world' he moves to 
'being-in' and to 'being-there'. Heidegger locates understanding in this 
movement from world to 'being-there'. Heidegger locates understanding 
within the trilogy of situation (Befindlichkeit), understanding (Verstehen), 
and interpretation (Auslegung). This trilogy is the existential constitution of 
'there' (374:107). 
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For Heidegger, before ever I come to language, I first find 
myself in a situation. I feel something, before I face it, before I express 
myself, before I orient myself. Before I talk, before I move, I am like a 
plant rooted in a situation. It is feeling that bonds us to a situation. It is 
feeling that enroots us. 
Understanding arises out of this Befindlichkeit. For Heidegger, 
understanding remains prior to language, prior to the text. For him, 
understanding is a power of being. Its task is to orient us in a situation. 
Dasein, for that reason, not only enroots us like a plant in a situation. But 
like an animal Dasein is also movement. Dasein is a being which orients 
itself. The task of understanding is to guide this orientation, to sketch 
projects in which our possibilities, our ownmost possibilities, are projected. 
Understanding apprehends the possibilities of Being. It reveals the Being-in-
the-world, the ontological conditions of our 'being-thrown' by Being itself. 
In Dasein this is brought to understanding (37¡>:108-109). 
For Heidegger, consequent upon understanding is interpretation. 
Interpretation, however, is not yet an exegetical method, but rather an 
explicitation (Auslegung), or an unravelling of understanding. The task of 
interpretation is to bring understanding to itself. In order to develop 
understanding, however, interpretation does not look to a theory of 
knowledge, but to something which Heidegger calls Vorhabe, Vorgriff, or 
Vorsicht. Interpretation, according to Heidegger, works with an 
anticipatory structure of understanding. In understanding there lies a pre-
understanding, a pre-acquisition, a pre-grasping or a pre-vision, of Being-in-
the-world. Interpretation explicitâtes this pre-acquisition of the whole in 
terms of a particular area under consideration. This is Heidegger's famous 
hermeneutical circle: in order to explicitate something as being this or 
that, one must first have an anticipatory understanding of the whole. 
Interpretation is the explicitation of something as (Heidegger's als) this or 
that, in relationship to the prior view or pre-understanding (ЗввіІЗЗ-ІЗ^). 
It is only at this point that Heidegger introduces the question of 
language in Sein und Zeit (par.33). Language is linked to interpretation at 
the point, where the als of interpretation passes into articulation or a 
proposition. Language is, therefore, not principally communication to 
another, but is disclosure (Aufzeignung). It reveals Being and its link with 
Dasein. Language is a disclosure of Dasein. A first consequence of this is, 
that language is not primary but derived. Being is primordial; language is 
the way we articulate and manifest the understanding of our Being-in-the-
world (388:155). 
This point is accentuated by Heidegger, when he insists that, 
what is of importance in the articulation, is not the saying of something, but 
rather the hearing of something. Because of its relationship to Being-in-
the-world, understanding is first of all hearing. Before the word that I 
speak, there must be the word that I hear. To produce speech, I must first 
be silent: "Hearing is constitutive of discourse".' Before discourse opens to 
5. Sein und Zeit, op. cit., p.206. 
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the world and to the other, it must have its foundation in hearing. In line 
with this, Heidegger distinguishes between 'saying' (reden) and 'speaking' 
(sprechen) to designate the difference between the 'letting-say' of hearing 
(the existential constitution) and the linguistic expression (sprechen) which 
exteriorizes the Rede. For Heidegger, all linguistics operate on the level of 
speaking. Linguistics can never attain the level of Rede, nor does it add 
anything to Rede. He calls linguistics the hypostasized isolation of human 
speech (374: Г Щ " 
Ricoeur's critique of Heidegger is radical. If Heidegger proposed 
to transcend the aporia of an epistemologica! approach to understanding, he 
only aggravated it according to Ricoeur. For Ricoeur the aporia is only 
shifted to the higher plane between an epistemology and ontology. Ricoeur 
welcomes Heidegger's recovery of the existential and ontological ground of 
understanding, but he cannot accept Heidegger's refusal to return from this 
ground to the epistemologica! question of the status of the human sciences. 
Heidegger showed that methodological questions, such as those presented by 
exegesis and historical criticism, are at most derivative questions. But, he 
refuses to consider these derivative questions. And that failure, according 
to Ricoeur, is inexcusable today. With the re-establishment of an ontology 
the epistemologica! question can no longer be avoided (386:50-51). 
D. HANS-GEORG GADAMER. 
Ricoeur's summation of the masters of hermenéutica! philosophy 
would be incomplete without H.-G. Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode." 
Gadamer undertook to re-open the question of the relationship between 
ontology and epistemology which Heidegger had largely ignored. That 
meant re-introducing Dilthey's concern of the epistemologica! status of the 
human sciences within the Heideggerean achievement of an ontology of 
understanding. Gadamer's hermeneutics is founded on the dialectical 
notions of participation and distanciation. The notion of participation 
expresses the primordial relationship of things to being. Before things can 
be opposed to us, they first of all belong - they belong to being. Now in the 
human sciences this ontological participation, the Zugehbrigkeit. is 
shattered in favour of an objectifying distance. In the distance created 
between participation and Being the human sciences have established a 
measure of objectivity. Sciences are founded upon that distanciation. 
Gadamer elaborates this theme in the three spheres of hermeneutics: 
aesthetics, history, and language. In each sphere, it is the distanciation that 
permits a critical judgement to take place. Thus, for instance, in the 
historical sphere, the distanciation makes possible the consciousness of 
being carried by a prior tradition. And it is this consciousness, according to 
Gadamer, that leads to the foundation and differentiation of the historical 
methodology into the variety of the human and social sciences. But its 
6. Tubingen, 3.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960. See F. Kirkland, 
"Gadamer and Ricoeur. The Paradigm of the Text." in Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal 6, 1977, p.l31-lW. 
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consequence is an inevitable impoverishment. The historical experience as a 
mode of Being, mediated through the method of text-interpretation, is 
destroyed as a life-experience. For Gadamer, the reality of life and method 
are irreconcilable: the ideal of method destroys the reality of life (374:97). 
Gadamer perceives the objectifying trend of the human sciences 
as a last-ditch attempt of Enlightenment thinking to retain consciousness as 
the master and subjectivity as the point of departure. For Gadamer, there 
is no last refuge for neutral observation. As he says in his Kleine Schriften, 
"We cannot extricate ourselves from historical becoming, or place ourselves 
at a distance from it, in order that the past might become an object for us. 
... We are always situated in History".^ Gadamer calls this consciousness of 
being always inescapably exposed to the effects of history the 
wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein.* The past does not become available 
to us as an object of observation. We are never free of the past. We can 
only become conscious of how it affects us as the past of our experience. 
This priority of historical existence over critical reflection will 
become a dominant problem for Ricoeur and the salient feature of the 
difference between Ricoeur and Gadamer. For Ricoeur, this is a remnant of 
the debate between Romanticism and the Enlightenment, in which Gadamer 
chooses to remain on the side of Romanticism (390:156-157). The 
interrelationship of participation and distanciation and, subsequently, of 
understanding and explanation forms the main outline of Ricoeur's 
hermenéutica! philosophy. 
E. RICOEUR'S METHODICAL HERMENEUTICS. 
The schematic outline of the history of modern hermeneutics 
touches only the basic vectors which Ricoeur encountered in the 
development of a modern hermeneutical theory. It is in continuity with this 
tradition that he wishes to place himself. He considers two lines of that 
movement to be constitutive of the hermeneutical tradition and indeed of 
the solution to the problem of the subject in our contemporary culture. 
The first movement of the hermeneutical tradition according to 
Ricoeur is its drive to recall hermeneutics from the number of regions, to 
which the hermeneutical art applied (exegesis of the Bible, philology, 
jurisprudence), toward a general hermeneutics. This process was first 
undertaken by Schleiermacher and then by Dilthey, when they organized the 
discipline under an epistemology of understanding. The movement was 
completed by Heidegger and Gadamer, who grounded hermeneutics in an 
ontology of understanding. Ricoeur's working definition of hermeneutics 
7. Tübingen, 3.C.B. Mohr, 1967, p.158. Cf. 499:159. 
8. Ricoeur translates wirkungsgeschichtlichei Bewusstsein as the 
consciousness of the history of effects. It is a consciousness of the agency 
of history. 
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reflects this orientation. For him hermeneutics is "the theory of the 
operation of understanding in its relations to the interpretation of texts" 
(388:1*1). 
The second movement of the current hermeneutical tradition 
involves the relationship of hermeneutical understanding to the explanatory 
mode of knowing of the empirical sciences. This issue was raised first by 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Both sought a mode of validation for 
hermeneutical statements which could compete with the successful methods 
of the natural sciences. Heidegger and Gadamer shunted aside this 
objective. But, for Ricoeur, this disjuncture of truth and method can only 
lead, in the end, to the splendid isolation of the two fundamental areas of 
contemporary human discourse.' The mediation of these two spheres of 
discourse is the great task of modern philosophy (229:16). Instead of 
Gadamer's truth and/or method, Ricoeur resolutely opts for truth and 
method. There can be no understanding without explanation and no 
explanation without understanding. Instead of the opposition between 
understanding and explanation, so popular among the neo-Kantians, Ricoeur 
seeks to expose a complementary and dialectical relationship between truth 
and method. 
In his inimitable fashion Ricoeur manages to interrelate these 
two movements by retaining both the Heideggerean and the Diltheyan 
thrust. But he transforms them both in the process. Ricoeur's hermeneutics 
is a dialectical blend of the ontologica! and the epistemologica!. It bridges a 
new dialogue between hermeneutics and the language of the experimental 
sciences. Ricoeur hopes, in this manner, to contribute to the stemming of 
the dispersal of human discourse and to the re-integration of the human and 
empirical sciences into some kind of unity of speech (229:16). Ricoeur has 
called the ontology which interrelates with an epistemology an indirect 
ontology and his hermeneutics a methodical hermeneutics (355:780). 
At first glance the hermeneutics of Ricoeur in his linguistic 
phase seems a radical departure from his earlier, more phenomenological, 
concerns. But that is only a surface impression. Ricoeur remains faithful to 
his earlier concern of the 'for me' of the appearances of things. As we shall 
see, he links the ontological and epistemologica! thrust with reflective 
philosophy by means of Gadamer's notion of appropriation. Hermeneutics 
remains incomplete until it explicitâtes the subject's desire and effort to be. 
9. The specific contours of Ricoeur's hermeneutical theory were 
shaped by two events. First of all, Ricoeur's confrontation with the 
semiological and semantic analysis of language forced him to a first-ever 
penetration into explanatory procedures. He recognized the validity and 
even the necessity of these procedures. But that meant the expansion of the 
horizon of interpretative methods, and a dramatic re-orientation of 
hermeneutics. The second event is Ricoeur's still growing awareness of the 
importance of language in a poetics of the will. Cf. Otto Bollnow, "Paul 
Ricoeur und die Probleme der Hermeneutik" in Ζ. philos. Forsch. 30, 1976, 
p. 167-189 and ρ.389-Ψ12. 
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Hermeneutics mediates the re-appropriation or the recovery of the subject. 
Only through a hermeneutics of the text is reflection liberated from being 
abstract. Through hermeneutics reflection becomes concrete reflection. 
1. Participation in being. 
Ricoeur, we said, abandoned the high road route of Heidegger I 
which is out of reach of the epistemologists and their concern for validation. 
His route is much more modest. He denies the possibilitiy of inhabiting the 
high ground of a direct ontology. For Ricoeur the subject never dwells 
there. S/he only climbs in its direction, urged on by the very reality that 
s/he seeks. In place of Heidegger's analytic of Dasein as the mode of being 
of understanding, Ricoeur opts - as does Merleau-Ponty (321:286) - for an 
indirect ontology. Instead of taking a primordial ontology of understanding 
as a point of departure, Ricoeur turned first to the forms of 
understanding.10 This is still in harmony with his phenomenological 
principles. These forms are accordingly derived forms, i.e., derived from 
the primordial, ontological understanding. It is the task of an indirect 
ontology to indicate in the forms of understanding the signs of their 
derivation and to follow up the repercussions for understanding. 
What are these forms of understanding? For Ricoeur the most 
fundamental form is language itself. In that respect he differs rather 
radically from Heidegger and Gadamer. In the ontologized hermeneutics of 
Heidegger language was only the interpretative dimension of understanding. 
In interpretation, understanding comes to language. Language for Heidegger 
is fundamentally bound to Being before it can be considered as the language 
of written documents. Language manifests the forgotten Being. Language 
is the text of existence. Language shows, it lets-be. Heidegger calls this 
dimension of language sagen (to say). This saying dominates Heidegger's 
hermeneutics. Its opposite, ordinary and logicized language, he called 
sprechen (to speak). For Heidegger only sagen unveils Being; sprechen 
promotes the forgetfulness of Being. In his later works, principally in 
Unterwegs zur Sprache (1959), the ontology of language was pushed to the 
forefront even more. Philosophy is said to think in the direction of language 
and not only in language. Language is not first of all a possession, a tool to 
be manipulated but a power to say, to let-be (355:779-780). For Heidegger 
this quality was best expressed and manifested by the poets and the pre-
Socratics. 
In the footsteps of Heidegger, Gadamer situated language as a 
region or modality of understanding which comes after history and 
aesthetics. For Gadamer, language is the universal medium of experiences 
of meaning. Its principal task is to help overcome the distance, the 
alienation, and incomprehension that shapes our existence, because of a past 
10. That is basically the critique of Heidegger and Gadamer by 
Jürgen Habermas. He also maintains that when understanding becomes a 
property of being rather than of consciousness, one loses touch with the 
critical dimension of hermeneutics. See 386:48. 
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that has object i f ied itself as a t radi t ion, or document, or aesthetic object. 
Writing for Gadamer is the major form of alienation or distanciation. The 
task then of hermeneutics is to overcome - to re-appropriate -what has 
become alienated in wr i t ing . And since both history and aesthetics have 
become linguistic realit ies through wr i t ing, they must be brought back to 
discourse (Sprachlichkeit) in order to be understood. But, for Gadamer, this 
Sprachlichkeit is no more than the letting-say again of our t radi t ion, the 
overcoming of the gap between the past and the present. In other words, 
language remains principally within an ontological perspective. From the 
lof ty position of an ontology of language the Methodenstreit is only a game 
of the uninit iated (355:780). 
Ricoeur reverses the downward gaze of Heidegger and Gadamer. 
With him there is no disdain nor a dazzling circumvention of the 
epistemologica! debate. Language not only says out our being, but i t equally 
manifests a structure and a strategy in its very saying. Let us explore this 
indirect ontology more closely. 
To describe the ontological dimension of language, Ricoeur 
borrows Gadamer's concept of Zugehörigkeit (part icipation, belonging-to). 
The notion of part icipation expresses a primordial relation of things to a 
source or foundation that is inclusive, encompassing, and global (375:227-
228). Participation expresses an ontological pre-eminence which says that a 
belonging to and a dependence on being is prior to any distinction between 
subject and object. The concept of part icipation breaks wi th any vision of a 
self-constituting subjectivi ty. Participation implies, that i t is not the 
subject who is the source of the unity of meaning, but something that 
precedes the subject. Subjectivity as wel l as object iv i ty are, therefore, 
secondary, derived forms. They are carried by and derived f rom 
part icipation (438:29). Similarly, explanation and understanding in the 
epistemologica! sense are derived forms. In the very heart of the 
epistemologica! process Ricoeur finds a notion of understanding that points 
beyond a concern for accuracy and validation to an "apprehension, at a level 
other than scient i f ic, of a belonging to the whole of what is" (434:165). 
Despite the dif ferent orientations of ontology and, therefore, of 
part icipat ion, Ricoeur, too, insists that before we speak, before we 
structure through language, before language is the product of a subjectivity, 
I am the being through whom existence, Being, comes to language. To say i t 
in Ricoeur's words, "The sense of human experience is made through us but 
not by us. We do not dominate the meaning, but meaning makes us at the 
same t ime that we make i t " (399:353, my translation). This condition is an 
ontological condit ion. We apperceive i t in situations in which I f ind myself 
without consciously having chosen them. These are very deep experiences 
of human f initude (375:228). They are experiences of being affected by 
things at whose source I do not stand (413:30;386:25). 
This notion of participation is borrowed f rom H.G. Gadamer. 
But already in L'homme fai l l ib le (152) Ricoeur investigated this 
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participation under the notion of feeling. ^  Feeling, he said there, is a 
mode of manifesting, not a mode of positing being. It stands in a correlative 
relationship with knowing. Feeling and knowing mutually generate each 
other. Feeling without knowing can be no more than a word. Knowing 
without feeling is no more than sophistry. Borrowing from Plato, who called 
the agency of the manifestation of being the thumos, the 'heart'. Ricoeur 
holds that feeling (the modern translation of thumos) mediates the 
participation in being. In the thumos, the bios, human life-energy, reaches 
out to consciousness. In other words already in the early, pre-linguistic 
phase of his philosophy, Ricoeur had investigated the reaching-out of the 
bios to logos (152:126). 
Basic to feeling for Ricoeur is its bonding power. It mediates 
between life and thought. It unites the vital, the psychic and the spiritual 
by relating us to the world in a manner that is much more profound than the 
relationships established by the cognitive process. The cognitive process by 
its very nature institutes the split between subject and object (139:263). 
Feeling unites and bonds us with being by attaching itself to things. It does 
so, because the intentional correlate of feeling is not an object, but 
something (the hateful, the lovable, the pleasing) 'meant' or 'felt' on things. 
Without the things, there would be no feeling. Feeling qualifies reality as 
desirable, as fearful, as hateful. Because feelings presuppose reality, they 
do not posit reality. At most, one can say that they manifest reality. They 
require reality in order to be able to manifest their quality. As 'meant' or 
'felt' on things "feeling attests our coaptation, our elective harmonies and 
disharmonies with realities whose affective image we carry in ourselves in 
the form of 'good' and 'bad'" (152:133). In intending reality, feeling 
expresses my affection. It is an intentional expression of my bond with 
reality, or of my existence with the outside, through desire and love 
(152:134). One may not think of this intentionality solely in subjective 
terms because feelings are objective, in the sense that through feeling 
"objects touch me" (152:135), reach out to me and link up with me. 
But feeling, while manifesting our participation with beings and 
with Being, is interrelated with knowing. Our participation in being through 
feeling is the inverse of objectification. It recognizes, that, before we are 
fragmented through knowing, before the subject opposes itself to the object 
in knowledge, there is a primordial belonging to being and the Being. 
However, human feeling remains indistinct, unconscious, and not human, 
unless it is informed by the knowing process. And in knowing, what was 
previously one in a vital affectivity, is split apart. Reason creates the 
degrees of feeling, and differentiates feeling. Reason becomes the source 
11. In the doctoral thesis Mystery and the Unconscious A Study in 
the Thought of Paul Ricoeur (Metuchen, N.3., the Scarecrow Press and the 
American Theological Library Association, 1977) Walter Lowe gives a 
lengthy analysis of genèse réciproque, a term used in L'homme faillible, 
which, according to Lowe, has a similar weighting as participation. 
However, Lowe allows that its importance is made more explicit in 
Ricoeur's later writings. See p.30-82. 
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oí the conf l ic t in l i fe between feeling and reason. 
This earlier elaboration of feeling finds its linguistic counterpart 
in the notion of participation in Ricoeur's later work. The interaction of 
feeling and knowing in L'homme fai l l ib le has i ts parallel in the process 
whereby our participation in Being is released from its diffuseness and 
indeterminateness. In addition, human part icipation in Being seeks to come 
to understanding. It can only do so to the extent that the experience of 
part icipation is externalized. And this occurs at the moment when we 
interrupt our participation in order to signify i t (398:239). 
2. Distanciation. 
The externalization of our participation into some form of 
object i f icat ion Ricoeur, again following Gadamer, calls distanciation 
(434:166). But despite his borrowing of the term distanciation f rom 
Gadamer, Ricoeur disagrees wi th his evaluation of distanciation. For 
Gadamer, the objecti f ication or distanciation of our participation in Being 
represent the alienation of our t ime. For him, this distanciation is our 
unfortunate exile f rom the home of being and needs to be overcome. For 
Ricoeur, our very part icipation in Being requires distanciation. For h im, 
distanciation is the condition of the possibility for the interpretat ion of our 
part icipat ion. Zugehörigkeit seeks exteriorization and object i f icat ion, "To 
invoke distanciation as a principle is to attempt to show the very experience 
of belonging to ... requires something like externalization in order to 
apprehend, art iculate and understand i tself" (422:691). I t presupposes that 
the being in which we participate is itself a dynamic principle that seeks not 
only to exteriorize i tself, but also to be understood (386:52-53). 
The difference between Gadamer and Ricoeur stand out quite 
clearly. For Gadamer, distance is to be abolished for the sake of 
understanding. Ricoeur seeks distanciation to make understanding possible. 
This distinction becomes even more evident when we take their di f fer ing 
approaches to language into consideration. 
Both Heidegger and Gadamer weigh the ontological dimension of 
language. Language shows or lets-say being. While not denying this 
ontological dimension, Ricoeur is careful not to distinguish sagen and 
sprechen so radically. For h im, too, language is the basic externalization of 
being. In language being says i tself. In fac t , in saying itself in language, 
being becomes itself (375:237). In the exteriorization of language and or of 
some other external mark, the experience of being is intensified (422:692). 
But this exteriorization is, at the same t ime, a creation of a distance 
between the speaker and real i ty. And, since for Ricoeur this distanciation is 
the transcendental condition of the apprehension of being, he perceives 
language as the exteriorization not only of our part icipation, but also of our 
distanciation. While for Gadamer Sprachlichkeit is i tself part of the 
ontological moment, as the language dimension of al l experience (406:15), 
for Ricoeur, language is at the same t ime a moment of distanciation. This 
distanciation through language is consti tut ive of part icipat ion. I t is 
pr imi t ive and radiceli in the fu l l sense of the word (413:34-35). And because 
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the distanciation is itselí original, language, and beyond it writing becomes 
possible and provides us with a medium of understanding. 
fcor Ricoeur, this dimension is strengthened even more. He 
accepts the position which François Dagognet advanced in Écriture et 
iconographie, 12 concerning the image and writing. Dagognet holds that an 
image is not a diminution or a copy of reality, but an intensification of 
reality. By its ability to concentrate reality and to combine dimensions, 
exteriorization increases our experience, rather than erodes it. The 
distanciation by way of language is, therefore, more than a mere distance, 
for it implies a creation of distance, in order to permit a redescription of 
reality. 
3. The hermeneutics of poetic language. 
If Ricoeur follows the indirect ontology of Merleau-Ponty, it 
must be added that he is much more specific about which expressions or 
which language can be the bearer of the indirect ontology. Ricoeur's 
attention is drawn to the creative dimension of language. It is there that he 
seeks the manifestation of the arche and the telos of being. 
Ricoeur, therefore, does not seek the language of being in the 
language of the physical sciences. In the physical sciences one can forego 
the emphasis upon the language of participation without creating a crisis. In 
the physical sciences the insistence upon mathematicizing reality has turned 
reality into an object vis-à-vis my subjectivity. The primary aim of its 
language is not to express my participation in being, but my ability to 
manipulate what the distanciation has enabled me to recognize and 
articulate. Distanciation is like the fissure across which one can build the 
bridge of method. But the experience of the physical sciences is not totally 
devoid of the experience of participation. But, for Ricoeur, it is not the 
privileged sphere in which our participation in being is manifested. The 
descriptive language of the physical sciences in its search for exactitude and 
univocity is less capable of evoking our source or foundation in being. 
Now, just as Heidegger proposed that the privileged locus of the 
manifestation of being must be sought in the pre-Socratic poets, in an 
ontology prior to metaphysics (377:101), Ricoeur has invested poetics with 
the charge of relinquishing the secret of our bond. The language of being is, 
therefore, not just any language. Its logic is the intended ambiguity of 
poetry. Its form is not merely a word, not merely a sentence, but a poetic 
text or an oeuvre. In other words we must turn once again to the text, the 
poetic text, as the manifester of the ontological ground. 
Ricoeur is aware that the approach to being by way of the text 
appears to break apart the carefully constructed unity of Heidegger's and 
Gadamer's hermeneutics. Does a text-theory with its multitude of texts not 
threaten to once again regionalize hermeneutics? Ricoeur's response to the 
12. See above, p.36. 
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charge is that the basic issue of hermeneutics remains for him the 'art of 
understanding', but that he seeks to apply it to the interpretation of texts 
(406:16). It is not strictly speaking, as he warns us, "A hermeneutics of the 
text, but a hermeneutics based on the problematics of the text" (406:16). 
Moreover, as we shall see, Ricoeur's notion of text is not as narrow as it 
may seem at first. It possesses an universality peculiar to itself since it is 
not limited only to literary, written texts, but also to any activity that has 
the qualities of textuaJity, that is, of inscriptability in signs in the form of a 
work. Along these lines history can also be considered a text.13 in fact, 
'text' becomes the name for any object of hermeneutical inquiry, even 
human existence. It circumscribes the hermeneutical field, even though 
Ricoeur warns that it remains but one point of departure (406:16). In short, 
one might equate Ricoeur's hermeneutics of the text with his philosophy 
itself: a hermeneutic phenomenology.^* 
What are the advantages of this point of departure? Mainly two. 
The first advantage is Ricoeur's brand of ontology. His ontology is indirect 
and methodical. He refuses the direct ontology of Heidegger, opting instead 
for the route towards the ontological mapped out by the strategy and the 
creative leaps of language itself which are inscribed in the text. By opting 
for this route he circumvents a series of obstacles that confront a direct 
ontology. 
A second advantage, which for Ricoeur is equally important, is 
epistemologica!. A hermeneutics based on the problematics of the text 
allows Ricoeur to rejoin the epistemologica! concerns of Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey. Can the interpretation of texts (Dilthey's 'expressions of life fixed 
in writing') be undertaken with a rigour that brings it beyond guessing or 
intuition? What is the epistemologica! status of an interpretation of a text? 
The theory of the text opens up new possibilities of dissolving the dichotomy 
between explanation and understanding that neo-Kantianism left as its 
heritage. Text-theory blends explanation and understanding so inextricably 
that, according to Ricoeur, there can be no understanding without 
explanation and no explanation without understanding. 
The approach presents Ricoeur, however, with one fundamental 
problematic. Does the theory of the text allow for making the distanciation 
occasioned by the text productive? Can the text effect the appropriation, 
or the re-appropriation, of one's participation in being? Can the 
objectification of the primordial experience in the text be transcended so 
that the text is more than an expression of our alienation? It is Ricoeur's 
13. See, for example, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action 
Considered as a Text" (370:529-562). 
14. See David Pellauer, "The Significance of the Text in Paul 
Ricoeur's Hermeneutical Theory" in Studies in the Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur, edited by Charles E. Reagan, Athens, Ohio University Press, 1979, 
p.97-114. 
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gamble that a passage can be found from the texture of the text to the self-
understanding of the reader (389:129).15 
15. In the article "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation" 
(389) Ricoeur proposes the real or imagined antinomy between explanatory 
procedures and the fundamental reality that we participate in the following 
way, "Either we have the methodological attitude and lose the ontological 
density of the reality under study or we have the attitude of truth and must 
give up the objectivity of the human sciences" (389:129). Ricoeur refuses 
the antinomy, seeking instead a mediation of explanation and understanding. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: MEANING AND TIME. 
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The marriage of hermeneutics with phenomenology has a number 
of interesting repercussions. More than any other movement, hermeneutics 
destroys the idealism of Husserlian phenomenology. But it does not destroy 
phenomenology itself. In fact, Ricoeur insists that phenomenology and 
hermeneutics belong together (398:223). Phenomenology remains the 
foundation of hermeneutics. In Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen, Ricoeur 
discovers a phenomenology, whose method is described in terms of an 
Auslegung, an interpretation, an elucidation of significations. And although 
that does not make Husserl's phenomenology a hermeneutics, it does offer 
an inroad for the interpénétration of phenomenology and hermeneutics (Cf. 
398:242-252). Hermeneutics' searching out for a hermeneutical equivalent 
113 
in phenomenology, will bear its fruit, when we shall consider how Ricoeur 
proposes to re-introduce the appropriation of the subject. 
For the moment, however, we must consider another aspect of 
the interpénétration of hermeneutics and phenomenology. Husserl's search 
for a final foundation of objectivity, according to Ricoeur, encounters its 
limit in an ontology of understanding. Every effort of justification, that 
purports to be final, must recognize that it is borne by a relation that 
precedes it. Every relation of a subject and an object is ultimately grounded 
in the relation of participation. An ontology of understanding is an ontology 
of finitude. All understanding is finite understanding. For Ricoeur, that is 
the very heart of the hermeneutical experience (398:228). To say it in other 
words, hermeneutical understanding is historical understanding. 
At its most universal level, one might say that whenever people 
communicate with one another in ordinary language, hermeneutics is 
involved. Ordinary language is by definition ambiguous language, because 
the words of ordinary language are polysemie and the actual use of these 
polysemie words does not exhaust the potential meanings of these words. 
The context of the sentence determines the meaning. This function of the 
context in selecting the actual meaning is the most extensive application 
one can give to the notion of interpretation. Aristotle understood 
hermeneutics along these lines. He called hermeneia the very process of the 
mediation by way of signs of our relation to things. Language by its nature 
is hermeneia (337:149). At this level, Ricoeur says, "interpretation is the 
process, by which, in the play of question and answer, the interlocutors 
determine together the contextual values that structure their conversation" 
(398:229-230). 
For Ricoeur, however, this definition of interpretation is too 
limiting. The model of conversation restricts interpretation to the face-to-
face communication. The field of hermeneutics finds its favorite focus not 
in the short conversational relationship, but in the much broader field of 
historical intersubjectivity. Hermeneutics seeks out the relationships with 
our predecessors, our contemporaries, and our successors. That relationship 
is a relationship of historical transmission or tradition. Hermeneutics brings 
in the historical connection. It promotes the communication with 
institutions, social roles, and collectivities (398:230). 
This transmission of an historical tradition is mediated by texts, 
that is, the documents and monuments in which that historical tradition has 
become fixated. Although these documents and texts have received a 
certain autonomy, as we saw above, they may not be hypostatized. They 
remain part of the historical connection. This means that hermeneutics 
does not place us at the foundation of things, but right in the middle of 
things: neither at the beginning nor at the end (398:231). Hermeneutics 
places us in the middle of a conversation which we did not begin, but it helps 
to orient us in that conversation, so that we can make our contribution, 
without it being at the same time, the last word. But this is only one 
dimension of the historical dimension of hermeneutics. For the moment we 
shall put it aside, in order to return to it in the subsequent chapters. In this 
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chapter we shall examine the more ontologica! side of the historical 
dimension. 
The interaction between phenomenology and hermeneutics also 
has ontological repercussions. We saw above that, for Ricoeur, our 
participation in being is dialectically paired with distanciation. This 
distanciation, contrary to Gadamer's opinion, is not an alienation to be 
overcome, but an indispensible condition. Phenomenology confirms that the 
distanciation is constitutive of participation. It posits that every 
consciousness of meaning is possible only if there is an epoche, a moment of 
distanciation. As Ricoeur says, "Phenomenology begins when, not content 
with 'living' - or with 'reliving' - , we interrupt the lived in order to signify 
it" (398:238). In that exchange between the lived and the signification of 
the lived, the sign retains its ontological depth as long as it is not forgotten 
that the èpoche is only a philosophical gesture. The breach it inaugurates 
between the sign and the thing is not an absolute or permanent chasm. They 
remain in dialectical tension with each other (398:238-239). 
Now this dialectical tension hermeneutics applies to its region of 
competence: historical existence. Its lived experience is the historical 
connection that is mediated by the transmission of the works, documents 
and institutions of our historical existence. It makes little difference that 
hermeneutics calls the lived experience, participation, and the epoche, 
distanciation. Corresponding to the consciousness of the meaning in 
phenomenology, hermeneutics knows of a consciousness of the historical 
connection. In Gadamer's terms it is a wirkungSReschichtliches Bewusstsein, 
a consciousness of the efficacity of history. Hermeneutics owes its 
existence to the fact that we no longer are satisfied with our participation 
in existence as historical, but interrupt it to signify it (398:239). 
In this Chapter we shall examine how Ricoeur has worked out the 
temporal and historical dimensions of poetic texts. We shall not turn to 
specific poetic texts but to genres of texts, going from the most dense to 
the least dense texts. It is Ricoeur's contention that symbol and myth as 
well as fiction and history speak to existence as temporal. It should be 
noted, however, that most of Ricoeur's investigation into symbol and myth 
antedates his hermeneutical work. For that reason, his insistence on the 
temporal dimension is not as strongly pronounced in the text of La 
symbolique du mal (153) and De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud (227) as it 
will be in later works. And yet, as we shall see, it is not absent. It is more 
implicit than explicit. It comes to its full flowering when Ricoeur comes to 
his analysis of the narrative. 
A. THE SYMBOL. 
For Ricoeur, the symbol is language at its most intensive level. 
He began his investigation of the symbol in La symbolique du mal (153) in 
the context of his philosophy of the will. This philosophy of the will, as he 
says in Le volontaire et l'involontaire (29:3-3*), seeks to clarify the 
structures and acts of the will according to a threefold game plein. The first 
115 
work, Le volontaire et l'involontaire (29), examines the eidetic structures of 
the will, unencumbered by the question of evil and transcendence. The 
second approach, Finitude et culpabilité (152, 153), removes the époché of 
evil, while a third work, yet to be written, will re-mtroduce the sacred. The 
removal of the époché of evil in L'homme faillible (152) and La symbolique 
du mal (153) makes Ricoeur look for the locus where the pathétique of evil 
surfaces in the cultural realm. This locus he takes to be the symbol.* 
Ricoeur's fascination with the symbol lies in the promise of its 
linguistic abundance to lead him to the root of language and existence. As 
he wrote in 1962, 
"If we raise the problem of symbol now, at this period of history, 
we do so in connection with certain traits of our 'modernity' and as a 
rejoinder to this modernity. ... In the very age in which our language 
is becoming more precise, more univocal, more technical, better 
suited to those integral formalizations that are called precisely 
'symbolic' logic ... - it is in this age of discourse that we wish to 
recharge language, start again from the fulness of language (320:288). 
The symbol and its interpretation is again the central theme of 
De l'interprétation (227). In this work Ricoeur looks at the oneiric 
dimension of the symbol in dream-language through the psychoanalytic 
theory of Freud. Inasmuch as the psychoanalytic theory of Freud is a 
cultured theory, Ricoeur is able to discover in symbolics the great cultural 
struggle between Eros and Thanatos, between the arche and the telos of 
existence, between freedom and bondage. More and more the symbol 
becomes for him the rejoinder to our cultural problematic. 
The theme is continued in Le conflit des interprétations (320). 
Here Ricoeur examines in greater detail the difficulties of interpreting the 
symbol. Because of its intended ambiguity, the symbol can either disclose 
our bond with being or the sacred or dissimulate or distort it. To clarify this 
ambiguity, Ricoeur is forced more and more to elaborate the semantic 
constitution of the ambiguous language. This he does in La métaphore vive 
(^17). La métaphore vive seems from this perspective to be no more than a 
great effort to bolster his theory of the symbol semantically. But in the 
semantic analysis of the symbol he suddenly perceived that his definition of 
the symbol as double-meaning language required a modification. A study of 
language reveals that symbol is not only language, but a mixed form. The 
symbol is a mixed form of language and force. 
1. Cf. A. Cipollone, "Symbol in the Philosophy of Ricoeur" in The 
New Scholasticism 52, 1978, p.lW-167; 3. van Bergen, "'Het symbool geeft 
te denken.' Een studie in Ricoeur" in Tiidschr.Theol. 13, 1973, p.166-188; 
T. Peters, "The Problem of Symbolic Reference" in The Thomist Ψ*, 1980, 
р.72-9Э. 
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1. The symbol and language. 
For Ricoeur, the symbol situates itself at the edge of language. 
More precisely, the symbol is found at the point where language emerges out 
of its pre-linguistic ground «fl6:143). The symbol, then, is already a word. 
The symbol is already language. But, at the same time, it evokes its pre-
linguistic source. Two universes are linked together in the symbol, one of 
which is linguistic, and the other non-linguistic (416:143). As early as in La 
symbolique du mal Ricoeur wrote: 
But symbols are already in the element of speech. We have said 
sufficiently that they rescue feeling and even fear from silence and 
confusion; in virtue of them, man remains language through and 
through (153:350). 
In "Langage religieux" he writes, 
Symbolism ... places us at the threshold of the word and of 
silence. That privileged frontier marks perhaps the point of birth of 
all language, just as it marks the exigency and the operativeness of 
being. The silence is the ground from which the tenacity of the word 
loosens itself, in order to break the silence, in order to speak once 
more, before being silent. It is a plea for the word in the presence of 
the silence from which the symbol snatches us (271:133, my 
translation).^ 
Ricoeur is attracted to the symbol, because the symbol is 
already language, while it sits at the threshold of language. Because of this 
unique position of the symbol, he calls it the fullness of language (e.g., 
227:30). In fact, it is language's first exploration and manifestation of what 
is not yet language, but which strives toward it. What that language 
explores is the inexpressible region of what grounds life. The philosopher, 
seeking entry into that region, may not destroy the delicate balance, the 
tension, which the symbol maintains between the linguistic and the non-
linguistic. Inattention to the delicate relationship could lead to the 
forgetfulness of being (271:132). 
2. "Le symbolisme ... nous place aux confins même de la parole et 
du silence; cette frontière privilégiée marque peut-être, au même titre que 
tout à l'heure l'impérativité ou l'opérativité de l'être, le point de naissance 
de tout langage. Le silence est le fond sur lequel se détache l'opiniâtreté de 
verbe à convertir l'inexprimable en exprimable, à rompre le silence, à dire 
encore, avant de se taire. C'est un plaidoyer pour la parole face au silence 
que le symbole nous arrache." 
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This warning puts us on guard against a view of the symbol as a 
free exploration of the pre-linguistic region. Symbolic language is bound 
language. It is bound in two manners. It is bound to and bound by 
(416:151-156; 227:31). 
First of all, what lies prior to language becomes bound to the 
language that begins to express it. The language of the symbol is a special 
type of language. The emergent language is language at its point of birth. 
The symbol is the moment of the creation of language, the moment when 
language first captures its own ground. As such, symbol must be defined as 
a word that effects something in relation to being (271:129). 
For Ricoeur, this bond of the non-semantic to language occurs 
primarily in three fields: psychoanalysis, religion and poetics. In each field 
the symbolic language is a manner of controlling, regulating, evoking, 
avoiding, dissimulating, revealing, and participating in its non-semantic 
dimension. 
The clearest example, for Ricoeur, lies in psychoanalysis. For 
psychoanalysis the dream is the mediator between the conscious and the 
unconscious. As Freud perceived it, the unconscious is that dimension of our 
subjectivity that is burgeoning towards language, without it being, as yet, 
language. It is only latent language (227:453). In the dream-text of the 
waking hour the unconscious achieves a linguistic dimension. But the high 
symbolic content of that language shows it to be a language, where desire 
meets meaning, where drives meet their representations or affective 
substitutes. The language of the dream-text mixes together desire and 
language. "The symbol hesitates on the boundary line between bios and 
logos" (416:153, my translation).^ 
The same bond between the non-semantic and the semantic is 
present in religious symbolism. In religious symbolism one is confronted 
with the sacred and the power of the sacred. In their primordial form 
religious symbols employ the elements of the universe and of vegetation, 
such as, the heavens, the earth, rocks, water and plants, to figure 
immensity, power, birth, growth and death. These cosmic symbols are 
hierophanic. They manifest the sacred. Their power and efficacy, as the 
phenomenology of religion has indicated, do not necessarily break through in 
the word. As Ricoeur notes, 
To the transcendent divine there opposes itself a sacred that is 
near, witnessed in the fertility of the soil, the exuberance of 
vegetation, the well-being of the herds, the fecundity of the maternal 
womb. In the sacred universe the living are not dispersed here or 
there, but there is life as a total and diffuse sacrality which manifests 
itself in the cosmic rhythms, in the return of vegetation, in the 
3. "Le symbole hésite sur la ligne de partage entre bios et logos." 
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alteration of births and deaths (^16Ά5^-155, my translation).* 
But the rock, the heavens, etc., do not become truly hierophanic, unless the 
cosmos is imbued with the word. "Only in the universe of discourse do these 
realities take on the symbolic dimension" (227:1*). It is the language that 
accompanies the cosmic elements that permits the figurative to emerge out 
of the symbol of Heaven, Earth, Rock and Water (404:62-63). 
In other words, these symbols do not come to language-except 
after passing through the elements of the world. "In the sacred universe the 
capacity to say is based upon the capacity of the cosmos to signify" 
(416:155, my translation).^ If a logic exists, it is a logic that finds its roots 
in the very structure of the universe. By way of the sacred hierophanies of 
the universe, the sacred reveals itself in the word and the gesture. 
Religious symbolism brings to language and manifests the power of the 
sacred more clearly than the oneiric symbols of the recounted dream. 
We have already indicated in a previous chapter the bound 
language of poetic images.^ The poetic images bind us to being precisely by 
abolishing and subverting the reference of the describable and manipulable 
world. The poetic image is a mixture of language and mood, bonding us in 
feeling to the world of being. 
The mixed language of the symbol seems, according to Ricoeur, 
to principally express something like power, efficacity or force. Symbolic 
language would then designate the human or being as a power, a force, an 
efficacity to exist. It does so from below through our dreams as a desire 
and an effort to be, as a power of drives, and through our poetic images as 
the power to open up new possible worlds in which we can live, as a power of 
creative existence. It does so from above in the religious symbols as the 
power of the sacred to heal and to destroy (416:156). But more about this 
later. 
But, second, once the pre-linguistic is captured by language, it 
binds that language to itself. The language is bound by the symbolic 
meaning. The language becomes a weighted language. It bears within it not 
only its literal meaning, but also simultaneously, in tension with the first 
4. "Au divin transcendant s'oppose ainsi un sacré prochain, attesté 
dans la fertilité du sol, l'exubérance végétale, la prospérité des troupeaux, la 
fécondité du sein maternel. Dans l'univers sacré il n'y a pas des vivants ici 
ou là, mais la vie comme sacralité totale et diffuse, qui se laisse voir dans 
les rythmes cosmiques, dans le retour de la végétation, dans l'alternance des 
naissances et des morts." 
5. "Dans l'univers sacré la capacité de dire est fondée dans la 
capacité du cosmos du signifier." 
6. See above p.67-69. 
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meaning, a second meaning. This meaning is the symbolic, figurative one. 
The literal meaning is invaded by this second meaning and becomes imbued 
with the force of the second meaning (320(247):6^-65). That is why the first 
meaning, if taken literally, would be, to use a phrase of 3ean Cohen, 
semantically impertinent. It is filled with another meaning which is not 
linguistic itself, but which is evoked by the first. In speaking of this force 
that invades language, Ricoeur points toward an excess, a surplus, an 
overdetermination, of symbolic language (^16:149; 227Ά96). Its excess or 
surplus is evocative of what seeks to come to language. That is why a 
symbol is like a movement. It is not a movement from the literal meaning 
to the symbolic meaning but it is a transfer from one level to another within 
and through the literal meaning. 
The semantic, therefore, is bound by the non-semantic. A 
specific language invades the pre-linguistic realm of desire and the sacred. 
That language not only qualifies and affects desire, force, and the sacred, 
but is in turn itself qualified. The sacred, desire, and force invade a specific 
human culture (153:4l). 
This point is of considerable importance to Ricoeur. The pre-
linguistic that comes to language in the symbol is historically, culturally and 
geographically oriented. For our Western civilization this formulation is 
Greek and 3ewish. In that sense the language limits the symbol. In La 
symbolique du mal and De l'interprétation Ricoeur recalls that our cultural 
memory reverts to the symbols and myths that underly our Western 
consciousness. 
These two cultures, which would contain nothing exceptional for 
an eye not situated anywhere in particular, constitute the first 
stratum of our philosophical memory. More precisely, the encounter 
of the Jewish source with the Greek origin is the fundamental 
intersection that founds our culture (153:20). 
If this appears as something of a scandal in our desire for truth, it remains 
an unavoidable fact, that an affectively binding perspective of a universal 
culture is not as yet avallale to us (153:2^). But the fact does point out the 
significant factor that in a specific culture desire, force and the sacred 
manifest themselves in a specific language.' 
7. Like Philip Wheelwright (The Burning Fountain, op. cit.) Ricoeur 
recognizes that this contingent linkage of the symbol with language leads to 
a hierarchy of symbols and furthermore to a gradation of durability and 
importance (^17:352, note 41). On the lowest rung are the images and 
symbols that predominate in one poem. This is followed by the preferred 
images and symbols through which a poet expresses him or herself in his/her 
entire oeuvre. Beyond the single poet we discover a scheme of symbols that 
may pervade an entire cultural tradition such eis the Western civilization. A 
fourth type of symbol is transcultural, inasmuch as it binds together people 
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2. The symbol and the metaphor. 
The linkage of the symbol with language has a consequence, 
however, which Ricoeur did not recognize in his earlier works on the symbol. 
If the symbol is already language, it possesses a form or a structure. 
However bizarre its predicates may be, symbols operate with ordinary 
sememes, lexemes and morphemes (320(247):79). In his more recent works 
Ricoeur has engaged himself, therefore, in a semantic exploration of the 
figure. And when he does so, he discovers that the semantic structure of 
the symbol is remarkably similar to that of the metaphor (416:148-151; 
421:53-57). 
Without repeating what was said above about the metaphor, we 
may signal here the relationship between the literal and the figurative 
meaning. The metaphor can help us to focus upon the linguistic affinity of 
the symbol. The symbol, we have already pointed out, refers to and solicits 
the non-linguistic by means of language. Its language bears the excess 
which did not come to language. It is this excess that brings about the 
tension between the literal meaning and the surplus. It is the tension that 
brings about the work of interpretation which transforms the semantic 
impertinence to a pertinence. In other words, semantically the mystery of 
the symbol is reducible to the functioning of the metaphor. 
But to acknowledge that the semantic structure of the symbol 
repeats that of the metaphor intensifies the significance of the metaphor. 
The metaphorical utterance of the symbol invests the metaphor with a depth 
and rootedness which it could not be given in our previous discussion. We 
are taken beyond the realm of apprehension, because the exploration of the 
sacred by the symbol assimilates us to that which the symbol refers (423:56¡ 
227:17). This existential quality of the symbol distinguishes it from what 
appears to be the much freer composition of the metaphor. The metaphor 
has transgressed into the realm of the logos more fully than the symbol. 
The symbol is found on the boundary line between the bios and the logos. 
The symbol binds us to existence. This existential intensity, when it 
translates itself into a metaphor, permits us to qualify those metaphors as 
'root' metaphors (423:64). 
The root metaphor like a symbol touches the "durable 
constellations of life, feeling, and the universe" (423:64). But how can a 
metaphor remain a living metaphor, that is, how can the metaphor retain 
the tensile moment, and at the same time attain the durability of the 
symbol? Ricoeur resolves this dilemna by suggesting that the invasion of 
of different cultures in certain religious or secular symbols. Finally, there 
are the archetypes, the great symbols that bind together large segments of 
humanity. Symbols such as the moon, the shadows, lordship, are common to 
many cultures and effect humanity's relationship to the depth-structures of 
life. By the participation of metaphors in that great work of assembling 
humanity, they attain a durability and tenacity and creativity, that 
transcends their original instance de discours. Cf. 408:173-174;4I6:158. 
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the metaphor by the symbol creates a whole network of metaphors. Thus, 
for example, the Hebraic tradition calls God King, Father, Husband, Lord, 
Shepherd, Rock, Fortress, Redeemer. All of these metaphors are gathered 
into the one metaphor. But also any one of these metaphors suggests the 
others so that they remain alive by means of their power to signify the other 
metaphors. The root metaphor is the metaphor that, on the one hand, 
gathers ail the partial metaphors into one, and, on the other hand, allows the 
scattering into a variety of related fields. This scattering is virtually 
limitless. This metaphorical scattering is, in fact, the force of the symbolic 
experience. But to avoid irretrievable scattering, there are root metaphors 
which organize the particles into a network of intersignifications (423:64). 
As Ricoeur remarks, 
Everything indicates that symbolic experience calls for a work of 
meaning from metaphor, a work which it partially provides through its 
organizational network and its hierarchical levels. Everything 
indicates that symbol systems constitute a reservoir of meaning whose 
metaphorical potential is yet to be spoken (423:65). 
But the assimilation of things to one another and of ourselves to 
things which the power of the symbol expresses and effects is not without 
tension. This is exemplified in the very structure of the metaphor. The 
tensile structure of the metaphor may itself reflect the tensile structure of 
reality. The very tensile structure of the metaphor may bring to expression 
and clarify a dimension of reality which the symbol only confusedly 
expresses (423:69). We must investigate a little further the tension and 
profusion of the symbol. 
3. The surplus of the symbol. 
The bios, the energy, force and exigency of life, we have said, 
reaches the logos in the symbol. But the logos is hardly adequate to 
encompass the bios. There is a surplus of meaning in the logos, because it 
makes available in language form what lies prior to language. For that 
reason, there exists a relationship of meaning between the meaning of the 
language of the symbol and the meaning of what lies prior to language. In 
this relationship between meaning and meaning, the literal meaning of the 
symbolic word comes to bear some type of analogical relationship to the 
symbolic meaning. 
In the symbol, I cannot objectify the analogical relation that 
connects the second meaning with the first. It is by living in the first 
meaning that I am led by it beyond itself. The symbolic meaning is 
constituted in and by the literal meaning which effects the analogy in 
giving the analogue. ... In fact, unlike a comparison that we consider 
from the outside, the symbol is a movement of the primary meaning 
which makes us participate in the latent meaning and thus assimilates 
us to that which is symbolized without our being able to master the 
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similitude intellectually. It is in this sense that the symbol is 
donative; it is donative because it is a primary intentionality that 
gives the second meaning analogically (153:15-16). 
On the semantic level Ricoeur calls this surplus, or its 
psychological term overdetermination (320(229): 14), polysemy or intended 
ambiguity.* The ambiguity is intended or provoked because the univocal 
language cannot be adequate to the reality to be brought to language. The 
language is, therefore, existentially ambiguous. 
A first consequence of this ambiguous twisting of language is 
that symbolic language, like metaphorical language, requires the work of 
interpretation. In La métaphore vive (416) Ricoeur emphasized the work of 
interpretation that is required to make an impertinent predication pertinent 
(416:90-100). For Ricoeur the field of interpretation is co-extensive to the 
work of unravelling the intentional ambiguity of symbolic language. 
Secondly, because of the ambiguity, the symbol is open to more 
than one interpretation. ' This quality inheres in the symbol itself. 
Ambiguity is part of the ontological fibre of the symbol itself. The being 
that is expressed in the symbol is itself ambiguous. In this context, Ricoeur 
likes to quote Aristotle's saying that Being is said in many ways 
(320(247):67). The symbol's ambiguity is expressed in the very tension 
created by the relationship of meaning to meaning. "It is the raison d'être 
of symbolism to disclose the multiplicity of meaning out of the ambiguity of 
being" (320(247):68, my translat ion).^ For in analyzing the symbol, one 
becomes aware that symbols are both regressive and prospective. Thus, for 
instance, dream symbols take one back to one's infancy. Poetic images, on 
the other hand, are prospective, inasmuch as they grasp hold of one's 
personal synthesis or one's future (227:175) in sympathetic imagination 
(153:9). But this regression to one's archaism in dream symbols and this 
prospection of oneself in the figures of wholeness are not mutually 
exclusive. A symbol, as its Greek root says, brings together. By immersing 
one in one's archaism - which is, in fact, the archaism of humanity 
8. See above p.63-67. 
9. The truth of the intended double meaning language is examined 
in the semantic study of metaphorical language. While maintaining a bond 
between metaphorical language and reality, Ricoeur is hardly able to 
indicate a criteriology of metaphorical truth beyond saying that it is 
measured by its appropriateness and by the work of resemblance. See above 
p.83-85; 417:235. It hardly helps in resolving the problem of literary 
criticism which asks which text is true or which text permits us to glimpse 
reality in its truthfulness. To my knowledge Ricoeur has not addressed 
himself to this question. 
10. "C'est la raison d'être du symbolisme d'ouvrir la multiplicité du 
sens sur l'équivocité de l'être." 
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(153:13) - the symbol explores simultaneously what might be. Hence the 
symbolism of evil reflects not only the archaism of evil, the beginning of 
evil, but also the future of evil, that is, its end (227:40). For that reason a 
symbol has two vectors. It is both a repetition of our childhood and an 
exploration of our adulthood. The surplus of the symbol manifests itself in 
this double movement of regression and prospection. 
This vision of the surplus of the symbol presupposes that the 
symbol under consideration be a living symbol. Only a living symbol is 
prospective and exploratory of my future. The so-called sedimented 
symbols of our culture have lost that power. Only in the creative moment, 
in the clash and tension of the poetic production, does the imagination give 
us a glimpse of wholeness and of the future (227:521ff).ll 
But the surplus of the symbol manifests not only the double 
movement of regression and prospection but also another movement which 
intersects with the first. It is the movement of disclosure and disguise. 
Ricoeur has investigated this movement of revelation and dissembling within 
the symbol at even greater length than the movement of regression and 
prospection. Thus, in the three major earlier works dealing with symbolic 
form and its interpretation Ricoeur investigated the revelatory character of 
the symbol in La symbolique du mal (153), the dissimulating character of the 
symbol in De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud (227), and the tension and 
conflict of these two interpretations in Le conflit des interprétations (320). 
He has applied his analysis particularly to the culturally sedimented symbols 
of the phenomenology of religion and of psychoanalysis. 
Thus the symbol investigated by the phenomenology of religion 
manifests the power of the cosmic symbols to bond one to the sacred. These 
symbols are fundamentally revelatory. Phenomenology of religion perceives 
the symbol as a linguistic form expressing and manifesting the sacred. But 
on the other hand, the dream symbols investigated by psychoanalysis do not 
fundamentally manifest but disguise and dissimulate. Instead of manifesting 
our bond with primordial desiring, dream symbols in the narrated form 
dissimulate. For psychoanalysis the symbol throws us off the track. It hides 
what it expresses. Within the framework of psychoanalysis, one should not 
permit the symbol to speak, one should not follow the prospect of the 
symbol, without first unscrambling the screening process that the dream 
symbols throw up to block the access to the effort and desire to be. 
Psychoanalysis perceives its task to be to destroy the disguise of desire in 
order to permit the symbol to manifest itself. 
Here we have two symbolic forms and two differing and opposing 
interpretations. But the tension that is expressed here between two 
11. Among the hierarchy of symbols the dream symbol occupies the 
lowest level, since dream symbols are not creative symbols but take up 
'stereotyped and fragmented remains of symbols'. They are "so worn with 
use that they have nothing but a past" (227:505). Dream symbols are nothing 
but vestiges, while creative symbols surge with meaning (227:499-500). 
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distinctive symbolic forms, also exists within the symbol as part of its 
surplus of meaning. In other words, the conflict and tension is not 
extraneous to the symbol and present only in its interpretation. The conflict 
of interpretation manifests an internal struggle within the symbol itself. It 
is the tension within the symbol itself that gives rise to conflicting 
interpretations. 
The movement of the projection of our possibilities is interlinked 
with the movement of regression into our archaism. Before the symbols 
unleash their power to project and guide us into our adulthood, they take us 
not only through the movement of regression, but also through the painful 
labour of unscrambling the disguise of our desire. The symbol is, therefore, 
not only a passive indicator of this tension of regression and exploration, but 
also an active power in the process of becoming. Symbolic language, to use 
Austin's expression, is performative language. It effects the bond, the 
relation which it signifies (271:130-131). Thus, 
culture is nothing else than this epigénesis or onthogenesis of the 
'images' of man's becoming adult. The creation of 'works', 
'monuments', and cultural 'institutions' is not something projected by a 
human symbolizing power which is brought to light by regressive 
analysis. It is the emergence of Bildung... That is how they are 
paideia, education, eruditio, Bildung. They are open to what they have 
disclosed (320:118- ÎW. 
For Ricoeur, the symbol is precisely the encounter of these two 
movements (227:f9<f). It mediates the dialectic between regression and 
projection without which it cannot effect its power. They retain their 
power as long as the dialectic of regression and projection remain in effect. 
And the regression is equally a dissimulation: 
But if symbols are fantasies that have been denied and 
overcome, they are never fantasies that have been abolished. That is 
why one is never certain that a given symbol of the sacred is not 
simply a 'return of the repressed'... The two functions of symbol 
remain inseparable. The symbolic meanings closest to theological and 
philosophical speculation are always involved with some trace of 
archaic myth (227:543). 
Ultimately, according to Ricoeur, the self depends both on the unconscious, 
the arche of existence, and the sacred, the telos of existence. The self 
moves in the tension of the arche and the telos in the process of a summons 
directed to it to become adult (320(191):333). Symbols point one to one's 
ground which is at the same time one's end. One can say with Ricoeur that 
symbols are indeed the prophecy of consciousness (320(191 ):333). They 
summon us beyond the present configurations of life in the dynamism of the 
movement of the symbol (156:120-124). 
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One might even say that, thanks to their overdetermined 
structure, symbols succeed in inverting the temporal signs of the 
origin(al) fantasy. The primal father signifies the eschaton, the "God 
who comes"; generation signifies regeneration; birth analogously 
stands for rebirth; the childhood - that childhood that is behind 
me - signifies the other childhood, the 'second naivete.' The process 
of becoming conscious is ultimately a process of seeing one's childhood 
in front of oneself and one's death behind oneself: "before, you were 
dead..."; "unless you become as little children..." In this interchange 
of birth and death, the symbolism of the God who comes has taken 
over and justified the figure of the primal father (227:543). 
The symbol in our language makes us touch the relationship of 
ourselves with beings and ultimately with being. It is a power that is no 
longer derived from the enslaving curse of our narcissism but a power that 
calls upon us to be attentive and listen (see 227:551; 8:291). 
*. The symbol and interpretation. 
For Ricoeur symbol and interpretation are correlative concepts 
(320(229): 13). There can be no symbol without interpretation. In other 
words, the symbol does not function except when its tension and conflict are 
interpreted (416:156). Moreover, to indicate that the symbol and 
interpretation seek each other, Ricoeur holds that the symbol is already 
interpretation. Here he comes close to the position of Heidegger and his 
ontology of understanding. Symbols are the language of being and, as such, 
an interpretation of being. The symbol is a language spoken to us more than 
a language spoken b^ us (320(191):319). 
In the preceding paragraph we used the word interpretation in 
the twofold sense that Ricoeur employs that term. Interpretation is both a 
technique, an application of semiotic and semantic rules of language to the 
decoding of texts, and an ontological trait of language. For him, 
interpretation is a dialectic of explanation and understanding. Hence "the 
sacred of nature shows itself in its being said symbolically. Showing founds 
saying and in that order" (416:156, my translation). But the saying possesses 
the structures of language which can be approached through explanatory 
procedures. Our effort and desire to be - existence, Being, the sacred, or 
whatever name one seeks to give to this reality - is itself imbued with a 
drive toward meaning and language.'^ ¡t finds its first articulation in the 
ambiguous language of the symbol. Despite its ambiguity, it is already an 
expression, and in a derived sense, an interpretation of fundamental reality. 
But the very enigma of the symbolic expression provokes our understanding. 
12. Ricoeur understands this drive toward meaning and language as a 
drive towards self-understanding. It is the drive by which meaning makes us 
while we make it. For Ricoeur, as for Hegel, the progress of meaning is the 
progress of the subject (See 399:353). This will be taken up again below in 
Chapter Seven. 
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It seeks to be unfolded (227:18). It is through interpretation that the 
symbol's power enters into the wider framework of language. 
This unfolding takes two directions. One direction is the 
symbolic proliferation, about which more will be said below. The symbol 
expresses its exuberance in an ever expanding wealth of metaphorical 
expressions. The other direction is toward ever more elaborate forms of 
interpretation. This movement of interpretation takes us first to the myth 
and from there to more discursive forms of reasoning up to the density of 
the concept (320(16Ό:269-286). Once the pre-linguistic plenitude enters 
into language and the framework of interpretation, the process of 
interpretation is unending. 
5. The symbol and totality. 
Symbols in their exuberance do not stand alone. One symbol 
calls forth another in an unending process of interpretation and re-
interpretation. Thus symbols link together and gather existence in its 
symbolic affluence. Now Ricoeur maintains, that only within a total 
economy of gathering the symbolic values into unity can the individual 
symbols be recognized and differentiated. Hence, the symbol becomes tied 
to an 'economy' or order of symbols (320(200):58).I3 
The delimitation of symbols comes forth only in their being 
brought together into an economy of symbols where their interrelationships 
and differential functions manifest themselves. Only an economy can 
attract, sift out, purify, and coordinate the ebulience of the symbolic forms. 
In this economy there stands revealed an intentionality towards a totality of 
meaning or toward a total meaning of the universe. For the signifying 
power of the symbol is virtually limitless. In its search, totality is, however, 
only aimed at . It is never completed. The symbol conjures up the wholeness 
of existence without giving us the totality as a perception or as a knowledge 
(153:170-171). It is only this economy that can orient us in our aim toward 
this totality. 
If the originary unity out of which the symbol comes forth and to 
which the symbol returns us is shattered in the variety of symbols, it is even 
further disjointed by the limitation that language and its operations place 
upon it. With language and its interpretation the symbol enters into the 
historicity of language. Through interpretation the symbol is sedimented. It 
begins to install a tradition and a history of the transmission of the tradition 
(320(200):55). The interpretative process of the symbol is, therefore, also a 
historical and cultural process. This tradition will be kept alive only by the 
constant renewal of the interpretative process of a community of 
interpretation, who will safeguard the tradition and retain the exuberance of 
the symbol within its economy. Without this process the symbol can easily 
"solidify into an idolatry" (320(173):293). 
13. See D. Rasmussen, Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical 
Anthropology, op. cit., p.113-128. 
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6. The symbol and the myth. 
Since the symbol is already a type of interpretation, the very 
surplus of meaning of the symbolic form has become a dynamism of meaning 
that searches out further possibilities of expression. In line with that 
development myths are "symbols developed in the form of narrative and 
articulated in a time and space that cannot be coordinated with the time 
and space of history and geography according to the critical method" 
(153:18). Certain dimensions of the symbol are accentuated in the myth 
such as its temporality and narrativity. In other words, what breaks forth in 
the myth as "what is beyond known and tangible reality" (320(29*0:391) 
breaks forth in the linguistic form of a narration (153:166). Although unique 
to the myth, its temporality and narrativity can also be attributed to the 
symbol because of its link with the myth (320(200):28). Also the symbol has 
a temporal and narrative dimension that the symbol by itself does not 
display. This linkage of the symbol with narrativity will assume greater 
import as Ricoeur's philosophy unfolds. 
In order to locate the myth in the thinking of Paul Ricoeur, we 
must think of it as one step further removed from "the indivisible plenitude, 
in which the supernatural, the natural, and the psychological are not yet 
torn apart" (153:167). Myth like the symbol, but at one pace removed from 
the symbol, seeks to express the reality that lies prior to language in the 
broken language of narration. As a development of the symbol the myth is 
equally a reduction of the symbol. It is an unravelling of the symbol and a 
reduction of the tension of the symbol. For the myth to retain its power to 
reveal it must not lose its relation to the symbolic field. Without the link 
with its ground a myth will quickly evolve into a fable or a gnosis 
(320(16Ш72; (173):304). 
B. THE MYTH. 
1. The myth and language. 
Etymologically a Greek word, myth brings with it a specific 
Greek philosophical problematic. In Greece the word myth (muthos) 
emerges in direct opposition to logos. In contrast to the pre-Socratic myths 
of Homer and Hesiod, there developed in Greece the word of the 
philosopher. Western consciousness has inherited this opposition of muthos 
and logos. The approach to the myth in the West has been either a denial of 
the truth value of the myth or some type of acceptance of the myth. As a 
result of this fundamentally Greek approach, Western thinking has tended to 
approach the other mythic strains from Babylon and contemporary 
civilizations in a similar manner. This approach is fundamentally 
epistemologica!. Because of its opposition to the logos, the muthos was 
considered the approximate equivalent of folklore, fables and legends 
(332:28-29). This dominant current of philosophical thought must not be 
allowed to overshadow another tradition which links the myth with the 
creative and productive imagination. Tlje Kantian schematism and 
productive imagination produced the pattern for the understanding of the 
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myth in Romanticism and 3ungian psychology. This strain of thought was 
much more appreciative of the power of the myth. According to this 
t radi t ion, myth is not opposed to the logos. I t expresses the power of the 
imagination to explore the realms inaccessible direct ly to speculative 
thought (332:30-31). 
Ricoeur's approach to the myth attaches itself to the lat ter 
t radi t ion. According to this understanding of the myth, the myth comes to 
philosophy, f i rs t of a l l , as an issue of meaning (357:530). Language is the 
medium whereby the fullness of experience, the invisible and unsaid, 
receives its tangible form (153:169). For the myth is also a form of 
discourse. This discourse is the analogue, the contingent fo rm, of what the 
myth signifies.^* The myth intends to say something about the reali ty in 
which we l ive. It commits a subject to its vision (357:532). I t is this 
referent ial thrust of the myth that interests us here. 
For Ricoeur this referential function of the myth is founded upon 
its metaphorical surplus of expression. The narrative interpretat ion of the 
symbol, which we said is the myth, assumes the form of metaphorical 
language. It is active, inasmuch as i t brings about a transfer of meaning. 
Its process is foundational in establishing new semantic fields. Its reference 
is a metaphorical reference and hence an inverse reference. What does i t 
say"1" To what reali ty does i t bond us7 
2. OntoloRical dimension of myth. 
Ricoeur's definit ion of the myth follows that of Mircea E l i ade . ^ 
According to Mircea Eliade, a myth is a story of origins. Its primary 
14. The structural analysis of myth such as undertaken by 
C I . Lévi-Strauss in La pensée sauvage indicates a logical coherence in the 
myth of kinship which is similar to the linguistic relationships of differences 
and oppositions in langue. However, Ricoeur warns against over-
generalizing the method of Lévi-Strauss. He points to the exclusive use by 
Lévi-Strauss of totemic thought in which the arrangements of thought 
predominate over content of thought. The Semetic, Hellenic and Indo-
European traditions show a preference of content over structure. Totemic 
thought is much more conducive to a structuralist analysis than the Semetic 
and Hellenic strains. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that a structural 
approach to the lat ter tradit ion is both welcome and necessary. Cf. 368:533; 
320(200):¡>0-49. Ricoeur suggests that the mythic tradit ion upon which our 
c iv i l izat ion is founded functions and reacts to the future out of the excess 
of meaning discovered in the mythic and symbolic substratum. Here there is 
a minimum of structuration and a maximum of meaning. Cf. also P. Riggio, 
"Paul Ricoeur et l'herméneutique des mythes" in Dialogue 35, 1967, p.73-89; 
Boyd Sinyard, "Myth and Reflect ion: Some Comments on Ricoeur's 
Phenomenological Analysis" in Сап. Зоигп. Theol. 16, 1970, p.33-40. 
15. Le myth de l 'éternel retour. Pans, 19<f3; Traité d'histoire des 
religions, Paris, 1949; Aspects du mythe, Paris, 1963; La nostalgie des 
origines. Méthodologie et histoire des religions, Paris, 1971. 
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function is the establishment and institution of the main traits of human 
existence. A myth tells how things began. It does not tell it in terms of 
historical times but in terms of primordial time: in ilio tempore. The myth 
relates how the institutions, ethical rules, and reality in whole or in part has 
its ground, its root, in the time of the myth. This relationship of historical 
time to the mythical, primordial time is essential to the myth (357:533). In 
fact, historical time is grounded in a mythical time. As such the ontological 
dimension of the myth is laid bare in this relationship of human existence to 
a depth structure of time. Existence is defined in this relationship of our 
historical time with our essential being (153:163). 
Three corollaries follow from this first aspect. 
1. What is invariable in the myth is its function of establishing 
things. Who does the establishing and what is established varies. It is 
secondary to the myth whether these figures are gods or heroes or a first 
ancestor. It is a misrepresentation of the myth, therefore, to make the 
figures of the myth autonomous. The myths are not the story of the gods 
but the stories of the origin of things. It is this quality that distinguishes 
the story form of the myth from other story forms (357:533-534). 
2. A myth has a practical function. Anthropology has pointed 
out the link between a myth and a rite. In other words, the myth cannot be 
understood outside of its linkage with a ritual action. The myth is the 
founding act of ritual. In the sense that a myth is the story of origins, it is 
linked with a paradigmatic action that links the story of origin with the 
existence and praxis of the present. The rite stands as a model for the myth 
and activates it in the present. The implication of the praxis is most clearly 
present in the Babylonian celebration of the New Year. The celebration is 
essentially a ritual of the enthronement of the king, in which the great story 
of creation is told. The enthronement of the king and through him the 
establishment of the order, justice, and harmony of his realm is the ritual 
re-enactment of the story in which the original order and harmony was 
established (332:33). Here the myth assumes the function of a guardian of 
existence (332:33). But what was said in the first corollary also applies 
here. It is possible to expand the representations of the myth into an 
autonomous story of the gods and the great heros. In the same way it is also 
possible to separate the ritual from its roots and give it an autonomous 
existence in which the myth is perceived as subservient to the rite. For 
Ricoeur the relationship of primordial time to historical time must be 
retained as central (332:45). 
3. The third corollary concerns the psychological implications of 
the myth. The linkage of historical time with primordial time also has an 
affective, emotional character. Ricoeur, following Rudolf Otto, calls the 
affective character of the myth, the sacred. 16 The myth brings us into 
touch with the ambivalent feeling of fear and attraction, which Otto said 
16. Das HeiliRe; über das Irrationale in der Idee des G'ôttlichen und 
sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen, München, C.H. Beck, 1917. 
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constitutes the realm of the sacred. In the myth the historical person is 
linked with the primordial times through the ritual action. Ricoeur calls it 
an 'emotional reactivation' of the primordial times. "To live according to a 
myth is to cease existing only in daily life; the narration and the rite trigger 
a sort of emotional interiorization which generates what one might call the 
mytho-poetic core of human existence" (357:53^, my translation). 17 7he 
linguistic character of this affective link with the sacred through the myth 
should not be overlooked. Here again, the affective moment should not be 
considered autonomous from its mythical narrative. The core is mediated 
only in and through the mythic recitation. Its recitation together with its 
ritual component instructs our affectivity in relationship to the sacred 
(332:46). 
3. Myth and time. 
Myth reveals not only the narrative dimension of the symbol, but 
also the temporality of the symbol. The temporal charge of existence that 
is present in the symbol is manifested more clearly in the mythical strain. 
In its relating of historical time to a primordial time, the myth suggests that 
the wealth of the symbolic content is imbued with temporality.18 The 
temporality appears then as a result of the symbolic affluence. In 
"Structure et herméneutique" Ricoeur has called this temporality of the 
symbol and myth 'historicity' (320(200):58).l9 Because of its historicity the 
symbol and the myth reach out to understanding first of all by being 
sedimented or institutionalized in a tradition and secondly by entering into a 
history of interpretation. 
Ricoeur maintains that because of the relationship of the myth 
to the symbol, the time of the myth is already a time that has lost some of 
the symbol's fullness of time. He calls it a time on its way to exhaustion 
(320(200): 33). 
But the myth explicitâtes another dimension of time which is 
only implicit in the symbol. The narrative form of expression of the myth 
17. "Vivre selon un mythe, c'est cesser d'exister seulement dans la 
vie quotidienne; le récitatif et le rite amorcent la sorte d'intériorisation 
emotionelle qui engendre ce qu'on peut appeller le noyau mytho-poétique de 
l'existence humaine." 
18. In the structuralist approach to the myth by Lévi-Strauss, the 
diachronicity of the myth has been replaced by the synchronicity or the 
a-chronicity of the deep structure. While recognizing the validity of such 
an approach, Ricoeur will not follow Lévi-Strauss in his a-chronical reading. 
Like Greimas, he retains a diachronic 'residue' which seeks an interpretation 
toward the time dimension of the myth (411:57). 
19. At the time of writing "Structure et herméneutique" (1963) 
Ricoeur had not yet undertaken the study of Heidegger's three levels of 
time. For a discussion of these three levels of time see below p. 138-146. 
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signifies that the reality aimed at by the symbol and the myth is itself a 
thing "woven of happenings and personages" (153:169). 
The narrativity and temporality of the myth make Ricoeur 
describe the original reality that reaches language in the myth as dramatic 
(153:169). The myth cannot encompass that original fullness and dramatic 
content - the fantastique transcendentale as he also calls it 
(357:531) - except in the form of a narration of the beginning of an 
experience and of its end m a primordial time. By its very expression of 
reality in a tension of time: of historical time and primordial time, of the 
present historical existence with what might be, the narrative aims at 
existence as dramatic. Existence is an intention and an effort that is never 
fulfilled (320(173):293). 
*. The economy of myths. 
As with symbols, the surplus of the myths comes to expression in 
the great variety of myths that we find within cultures. This multiplicity of 
myths can be tamed only when these myths are placed within, what Ricoeur 
calls a typology (320(173):293). Like the symbols, the myths can be 
understood in an order or an economy of myths. Thus, a myth does not stand 
alone. It communicates with other myths m a climate of struggle and 
affinity. The myths too aim at a totality of meaning by the very rich diet 
that they place before us. In the myths of evil, for example, this wealth is 
ordered in a typology and dynamics of myths which, according to Ricoeur 
permit us to situate myths on a scale in which myths run the gamut from 
those in which evil is seen as purely external to the human individual to 
those in which evil becomes almost exclusively anthropological 
(153:232-278). Thus, for instance, because the anthropological Adamic myth 
is more phenomenological than the other near-Eastern and Greek myths, it 
is the key to the understanding both of the dialectic of exteriority of evil 
and interionty of evil, and of the dynamic of an interpretative process 
among the myths. In Ricoeur's analysis of the symbolism of evil the Adamic 
myth becomes the key to open the maze of mythic exploration. The Adamic 
myth helps to decipher and uncover the latent dimensions of the other 
myths. 
This breakdown of the totality of reality into the maze of myths 
should not make us lose sight of the totality that these myths aim at. In 
Ricoeur's perspective, the myth, both in its internal plenitude and in the 
plenitude of its proliferation, signifies the totality out of which the myth 
has come forth. Myths signify and aim at that totality. But it becomes 
available only in its broken form, they are no longer the full experience of 
what they express. Their great variety fragments the reality out of which 
the myths come forth. That reality is now glimpsed only through the broken 
fragments: 
Because it is aimed at only symbolically, it requires special signs 
and a discourse on the signs; their heterogeneity bears witness to the 
significant whole by its contingent outcroppings. Hence, the myth has 
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the function of guarding the finite contours of the signs which, in their 
turn, refer to the plenitude that man aims at rather than experiences 
(153:169). 
5. Myth and interpretation. 
If for Ricoeur myth continues the interpretative process that 
comes to language first in the symbol, the process of interpretation does not 
stop with the myth. Although at this point we cannot go into a full 
examination of the notion of interpretation, one aspect of that 
interpretative process of the myth needs mentioning. And that is the notion 
of demythologization. 
The interpretation of myth has been influenced in our century by 
the work of demythologization of the New Testament by Rudolf 
Bultmann.20 For Ricoeur the process of interpretation of the myth, leading 
to a phenomenological reflection upon the myths, is fundamentally a process 
of demythologization (320(173):300). The myth's power to reveal is 
uncovered in the same process whereby its non-essential qualities are 
eliminated. If myth is already an interpretation, the dynamism of meaning 
which is found in its linguistic expression searches out and seeks to bring to 
understanding the true tension of the myth. Hence, the demythologizing 
process of interpretation will eliminate from the myth all attempts to 
conceive it as an explanation of reality. It will also refuse to accept all 
attempts to objectify the features of the myth. In hermeneutical reflection 
"to demythologize is to interpret myth, that is, to relate the objective 
representations of the myth to the self-understanding which is both shown 
and concealed in it" (320(29Ό:391). 
Myth is the bringing to language in narrative form of our bond 
with being. To the extend that this is released for us in terms of self-
understanding the true function of the myth is safeguarded. To 
demythologize is to interpret so that the powers of the myth be set free for 
our own self-understanding. 
20. Bultmann's intention to remove the mythological representations 
of the universe from the New Testament, in other words, to demythologize 
the New Testament, in order to let the true 'Scandal of the cross' be 
revealed, need not be rehearsed here. For Ricoeur there is a twofold 
approach to the interpretation of myths. First of all,there is the work of 
demythologization which is the work of interpretation inherent in the myth, 
i.e., to think the myth. But beside a demythologization there is also the 
work of démystification. Démystification approaches the text not with a 
sense of belief and openness but with suspicion. The text also dissembles. 
The relationship of demythologization and démystification will be taken up 
again below. Cf. "Préface à Bultmann" in Le conflit des interprétations 
(320:373-392). 
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С. THE NARRATIVE: FICTION AND HISTORY. 
On the surface the distance between myth and story appears 
vast. The story is an even freer composition, i.e., less bound to reality, than 
the myth. The openness to an ontologica! depth is even less evident. 
However, the distance between the myth and the story is not a chasm. The 
narrative story also shapes us in our existence prior to our intentional 
consciousness. If, as we saw above, existence is dramatic, it is the story 
above all that brings its drama to language. 
Our analysis of Ricoeur on this point must remain tentative since 
he is at the time of writing still elaborating the narrative and its temporal 
dimension. However, the articles "The Narrative Function" (453) and "La 
fonction narrative et l'expérience humaine du temps" (474) and an 
unpublished lecture "Narrative Time" (469) give sufficient indication of the 
direction of Ricoeur's theory of the story. 
The story is a broad category. Ricoeur includes in this not only 
the enormous variety of fictional narratives but also historical narrative. It 
is his thesis - derived from W.D. Gallie^l - that history too must be 
gathered under the genus of story. Both the historical narrative and the 
fictional narrative in all their variety articulate our insertion in the 
temporal dimension of life. This approach implies the need to break down 
the positivistic approach to history of Carl Gustav Hempel.22 For Hempel 
the narrative dimension of history is diverted into an epistemologica! debate 
concerning explanatory laws of history. On the one hand, Ricoeur will seek 
to establish that a synchronic or a-chronic analysis of the story such as that 
undertaken by the Structuralists, could be rescued from a-chronicity by the 
linkage of the story with history. On the other hand, he will strive to link 
the narrativity of fiction with a theory of history, rescuing it from the anti-
narrative efforts of the positivists. By recharging history with its narrative 
thrust, Ricoeur hopes to retrieve a temporal dimension in history that links 
it closely with the fictional story (453:179). 
1. The story and the structuralist code. 
The major hurdle to Ricoeur's approach to the story as a 
narrative comes from the school of French Structuralism. We have seen 
that this School shows a great interest in the narrative tradition.23 The 
structuralists concentrate their efforts in analysing a code or structure 
underlying the narrative. They recognize a relationship between this code 
21. Philosophy and Historical Understanding, New York, Schocken, 
1964. 
22. "The Function of General Laws in History" in Aspects of 
Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New 
York, Free Press, 1965 (1942), p.231-243. 
23. See above p.44-46. 
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and the narrative structure of the story. However, in their search for a 
depth-structure of the narrative, they look behind the narrative features of 
the story. The meaning of the story lies not in the narrative dimension, 
which they call its surface feature, but in the underlying code. The code is 
the real meaning of the story. The surface features are only the dressing, 
the envelope, for the underlying structure. The reference of the story, to 
use another terminology, is the logical sequence or the binary logic of the 
actants. 
In his critique of structuralism Ricoeur warns against a 
structuralist ideology, which he calls the 'for-the-sake-of-the-code-fallacy' 
(^11:69). Ricoeur denies validity to a structuralist approach to the text that 
takes us from the surface structures to the depth-structures of the 
narrative, but refuses to undertake the journey back to the surface. He 
judges this type of structuralism to be fixated upon the dead-end of the code 
that has broken its link with the story as discourse. Thus, for example, 
V. Propp maintains that the depth-structure of the Russian folktale consists 
of the closed system of a limited number (31) of functions.^* All folktales 
bear the same structural invariant built upon an unchangeable sequence. 
For Greimas the depth-structure is provided, not by the functions in their 
sequential order, but by the actantial model, governed by R. Jakobson's 
binary opposition. According to him an actantial logic rules the story. 
But if the return to the story as told, read, or heard is blocked, it 
leads to a suffocation of language in its capacity to communicate. Ricoeur 
refuses to acknowledge a narcissistic language that has broken its contact 
with language as discourse. Only to the extent that a semiotic analysis aids 
in the understanding of the story as told, read, or heard, i.e., in making the 
story more 'followable', does the story warrant such a thorough analysis of 
linguistic procedures (411:67). In other words, Ricoeur remains convinced 
that "the surface-structure of the 'plot' is not an epiphenomenon, but the 
message itself" (*11:71). 
Positively, however, he recognizes the structural analysis as an 
indispensible tool within the household of hermeneutical procedures. The 
breach between a semiotic analysis and an existential understanding is 
bridgeable. In fact, without the mediation of a structural analysis a proper 
reading of a text may well be impaired. The possibility of such an analysis 
lies, first of all, in the distanciation, created by the inscription of discourse, 
and, secondly, in the fact that all discourse is produced discourse. Discourse 
is inscribed in a certain code, a certain literary genre. These codes 
generate the epic, the poem or essay. These generative codes reveal the 
text to be a work. The text is encoded. It is the unique product of an 
individual, who produced this text as a poem or an essay. A structuralist 
analysis is possible and even necessary to unravel the discourse or even the 
text as a production. Since the production is inscribed in the very text, a 
text can and must be decoded in order to be understood. To understand a 
text one must be able "to identify the individual discourse (the 'message') 
2*. See above p.46-47. 
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through the modes of discourse (the 'codes') which generate i t as a work oí 
discourse" CU 1:70). 
But beyond his concern for the val idity and even the necessity of 
structural ism, Ricoeur has tested the abi l i ty of structuralism to leave space 
for the temporal i ty of the story. A structuralist approach defines itself by 
the achronicity or more properly the synchronicity of the system.25 7 h e 
diachronical elements are systematically excluded. This achronicity also 
extends itself to the structural analysis of the narrative. Thereby i t 
deprives the narrative of its most constitutive characteristic. However, the 
factual structural analysis of the narrative of both V. Propp and A. Greimas 
fai led in its attempt to remain achronical. V. Propp, for instance, retains a 
diachronical level by his insistence upon a sequential order for the th i r ty -
one functions. And although Greimas discards the sequential structure for 
his actantial model, he is le f t w i th a measure of chronicity which he calls a 
'diachronic residue' (411:^9). 
In line wi th what we have already said about the purpose of the 
structuralist analysis in its relation to the existential dimension of the text , 
Ricoeur maintains that i t is the function of structural analysis to highlight 
this diachronic residue. The diachronic residue, in fact , would constitute 
the depth-semantics of the text (411:50). I t is to this emphasis of Ricoeur 
upon the t ime dimension of the narrative text that we must now turn our 
at tent ion. What does the story say about our fundamental existence? 
2. Narrativity and emplotment. 
The dimension of t ime which in a structuralist analysis of the 
story is merely a residue becomes a central theme in Ricoeur's analysis of 
the narrative. He introduces the temporality of the narrative by way of the 
plot. He refuses, therefore, to bury the narrat iv i ty and the temporal i ty of a 
story under the weight of the system or the deep structure (411:65). 
Fundamentally i t is in the plot that temprarality achieves its narrative fo rm. 
What is the plot? In the paper "Narrat ive Time"26 Ricoeur 
defines the plot as "the intel l igible whole that governs a succession of 
events in any story" (469:4). The plot is a device connecting events into a 
specific succession to form a whole called a story. The plot "makes events 
into a story" (469:4). The emphasis here is on the poietic character of the 
plot. The plot is not an accidental structure of a story but i t is a deliberate 
structuring. Rather than speaking of plot we might speak of emplotment. I t 
is a poiesis, a craftsmanship, by which events and a succession of events are 
crafted into a pattern to form a whole (453:191-195). 
A number of points need to be accentuated here. 
25. See above p.45-50. 
26. A r t , c i t . 
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1. Basic to a story is both that it be told and that it be heard or 
read. Not only must the plot be crafted by the story-teller but on the part 
of the listener or reader the story must be followed and followable. The 
story must possess 'followability'." This followability is the correlate of 
the development of the story. To follow a story one must understand the 
sequence of actions or experiences of a number of characters who find 
themselves in a number of situations, who react to these situations, and who 
in the ensuing crisis bring the story to its conclusion. The following of the 
story consists in being taken along by the sequence of actions, in being 
challenged by its options, and in grasping proleptically the possible 
conclusions. The attraction of the story lies obviously in its conclusion. But 
the conclusion must be reached by passing throught the entire story. Only 
then is it an acceptable conclusion. One must pass through the story, one 
must follow the story to its conclusion, for it to be effective and understood 
(469:10). 
2. In a narrative a distinction clearly exists between the 
episodes or events and the configuration of events (469:16).28 A story is 
created out of events, perceivable as units. To make these events 
intelligible they need to be taken out of their individuality and placed in an 
encompassing configuration. The act of the plot is to elicit such a schema. 
Ricoeur calls this act a reflective judgment, because emplotment is a 
reflection upon events within the context of a configuration (469:17). The 
act of the plot, in crafting the configuration, leads to, what may be called 
with Aristotle, the 'theme' or 'thought' (dianoia of the muthos), or the 'point' 
of the story (469:19). The configuration, envisaged by Ricoeur, is not the 
same as the achronical depth-structure of the structuralists. The 
configuration does not suppress the episodes but heightens them by means of 
the narrative sequence and pattern. Hence, the point of a story or the 
th^me is not to be torn from the narrative context nor from the temporal 
aspect of the story. The thought of the story is itself both narrative and 
temporal. 
3. Finally, a narrative also touches on the need for totality. The 
mere crafting of a configuration upon the sequence of events forges a 
specific closure upon the myriad possibilities of the sequence of events and 
upon the open-endedness of the episodes. Episodes can gather to themselves 
a variety of perspectives that are virtually limitless. But the configuration, 
by patterning the sequence, brings the open-endedness to a conclusion. It 
ends the open sequence. And in ending the open sequence, one might say 
that the ending rules the story. By imposing a certain resolution on the 
crisis of the story, it gives intelligibility to the specific pattern of the 
sequence of events. Retrospectively the resolution of the story colours the 
pattern of events that led up to it. A story seeks to be complete and it is 
the resolution, the ending, that allows it to be complete. 
27. The source here is W.B. Gallie, op. cit . 
28. Ricoeur borrows here from Louis O. Mink, "Interpretation and 
Narrative Understanding" in The Journal of Philosophy, 69, 1972, p.735-737. 
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3. Emplotment and temporality. 
The interrelationship of temporal i ty and the plot is no mere 
accident. I t is Ricoeur's thesis that narrat iv i ty and temporal i ty are 
reciprocally related. It means, that for Ricoeur narrat iv i ty is that form of 
language whose ult imate referent is temporal i ty. But, conversely, i t also 
means that temporal i ty is a structure of existence that receives its 
l inguistic expression in narrat iv i ty (469:2). The ontological dimension of 
narrat iv i ty surfaces here. Narrat iv i ty expresses, to use Wittgenstein's term, 
a ' form of l i fe ' . The human experience of t ime is, therefore, inextricably, 
but mostly unconsciously, bound up wi th narrat iv i ty . 
In order to manifest this temporal i ty of narrat iv i ty , Ricoeur 
maintains that temporal i ty and narrat iv i ty intersect in the plot (469:4). I t is 
at the level of the emplotment of the narrative that the temporal i ty of the 
narrative is, therefore, to be made conscious. 
Borrowing Heidegger's analysis of t ime in Sein und Zeit,29 
Ricoeur retains a threefold level of t ime, each corresponding to a level of 
narrat iv i ty. 
a. Narrativity and within-time-ness. 
Correlative to the development of the narrative and, therefore, 
of the fol lowabi l i ty of the story, there is a t ime dimension which Heidegger 
has called 'within-time-ness'. This level of t ime is closest to what is 
ordinarily known as linear t ime. Within-time-ness is often reduced to linear 
t ime, because i t is so easily linked wi th the observable. It is t ime that is 
datable; i t is public and measurable (469:3). But in a significant manner i t 
ctlso goes beyond linear t ime. 
'Within-time-ness' is primari ly an existential determination of 
t ime. I t reflects our thrownness among the objects of our care. The objects 
of our care are the things that are available to and manipulable by us. We 
are thrown among these objects and they are the source of our pre-
occupation and circumspection. This existential dimension of our pre-
occupation wi th these seemingly external objects has also a temporal 
dimension'. I t is not a linear t ime such as we f ind in a sequence of events, 
but a being in t ime. Our being in t ime makes us reckon wi th and, therefore, 
measure t ime. But t ime receives its meaning not f rom the objects but f rom 
our pre-occupation. But since our pre-occupation is wi th objects, i t is 
datable and measureable t ime. However, the 'now' of t ime is not the 
measured second of the clock, but the t ime to do something as an expression 
of our thrownness in existence (469:6-10; 422:369-371). 
It is Ricoeur's thesis that the Heideggerean 'within-time-ness' is 
best brought to l ight in the narrative. We have pointed out above the 
importance that Ricoeur attaches to the diachronicity of the narrat ive. He 
29. Op. c i t . 
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thinks Structuralism's attempt to dechronologize the narrative is due to its 
inability to perceive narrative time as more than linear, chronological time. 
Ricoeur hypothesizes that there are as many as three levels of 
time - Heidegger's three levels - in the narrative (422:348). Limiting 
ourselves for the moment to the first level of time, 'within-time-ness', we 
wish to indicate how Ricoeur develops this notion by attaching it to the 
development of the plot. 
Now within the development of the plot there is a certain 
temporal directedness. We mentioned that the attraction of the story lies in 
its conclusion, which, although not predictable, intrigues us with its varying 
possibilities. The interaction of the conclusion of the story upon the 
development of the plot is such that a dimension of time emerges which is 
hardly linear. The narrative structure confirms the 'within-time-ness' as 
Heidegger proposes it, but in a significant point also amends it (422:350). 
The confirmation of 'within-time-ness' in the narrative is 
apparent in the surface text of the story. Story-telling and following a story 
throw us in time. By the use of such words as 'then, now, next, after, while,' 
the story places us in time. The hero or heroine is presented with all the 
characteristics of 'within-time-ness'. There is a pre-occupation with things. 
There is time for ... and a lack of time for... Although measureable in terms 
of days and hours, the emphasis is upon the pre-occupation with things, with 
care, and not upon the abstract, objectifiable time of the clock that can 
date the pre-occupation. The time of the story is 'now'. It escapes ordinary 
time in two ways. It is first of all a 'now' that is shared each in their own 
way by the characters of the story in the telling of the story. But, secondly, 
it is as well a 'now' that clings to the hearer and reader of the story. The 
story's saying of 'now' is, to use Heidegger's term, a way of 'making present' 
that is more than the 'now' of ordinary time. 
For Ricoeur the narrative category of the epic,'" as expressed in 
the genre of the story of the questui is the 'privileged discursive expression' 
of this dimension of time (469:14). Ricoeur here amends Heidegger by 
insisting that an analysis of the quest in the narrative is better able to 
account for the 'making present' of time. The 'saying now' of the narrative, 
more so than Heidegger's 'reading of the hour', shows the 'now' to be a time 
of intervention, a time in which a character actively tests his or her 
existence. The 'now' is a moment of actively wrestling an orientation from 
life, a time in which the possible becomes actual (422:352). This time-
dimension is most clearly enshrined in the quest narrative. It manifests 
most clearly how the 'now' is a 'making present', an interpretation of our 
care. Ricoeur calls the quest 'the narrative par excellence of preoccupation' 
(422:352). 
30. Ricoeur here refers to the work of Robert E. Scholes and Robert 
Kellogg, The Nature of Narrative, New York, Oxford University Press, 1966. 
31. Both V. Propp and A. Greimas use the story of the quest as the 
paradigm of the narrative. 
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But there is another contribution that the narrative of the quest 
makes to bring forward the 'making present' of time. This contribution will 
bring us to the threshold of a deeper dimension of time which Heidegger 
calls historicality. 
This contribution to our understanding of time devolves from the 
relationship we have described above between the episodic aspect and the 
configuration activity of the story. This interrelationship of the episodes 
and the configuration of the episodes pulls the story out of the chronological 
succession of events into a unified whole, where the conclusion rules the 
plot. Upon the completion of the reading or hearing of the story we in fact 
reread the succession of events and the transformation of the characters in 
the light of the ending. That is why the point of the story or its theme 
remains bound not only to the narrative but also to the time of the 
narrative. The episodes are retaken in the conclusion and through the 
conclusion they become locked into a certain sequence and receive a 
specific meaning. The ending repeats the episodes and takes them out of 
their contingency. We are enabled to read time backwards from the end to 
the beginning. This type of configurationai activity is a type of recollection 
or repetition. But this activity is brought to language more expressly in 
what Heidegger has called historicality (^22:355). 
b. Narrativity and historicality. 
In his analysis of time in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger developed the 
theme of time starting from time at its most authentic and unified level, 
which he called temporality, to time at the point of its scattering in 'within-
time-ness'.32 Historicality, according to Heidegger, is the intermediate 
level of time. It manifests itself on three levels (469:21). 
(1) Time as 'extension' between birth and death. 
Historicality, where it most closely approximates 'within-time-
ness', is first of all the 'extension' of time between birth and death. If 
temporality is time in its deepest unity, historicality distends or extends 
that unity of time. It is in its extension that the time of historicality can 
become time as care, as time for ... and time to ... of 'within-time-ness'. 
Historicality is the stretching of time between past, present and future or, 
in existential terms, between 'having-been', 'making present', and 'coming-
forth'. Historicality represents, therefore, the cohesion, the 
Zusammenhang, of life as stretched between life and death. Heidegger's 
word for this extention of time is Geschehen. By means of this word 
Heidegger attaches to the notion of extension the aspect of mobility, of 
movement, of extending. Geschehen in Ricoeur's translation is to 'make 
32. In line with his general approach of Heidegger's ontology, 
Ricoeur reverses Heidegger's ordering of time. He begins with 'within-time-
ness' and works toward temporality. Heidegger begins with the deep unity 
of time and works toward the dispersal of time in 'within-time-ness'. 
ito 
history ' .^ its close association in German with Geschichte links the 
extension of time with history. Geschehen constitutes the grounding of 
historiography. 
But this grounding of historiography upon Geschehen is 
impossible according to Ricoeur. It reveals a basic deficiency in Heidegger's 
concept of history. Heidegger was faced with the task of incorporating 
historiography into his scheme of time which has started with the densest 
ontological time of temporality and worked towards a time that is closest to 
measurable time: within-time-ness. Heidegger tried to resolve the dilemna 
by grafting historiography directly upon an ontology of Geschehen. 
According to Ricoeur, Heidegger fails because such a direct ontology cannot 
provide a foundation for an epistemology of historiography (¿22:357). 
Ricoeur proposes to correct this deficiency by once again taking an indirect 
route. Once again narrativity is the intermediary to deepen an aspect of 
time. 
What Heidegger overlooked is that fundamentally history is a 
species - as Gallie has maintained in his Philosophy and Historical 
Understanding - of the genus story (453:182).^* If the thesis of Gallic is 
correct, it means, according to Ricoeur, that the epistemology of 
historiography, that is, the character of historical explanation, must 
resemble the traits that are attached to the intelligible emplotment of a 
story or to the followabihty of the story. Historical explanations are given 
us only in a narrative dress or, to use Ricoeur's statement, "an epistemology 
of historical knowledge (is) grounded on a phenomenology of following a 
story" (453:183). History, then, employs the same type of explanation as the 
story. It is an 'explanation by emplotment' (453:189). The thesis, that 
history is a species of the genus of story is borne out by the application to 
the realm of history of all the traits attached to the story, such as, 
emplotment, the configuration applied to the events and to the sequence of 
events, and the sense of an ending. On a structural level there is a 
homology. The only distinction that one might draw is on the basis of their 
33. Ricoeur finds the translation of Geschehen with historial 
(H. Corbin) to reflect insufficiently the verb character of Heidegger's 
Geschehen. See 420:357. 
34. Op. cit. The refusal to acknowledge this narrativity in history is 
derived from Carl Hempel's "The Function of General Laws in History", art. 
cit. Hempel tried to draw an analogy between the scientific laws and the 
historical laws. The statement of the law in the determination of an 
historical event constituted for Hempel an explanation of an event. Both 
Heidegger and Ricoeur consider the attempt to be a failure, but for 
different reasons. Heidegger attempts to reroute the epistemology away 
from the explanatory mode by way of a direct ontology. Ricoeur refuses, on 
the other hand, to bypass the epistemologica! stance but grounds it instead 
in a theory of narrativity. Heidegger overlooked the narrative of history 
and for that reason failed to find the link between the levels of time and the 
variety of narrative levels. 
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referential quality. History claims to represent actual occurences, while 
the fictional story deals with possible events (453:178)Д5 Historicality, 
therefore, finds its outward expression in two narrative modes, the fictional 
and the historical. The historical brings historicality to expression 
indirectly through documents, memoirs, letters and other traces. The 
fictional narrative brings possible reality to expression by means of the split 
reference. As Ricoeur notes, historicality appears to require narrativity and 
narrativity appears to require "the intersecting interplay of two narrative 
modes. Historicity is said to the extent that we tell both stories and 
histories" (453:195). Both stories and histories belong to the 
Wirkungsgeschichte - Gadamer's term for the history of the efficiency - of 
historicality.^*» 
On the basis of this thesis Ricoeur maintains that both the 
fictional story and history refer to Geschehen, to 'making history'. Both do 
so by way of narrativity. In other words, what expresses itself in the form 
of the fiction and history as narrative is existence and time as historicality. 
(2) The backward orientation of time. 
Historicality, as the extension of time, is further characterized 
by the weight that it places upon the past. Within the schema of Heidegger, 
who proceeds from temporality to 'within-time-ness', this orientation of our 
care to the past is enigmatic. The orientation of care in temporality 
according to Heidegger is toward the future. This hardly explains why 
historicality which flows from temporality reverses this orientation from 
the future to the past (469:22-23). But when placed in a narrative context, 
the backward orientation of historicality is less enigmatic. 
(3) The illimitation of the extension of time. 
A third trait of historicality is its illimitation. The extension of 
time both backward and forward knows no limit. The history of nature and 
humanity stretch in both directions indefinitely. Again we meet a paradox. 
35. The ability to attach explanatory procedures to history is not 
thereby denied. Hayden White indicates that a variety of levels of 
conceptualization can be added to the "explanation by emplotment". Among 
others he mentions the explanation by formal argument, the explanation by 
means of the form of its discursive argument, (e.g., formacist, organicist, 
mechanistic or contextualist), and the explanation by ideological 
implication, (e.g., anarchism, conservatism, radicalism, or liberalism). 
Cf. 453:189-190. 
36. Accordingly, Ricoeur recharges history with the power of the 
imagination. History is a type of story that probes the region of the 
possible. In history the imagination is made productive on the basis of the 
analogy of the intersubjective recognition of the other in history as another 
I. See the informative article of M. Gerhart, "Imagination and History in 
Ricoeur's Interpretative Theory" in Phil. Today 23, 1979, p.51-58. 
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While historical i ty extends indefinitely, temporal i ty out of which 
histor ical i ty f lows places a l i m i t upon the experience of t i m e . Temporality, 
Heidegger argues, is l imi ted, f i rst of a l l , to the t ime experience of the 
individual and, secondly, to the t ime extension of the individual between 
b i r th and death. Temporality is structured by its 'being-toward-death'. 
Ricoeur w i l l t r y to correct this too subjectivist and monadic t r a i t of 
temporal i ty of Sein und Zeit by once again l inking these temporal 
dimensions w i t h a theory of narrat iv i ty (469:23-2Ό. 
The linkage of the notion of historical i ty wi th narrat iv i ty is 
effected by Ricoeur by means of Heidegger's understanding of repet i t ion. 
For Heidegger, repetit ion is the fundamental experience whereby 
historical i ty as extension, as retrospection, and as l imitless is grounded in 
temporal i ty. For Ricoeur this notion of repetit ion wi l l help to highlight a 
dimension of narrat iv i ty which might have been overlooked otherwise. On 
the other hand narrat iv i ty can help correct a deficiency in Heidegger's 
understanding of historical i ty. 
Br ief ly, the notion of repetit ion according to Heidegger can best 
be approached through the notion of heritage. Something is transmitted 
from the past f rom which one can draw. This resource is drawn on by going 
back into the past, by repeating the past, drawing on one's existential 
possibilities that l ie expressed in the past. Heidegger, however, perceives 
this repetit ion very individualistically. Rooted in the 'being-toward-death' 
of temporal i ty, repetit ion individualistically identif ies the source of the 
heritage to be the self: each one draws from h i m - or herself the resources 
of the past and transmits them. In the same vein the past and its repetit ion 
approach us as a fate (Schicksal): each one receives h i m - or herself as fate. 
This linkage between the repetit ion and fate is the heart of his 
historical i ty.^? 
Despite this l imi t ing character of Heidegger's historical i ty, 
which Ricoeur w i l l attempt to heal, the notion of repetit ion reaff i rms the 
primacy given to the past by history. The retrospection towards the past as 
fate cannot, however, be divorced from the transmission of that fate as a 
project. What we receive as heritage is our possibility of Dasein, that is, 
our project as a movement towards the future. Our future, our project, is 
what Heidegger calls an 'Ent-wurf', a thrownness. The future is bounded by 
retrospection, that is, "a re-taking in the manner of being affected by that 
which we can be" (422:358, my t r a n s l a t i o n ) . ^ Here again, according to 
Ricoeur, the l imi tat ion of Heidegger's approach is its individualism. It is 
only after Heidegger has delved into historical i ty on the level of the 
monadic individual that he extends fate to a communal destiny (Geschick). 
But the pr ior i ty remains w i t h individual fate (Schicksal) over destiny. 
37. This analysis of Heidegger bears a close resemblance to the 
relationship that Freud established between the movement of regression and 
the movement of projection. 
38. "Reprise sur le mode de l 'être-affecté de ce que nous pouvons 
être." 
1 « 
Now, by linking historicality with narrativity, these narrowing 
dimensions can be eliminated. Ricoeur seeks to do so, first of all, by 
indicating a certain genre of narrative where this is most apparent. He 
excludes the genre of the quest narrative as the paradigm. He does so, 
despite the fact that the narrative of the quest brings us to the threshold of 
historicality. He recognizes that several quest narratives include a measure 
of repetition. But the success at dechronologizing these stories by the 
structuralists ought to be a warning against extending the story of the quest 
as the paradigm of the narrative. Instead, Ricoeur opts for the genre 
initiated by Augustine in his Confessions (422:362-363). 
What form does repetition take in Augustine's account of why he 
became a christian? Unlike stories of a quest where the repetition tends to 
be a preparatory phase of the story, in the genre of Augustine's Confessions 
the temporal form itself is one of repetition. It tells how someone "becomes 
who he was" (422:363). The movement of time can hardly be confused with 
ordinary time. It is a "spiral movement which, by way of anecdotes and 
episodes, brings one back to the almost motionless constellation of the 
potentialities that the story repeats. The end of the history makes the 
present the equivalent of the past, the effective the equivalent of the 
potential" (422:363, my translation). '9 Or as Ricoeur says elsewhere, "The 
hero is who he was" (469:31). What is repeated in this genre is no more than 
what I can be. I can be what I have been. Repetition applies equally to 
historical accounts. They too express how the project of our communal 
possibilities has reached us (422:363). 
But the perspective that this genre of narrative brings to 
historicality can also add a decisive corrective to a number of Heidegger's 
themes relating to historicality. These must be examined because they 
reflect some basic themes of Ricoeur. 
First, Ricoeur insists on the priority of the communal destiny 
over the individual fate. Both Ricoeur and Heidegger agree that repetition 
is presented to us in the narrative form. However, Ricoeur maintains that 
the chronicle as an articulation of the destiny of a people is not derived 
from the private form of fate. Repetition is first of all a repetition of 
communal destiny. For Ricoeur narrative time is right from the start public 
time or time with and for others. Narrative time is not monadic and 
individual time. 
Second, this correction, in turn, affects the much more decisive 
theme that characterizes temporality, namely, communication. If 
historicality is from the start a being-with-others can temporality remain 
within the limit of 'being-toward-death'? Does narrativity not also question 
this private experience which is the foundation of the deep understanding of 
39. "Le mouvement en spirale qui, à travers anecdotes et épisodes, 
reconduit vers la constellation presque immobile des potentialités que le 
récit répète. La fin de l'histoire est ce qui égale le présent au passé, 
l'effectif au potentiel." 
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time for Heidegger? Ricoeur hardly takes it beyond this question when he 
asks rhetorically, 
Does not narrativity, by breaking away from the obsession of a 
struggle in the face of death, open the meditation on time to a 
radically different horizon than that of death, namely, to the issue of 
communication, not only between the living, but also between 
contemporaries, predecessors and successors...? (¿»22:365, my 
translation).*" 
Ricoeur insists that by the very fact that the narrative time takes us beyond 
the death of the antagonists, it also takes us beyond the individual fate and 
introduces us to public time (422:365). Ricoeur seeks, therefore, to bring 
temporality beyond the framework of death and struggle and into the realm 
of communication. In his article "The Narrative Function" (453) Ricoeur 
provides another suggestion that may help overcome this monadic pre-
occupation with death. He introduces the notion of interest. The notion of 
interest, borrowed from 3. Habermas, is the power that underlies and rules 
the variety of human cognitive undertakings. Applied to the area of 
historical inquiry, the underlying interest is the interest in communication. 
History's ultimate interest is perceived as the enlarging of our sphere of 
communication. According to Ricoeur, the historian does so in two ways. 
He gleans from the past what needs to be remembered, i.e., the values that 
rule actions, the life of institutions and the social struggles. And the 
historian also enlarges communication by creating a distance between one's 
desires, and, by extension, one's pre-occupation, in order to perceive what is 
different. In these two ways the pre-occupation with one's own death is 
engulfed by an interest that supercedes it. 
Third, priority must be given not to the self but to the other. 
The repetition of the heritage is not from self to self, but from the other to 
the self. It is this that Gadamer has elaborated under the notion of 
tradition, as the transmission of the heritage from one generation to the 
next. For Ricoeur this approach of Gadamer has a better chance of building 
a bridge between the ontology of historicality and the epistemology of 
historiography. It is the community who ultimately determines and takes up 
its tradition. This act of the community is a repetition of its origin but at 
the same time a new beginning. In that sense it is a Geschehen, a making-
history. The writing of history, historiography, is the outflow of this 
historicality.*^ Historiography is founded, then, on repetition which, as 
40. "En l'affranchissant de l'obsession du combat face à la mort, la 
narrativité n'ouvre-t-elle pas la méditation sur le temps sur un tout autre 
horizon que celui de la mort, sur la problématique de la communication, non 
seulement entre vivants, mais aussi entre contemporains, prédécesseurs et 
successeurs...?" 
41. As Ricoeur says in "Narrative Time", "Historiography, in this 
sense, is nothing more than the passage into writing, then to critical 
rewriting, of this primordial constituting of tradition" p.35. 
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Ricoeur insists, always has a narrative form. But the repetition is of the 
founding acts of the community that need to be communicated in order to 
insert me into its otherness. Historiography turns this narrative repetition 
into a critical inquiry (422:366). 
c. Narrativity and temporality. 
In the three articles upon which we have based the previous 
analysis of the ontological dimension of the story, little was said concerning 
temporality itself. Temporality is the deep unity of time of past, present, 
and future, or in existential terms, a 'coming-forth', a 'having-been', and a 
'making present' before its extension and repetition of historicality and its 
dispersal of 'within-time-ness'. Its emphasis, as we have remarked above, is 
future rather than past. Its future is marked by the limit imposed by 'being-
toward-death'. As we have seen, Ricoeur transforms this into the giftedness 
of the other in the interest of communication. At issue for Ricoeur is 
whether temporality can also be linked to a theory of narrativity. Can 
narrativity lead us to the depth dimension of time? Ricoeur suggests that 
this possibility may not be excluded especially since the concept of 
tradition, death, and repetition may well lead us to a point that breaches the 
boundaries of extension to its genesis (422:367).*2 
Symbol, myth and narrative have uniquely interlaced meaning 
and time. To use the terminology of Aristotle's Poetics,*^ these genres are 
a mimesis of human action. They shape, embellish, and express what is of 
deepest significance for human existence. To the extent that this mimesis 
is an active redescription of human existence, they achieve the discovery of 
our self and of the human community as historical and temporal. A 
phenomenology that does not shy away from a hermeneutics and an ontology 
has the added advantage of incorporating the temporal dimension into the 
process of meaning. 
42. We need to emphasize once again, that with the linking of 
temporality and narrativity we find ourselves with the most recent texts of 
Paul Ricoeur. The work is by no means complete. It is somewhat 
surprizing, for instance, that despite his hermeneutics of the biblical text he 
has made no attempt to link the third layer of time, temporality, with the 
apocalyptic and eschatological genres of the Old and New Testament. The 
fulfilled time of the stories and proclamatory statements of the Kingdom of 
God in the New Testament is the time of the giftedness of God's rule of 
justice and mercy entering into the 'now' of our time by way of the narrative 
proclamation. The proclamation of the future of God has all the 
characteristics of what Heidegger called temporality. However, the most 
recent publications of Ricoeur indicate that his meditation on temporality 
and narrativity has not ended. 
43. See above p.81-82. 
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Ricoeur's original project to construct a philosophy of the will 
ought to be a warning not to exhaust his work within the representational 
framework of the previous chapters. Priority in his philosophy must be 
granted not to theoretical reason but to practical reason. Beside a recovery 
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of the subject on the level of seeing, there is a prior recovery of the self on 
the level of doing. The home of meaning is not dwelt in and explored only 
by perception. It is a home not merely to be contemplated or viewed. The 
home of meaning gathers us even more in act ion, in a doing, that is properly 
human. If in perception we encounter a subject who constitutes meaning, 
after f i rs t being constituted by meaning, in the world of praxis we are 
presented wi th a subject of praxis which is both source and not source of 
i tself . I t is this praxis and the subject of this praxis which we wi l l explore in 
this chapter. 
The realm of praxis, however, is not to be divorced f rom the 
realm of theory.* Before we delve into practical reason we do well to 
indicate their points of convergence. In several ways there is a parallel 
between the creat iv i ty of the imaginative variations of the poetic and the 
realm of possibilities (Heidegger's "my ownmost possibilities") that human 
action effects and creates. Both my speech and my action are grounded in 
something anterior to speaking and doing.2 Both my speech and my action 
bespeak a freedom and bondage. If poetic speech is bound by what i t says, 
my action too does not shape real i ty arbi t rar i ly. I t too as freedom is bound. 
The human speaking and doing, human theoria and praxis, express 
a human existence that is ambivalently both a nature and an act. Both 
theory and praxis enroot us in our original world according to which we are 
not only a subject of perception but also a responsible subject (<*52(26<i):61). 
But in their relationship to one another we must give anterior i ty to praxis 
over theory. Ricoeur provides as the reason for this anter ior i ty the new-
found precedence in the notion of being of act over nature, essence, or 
f o rm. The real meaning of being, as Ar istot le had already perceived, is 
being as act. Being is primordially the act of existence. Human freedom 
finds its source, therefore, not in some type of "essential being, the already 
completed being, the dead being" (<H4(183):32), but in a primordial 
dynamism, in being as act . This chapter wi l l probe this act of being in order 
to appropriate this primordial dynamism not theoretical ly but pract ical ly. A 
theoretical appropriation at this level can only be secondary to the practical 
appropriation. Theory only expresses and orders the emergence of our 
primordial existence. Praxis is the true realm of the emergence of freedom 
or of the subject as free and responsible. 
1. In "Le " l ieu" de la dialectique" (395:95) Ricoeur defines praxis as 
"la sphère entière de la réal i té humaine, considérée sous l'angle de ses 
prédicats historiques." The insistance upon the historical dimension colours 
the treatment of praxis throughout. 
2. The questions which Ricoeur asks in his art ic le, "Explanation and 
Understanding" (434:158) express well the tenour of his concern wi th praxis, 
"How can a project change the world? What must be, on the one hand, the 
nature of the world in order that man can introduce changes? What must 
be, on the other hand, the nature of action that i t can be seen in terms of 
changes in the world?" 
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Ricoeur has expressed the priority of the practical over the 
theoretical in other ways as well. In fact, initially his philosophical project 
as set forth in the introduction to his doctoral dissertation was toward a 
practical philosophy.3 His philosophy of the will which still stamps his 
philosophical career most decisively remained dominant until his practical 
philosophy encountered the problem of the symbol and, through the symbol, 
the problem of language.* His linguistic studies diverted his practical 
project towards the realm of the theoretical. But his proposed "Poetics of 
the Will" with which his concerns have constantly been baited remains the 
original· horizon of his philosophical oeuvre. In this context, his linguistic 
studies appear as a great detour to a poetics of the will. 
Because of this original horizon, the later writings of Paul 
Ricoeur have begun to show the inroads of these linguistic studies into the 
practical realm. Thus, for instance, in the article, "The Problem of the Will 
and Philosophical Discourse" he voices a dissatisfaction with his analysis of 
the will in his doctoral dissertation (375:273) by recognizing that an 
application of a theory of discourse and of the text can be fruitful in the 
analysis of practical reason.-^ 
This search is not yet complete. It is possible, however, to show 
the principal areas of the incursion of language studies into Ricoeur's 
philosophy of the will. In his latest writings Ricoeur acknowledges three 
levels of discourse of the will. The first discourse is the phenomenological 
discourse of his earlier writings which has now listened to and passed 
through the findings of the linguistic analysis of the Anglo-Saxon School of 
Ordinary Language.^ The first discourse is a discourse on human action. It 
3. Le volontaire et l'involontaire, op. cit., ρ.Ψ-З^. In his doctoral 
dissertation Ricoeur transformed Husserl's phenomenology of perception 
into a vehicle for an eidetic of the will, i.e., of the affective and volitional 
aspects of the world, the other, and the body. 
4. The impasse that his phenomenology encountered in his study of 
symbol and myth in La symbolique du mal makes Ricoeur wonder at the end 
of the work, "How shall we continue?" (p.3^7). 
5. Cf. "Explanation and Understanding" (434) and 'The Model of a 
Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text" (370). These attempts are 
still too lapidary and tentative to give a firm foundation to such an attempt. 
The present chapter will attempt to study this area of practical reason in 
Ricoeur's latest writings. We have to base our work on a number of articles 
and the stencilled version of a course, taught at the University of Louvain in 
1970-1971 entitled, "La sémantique de l'action" (373). See D. Pellauer, "The 
Significance of the Text in Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutical Theory" in Studies 
in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, op. cit., p.108-114. 
6. "I would say that today the future of this first type of discourse 
lies in an interpretation of phenomenological description and the conceptual 
analysis of ordinary language" (375:276). 
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is an analysis of the variety of ways in which we say our doing. Its discourse 
is pre-ethical. It examines the various ways in which human beings use 
language to express actions which have the human 'I' as subject.' The 
second discourse is an ethico-political discourse. This is the discourse of 
human meaningful action in which we act out our existence and transform 
existence into concrete freedom. Ricoeur qualifies this discourse as in 
essence dialectical. The third type of discourse is the ontological discourse 
on freedom. Here again as on the perceptual level Ricoeur's ontology of 
freedom is indirect. It is a discourse in the form of an interpretation. Once 
again, the ontology is fundamentally a hermenéutica! discourse (cf. 
375:273;396:352). 
Before proposing Ricoeur's three levels of discourse of human 
freedom, I want to indicate where Ricoeur, as an historian of philosophy, 
situates the problematic of the will and of freedom. Ricoeur finds five 
major signposts in the history of philosophy that isolate the major thread of 
this philosophy. They are Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, Kant and Hegel. 
1. Aristotle; the ethico-political context. 
Influenced by the tragic poets and orators, Artistotle was the 
first to force a reflection on human action. He concluded from the 
deliberations of the courts and of political assemblies that there is a 
distinction between actions done 'willingly' and actions done 'unwillingly'. 
Two types of actions are distinguished: on the one hand, actions that depend 
on me, or done knowingly, and, on the other hand, actions done under duress 
or constraint or through ignorance of the circumstances. An action willingly 
undertaken is an action whose roots lie in me and whose circumstances are 
known to me. Among these actions Aristotle distinguished between those 
actions which are simply wished, i.e., actions not depending on me, and 
actions which are preferred, i.e., actions depending on me. Preferred 
actions are deliberated actions. Voluntary actions are predeliberated. But 
this deliberation can only be about the means towards an end. The end is 
proposed by the wish, but it does not depend on me. 
Ricoeur signals three contributions that Aristotle brought to a 
philosophy of the will. 
1. Aristotle enrooted the will both in human vitality or desire 
and in rationality. It is this vitality that feeds our motivation. But it speaks 
at the same time to our reason. The notion of preference speaks to both 
dimensions. This joining of desire and reason can be called practical reason. 
It reveals, however, the double temptation of voluntarism and 
intellectualism that will plague the subsequent philosophy of the will. The 
voluntary is a 'deliberated desire' for Aristotle. 
7. The course, "La sémantique de l'action" examines this discourse 
at length. Because our concern is merely to indicate the inroads that 
linguistic theories have made into a phenomenological analysis, the remarks 
below can provide only the sketchiest of presentations. The real recovery of 
the subject takes place not in this discourse but in the discourse of freedom. 
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2. Ar istot le placed this discussion of deliberated desire in an 
ethical and pol i t ical context. Deliberated desire is involved in the debate of 
the 'good l i fe ' . As deliberated, i t seeks a mean between excess and 
deficiency in actions. This l i fe according to the mean, this l i f e of practical 
wisdom, leads to a l i f e of excellence* and happiness. This ethico-polit ical 
context was largely overlooked in history, unti l i t was taken up again by 
Hegel. 
3. Aristotle's approach opens the discussion of the wi l l both to a 
linkage w i t h l inguistic analysis and to an ontology. The linkage wi th 
linguistic analysis is provided by Aristotle's point of departure: the poets 
and orators and their discourse on human action. On the level of a 
psychology of the wi l l there is is a specific language which expresses that 
psychology, making i t accessible to a linguistic analysis. But human decision 
is also rooted in an ontology because for Ar istot le, decision as a human work 
or task, is an outpouring of the energeia of being i tself. Being as power and 
act is revealed in the will's act iv i ty (385:943-9^;356:981-982;409:174-
175;375:274-277;373:109-112). 
2. Augustine; the theoloRical context. 
The second decisive moment in the philosophy of the wi l l 
occurred in the theological ref lect ion of Augustine. Augustine introduced 
an inf in i te dimension into the power of the w i l l . In contrast, Aristotle's 
philosophy of the w i l l , concentrating as i t does upon the means rather than 
the end, stands out as a metaphysics of f i n i t e act ion. Augustine enriched 
Aristotle's metaphysics by his metaphysics of the desire of God and by his 
meditat ion on ev i l . As Ricoeur says, "Here, voluntas is revealed in i ts 
terr ib le splendour in the experience of evi l and sin; the wi l l has the power to 
deny being, to say 'no', to 'turn away f r o m ' God and to 'turn towards' his 
creatures" (М9:176). This posse peccare introduces the notion of freedom 
into Western consciousness which had been lacking in Ar istot le. The wi l l is 
the power to deny what is true and good. S/he can choose the true and good 
because s/he can deny this. But as his meditation on the origin of sin and 
evi l revealed, this freedom to act is l imited by an impotence in the very 
nature of man. Freedom is bound freedom. 
Medieval theological speculation, according to Ricoeur, 
aggravated the problem of the wi l l by introducing a parallel divine 
'psychology' of God's knowledge, w i l l and power. The absolute knowledge 
and power of God became the dialectical opposite and source of the f in i tude 
of human knowledge, w i l l and power. Consequently, the wi l l was perceived 
both as the inf in i te power to say 'no' and the f in i te power to say 'yes'. The 
wi l l is f i n i t e because of the poverty of the i l lumination of the wi l l by the 
intel lect and the resisting obedience of the body. This philosophy of the 
will's f initude was heightened by the speculation concerning the relationship 
of this all-powerful creative, divine w i l l and the creaturely dependent 
8. The ' l i fe of excellence' is Ricoeur's translation of Aristotle's 
arete (virtue). 
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human will. Is it still possible, it was asked, to speak of a human act-center 
in the face of this divine will or must one speak of a predetermination or 
predestination? The paradox which emerges for the Christian West is a 
human freedom that is bound by something over which we have no control. 
Freedom is then perceived as a gift, not as the source of itself (Cf. ^09:176-
177;264:10; 356:984;385:99¡>-945). 
3. Descartes; the epistemologica! context. 
Descartes placed the philosophy of the will in the context of the 
first truth of his philosophy: Cogito, ergo sum. In his search for an 
indubitable truth to give foundation to knowledge, Descartes subordinated 
the will to this search. The basic question governing the Cartesian 
enterprise is "Why is there not only truth?" In seeking the cause of error, 
Descartes was the first to investigate a psychology of assent. Freedom is 
the power to be mistaken and the power to give assent to what we truly 
know. That places the weight of truth as well eis of error on the will. The 
power of knowledge is innocent. When I do not keep my will within the 
limits of my intellect, it is the source of error. 
This represents a dramatic shift in the philosophy of the will. 
Descartes drew away from the ethical and political realm and limited the 
perspective of the will to that of judgment, choice and consent, i.e., to a 
psychological dimension. In the process he isolated the will from the 
intellect and introduced the problematic of a faculty psychology. But 
although Descartes transformed Augustine's problem of sin and evil into the 
problem of error, Descartes and Augustine remain linked in that the will 
remains for both the power of alternating between yes and no. Thereby 
Descartes retained the tension between an infinite and finite pole of the will 
(Сі.26Ч:63;2ііц156;322-Л2;З 5:П5). 
*. Kant: the critical context. 
Kant is the fourth signpost in Ricoeur's philosophy on the will. 
While for Descartes there is still an experience of the will, Kant removes 
the will and freedom from the realm of knowledge and experience (373:1^2-
148). Pure reason is operative in the knowledge of the natural sciences. 
With their natural causality, with regular successions without an absolute 
beginning, the natural sciences are antinomical to the will and its free 
causality. This means that for Kant a cosmologica! point of departure for 
the free will is excluded. But that also means that pure or theoretical 
reason can gain no access to the will and to freedom. Moreover, there is no 
longer a knowledge that would encompass both natural causality and free 
causality (264(270):63). Natural causality and free causality are 
antinomical. 
But if excluded from theoretical reason, the will is open to 
practical reason. It is possible to determine the practical conditions of a 
good will (385:945). For Kant the will can never become a knowledge. It 
must forever remain practical. But his practical philosophy remains a 
philosophy. And for Kant philosophy is fundamentally a theory of law. 
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Hence, at the theoretical level he posits a law of thought founded on the law 
of nature. On the practical level, there is not a natural law, but something 
similar: the moral law. Freedom cannot exist -cannot be thought - outside 
of this law. The moral law is to freedom what the natural law is to nature. 
As a critique, practical reason's task is to define the necessary conditions of 
moral judgments. 
Because of this constellation the correlate of Kant's will is not, 
as in Descartes and Augustine the power of contraries, ' but duty. Because 
duty is non-empirical, the will is known only as determined by law. The free 
will and the moral law are inseparable: the free will is the basis of moral 
law and the moral law is the presupposition of our knowledge of the free will 
(409:180). Freedom is, therefore, like a third term that is the ground of the 
will, but which can only be known by way of the law. 
But because Kant saw the will as a type of reason, his practical 
reason banished desire as pathological. The careful corelation of desire and 
rationality by Aristotle is broken. This exile of desire forces Kant, however, 
to situate it elsewhere. He does so by instituting a distinction in the will 
between moral law and desire. Ricoeur suggests, that thereby Kant's 
critique comes very close to opposing the practical will to the idea of an 
arbitrary will (Willkür) that is not determined by reason at all. Thus the 
practical will, governed by law is an objective will, while the arbitrary will 
is a subjective will. Ricoeur severely critiques this bonding of will and law 
precisely because Kant's position ultimately leads to arbitrariness: in order 
to introduce radical evil, Kant had to rely on the arbitrary will, because to 
the good will of practical reason the 'bad will' can only be a scandal (see 
385:9<i5-946;356:982;409:179-180;375:277-279;373:IX.l-l<*;232(239): 336-
3*1; 29:130-134;373:128-148). 
5. Hegel: the dialectical context. 
The deep divisions that Kant instituted between nature and 
freedom, between rationality and desire, between duty and desire, between 
the objective will and the subjective will, led Hegel to seek to transcend 
these antinomies. Hegel's dialectical concept of the will healed the 
divisions by preserving them in a higher unity. 
In the abstract terms of the Philosophy of Right the dialectics of 
the will supposes three moments: a moment of indétermination to an empty 
9. Ricoeur sees the will as the power of alternatives also returning 
in Kant's philosophy but in a manner different from Augustine and 
Descartes. The alternatives are provided by creating a division in the will 
itself between Wille, the will determined by duty and law, and Willkur, the 
subjective will which is the power to obey or not. For Kant this awesome 
power is purely subjective (289:157). For Kant philosophy is fundamentally a 
theory of the law. Hence, he posits a law of thought and a law of nature. 
So there is also a law for freedom. Freedom cannot exist and cannot be 
known outside of the law. The moral law is to freedom what the natural law 
is to nature. 
154 
universality, a moment of determination by a limited project, and a moment 
of bringing together the indétermination and the determination into a 
singular activity. The human will is the encounter of a moment of 
universality and a moment of particularity. In the words of Ricoeur, "In the 
concept of singularity the opposition of the universal and the particular is 
the source of the concrete power of determining oneself" ОіУ.ЭЬб). For 
Hegel the will became thinkable again by way of dialectics. Thus Hegel 
approached the antinomy of rationality and desire by accepting Aristotle's 
view of will as deliberated desire. For Hegel the will is desire that is 
overcome by a reasonable project. And, in the antinomy of the subjective 
and objective will, Hegel proposed that the subjective will must pass through 
the objective will in order to become itself. 
The concrete form of a proper discourse of freedom is examined 
by Hegel in his Phänomenologie des Geistes. He recognized that the 
discourse of freedom must pass beyond the Cartesian psychology of faculties 
or the Kantian concept of duty and law. A concrete dialectics insists that 
the will in order to become itself must first confront another will and other 
wills in the form of institutions. There is no free will, until it has been 
touched by the will of another (Hegel's abstract right or contract). In the 
passage towards the objective mind, the will internalizes the institutional 
contract. And, in the passage, the objective mind becomes subjective. But, 
at the same time, arbitrary freedom becomes concrete freedom or 
reasonable will. According to Hegel the institutional forms through which 
the subjective mind must pass are successively the family, the economic 
collectivity and the political institutions. Only in this successive dialectical 
process is freedom realized. The highest form of freedom is realized in the 
State. 
Hegel's dialectics will allow the elements Kant separated to be 
thought together. Thereby, he also returned freedom to thought. For Hegel 
the will has its own discourse - a dialectical discourse - which philosophy 
can analyse to obtain its underlying logic. This logic is the logic of being. 
Hegel discovered a discourse in which nature and freedom can once more be 
thought together. The other of freedom is internalized. Substance becomes 
subject. This concrete freedom by way of the institutions is Hegel's 
greatest contribution to a philosophy of the will. It is practical reason, par 
excellence (see 385:946;W9:181-1 *2;Ш:2Э5-2Ь 1·,297·ΑΙ3-Ψ1 *;375:286-287). 
A. THE LINGUISTIC-PHENOMENOLOGICAL DISCOURSE OF HUMAN 
ACTION. 
Prior to any discourse on meaningful action or on freedom 
Ricoeur insists that there be an underlying discourse that articulates the 
conditions of the possibility of that discourse on freedom. He had 
elaborated such a philosophy in his Le volontaire et l'involontaire (29). But 
Le volontaire et l'involontaire is strictly a phenomenological discourse, 
applying to the will Husserl's phenomenology of perception. It was written 
prior to the development of Ordinary Language Philosophy (Linguistic 
Analysis) and its theory of action in English speaking countries. The first 
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phase of that development occurred between 1955-60 (№ϊ·Λ55ί). In his 
writings on the will after 1960, Ricoeur began to incorporate the analysis of 
this action theory into his philosophy of the will, bringing about a 
considerable change in texture. 
But, in accordance with a trademark of Ricoeur's philosophy, the 
introduction of linguistic analysis did not lead to the supplantation of 
phenomenology. It led instead to the recognition of a number of levels on 
which the will might be brought to discourse. For him the first level 
became a discourse of human action. It comprises an interanimated 
discourse of linguistic analysis and phenomenology. Although linguistic 
analysis and phenomenology find themselves on different strategic levels, 
their interanimation can cure their mutual short-comings (373:122). 
It is impossible to repeat here Ricoeur's extensive analysis of the 
phenomenology of the will as he worked it out mainly in his Le volontaire et 
l'involontaire and of linguistic analysis which he developed most extensively 
in his La sémantique de l'action (373). We must be content with a few basic 
points that have bearing on our concerns. The first paragraph briefly 
outlines Ricoeur's phenomenology of the will. The second paragraph will 
touch on some aspects of a linguistic analysis of the will. 
1. Phenomenology and the philosophy of the will. 
The contribution of Husserl's phenomenology of perception to a 
philosophy of the will concentrates on three dimensions. 
1. Ricoeur has shown that one can apply Husserl's justly famous 
èpoche to the will. As an abstraction, the èpoche reduces the naturalistic 
world of things, facts, and laws first of all to a world of meaning (385:946). 
In other words, phenomenology is basically an analysis of significations and 
not of immediate experiences. In order to understand the meaning of 
willing, phenomenology seeks the 'essences of the lived' or the structures of 
the experience of willing. Phenomenology seeks to uncover, therefore, the 
meaning of the lived. It operates out of the awareness that the lived, as 
constitutive of reality, is pre-predicative (385:947). It is not yet language 
and at the same time it is on the way to language. For Husserl, these 
essences are the a priori structures of lived experience. The lived is not 
bottled up within an individual as incommunicable according to Husserl but 
it emerges in understanding and even more so in language (373:114). Thus 
the will also manifests itself in phenomena that exteriorize its life and that 
possess a specific logic (264:14-16). 
Ricoeur's phenomenology of the will is patterned upon this 
intentionality analysis of Husserl's phenomenology of perception. This 
means that willing - its acts, its aims and its intentions - becomes available 
for analysis in its objects. In phenomenology the Objects' of the will are 
identified as the world, my body, and others (264:16). 
2. What does such an intentionality analysis of the will 
manifest? The intentional act of the will, the 'vécu de volonté', shows itself 
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primarily in an act-done-by-me or, more strictly, an act-to-be-done-by-me. 
It points to a project or pragma to be undertaken by me. The act of decision 
implies a world that is as yet a possibility and that can be filled with my 
action. The project of my decision is a project that lies within my power 
and is attainable in the world. The project says as much about the world as 
it says about the I by whom the project is undertaken. In the words of 
Ricoeur, 
The project is inserted into a future of the world, which world 
includes voids, the indeterminate, the non-resolved; this possible is 
projected upon the course of events, some of which do not depend upon 
me and others of which do, to speak as the Stoics... The world is such 
that a responsible agent bears the weight of a certain number of 
events which happen because of him; the world is such that it can be 
the object of provision and of projects (26^:17-18). 
On the poetic side, the pragma or project is a commitment of 
the 'I'. The pragma or project brings to language a dimension of self-
imputation. In decision the pragma reveals a binding of the 'I'. The pragma 
is a to-be-done-by-me. I determine a world and in turn am determined. The 
action can be ascribed to me. "In making up my mind, I impute to myself 
the action, that is, I place it in a relation to myself such that, from then on, 
this action represents me in the world" (26^:19). I decide but in the very act 
of deciding - to use a French idiom - 3e me décide: I decide myself (29:58-
62). This is not a speculative or perceptive act but a practical act . In 
deciding, I reveal myself to myself as a being of action, as a being of 
possibility, "It means that what I shall be is not already given but depends on 
what I shall do. My possible being depends on my possible doing" (29:6^). 
Hence, not only the world is shown to be a world of possibility, but also I 
stand revealed as a possibility: the possibility of acting (264:19). 
3. A third dimension of a phenomenology of the will that we 
must point out briefly in the light of the above history of the philosophy of 
the will is the problem of motivation. Phenomenology points out that 
motivation is another link between the project and the 'I'. It shows this bond 
with the project to be not a causal link, based on a natural necessity, but a 
reasoned link. I decide because... The link is called motive.^" A motive is 
not ascertainable outside of the decision that reveals it. The meaning of a 
motive is "tied in a basic way to the action of the self on the self which is 
decision" (29:67). By the very act by which I project myself into the world 
as practical being, I also invoke a reason: I do this in the light of... 
A motive is not a cause because unlike a cause a motive is 
inseparable from what is done. A cause, on the other hand, can be known 
10. On a number of occasions Ricoeur has gone to considerable 
lengths to differentiate between motive and cause. Cf. 29:66-72;29:347-
353;373:II-18 - 11-54. 
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without knowledge of the effect. Motives are, therefore, not pure 
rationalizations or intellectual arguments but they are supports to willing.!! 
At the upper level of motivation we may find rational justifications to give 
support to willing. But at the lower extremity there lie the needs and drives 
that almost void the will as a power of projection and make the will appear 
as a determined movement. For Ricoeur what becomes central to the 
problem of motivation is that motives make a specific subjective reference 
appear. The motive, as reason for action, reveals the body as a partial 
source and an ultimate referent of the will (373:12*). But the body that 
emerges out of this reflection is not the body as object, as separable from 
my action and, therefore, knowable by itself as a cause, but the body as 
subjective or as a personal or I-body.12 
Aristotle had already recognized this dimension when he said 
that the will is moved by desire. The body is a type of involuntary that is 
not fully pliable and at our disposition, but which, nonetheless moves us not 
as foreign to our willing but as the human dimension of our willing (290:81-
82). As a consequence the body as 'corps propre' becomes the organ of the 
act of the will (29:212). In the words of Ricoeur, "This means that the will 
actually decides about itself only when it changes its body and through it the 
world. Inasmuch as I have done nothing, I have not fully willed" (29:202). 
The body is brought to language when the 'I will' becomes expressed as the 'I 
can' (385:947). For Ricoeur the personal body that emerges out of the 
analysis is on the level of the vécu - the lived experience. It pertains to the 
ontologica! structure of being-in-the-world. It expresses the human manner 
of being-in. Once again, the phenomenological operates on the level of the 
meaning of the lived as manifested in the exteriorizations. It is through 
these that we can read the original constitution of the self (374:126). 
2. Linguistic analysis and phenomenology· 
According to Ricoeur, linguistic analysis does not add greatly to 
the analysis of phenomenology. In order to escape the finely honed, 
artificial language of the sciences, Ordinary Language Philosophy turned to 
the expressions found in ordinary usage. In the area of human action this 
means that Ordinary Language Philosophy turns to the language with which 
people articulate their action. Like the phenomenology of willing, the 
discourse of action, as analysed by linguistic analysis, is pre-ethical. It is 
thought - more implicitly than explicitly, because Ordinary Language 
Philosophy is in principle incapable of reflecting its own presuppositions -
that ordinary language is the depository of the human experience of action. 
It refuses to start with an intuition of human action, but concentrates on the 
concepts and propositions which language displays to say our doing. The 
contribution of linguistic analysis to the philosophy of the will consists 
11. Ricoeur refuses to see motives only as a type of Kantian 
practical reason. Cf.373:123. 
12. "I-body" is D. Ihde's translation of corps propre. Op. cit., p.28, 
footnote 2. 
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primarily in concretizing the analysis of phenomenology, safeguarding it 
from intuitionism, or more precisely, providing another procedure to reach 
the same end (373:105-106). 
The strategy of Ordinary Language Philosophy presents itself at 
three levels. 
Ricoeur places the conceptual analysis of the expressions used 
when speaking of human action on the first level of discourse. The concepts 
that ordinary language uses are intention, aim, reason for doing, motive, 
desire, preference, choice, etc. The originator of this codification of our 
language's capacity to say our doing is L. Wittgenstein in his Philosophical 
Investigations (par. 611, 660). In his recognition of the organization of 
language in language games, he realized that the language of action is 
distinct from the language in which we describe movement. Thus, for 
instance, we speak of an action in the following proposition, "I raise my arm 
to indicate that I am going to turn left". Movement, on the other hand, is 
expressed in a proposition such as the following, "The arm is raised". It is, 
therefore, in a specific language space with interlinking concepts that the 
question of human action and motivation is expressed. Through this 
conceptual analysis of action, one learns that the language game of action is 
entered by a carefully selected series of questions and answers (What are 
you doing?, Why?, How?) and that this questioning and responding itself 
takes place in the even larger language game of interaction (373:3-6,21-
35;II-1 - 11-54). 
The second level of discourse of action stems again from 
Wittgenstein. The second discourse is not a conceptual analysis but a logical 
analysis of the propositions of action. It is related to the propositional logic 
of Frege and connected to the work of Austin (How To Do Things With 
Words), Strawson (Individuals, e.a.), and Searle (Speech-Acts. An essay in 
the Philosophy of Language). It is termed the theory of speech-acts. 
Instead of examining the concepts used in our discourse of action, the theory 
of speech-acts examines the logic of the propositions that articulate action. 
As we saw above,^ the theory of speech-acts uncovered the force of 
language in Austin's distinctions of the locutionary, the illocutionary and the 
perlocutionary dimension of a proposition. Along these lines the category of 
promise and intention best express what is known as willing: one promises 
or intends something to be done into a type of void, which can or cannot be 
filled. But the theory of speech-acts zeroes in only on the declaration of 
that intention or promise. The theory of speech-acts submits all the ways in 
which propositions express the act of willing to an exhaustive examination 
(373:6-9,36-90;385:M7). 
There is also, however, a third level of the discourse of action 
which moves beyond the conceptual analysis and propositional logic. For 
Ricoeur that level is a type of discursive discourse, a syntax of action. In 
this discursive discourse one discovers the line of argumentation that a 
13. p.27-34. 
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complete discourse of action utilizes. An intention is never a simple act 
that can be expressed in one proposition. Generally it finds itself expressed 
in a chain of propositions. It expresses itself in a syntactical form such as 
"to do £ in order that £", i.e., beyond a semantic, propositional "to do 2" to a 
syntactical interlinking with another action, "in order to do g". The 
discourse of action displays a certain strategy, a sighting of an end through 
the arrangement of means. This discursive discourse is worked out by 
C. Perelman's theory or argumentation^* and in what has become known as 
the decision-theory and the game-theory (373:9,91-104;385:947). In his 
conference "La raison pratique" (^69:228-229) Ricoeur calls this syntax of 
action practical reasoning (raisonnement pratique). 
3. Critique of the theory of action. 
Ricoeur's evaluation of the discourse of action of linguistic 
analysis is rather harsh. He allows that as an analysis of the concepts, of 
the logic, and of the argumentation of action, linguistic analysis can throw 
light on the lived experience of the phenomenology of willing to the extent 
that that lived experience is an expressed experience. But strategically 
phenomenology and linguistic analysis operate on different levels. The 
former operates on the level of the lived, because it seeks to reach the level 
of the Lebenswelt. The latter operates only on the level of the articulation 
of discourse without reflecting on its presuppositions and its carrying 
ground. There is a level, therefore, on which phenomenology and linguistic 
analysis are contiguous, but the interanimation of both is minimal. 
Linguistic analysis cannot think its own presuppositions. It is too bound to a 
positivistic logic to recognize the need to enter into the pre-predicative 
source of willing. Ricoeur says that the description and analysis of the will 
of linguistic analysis is unproblematical. It fails to understand that the 
problem is not the analysis of the concepts, the propositions, and the 
argumentations of the discourse of action, but the realization of our 
freedom (385:947). Only when a will is confronted with other wills, with 
historical norms and with institutions, does the problem of the will surface 
not as psychological but as philosophical (373:105-127). 
B. THE DISCOURSE OF MEANINGFUL ACTION. 
1. From solipsism to meaningful action. 
The discourse of action of phenomenology and linguistic analysis 
is not yet an ethical discourse. The phenomenology of decision, motivation, 
and self-imputation provides the conditions of ethical discourse, but it does 
not enter the real arena of ethics or of meaningful action. Ricoeur calls the 
phenomenological moment the "solipsist moment of freedom" (322:42). The 
phenomenology of the voluntary and the involuntary hardly leaves the circle 
of my decision, my motivation, my action, my limitation imposed by my 
14. See С Perelman and L. Olbrechts - Tyteca, Traité de 
I'arRumentation, Paris, 1958, 2 vol. 
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character, my birth, and my unconscious. While it reflects my action and 
my power, it remains abstract and arbitrary. The phenomenological 
reduction to help open up the lived experience neutralizes another dimension 
of action which is called meaningful action (37'3:130-l)2;322-A2-<t7). 
If in his earlier philosophy Ricoeur was not so aware of this 
negative dimension of the phenomenological èpoche, in his later philosophy 
he frequently expresses the limitation of a phenomenological approach to 
the will as it is based on a phenomenology of perception. He realizes that 
every phenomenology in the final analysis remains bound to a 
phenomenology of perception, even his own Le volontaire et l'involontaire. 
It cannot loosen itself from the subjective view of decision, suggesting that 
freedom is ultimately a subjective self-determination. As such it explores 
only one dimension: the Kantian Willkür which, as we saw above, must be 
distinguished from an objective Wille (284:161-163). This philosophy of the 
will has its roots in Stoic philosophy, according to Ricoeur. Stoicism was 
not able to place choice and preference in a political context, as Aristotle 
had done, but located them instead in a psychological and moral context, 
based on the power to give or refuse assent. Strengthened by Descartes and 
Kant, this philosophy of interiority came to exist alongside a political 
philosophy that concerned itself almost exclusively with power and 
sovereignty (Machiavelli, Hobbes), but which lost all reference to the life of 
excellence and the rule of prudence as Aristotle had first perceived it 
(322:45). 
If the ethical moment is not found in a phenomenological or 
analytic framework, the discourse on meaningful action will, of necessity, 
take on a fundamentally different mode of discourse. It must transcend the 
phenomenological solipsism and confront human reality from the perspective 
of what it is not but might become. Such an approach is dialectical, because 
what is not yet opposes itself to the what is in such a manner that the 
former can be productively appropriated by an individual in his process of 
becoming (see 395:92). This dialectical discourse of ethics is thoroughly 
historical. It falls, therefore, under the regime not of action but of praxis, 
that is, the regime of human reality precisely as historical (395:95)Д' 
Despite this Hegelian note in the discourse of meaningful action, 
Ricoeur maintains that Kant still determines the discussion today beyond 
Hegel. The criticist approach of Kant, in spite of its limitations, released 
the problematic of freedom in the clearest terms. The Kantian antinomies 
of nature and freedom, of duty and freedom, of subjective and objective 
will, of desire and practical reason, will for that reason return in Ricoeur as 
the touchstone of an authentic analysis (264:20-21). Once again, a 
philosophy of the will is to be achieved for Ricoeur only within a history of 
philosophy (451:54). 
15. For Ricoeur the core dialectical reality is the human reality. 
Hegel had refused to give priority to any of the three dialectical realities of 
logic, nature, and human reality. Ricoeur is less cautious. Without falling 
into the trap of an Hegelian type of absolute knowledge, Ricoeur points to 
human praxis as the privileged area of dialectics (395:94). 
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2. Ricoeur's reflective context. 
Kant's moral philosophy, weighted as it is by the problematic of 
theoretical reason, constituted the notion of duty and law as the non-
theoretical pole of freedom. In opposition to this antinomy, which has set 
the tone for the contemporary discussion of morality, Ricoeur indicates a 
point of departure for ethics that precedes a moral philosophy. He grounds 
ethics in a movement anterior to duty and law. For Ricoeur the Kantian a 
priori structure of duty and law is only a derived structure. Ethics is not 
first of all obedience to a Jaw but an affirmation of life and existence. 
Before we enter into the objective moment of ethics, where Ricoeur will 
introduce the notion of law, we must attempt to construct the conceptual 
network that might indicate the proper moment for such a discussion of law. 
a. The ethical point of departure: the human desire and effort 
to be. 
Ricoeur's ethical quest begins with an affirmation or a belief 
(cf.324:171-176). It is affirmed against all the philosophers of negation 
since Hegel that the first human reality is not a denial or void or 
nothingness but being and existence (212(93):305). Ricoeur calls it the 
primary affirmation. He has borrowed the notion of this primary or 
originary affirmation from 3. Nabert, a philosopher who has had a pervasive 
influence upon Ricoeur's thought, even in his latest writings (see 405:178).16 
The originary affirmation is not an a priori. For both Nabert and 
Ricoeur it is diffusely present in our experience through feeling (152:209). 
Its diffuseness in our feeling does not permit us to grasp this originary 
affirmation immediately or directly. As Ricoeur shows at length in 
L'homme faillible (151) and elsewhere, such a belief or affirmation is only 
recovered in experiences of negation and lack, e.g., K. Jasper's limit-
situations. It is the experience of anguish, of death, of fault, failure, and 
solitude, that calls for an exercise of reflection that seeks to reconcile or, 
at least, to confront within ourselves a seemingly contradictory feeling. On 
the one hand, the experience of fault, failure and death appear to confirm a 
relationship within ourselves to non-being, to negation. On the other hand 
the experience of the threat to our existence underscores an "intense 
passion for existence" (83(62):288). The anguish of death, the non-necessity 
of my being there, the experience of my finitude, the experience of my 
16. The major works of Nabert that have stimulated Ricoeur's 
reflective philosophy are L'expérience intérieure de la liberté, Paris, P.U.F., 
1924; Éléments pour une Ethique, Paris, P.U.F., 1943, for whose second 
edition (Paris, Aubier, Editions Montaigne, 1962). Ricoeur wrote the 
preface (p.xvii - xxviii); Essai sur le mal, Paris, P.U.F. (Collection 
Épiméthée), 1955, of which Ricoeur wrote a review ("'L'essai sur le Mal' de 
Jean Nabert" in Esprit 25, 1957, p.124-135). After Nabert's untimely death 
Ricoeur helped to edit his unfinished manuscripts in a volume entitled, Le 
désir de Dieu. For other articles in which the influence of Nabert is evident 
cf. 83(62),83(93), 184,185,190,380. 
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violence, cannot hide that at the core of my existence there is also another 
dimension: my passion to exist. This passion to exist is more original than 
the dread and anguish of existence. For Ricoeur this passion to exist is the 
root of all acts (83(62):301). It is the root of the regulative idea that being 
is primordially good and that evil is not co-original with ourselves. 
Accordingly, the human being is a power of affirmation, a "3oy of Yes in the 
sadness of the finite" (152:215; see 212(93):305). But the human attests to 
this passion only in negation. 
For Ricoeur this negation is not founded on the Hegelian 
limitation and denial of the absolute in its exteriorization, but in the 
operation of distinguishing. The language of negation is the language of 
otherness. For instance, in perception the act of signifying means to make 
distinctions, e.g. between form and substance or between substance and 
qualities. On the level of existence too there is the otherness of distinction. 
We differ from ourselves, i.e., we are not ourselves. Spinoza called this 
otherness the "sadness" (212(93):3I8). This "sadness" affects the very 
passion for existence. For Ricoeur, this contingency, this lack of existence 
in the very desire for existence, is the constitutive dimension of my 
existence as finitude. The human being is a being that needs to be. 
Freedom manifests this nothingness at the very heart of existence 
(Ψ14(183):32). It apperceives itself as being without that which necessitates 
it, as being without a cause, and yet as an exigency to be itself a source. It 
is this affirmation of being that grounds human existence, but only in the 
experience of a difference, of failing to live up to itself. Human existence 
is an act, therefore, whose meaning is not immediately available, but which 
must constantly be recovered in its negations (186:322). This act of 
existence always remains a task of understanding, without ever achieving 
itself (380:59). Or as Ricoeur says it cryptically, "I am not what I am" 
(212(93):311). 
Ricoeur articulates this foundation of the "I am", "the being in 
question in man's being" (152:210), particularly subsequent to his analysis of 
Freud, as the desire and effort to be. Human existence, he says, is both an 
effort and a desire. It is an effort - Spinoza's conatus - because existence 
must be posited only out of itself (320(2i>6):170). Effort is the positive act 
whereby we constitute or posit our existence and being. This affirmation of 
our existence seeks nothing other than the duration of existence. We are 
this constituting affirmation. However, in a variety of ways, this 
affirmation is threatened. Human existence consists in the constant effort 
to appropriate and the reappropriate this original affirmation, even though 
it is in fact inalienable, since it is our being itself. It is the energy of human 
existence (320(232):3^2). But in the light of the presence of non-being in our 
very being, the effort (conatus) of existence, in its alienation from itself, is 
at the same time a desire (320(325):i>62). Desire here has the meaning of 
Plato' and Freud's eros, i.e., a lack or need. It is the non-being, the negation 
of being, in the very heart of existence that makes the self-constituting 
effort simultaneously a desire to be in the face of the manifold alienations 
of life (320(325):'>52). Human existence is the effort and the desire to be 
(320(229):21). 
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But having established this primary affirmation, we have not yet 
attained the ethical dimension. For Ricoeur two further dimensions need to 
be added. First, as the effort and desire to be stretch into human duration 
it is forced to speak and manifest itself in human works 
(Wt:185;320(229):20-21). Energy and desire attain meaning through their 
transformation into the words and works of human action and ultimately 
into the production of human culture.17 For Ricoeur this externalization 
and objectification is essential. There is no direct intuition of our 
existence, no immediate grasping of our existence, except through its 
coming to be in the language and the works of our effort and desire to be. 
Secondly, it is this appropriation in words and works of the effort and desire 
to be that Ricoeur, following Nabert and Spinoza, calls ethics. In ethics we 
encounter the attempt to recover our existence as desire and effort by 
means of the signs (significations) of existence. Across the lack of identity, 
the alienation, the negation of being, ethics seeks to appropriate and re-
appropriate our existence. Ethics leads, therefore, from alienation to 
freedom (227-Ά5), from slavery to beatitude (320(232):340). That is why in 
these writings Ricoeur identifies ethics with philosophy, i.e., with the 
"exemplary history of the desire to be" (320(185):219;227:45;326(191):329). 
This ethical philosophy bears the stamp of reflective philosophy. 
It sets itself as task to take hold of existence, of the "I am" of the effort 
and desire to be, by way of the signs by which it manifests itself (190:xviii). 
Because we do not possess ourselves immediately in one total act of 
existence, we have to take the long and arduous route of the "I am" in which 
the "I" has objectified itself. The "1" must lose itself in order to regain 
itself (320(191):327). The reflective task to gain oneself through the detour 
of the interpretation of the signs and works in our history is essentially the 
ethical task (190:xxi).18 The ethical task is the becoming of what one is, 
(186:322), the "education of desire" (320(309):Ψ7<0. 
b. The condition of meaningful action. 
The project of the recovery of the self through the pathway of 
an appropriation of that which we lost, or of that from which we have 
become separated through our history, our guilt, or our forgetfulness, is also 
a pathway to the realization of our freedom. Freedom is the second notion 
at the source of ethics. 
Kant made us aware that freedom is beyond the realm of 
knowledge and pure reason. It does not add anything to our knowledge. 
Freedom is practical without ever being able to supply a proof of itself. 
17. Here again we encounter the enigmatic relationship between bios 
and logos. Again Ricoeur turns to the language of Nabert to discover its 
language. 
18. According to Ricoeur, Kant created an illusory ethics by 
dumping desire from his moral philosophy in favour of reason. It is the 
major drawback to Kant's moral project:320(232):336. 
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Freedom must, therefore, be constituted in the works of freedom (375:281-
282). But before I can undertake the positing of my freedom, I must believe 
that I am free, "I can only begin from the belief that "I can," and that I am 
what I can do, that I can do what I am" (405:176). The unfolding of our 
effort and desire in action is a task of this freedom and this belief. 
Freedom is a power to be that shows itself in a doing and not in a knowing. 
Freedom is a doing that is not in possession of itself except by means of the 
long duration (405:177) and through what the doing establishes in the world 
(264:19). 
The belief of freedom is that it can contest the "real" 
(212(93):322). Therefore, that from which freedom wrests itself cannot be 
such that it is immutable. Reality must be such that freedom is possible. It 
cannot be an immovable nature, but it must be a dunamis, a potency, a lack 
in the wealth of existence. Freedom implies a void that the project of my 
decision can fill. Freedom is therefore, a conquest of our humanity over a 
nature which is antinomical to it without being an irreconcilable opposite. 
That is why the will, according to Ricoeur, is the terre natale of dialectics 
(395:98). What Kant had so diligently dichotomized, a philosophy of freedom 
must relate dialectically (373:ix -13). The dialectic of nature and freedom 
makes nature both the "other" of freedom and the mediator of freedom (see 
414(183):24). 
This dimension of freedom becomes even more paradoxical when 
we consider that not only is freedom a conquest of nature, but also that 
freedom must first assume nature before it can realize itself as freedom. 
Freedom must become like a second nature. Freedom is its own task to 
realize itself. This too is the ethical project. In the words of Ricoeur, 
I will call ethics therefore this movement (parcours) of 
actualization, this Odyssey of freedom across the world of works, this 
proof-testing of the being-able-to-do-something (pouvoir-faire) in 
effective actions which bear witness to it. Ethics is this movement 
between naked and blind belief in a primordial "I can", and the real 
history where I attest to this "I can" (405:177). 
Freedom does not exist, therefore, outside of its objectification 
in works. Freedom that does not take on the form of a habit, that does not 
solidify itself in works and institutions, that does not first lose itself, 
remains an arbitrary freedom. Only at the conclusion does freedom become 
my own and ethics the flowering of my nature (414(183):37;414(95):75-76). 
c- The imagination as the power of the possible. 
If freedom is the irruption of the possible into our world, the 
power of that projection lies in the imagination. It is in the imagination 
that the movement of our effort and desire to be takes form. We noted 
above that for Ricoeur, following Kant, the imagination is the power of 
opening up meaning, the mediator between the bios and the logos, the 
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creative intrusion into the realm that lies prior to our language.*' As 
Ricoeur says in "Hegel aujourd'hui", "The project of being free of man is less 
dependent on knowledge than on the imagination" (399:353). 
Without repeating what we developed earlier concerning the 
linkage between imagination and semantic innovation, it is obvious that the 
imagination, as the mediary function, extends beyond the theoretical 
dimension into the practical. The semantic innovation, operative in the 
metaphor and by extention in fiction, implies a redescription of reality not 
solely in the area of perception but also in the realm of human action. 
For Ricoeur the images, the possibles, of imagination are first of 
all linguistic realities. The emergence of the new in the imagination is a 
linguistic phenomenon. The new is apperceived in the semantic clash upon 
the ruins of the first reference. It is, therefore, the power of the metaphor 
and of fiction to bring about a redescription, a remaking, of reality, opening 
up the realm of my ownmost possibilities. Now some fictions possess the 
power to remake human action. This power lies first of all not in the 
structure of the story but in the narrative act . In the telling of the story, 
we activate not only the force of language, its illocutionary power, but also 
the power of the imagination. The referent of the story is the human 
action, even though, in the case of already existent narratives, it repeats for 
the reader/listener what has been redescribed already (^2^:216-217). 
Ricoeur extends this power of the imagination to the realm of 
action by relating the imagination to the project and the pragma, to the 
motivation, and to our being-able-to-do-something. Phenomenologically I do 
not appropriate these powers except by the long route of the 
exteriorizations of this power. These exteriorizations are the imaginative 
variations of the "I can". Hence, as Ricoeur says, one may discern "in the 
freedom of the imagination, that which might be the imagination of 
freedom" (424:218). 
But, with what we have said thus far about the imagination, we 
have gone only part of the way. We must pass beyond the imagination 
perceived on the level of the individual and attempt to immerse the 
imagination in the social realm as well. After all, it is not in my solipsism 
that freedom realizes itself, but in myself as social being. In a philosophy 
such as Ricoeur's, where understanding is equated with self-understanding, 
the movement from the subject to the other and from the other to 
institutions and collectivities is weighted by a number of problems. The 
state and the other can be approached only from the perspective of a theory 
of intersubjectivity. In this Ricoeur remains faithful to Husserl as the latter 
developed this concept of intersubjectivity in his Fifth Cartesian Mediation. 
This theory of intersubjectivity requires some attention because 
it has become central to a number of theses in Ricoeur's work. The passage 
from the individual subject to the other and the collectivity cannot be 
19. See above p.75-79. 
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brought about by some means of argumentation or by an empiricism. For 
Ricoeur, the movement toward the other and others is first of all an 
historical movement. 
Historical experience involves a number of temporal fields 
(472:10-11). These fields, whether perceived at the individual level as a 
type of "histoire événementielle", or as the history of "slow rhythms" with 
its "long time-span", or eis the history of what has become known as the 
"geographical time", are related to one another. As Husserl remarked, these 
temporal fields can be paired. In the pairing of one temporary field with 
another, the subject apprehends the subject of another temporal field as 
having the same capacity to say "I" as I have. This coupling of temporal 
fields relates me therefore not only to my contemporaries but also, as 
Alfred Schutz saw, to my predecessors and to my successors (422:686-689). 
The transcendental principle that governs this historical chain is 
the principle of analogy.20 it proposes that temporal fields are not unlike 
mine, or that "others, all these others, before, with, and after me, are egos 
as I am an ego; that is, they, like me, can ascribe their experience to 
themselves" (422:688). It is the imagination that plays a constitutive role 
here. 3ust as in the theory of metaphor the imagination is the operative 
power in forging new meaning, so in the practical sphere it is the power of 
forging intersubjectivity through an analogical apperception. The 
imagination must keep alive intersubjectivity on the basis of the analogy of 
the ego, preserving it from sliding into reified relations or into causal 
explanations. 
But what is the form and the role that the other, the institution 
and the state play in the realization of my freedom? How does our social 
imagination operate to forge my ownmost possibilities? 
3. The building-blocks of an ethical theory. 
a. The ethical point of departure: the other. 
For Ricoeur the ethical moment of freedom must move us 
beyond the subjective description and analysis into the realm of what he has 
called "the ethic of the second person" (75:380, cf. also 79:289-297). What 
was presented in the previous praragraph was solely the ethical principle. 
The ethical content has not been injected yet (405:178). 
How does the other, the second person or my alter ego -
introduce the ethical moment? The other encounters me not as an object 
that I can make my own (108:211-212). I cannot see the other (75:381). 
That is why Descartes failed to recover the other after his doubting 
20. Gadamer's wirkungsgeschichtlichei Bewusstsein, says Ricoeur, is 
equally subject to this principle. It helps to apprehend why we can have an 
historical experience and why we can continue to be affected by the effects 
of history. Cf. 424:221. 
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experiment. I can only apperceive the other (75:381;Μ0:11). The other 
encounters me as an other "I". The other is other and yet similar. The other 
is linked to me, yet is not "I". Kant identified this link (Husserl's term was 
Paarung) as respect. Ricoeur borrows this notion of Kant (152:105-121). 
For Kant the other is an event of practical reason. The other is given to my 
attention as a duty to recognize him or her as other and yet equal. The 
other is a call to recognition, "The other is a center of obligation for me, 
and the obligation is an abstract abridgement of possible behaviour toward 
another" (76:388, my translation).^! Ricoeur terms this respect person. In 
other words, he does not develop respect in the direction of law and 
obligation." 
This meeting of another as person is fundamentally a self-
limitation. It calls upon me to recognize him or her. Ricoeur accordingly 
calls the person a project (152:107), an "is-to-be" (152:110), which his or her 
presence asks me to accomplish. A person can never be a means, only an 
end. "I ought to treat myself and others as an end" (157:399). This is the 
task that Kant called humanity: to let the other and myself be as my 
ultimate project (75:389). In letting you, the other, be, I let your freedom 
be. Fundamentally, this is an auto-limitation. In letting your freedom be, I 
will to limit the extent of my own desires. I will to respond to the other as 
person, as task to establish his or her freedom. 
For Ricoeur, ethical existence begins where I curb my desires in 
the recognition of the other. 
Ethical freedom is not a claim which proceeds from me and is 
opposed to any control, it is, rather, a demand which is addressed to 
me and which proceeds from the other: allow me to exist in front of 
you, as your equal! (391:17Ψ) 
I recognize the right of the other to exist and thereby oblige myself to exist 
according to that right. 
21. "Autrui est un centre d'obligation pour moi, et l'obligation est un 
abrégé abstrait de comportements possibles à l'égard d'autrui." 
22. Ricoeur borrows the notion of respect from Kant and places it in 
the context of person. Kant himself, however, had developed respect in the 
context of law. Cf. Adri Geerts, "Het fundament van de ethiek en de 
opbouw van de ethische intentie volgens Paul Ricoeur," in Tijdschrift voor 
filosofie, *0, 1978, p.270-305, esp. p.282. See also Stephen Skousgaard, 
Language and the Existence of Freedom. A Study in Paul Ricoeur's 
Philosophy of Will. Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1979. 
This work presents a chronological analysis of Ricoeur's Philosophy of the 
Will up to La symbolique du mal. The author passes too quickly, however, to 
the kerygmatic perspective of freedom, bypassing Ricoeur's notion of 
concrete freedom. 
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The curb that I place upon myself by letting your freedom 
become my task must take into account that this self-limitation takes place 
in the context of conflict. Negation also mediates here. Within the ethical 
context it is not sufficient to focus on the inadequacy of ourselves to 
become. This lack of selfhood is only one aspect. To it must be added that 
the realization of my freedom through your freedom has taken place, as 
Hegel realized so clearly, in the struggle and conflict of the other to be 
recognized. Therefore, the dialectic of freedom and conflict has a very 
specific history: the history of the struggle for freedom in the face of 
oppression (405:179). Freedom emerges in history as a demand for 
emancipation from oppression and for mutual recognition (75:394-396). 
It might be important to note that Ricoeur thinks that the word 
has a powerful influence upon the history of our freedom. Ricoeur believes 
that our will and our quest for freedom can be fundamentally touched by the 
word. As a "positive, vital reality", the word is bound to the very core of 
my existence. 
Word has the power to change our understanding of ourselves. 
This power does not originally take the form of an imperative. Before 
addressing itself to the will as an order that must be obeyed, word 
addresses itself to what I have called our existence as effort and 
desire (320(325):454). 
The power of the word and its relation to existence will be taken up more 
extensively in the final chapter. 
b. The duplication of wills. 
With the recognition of the freedom of another we have not yet 
reached the full dimension of ethics, only its point of departure. Ricoeur's 
second step in the direction of ethics is to begin to introduce the objective 
will beyond the subjective will and intersubjectivity. To realize itself, 
freedom must insert a dimension of nature in its bosom. Thus, for instance, 
the confronting of two wills over a piece of property can lead to a common 
will whereby the one commits him/herself to the other. That situation we 
may call a duplication of wills or a contract (356:980-981). In a contract a 
will agrees to bind itself before another will in a type of mutual recognition. 
That mediation by another will in a contract makes me become objective - a 
nature - before myself. 
This second step shows us a freedom that moves away from 
abstraction and wild freedom to a freedom that realizes itself in action. It 
is a freedom that does something. It is a freedom that assumes the form of 
a work. It relinguishes its indétermination - its desire to be everything - and 
chooses to become something. It is a choice to accept one's existence as 
finite 
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Hence concrete freedom is a freedom which assumes the law of 
work which is the law of the finite courageously and joyously; to give 
form and, in giving form, to take form, that is freedom (322:52). 
For Ricoeur finitude is an achievement, not a destiny, "Man is man when he 
knows that he is only man" (Ψ14(95):86). 
This process whereby the universal, unrestrained will limits itself 
through work to become a singular will Ricoeur describes by means of 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right. For Hegel the will is fundamentally dialectic. 
Freedom comes into existence through assuming what negates it. According 
to Hegel that is what Kant had failed to recognize (^64:236). Kant left 
behind the irreconcilable antinomies of freedom and nature. Hegel brought 
together in a dialectic on the one hand the "I" that refuses any content in 
order to remain free (wild freedom), and on the other, a finite existence. By 
dialectically relating the two dimensions Hegel brought freedom into the 
concrete realm of human work, of institutions, and of the state (322:52-53). 
In his more recent works Ricoeur has turned to Max Weber's 
notions of social action and social relations to articulate the inclusion of the 
other in the work of freedom (396;*6^:230). For Weber social action is an 
action that is meaningful to an individual because it takes the other into 
consideration. This social action must, however, have a certain stability and 
predictability. This stability is provided by what Weber calls social relation. 
A social relation is "a course of action in which each individual not only 
takes into account the reaction of another, but motivates his action by the 
symbols and values which no longer express only the private characters of 
desirability made public but specifically public rules" (464:230, my 
translation).23 
But with these public symbols and values we have arrived at the 
third building-block of ethics: the institutions. 
c. Freedom in an institutional framework. 
The third step in ethics is probably the most difficult step. At a 
time when freedom demands to be set free from the oppression of 
institutions (464:238), it seems reactionary to maintain that institutions are 
the royal road to freedom (322:62). Ricoeur makes this third step by 
articulating freedom as a duplication of wills and as a work through Hegel's 
concept of right. Right he defines as "that region of human action in which 
work is presented as institution" (322:53, my translation).^* For Hegel the 
23. "Un cours d'action dans lequel chaque individu non seulement 
tient compte de la réaction d'autrui, mais motive son action par des 
symboles et des valeurs qui n'expriment plus seulement des caractères de 
désirabilité privés rendus publics mais des règles elles-mêmes publiques." 
24. "Cette région de l'action humaine où l'oeuvre se présente comme 
institution." 
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system of right is the realm of realized freedom. For him right is the 
concept that links both institutions and freedom. Through the concept of 
right it becomes possible to have a philosophy of freedom that is at the 
same time a philosophy of the institution and a philosophy of the institution 
that remains a philosophy of freedom (322:5*0. According to this view an 
institution is defined as "the whole of the rules relative to the acts of social 
life that allows the freedom of each to be realized without harming the 
freedom of others" (322:53, my translation).25 Hence the institution is an 
organ of freedom that is acknowledged by others, guaranteed by laws and 
protected by public order (322:5*). 
The institutions of our culture are to be perceived first of all as 
the concrete realizations of freedom. They are the "being-there" of 
freedom. Before being sources of conflict (363:189-20*), institutions 
guarantee the flowering of freedom. Hence the familial, juridical, 
economic, policitical and cultural institutions are fragmentations - liberties 
- of freedom en route to realizing itself. In the complex task of thinking 
together freedom and institutions, freedom and the state, Ricoeur seeks the 
highest realization of freedom - as did Hegel - in the ever expanding and 
encompassing institutional structures of the family, the economy and finally 
the state. Hegel's Sittlichkeit, his ethics in the institutional framework, 
achieves its apex in the political institution because the political realm is 
the highest realization of the co-ordination of the individual good and the 
good of the community. It is the task of a political ethics to incorporate the 
decision-making process and the force to enact the decisions at the level of 
the community (23»:14*;11*:*12-*29; cf. also 112:721-7*5). 
Ricoeur, however, refuses to go the full way with Hegel. Hegel 
absolutized the modern liberal state as the highest realization of the 
objective spirit. In doing so, he hypostatized the spirit totally out of reach 
of the subjective spirit. The state as hypostatized becomes an absolute 
reality, beyond the reach of individuals, closed to intersubjectivity, and 
subject to the supreme temptation of totalitarianism. To counteract the 
divinization of the state, Ricoeur suggests that only the principle of 
intersubjectivity, as developed above, can safeguard the undue reification of 
the institutions (*6*:238-2*0).26 
25. "Un ensemble de règles relatives aux actes de la vie sociale 
permettant à la liberté de chacun de se réaliser sans nuire à celle des 
autres." 
26. In this linking of ethics and politics Ricoeur follows Aristotle. 
Yet, he will at a further level, which we must examine in the final chapter, 
inject an evangelical ethic into this political context. Many of Ricoeur's 
articles that have a bearing on his political and social views have been 
collected in Political and Social Essays, collected and edited by David 
Steward and Joseph Bien, Athens, Ohio, Ohio University Press, 197*, 293p. 
In these essays one notes the influence of the personalist views of 
E. Mounier (Cf. also "Emmanuel Mounier: une philosophie personnaliste" 
(83(33):135-163) and the movement of Christianisme social. See also 
Politiek en Geloof. Essays van Paul Ricoeur, translated with an introduction 
of A. Peperzak, Utrecht, Ambo, 1968, 199 p. 
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Ricoeur's development of the institutionalization of our freedom 
is quite similar to Max Weber's notion of the social relation, that is, action 
structured according to certain rules. Action within an institutional 
framework is action set within a system of conventions. Actions are not 
private or purely individual, but assume a meaning within the social code in 
which they take place. Clifford Geetz speaks of symbolic mediation in this 
context (*64:230). As cultural entities, the social code of conventions 
proposes what is to be done. They are the media through which humans act 
and interact socially through which they interpret one another's activity. 
The institutions insert themselves in my realization of freedom as agencies 
that I have not created and which may not even coincide with my desires, 
but which are inscribed in norms and values that say to me what I ought to 
do.27 
Accordingly, if free action is action governed by rules which I 
have not set, we must examine the relationship of the subjective will and 
the objective will at the institutional level. Ricoeur undertakes this through 
the examination of value (see 23^:1Ψ5-148;390;405:182-184). 
It is in his analysis of value that Riceour confronts head-on the 
concrete human dimension of freedom. It is the anomaly of value that it 
realizes my freedom, although value is not the creation of my freedom. For 
Ricoeur this is the central antinomy of moral philosophy (390:153). Values 
seem so much the work of freedom, the work of creative spontaneity. Yet, 
there is an objective dimension to values that makes them appear as a vis-à-
vis of my freedom: as duty and obligation. For values are not made by me; 
they are discovered by me. Even those who appear to be the creators of 
value in our history, admit that they are not the inventors but the 
discoverers of value. To live in accordance with values becomes thereby 
27. It is important to note that the ethico-political discourse is not 
necessarily an univoca! discourse. On a number of occasions, Ricoeur 
introduces into this discourse the distinction of Max Weber between an 
ethics of conviction (Gesinnungsethik) and an ethics of responsibility 
(Verantwortungsethik) or the ethics of power. The two levels of ethics are 
indispensible to the well-being of the human community. The ethics of 
conviction is borne by the communities such as societies and the churches. 
They seek what is humanly desirable, the moral epitome. In 'Tâches de 
l'éducateur politique" (cf.234:78-93), Ricoeur points to the Sermon on the 
Mount as the highest realization of such an ethics of conviction. But an 
ethics of conviction can degenerate into fanatical moralism or clericalism, 
when it demands sole right in the realisation of freedom. And ethics of 
conviction must learn to live and interact with an ethics of responsibility 
and power. This is the ethics of the use of power, or regulated violence and 
calculated guilt. This ethics of power must respect the ethics of conviction 
and not identify with it, lest it fall into Realpolitik or a type of 
Machiavellianism. Cf. for example, 105(83):23<>-246;1<Ю:225-2Э0;235:Ш; 
236;238;270:251;222:1<H-142;367:7<>; іЮ5:192;«8:64. Ricoeur wrote an 
introduction to the French translation of Weber's Politik als Beruf (Cf. 
"Éthique et politique" in Esprit 27, 1959, p.225-230). 
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more an obedience than a creative spontaneity to situations. But must we 
leave value as an antinomy between obedience and creative spontaneity? Is 
there a way of mediating between the vision of value as uncreated essences 
in the heavens and value as completely originating in the will? Throughout 
his work Ricoeur has struggled with this antinomy. In his writings 
contemporaneous with Le volontaire et l'involontaire (29)28 he frequently 
raises the issue, but as A. Geerts notes, Ricoeur became more and more 
pessimistic about being able to determine values more objectively.^' In the 
more recent article, "Ethics and Culture. Habermas and Gadamer in 
Dialogue/'^O he moves toward another solution. He transposes the antinomy 
from the axiologicai level, where the dilemma appears to be unsolvable, to 
the philosophy of culture, where a parallel antinomy exists. He ventures 
that a discussion of the antinomy in cultural philosophy between traditions 
and reason can throw light on the antinomy of values. The discussions in its 
modern dress is between Hans Georg Gadamer'* and Jürgen Habermas.·^ 
The transposition to cultural philosophy reveals one new 
dimension. Values are historical. Culture like value is a human work. But, 
like value, culture approaches us not as an ever original creation but as a 
heritage, that is transmitted to us in the form of a tradition. Culture is a 
transmitted heritage that comes to us with a certain force that is 
experienced as binding. A cultural tradition is, therefore, the authority of 
the past upon the present. It is in this capacity that tradition comes in 
conflict with enlightened reason. Tradition is perceived as the violence 
against reason. In historical terms this conflict is translated into the debate 
between the Enlightenment (Aufklärung) and Romanticism. The 
Enlightenment, best articulated in Kant's sapere aude, was a protest against 
28. "Le chrétien et la civilisation occidentale" (6); M. Dufrenne and 
Paul Ricoeur, Karl Jaspers et la philosophie de l'existence (8); Gabriel 
Marcel et Karl Jaspers. Philosophie du mystère et philosophie du paradoxe 
(12); "Dimensions d'une recherche commune" (15); "L'expérience 
psychologique de la liberté" (19); "Le Yogie, le Commissaire, le Prolétaire et 
le Prophète" (2Ό; "Note sur l'existentialisme et la foi chrétienne" (51). 
29. Art, cit., p.290. 
30. 390:153-165. 
31. Wahrheit und Methode, op. cit. and particularly, "Rhetorik, 
Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik. Metakritische Erörterungen zu 'Wahrheit 
und Methode'", in Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik, Frankfurt a.M., 
Suhrkamp Verlag (Theorie-Diskussion), 1971, p.57-82. 
32. See esp. his Erkenntnis und Interesse, Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1968; "Erkenntnis und Interesse" in Technik und Wissenschaft als 
Ideologie, Frankfurt a.M. Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969, p.l*6-167; and "Zu 
Gadamers 'Wahrheit und Methode"' in Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik, 
op. cit. pA5-56; and "Der Universalitätsanspruch der Hermeneutik", idem, 
p. 120-159. 
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the power of traditions and a call to a revamping of existence along the 
patterns set by reason. The subsequent Romantic movement was a protest 
against the destructive powers of reason and an impassioned retrieval of 
prejudice, authority and tradition. If the position sketched here appears 
solidly antithetical, Ricoeur will argue that the split is not as radical as it 
may have appeared in the terms of the nineteenth century. 
In the debate between Gadamer and Habermas this antinomy 
becomes the antinomy of a hermeneutics of tradition, schooled by 
Heidegger, and a critique of ideologies from its nesting-place in the 
Frankfurt School. The former views tradition as an authentic dimension of 
historical consciousness. The latter views tradition as the source of 
distortion and alienation. The focus of the debate is the historical origin of 
values. For Gadamer tradition is a dimension of our human historicity and it 
is grounded in the experience of participation. He argues that in the 
hermeneutics of tradition there is brought to expression our original 
belonging to things and to being. Thus historical experience is the 
consciousness of being carried by traditions. Gadamer points to the 
distanciation that the modern sciences have interjected between ourselves 
and our participation in being as the modern tragedy. In terms of tradition 
one ought to recognize, therefore, that we can never extricate ourselves 
from history and its effects. There is no a-historical situating of ourselves 
in a space and time where we might be an uninvolved spectator or an 
absolute origin. All we can do is to become conscious that we are inserted 
in historical becoming (390:I56-157;386:33). 
Habermas' position is that such a captivation by prejudice, 
authority, and tradition is a distortion of our freedom. He allows that to 
permit oneself to be assumed by the hermeneutics of prejudice, authority, 
and tradition is to forget that hermeneutics itself is governed by an interest. 
In fact, all knowledge production is ruled by an interest. Thus instrumental 
activity is ruled by a cognitive interest. The sphere of the historico-
hermeneutical sciences is ruled by the interest of communication. The 
sphere of the critical social sciences is ruled by the interest in 
emancipation. It is the thesis of Habermas that the sphere of instrumental 
activity, the realm of the modern sciences and technology, has gained such 
an ascendency today that it has invaded the properly human realm of the 
historico-hermeneutical sciences and is distorting communication. For 
Habermas the scientific and technological venture has become ideological in 
the Marxian sense of the word. As a consequence the tradition of the 
historico-hermeneutical sciences is not a bearer of the value of freedom, 
but it distorts the communication of freedom. 
Habermas assigns the task of unblocking the distorted 
communication to the critical social sciences. These critical social sciences 
are guided by their interest in emancipation. The interest in emancipation, 
according to Habermas, is not derived from the past tradition. For him it is 
a regulative idea. It is an anticipation of a future in which the violence, 
presently hiding the real interests from our consciousness through a 
censored communication, is unmasked. The process of emancipation as a 
demand for an unconstrained and unlimited communication is guided, 
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therefore, by the anticipation of freedom. "The cr i t ica l thinker does not 
speak as the poet does of "the dialogue which we are," but of the idea of 
communication which we are not, but which we ought to be" (390:159). For 
Habermas value comes not from the recovery of past tradit ions but f rom the 
future, f rom the regulative idea of a communication without l im i t and 
constraint. 
The obvious antinomy of Gadamer and Habermas' view calls for a 
dialect ic approach. Against Gadamer, Ricoeur suggests that there is a need 
to interject a cr i t ica l agency in his hermeneutics of reminiscence. Ricoeur 
has provided such an agency by indicating that the distanciation f rom our 
part icipation that takes place in the historico-hermeneutical sciences is not 
a harmful alienation but an indispensible and productive distanciation. By 
placing a positive face on distanciation, one provides the necessary opening 
for a cr i t ique and hence a cr i t ica l recuperation of past tradit ions. On the 
side of Habermas, Ricoeur urges that the crit ique of ideology requires a 
more sympathetic reabsorption of the past tradit ions. The past, he says, is 
more than a distort ion of communication. He rejects, therefore, the idea 
that only the cr i t ica l social sciences are the praxis and knowledge that bring 
about emancipation. He insists that the interest of emancipation must be 
linked wi th the historico-hermeneutical sciences. Habermas' position is 
based on the mistaken assumption that the historico-hermeneutical sciences 
operate only on the level of understanding, and not on the level of 
explanation, while the emancipatory praxis demands that i t operate both on 
the level of understanding and explanation. As we have seen, for Ricoeur 
the historico-hermeneutical sciences are interpretation-sciences, operative 
within a dialectic of understanding and explanation. But even more 
pertinent to our problematic is the fact that the misunderstanding that 
hermeneutics seeks to clear up is not far removed from the ideology that 
the crit ique of ideology seeks to unmask. Both hermeneutics and the 
cr i t ique of ideology recognize that there is no absolute zero point f rom 
which we can survey our bond wi th history and from which we can start 
anew. Both a cri t ique of ideology and the elucidation of our pre-
understanding are consciously inserted in our historical becoming. Hence 
both seek to emancipate by enhancing the competence of our 
communication. For Ricoeur this competence can be strengthened only by a 
recouping of our cultural memory. If our heritage contained no reference to 
an unconstrained communication, our emancipatory interest could itself 
become an illusory dream. 
On the level of the appropriation of value this type of 
interpénétration of a hermeneutics and the cr i t ique of ideology would mean 
that one would insert a cr i t ica l moment in the very process of appropriating 
a value. It would assert a value as historical, i.e., found within the very 
historical process of realizing our freedom. Our world is already qualified 
as ethical (320(325):453-Ψ54). And yet the discovery of a value requires not 
an unequivocal surrender to i t , but a c r i t i c a l re-appropriation. Only a value 
that has been tested for its illusory and distortive aspects and content is 
worthy of human appropriation. Only a value, in other words, that has been 
'transvaluated" by the interest in emancipation is tru ly a human value. The 
ethical l i f e today demands that we move beyond an unmediated ethics into a 
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life process that constantly seeks to achieve its freedom throught the re-
appropriation of our past her i t ages . " 
The solution to the antinomy of values is fundamentally a 
practical solution (390:16^-165). Let us take the example of justice. In 
Ricoeur's view justice is "the institutional instrument by means of which 
several freedoms may co-exist" (405:182). Justice says that I want you to be 
free. But that means that justice is not a theoretical construct or some 
type of ethical essence but a "schema of actions to be done to make 
institutionally possible the community and communication of freedom" 
(405:182). Justice as a value says that your freedom should be as my 
freedom should be. That is the supreme ethical situation. But that 
recognition lies within an institutional and social order. Consequently, 
the concept of value is a mixed concept which assures the 
compromise between the desire for freedom of individual 
consciousnesses and the situations which are already qualified as 
ethical situations. Furthermore, this is the thrust of an action that 
intends to produce a new institution, but to do so beginning from an 
already sedimented institutionalized state of affairs. Every value is 
situated in an order already "stamped" as ethical. In this sense, every 
value is a compromise among an exigence, a recognition, and a 
situation (405:183). 
To maintain that value is historical is to raise the question of the 
truth of a value. Can we commit ourselves to an historical value? Is all 
value not ideological? That is the question that we must now raise. 
d. Ideology and utopia. 
With the notion of value, historically and institutionally 
motivated, we touch on an issue that becomes prominent in the later 
writings of Ricoeur, namely, ideology. The preceding analysis has indicated 
one level of the discussion. Before we leave this section we must take up 
the matter of ideology in the broader context of Ricoeur's theory of praxis 
and of the realization of human freedom. We have left the ethical thrust in 
the political realm. We cannot leave this political realm without taking 
cognizance of the mode in which political society receives its social 
motivation and self-image and promotes itself. Since Ricoeur wishes at all 
costs to avoid the tyranny of an absolute knowledge, it should not surprise us 
that even at the level of praxis there is not an absolute appropriation of the 
self. All understanding is fundamentally historical understanding. All 
33. The question of evil and the original breach in human willing 
between desire and the humanly preferable will be dealt with below. For 
Ricoeur the fault that creates a chasm in human existence (the human as 
'intended for good' but 'inclined to evil') is best read through the religious 
affirmation of the believer in the confession of evil. 
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understanding is of the long duration. It must be retaken in an endless 
process oí losing oneself in order to gain oneself. A discussion about 
ideology and utopia can articulate that desire and effort on the cultural and 
social level. 
For Ricoeur, ideology and its correlative concept utopia are the 
ultimate proof that human action is mediated, structured and integrated by 
symbolic systems. It is that dimension of the debate that attracts our 
analysis. Ideology is first of all an epistemologica! and political concept. 
We introduce it and utopia here to accentuate three points. First of all we 
must bring the integration into culture by means of a symbolic mediation 
into focus. Secondly, this symbolic mediation and integration is to be 
related to power. And thirdly, the whole area of human praxis must be 
correlated with ideology in the sense that all understanding is properly 
speaking historical understanding.^* 
(1) Ideology and social integration. 
By introducing values into a social, institutional and cultured 
context, Ricoeur has no difficulty in linking values with norms, imperatives 
and laws. Value which promotes the praxis of your freedom, my freedom 
and our freedom does not always coincide with my desire. Consequently, 
value appears as the preferable over the desirable. Then value approaches 
my desire as a force and is expressed in negative terms as a prohibition: 
Thou shalt not... Because of this tension between desire and preference, I 
experience value as a norm. This does not mean that the value is negated. 
It means very succinctly that I will to be one will in the face of desires in 
order to protect value from subjective arbitrariness. Through the mediation 
of norms I change from an arbitrary will to a rational will (<Ю5:18<М85). 
The imperative attaches to this norm the element of command: 
"Do this!" (W)5:185). At this level values are objectified into a system and a 
hierarchy of values and appear as the other of my freedom. In the 
imperative I lose the consciousness of being author of my freedom. I relate 
to value in a relationship of command and obedience (405:186-187). 
Law, according to Ricoeur, inserts itself into the ethical process 
only at this juncture. Law is the "terminal moment of a constitution of 
meaning" (405:187). Law adds to value, norm and imperative the demand for 
universality. By law we manifest that our human actions cannot be so far 
removed from our natural environment that we cannot place our praxis and 
rationalization in the neighbourhood of the rationality we seek in nature 
(405:187). The test of universality lies in the ability to make a value 
generally applicable according to the Kantian criterion, "Would I want 
everyone else to do the same?" (405:187). But the law of nature is only an 
34. The discussion of ideology and utopia enters Ricoeur's work 
following the intense debate in the latter part of the бО'з and the early 70's 
on social and university reforms. It is the version popularized by the neo­
Marxist Frankfurt School that Ricoeur here interjects into his hermeneutics. 
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analoRon; human law can never take on the solidity that Kant found 
reflected in the order of nature. By placing law at the conclusion of the 
odyssey of freedom, Ricoeur has inverted Kantianism. Law is not the first 
realm but the terminal moment. For Ricoeur the Kantian law is too formal; 
it is only a didactic criterion. Between freedom and the law Ricoeur felt it 
necessary to interpose the concrete odyssey to the other, the institution and 
the state. 
One can also express the process from norm to law in 
sociological terms. There meaningful action can be expressed in the 
Weberian terms of social action, i.e., the orientation of action to the other, 
and of social relation, i.e., the motivation of that orientation to the other by 
means of public symbols and values. Public meaningful action is action 
governed by a public code that specifies the cultural structure in which my 
individual action must take place. Hence every culture possesses a system 
of interacting symbols that regulate and govern the actions of individuals in 
an institutional framework. Because these systems of interacting symbols 
resemble a code, they possess what Ricoeur calls a "readability-character", 
i.e., they can be committed to writing so that in an analogous fashion the 
texture of action also resembles a text (Wt:231 ¡370:529-562). 
It is at this level of the codification of a political society that 
the notion of ideology enters. Ideology is bound to the need that every 
social group has to form an image of itself so as to settle its identity or in 
order to present itself to itself. This image mediates the relationship of the 
group to its being. Lévi-Strauss stresses that this symbolism is not an effect 
of society but that society is an effect of this symbolism (^2^:223). This 
self-image is grounded in the founding event that brought this historical 
community into being. The primary task of ideology is therefore to ground 
an historical community in its founding act as a type of perpetuation of its 
dynamism. It is by constantly returning to its origins in a creative re-
actualization that a community stabilizes or, one might say, domesticates, 
itself. Ideology mobilizes an historical community by means of the 
representations of its own identity (396:331-332;<>64:230). 
Beyond this primordial role of social integration, Ricoeur points 
to four other traits of ideology. 1. The dynamism of ideology is derived 
from its role as social motivator. It is a force driven by the desire to show 
that this historical community has a right to exist. Its project is to keep the 
community alive in the light of its foundation. 2. It retains this motivating 
force by simplifying and schematizing the human totality into a 
recognizable, ritualized, stereotyped prism. Ideology is the kingdom of 
'isms'wocialism, liberalism, capitalism... The ideology is the view of the 
whole through a specific prism. Epistemologically ideology is at the level of 
opinions. 3. The interpretative code of an ideology is not a deliberate 
creation but much more something "in which men live and think" (396:333). 
It is operative behind our backs so that fundamentally it is not critical. In 
fact, it is socially efficacious because it operates unconsciously. 4. This 
third'trait explains why ideologies are by nature difficult to budge. Social 
groups tend to be orthodox and intolerant of dissenters. The social self-
image is deeply ingrained and socially desirable. But this hardening of the 
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social reality can also become a stumbling block in the realization of 
freedom. 
(2) Ideology as Légitimation. 
There is, however, a second concept of ideology. Beyond being a 
symbolic mediation of social integration, ideology is also an instrument 
legitimizing a given system of authority. What ideology does best is to 
interpret and justify the human relationship to authority and power. Max 
Weber again provides the analysis. All authority, he says, needs to 
legitimate itself. Every phenomenon of domination brings together, on the 
one hand, the claim to legitimacy and, on the other, the belief in that 
legitimacy by the individuals subject to that authority. The relationship 
between the claim and the belief is dissymetrical in the sense that the claim 
to legitimacy surpasses the belief in the legitimacy. It is this surplus -
Ricoeur calls it the "plus-value de créance" (^30:5Ψ, note 11) - that the 
ideology needs to legitimate. But his legitimation is never apparent or 
transparent because the phenomenon of authority operates of necessity with 
an opacity (396:336). In fact, ideology legitimates and therefore motivates 
best when it is not perceived as a legitimation. 
(3) Ideology and illusion. 
The above concept of ideology is untainted by the pejorative 
connotation that ideology has received from Marxist philosophy and in the 
critique of ideology of the Frankfurt School. The Marxist concept of 
ideology adds to the preceding concepts the notion of distortion and the 
reversal of the real into an illusion.^ For Marx there is a reversal of the 
real because a certain social production reverses the real. For Marx, as it 
was for Feuerbach before him, this reversal of the real takes place in 
religion. Religion is ideological because it reverses the heavens and the 
earth. Religion makes us walk on our heads. Real life is replaced by these 
reversed religious images, so that the religious ideology represents life. 
Marx, therefore, sought to reverse the reversal. 
For Ricoeur's Marx' concept of ideology is valid only if one is not 
forced to look for a reality that is not ideological. The reversal of the 
reversal is possible only if the distortion of ideology is exposed. Marx' 
emphasis is best supported when we see it founded on the need of every 
social group to be integrated by a symbolic mediation. In addition Marx' 
recognition that the legitimation of authority which is ideology's principal 
area of activity is tied to specific social classes and the struggle between 
classes is valuable only in the context of the task of ideology to provide that 
legitimation of authority. For Ricoeur ideology is indispensible to social 
35. Ricoeur insists that Marx' concept of ideology as reversal and 
distortion gains its validity only on the basis of the two previous concepts of 
ideology. The very efficacity of ideology in establishing and maintaining 
social links is the foundation of the dissimulation of ideology. Cf. Wf:223-
22*. 
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existence. Social existence is founded upon a symbolic constitution and 
requires an interpretation of itself in and through the images and 
representations of its social links (396:336-338). 
«0 Utopia. 
This function of ideology as integration, legitimation, and 
distortion, is confirmed when ideology is placed in conjunction with utopia. 
Following the lead of K. Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie, Ricoeur 
maintains that the polarity between ideology and utopia is primarily a 
dialectic relationship.^ Three concepts of utopia dialectically correspond 
to the three concepts of ideology. 
1. The constituent function of utopia is not to integrate and 
ground the social relations in the founding act, but to disrupt the order 
mediated by ideology by means of a project of an order that differs from the 
ruling order. Utopia is the literary genre that translates the project to a 
new social order into a type of discourse. Although principally a written 
literary genre, as first created by Thomas More's Utopia (1516), it is not 
essential that it be written (430:57). In contrast to ideology, Utopia has a 
high profile. It does not hide itself as ideology does. Utopia, as described 
by Thomas More, is the "no-where" (u-topia), where a different social order 
is established. It is a project of the imagination that creates a new space 
and time from which one looks at existence as it is ruled by the dominant 
symbolism and injects into that dominant reality the vision of new 
possibilities. By rethinking in radical fashion the family, sexuality, 
government, religion, etc. , it contests that which is. Utopia's function of 
social subversion is exactly counter to ideology's function of social 
integration (424:225). 
2. Utopia's relationship to the legitimation of authority is 
equally subversive. The literary products that have come from the utopie 
imagination indicate that the principal area of concern of the utopie genre 
is power. Utopia, by projecting another society, shows the fragility of the 
ideology that seeks to bind together the claim of legitimacy and the belief 
in that legitimacy. By its imagination of another society, utopia exposes the 
obfuscating game ideology plays to bolster its credibility. Here again, the 
need of legitimation is kept in check by the projection of another mode of 
social relation (430:58). The legitimation as well as the power it serves is 
never absolute. 
3. But there is also a pathology of utopia, similar to the 
pathology of ideology. Utopia can degenerate into the mad dream that 
seeks to submit reality to itself. Utopia can become fixated into 
36. The dicdectics of ideology and utopia repeats in many ways the 
dialectics of archaeology and the teleology of the subject which we have 
developed above. The dialectics of ideology and utopia isolate the historical 
dimension more clearly than the dialectics of the archaeology and teleology 
of the subject, however. 
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perfectionistic schemes and uncompromising refusals to undertake the 
concrete means to realize the aim of the utopia. Utopie imagination can 
lead to unrequited nostalgia. 
For Ricoeur utopia cannot function outside of an ideological 
context. Mannheim had indicated that the possibility of thinking together 
ideology and utopia is based on the concept of non-congruence. Together 
ideology and utopia refer to the dissonance and incongruity of social and 
historical reality (424:222). Left without the complementarity of the other, 
ideology or utopia would hide this fundamental position of historical reality 
from view. Both point to that essential dimension, ideology despite its 
attempt to repeat and stabilize, and utopia despite its excentricity, its being 
"no-where" (424:227). For Ricoeur the tension of ideology and Utopia must 
remain, "The dialectic of ideology and of utopia is open and without end" 
(430:60, my translation).37 
e. A non-ideolofiical discourse? 
The ultimate question to be asked, therefore, is whether there is 
a non-ideological approach to reality and to social relations? Could science 
be such a non-ideological approach? It has often been suggested that it can 
fulfill that role. But if science assumes such a position, it would remove 
ideology from its mediating role and ideology would become the 
mystification of a false consciousness (396:339). For Habermas the sciences 
that fulfil this non-ideological role are the critical social sciences. Ricoeur 
rejects the claim that the critical social sciences defuse the system of 
ideology, because they cannot fulfil the requirements of scientific 
explanation and verification. Also science as critical science has not shown 
the capacity to rise above the ideological debate. If, as Ricoeur says, the 
social link is itself symbolic, it is vain to look for something that might be 
anterior to images. There is not something like the real, or real activity, or 
real life, to be found prior to images, if the images are that whereby the 
social link is constituted. In the final analysis an absolutely radical critique 
of ideology is impossible because there is no non-ideological place from 
which such a critique can be initiated. 
That brings us to the point that needs to be made about the 
whole realm of the realization of freedom. There is no possibility of a 
reflection or a knowledge that is total (464:239). Every reflection implies a 
point of view, an historical stance. Every social stance is an ideological 
stance. And that creates an agonizing situation. How does one avoid 
becoming a cynic or a sceptic, incapable of concretizing one's freedom 
because every thing is relative? If a total synthesis or a total point of view 
is not possible, if every view is a point of view, must we renounce all claim 
to truth and any claim to a critique of ideology? Ricoeur does not think so. 
There is a middle road, he suggests, between absolute knowledge and 
absolute relativism. It belongs to the hermeneutical discourse on the 
37. "La dialectique de l'idéologie et de l'utopie est ouverte et sans 
fin." 
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conditions of historical understanding (396:352). For Ricoeur, as we shall 
see, our naivete has been savagely jolted out of its complacency. Only a 
knowledge that has passed through the critique of knowledge and through 
the explanatory procedures of our time can safeguard us from sterility. 
Only a second naivete, chastened by the modern suspicion, is yet open to us 
{464:241). 
But the discussion of this hermeneutical discourse links the 
ethical discourse to the discourse of perception. For Ricoeur the symbolic 
text -understood in its broadest sense - is the indispensable detour, whereby 
the self recovers the conditions of its own installation. If story and history 
insert us in historical time (355:536), and if ethics too is the realization of 
our freedom in history, the hermeneutics of perception and action find 
themselves on a common ground. Both seek to discover the conditions of 
historical understanding. Because Ricoeur sees this as bound up with the 
most fundamental problematic of our time: the relationship of explanation 
and understanding, we must take up this issue at greater length in the next 
chapter. 
C. THE DISCOURSE OF FREEDOM. 
Even with the development of a discourse of human action and 
decision, and the discourse of meaningful action, the discourse of freedom 
has not yet been plumbed completely. Ricoeur points to a third level of 
discourse that more strictly examines the enrootment of freedom in being 
and the various modes in which this enrootment has been expressed in our 
history. Ricoeur points to three phases of the philosophy of the will in 
history to indicate three basic modalities of the will. Today we find 
ourselves in the crisis of the third phase. This discourse on freedom 
provides a prime example again of how the history of philosophy is itself a 
mode of doing philosophy and why philosophy for Ricoeur is fundamentally 
interpretation. 
The third discourse of the will is an ontological discourse, i.e., it 
is a discourse underlying the two previous modes of discourse. Human 
action, as Aristotle reminds us, speaks to us of a mode of being. Being, he 
remarked, is an act, an energeia, that is manifested in the human erga 
(works). Being itself is activity. The human 'being' or energeia is 
manifested in the life lived according to excellence, the life of virtue. In 
other words, the ethical quest itself refers back to being as act and the 
ontology of potentiality (Metaphysics, Book 9; *1*(183):32-33).38 This third 
discourse of an ontology of freedom does not know a smooth transition from 
38. Ricoeur suggests that the reason why Aristotle lacked a notion 
of freedom was his inability to co-ordinate being as act with his ethics. In 
the final analysis Aristotle predicates being as act not of human individuals 
but of the divine being. As a consequence the ontological and the ethical 
discourse remain distinct. For the same reasons it can be said that Aristotle 
lacked the concept of subject and subjectivity. Cf. 356:983-98^. 
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the first and second discourse of the will. It is not a phenomenologicai nor a 
dialectical discourse, but an ontologica! discourse. But as we have pointed 
out a number of times, Ricoeur insists that today's ontologica! discourse can 
only be a broken, indirect discourse. Ontological discourse is fundamentally 
hermeneutical, passing through the historical signs and traces in search of 
its roots and its aims. 
This hermeneutical ontology of freedom possesses the curious 
dimension of historicizing the ontology of freedom. The hermeneutics of 
freedom passes through the history of its modes of being. There it reveals a 
number of phases which we can identify as cultural phases of freedom's 
mode of being. As Ricoeur notes, "The history is, in a certain way, the 
history itself of the modes of being, the history of the manifestation of 
being" (375:284). This is the deep history of the will that has found a 
number of ways of surfacing in our history. Ricoeur points to three 
thresholds that the deep history has crossed. The crossings of these 
thresholds were axial cultural moments in our history. As we shall see, the 
terminal point of the historical journey of the will is the will as subjectivity. 
For Ricoeur subjectivity is the pre-dominant mode of being (375:285). 
The first threshold in the perception and functioningof the will 
occurred when the Greek culture was transformed into Christian culture. It 
was at this crucial point that the Aristotelian psychology of the will as the 
choice of means towards an end was confronted by Augustine's view of the 
will as infinite. Augustine saw the power of the will in the experience of 
evil and sin. In the possibility of sin the will shows itself to be a power to 
deny being. The power of the will is an infinite power (375:285;356:98i>). 
The second threshold emerged at the crucial moment of the 
beginning of modern consciousness. It was articulated in the Cartesian 
cogito. Here the subject appears as the one before whom the world is a 
spectacle. The world is the representation before the subject in search of 
certainty. The ego is the first truth. It is the power to say "yes" and "no". 
Freedom becomes part of the ego cogito. The "I will" pertains to the "I 
can". The experiment of doubting is an experience of my freedom. To will 
and to be free are inextricably related. By snatching us from doubt, the 
cogito is a profession of freedom: the freedom of thought (356:984). 
The third threshold was the achievement of Kant and Hegel. 
Freedom as subjectivity emerged through the recognition of the antinomy of 
freedom and nature. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason which presented a 
nature entirely subject to laws that brooked no exception forced the 
secession of freedom from the realm of nature. Freedom and nature fall 
under different regimes. Freedom lies beyond a cosmologica! framework. 
Kant therefore placed freedom in the realm of action of an ethical subject. 
This antinomy of freedom and nature is unresolvable on the speculative 
level. Speculative reason cannot unify the twofold causalities. It can only 
know them antinomically. Freedom presents itself as a power that is not 
cosmologica! but that can be an originator of phenomena. For Kant freedom 
is the transcendental condition of ethics and moral reflection (284:163). 
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But Kant only obtained this transcendental condition at the 
expense of a ruined cosmology. By distinguishing, Kant separated and left 
us a split world. Hegel attempted to heal that split. As we know Hegel's 
philosophy attempted to articulate this in a dialectics. For him the 
dialectics of the objective and subjective Geist articulates the process 
whereby substance (nature) becomes subject. If Geist is dialectic, then 
freedom too is dialectic. 
According to Ricoeur, this achievement of Hegel is the 
completion neither of the philosophy of the will nor of the ontology of 
freedom. Hegel's Geist remains but one moment in the emergence of 
subjectivity. It is not the absolute moment: substance has not yet become 
subject (356:98^). Hegel's difficulty lies in his relating of the will and truth. 
Hegel's truth, we saw, lies not in the present moment but in the succeeding 
moment, where the present contradictions are reconciled. The final 
moment has the distinction then of being the decisive moment. It becomes 
the moment of truth: the final reconciliation. The philosopher who 
penetrates the succeeding moment more deeply than any other is, therefore, 
in a position of advantage in the progression of truth (375:287). But history 
did not prove the truth of Hegel. History subsequent to Hegel - Ricoeur's 
deep history -reveals the weakness of Hegel's truth. It is labelled Idealism. 
With Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche a new mode of being 
came to history. In one way, they bring this historical manifestation of 
freedom full circle. Nietzsche, in particular, shows the ground of being 
again as an act and power and not primarily as form or essence. But this 
rediscovery of being as act and power has brought the philosophy of 
subjectivity to a head, according to Heidegger, and opened up another mode 
of being. Nietzsche injected into history the will to power as a mode of 
being. However, the symbols by which Nietzsche brought this will to power 
to language are not the symbols of subjectivity but cosmic symbols: the 
Eternal Return of the Same, Zarathustra, Übermensch, Dionysus. The new 
mode of being was not yet in his grasp - he only announced it. Nietzsche 
saw subjectivity destroying itself in nihilism (375:288). 
But Nietzsche also accomplished something else. This is at the 
level of philosophical discourse. The problem that Hegel deposited with us 
was the relationship of will and truth. If for Hegel the truth of freedom is 
always in the succeeding movement, for Nietzsche that relationship is 
inverted. He states that truth itself or the search for truth manifests a 
quality of the will: the will to truth. If truth lies in the will, where do we 
search for the manifestation of truth and of freedom? Here Nietzsche 
pointed to the philosophy of interpretation. Hegel's philosophy had 
attempted to stand at the apex of history, or perhaps more accurately, in 
the next phase of history from which he could glance back at the present. 
Nietzsche's philosophy seeks to stand in the midst of an ambiguous history. 
As we have seen Ricoeur is more sympathetic to this stance. With 
Nietzsche he can turn only to all the signs that attest to the power of being. 
And these are found in the play of every-day existence, in its display of 
intentionalities and in its quest for meaningful action in the ethical and 
political sphere. Although Ricoeur has not worked out this sympathetic 
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reading of Nietzsche in any great detai l , he too seeks only a discourse in the 
form of interpretat ion. Only the interpretat ive discourse can discern the 
depth-history of human freedom. Only interpretat ive discourse wi l l avoid 
the temptat ion to be more than an historical understanding and to resort to 
tota l i tar ian violence (375:288-289;356:984-985). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE APPROPRIATION OF THE SUBJECT. 
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What has emerged out of Ricoeur's theory of discourse and the 
text is a dislocated and despoliated subject, who is no longer either the 
Cartesian self-constituting subject or the Kantian transcendental principle. 
The subject does not know him or herself. The subject does not know the I 
that accompanies all representations. Self-consciousness is false: I am not 
who I am. I am in fact disbonded from my self to which I constantly seek to 
be rejoined. But the meditation on Ricoeur's indirect ontology warns us that 
this is not the total story. This dethronement of the subject as the master 
of consciousness is only the negation through which must come a rediscovery 
of the subject beyond the Cartesian Cogito. Now while the contours of the 
world in which the subject dwells have been sketched, it remains to highlight 
the process whereby this world shapes a new I. The word 'new' is used 
advisedly. The demise of the Cartesian subject is a cultural event of high 
significance, because it marks at the same time the advent of a new cultural 
I. 
According to Ricoeur, the process of the recovery of the subject 
consists of three moments which are dialectically related. The grounding 
moment consists of participation which is dialectically related to the 
moment of distanciation. Both moments are taken up into the moment of 
appropriation. This chapter will examine these three moments and the 
process that links them. The first section will examine the correlative pair 
of participation and distanciation. It will focus specifically upon the 
historicity of human existence. The second section will consider the textual 
dimension of the distanciation. The third section inaugurates the movement 
in which the interpretion of the world of the text reveals a subjective 
dimension of that world. The process whereby this 'for me' of the text 
forges a new self is called appropriation.I The appropriated self is a self 
mediated by the reading of the text. 
1. In the language of Jean Nabert's reflective philosophy, the 
appropriation is called concrete reflection. Gadamer calls it application. 
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A. THE HUMAN MODE OF ΡΑΙΜΊΟΡΑΤΙΟΝ. 
For Ricoeur, hermenéutica in the broadest sense means the 
making of the human mode of existence my own. We have insisted in the 
previous chapters, that the human mode of existence has an ontological 
ground which is our true being but with which we do not coincide. We are 
not who we think we are or who we might be. In the previous chapter we 
have described this enrootment of ourselves and our non-coincidence with 
our ontological ground with Nabert's concept of originary affirmation and 
with the hermeneutical concept of participation. As a consequence, all 
human activity, all human knowing, all human experience, all objectivity and 
subjectivity, are taken up in this all-encompassing relation of participation 
(398:227).* In other words, the belonging of ourselves to being and to beings 
- Heidegger's Being-in-the-world - is the primordial hermeneutical 
experience. 
However, the experience is not intuited. It is not grasped in all 
its immediacy. Participation is human only to the extent that this 
primordial participation is intercepted and exteriorized, so that it becomes 
accessible to understanding. In Ricoeur's view, for participation to be 
human it must be correlated with distanciation (398:228). Distanciation is, 
therefore, equally constitutive of human existence (<H 3:3*0. What for 
Gadamer is the "scandal of modern consciousness" (390:156), is in fact the 
transcendental condition of every human science, and for Ricoeur the 
challenge of the contemporary human mode of being. By disrupting the 
primordial core of participation, distanciation establishes us as historical 
beings. In other words, the correlative concepts of participation and 
distanciation are the foundation of historical understanding and historical 
existence (412:29-30). What does Ricoeur mean by historical existence and 
historical experience? 
Above it was noted, how, for Ricoeur, the historicity of human 
existence is brought to language in narrativity.^ In narratives, whether 
fictional or historical our historical existence and experience is found 
exteriorized (453:195). What we wish to examine here, however, is the 
epistemologica! status of our historical experience. This must be 
undertaken to set the stage for a proper understanding of the appropriation 
of ourselves as historical beings. 
The principal difficulty of historical experience is that it does 
not lend itself to conceptualization. Its externalization in narratives is but 
2. See above p. 106-109. That condition of participation is valid for 
the natural sciences as well. The object of the natural sciences can be 
apprehended in a primordial sense, because I am first of all among things 
that I did not make (422:686). It is the ideology in the pejorative sense of 
the natural sciences that they can be forgetful of their historical 
constitution. 
3. See above p. 138-146. 
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one indication of this. Terms such as objectivity and even experience do not 
apply with equal rigour to historicity as they do to the objects of the 
physical sciences. Ricoeur shows this by his exposition of the conditions of 
historical experience. He does this by means of a critique of Kant's 
analogies of experience in his Critique of Pure Reason. 
In his analogies of experience, Kant concerned himself with the 
ordering of time. He instituted there the distinction between an objective 
succession of time in the object and a subjective succession in the 
representations of the object. In other words, he recognized two 
successions, one that is ordered and one that is not ordered. Accordingly, 
there are two temporalities. For Kant, objectivity consisted in the capacity 
to keep distinct these different successions and temporalities in every 
experience (413:28). Now, for these successions and temporalities to be an 
experience, they have to possess two further qualities. For Kant, these 
temporalities and successions must first of all be ordered, i.e., interlinked 
into an order; and secondly, be unified in such a way that I can attribute 
them to me. An experience is ordered and one. An ordered experience is an 
experience that can be imputed to one consciousness (413:28). Only then 
can one call an experience one's own. 
In this context, is it possible to speak of an historical 
experience? For historicity to be an experience Kant demanded that the 
order of the experience be subordinate to the unity of the experience, and, 
we might say, the unity of the experience subordinated to the ability to 
ascribe the experience to myself. Ricoeur disputes this. The final condition 
of experience, he maintains, is not the ability to ascribe something to 
myself. This self-ascription of any experience must be preceded by the 
ontological dimension of participation. The self-ascription, Ricoeur says, is 
not a first, sovereign, constitutive act of experience. The experience is 
constituted by participation (413:29). With that we are back on familiar 
ground. In fact, as we have seen, this participation is constitutive not only 
of historical experience but also of the physical sciences. The initial 
situation of both is receptivity rather than the imperious constituting by a 
subject. But how then does the experience of participation in the object of 
the physical sciences differ from the participation in the object of historical 
experience? 
In the physical sciences, the object can be set over and against 
me for analysis despite the participation. In historical experience, however, 
the object is a temporality that I cannot oppose to myself. For it is a 
temporality like my own. The historical object is not an over and against 
but a paired (Husserl) object. The other temporality is a subject-
temporality, not an object-temporality. The other is subject like me. That 
means that my temporality is accompanied by other temporalities, all of 
them analogous to my own. For Ricoeur, therefore, following Husserl, 
historical experience is first of all an intersubjective experience. This 
intersubjective experience extends not only to my contemporaries but to my 
predecessors as well and even to my successors. The contemporary 
intersubjective experience is, in other words, caught up and encompassed in 
a larger temporality that relates my history to the temporality of those who 
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preceded me and those who will succeed me. In the language of 
participation, my temporality belongs to this great temporality. This 
encompassing temporality is history (Ψ22:686-687; 413:29-31). 
This encompassing temporality escapes the rule of objectivity 
proposed by Kant. The historical field escapes the ordered and unordered 
succession because it is constituted by the immense number of temporal 
fields which can be placed into the threefold relationships of 
contemporaneity, precedence and descendence. But, if it escapes 
objectivity, historical experience does not thereby become irrational. All 
that it means is that history is not nature, and that history has its own 
rationality (413:31). It is not the rationality of the ordered sequence. Its 
rationality is the rationality of human praxis, which, as we said above, is 
based on the principle of analogy. For Ricoeur analogy is the transcendental 
principle that can provide intelligibility for the relationship of different 
temporal fluxes. The analogy does not establish the relationship of our 
contemporaries, predecessors and successors. It is only a transcendental 
principle signifying that all others, whether they are contemporaneous, or 
whether they came before me or will come after me, can, like me, say 'I' 
and ascribe experience to themselves (413:31-32; 422:687-689). 
However, this primordial constitution of my historical 
experience in participation achieves, as in all cases of human participation, 
a measure of exteriority. The distanciation of historical experience is most 
apparent in our relations with our predecessors. Our relations with our 
predecessors are accessible to us in the archives, documents, letters and 
monuments that are the external mark of their presence. These present the 
"facts" of history, never to be reified, but always kept alive in the dialectic 
of participation and distanciation. It is through these externalizations that 
our participation with our ancestors becomes understandable. It is also the 
condition of the possibility of historiography (472). 
But our historicity pervades all human existence. Human 
existence is fundamentally intersubjective. The recuperation of ourselves as 
historical is a recuperation that keep» alive the intersubjective bond of 
communication attaching us to our contemporaries but also to our 
predecessors and to our successors. A hermeneutics of the subject will 
guard against any reification of this intersubjective rapport, as well as the 
reduction of the narrative of that rapport to a physical object. 
B. THE OBJECTIVATION OF OUR PARTICIPATION: THE TEXT. 
For Ricoeur, the act of distanciation from our primordial 
participation pertains to the necessary condition of the appropriation of 
ourselves. Appropriation is not a simple, intuitive procedure. There is no 
appropriation that reintroduces the subject prematurely, before it has been 
tested in the fire of the various modes of analysis and of the critique of the 
representations in which our participation manifests itself. In other words, 
our participation requires a mode of self-communication. Without this self-
communication, an appropriation of ourselves is impossible (420:73). 
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For Ricoeur, the most constitutive mode of this self-
communication of participation is the text. For him, the text is "the 
paradigm of the distanciation of all communication" (389:130). The text is 
the narrows through which the water of human existence must pass. This 
philosophical hypothesis is the biggest gamble of Ricoeur's hermeneutical 
theory. He has to prove that "the entirety of human existence is a text to 
be read" (220:223). At issue, therefore, is not only that our participation in 
being exteriorizes itself, but that the texture of that exteriorization 
resembles that of a text. It presupposes that fundamentally human 
existence has a languagistic character (320(2<f6):68; 398:237), that this 
dicibilité can be written or inscribed (413:3*0, and that the discourse of 
existence can be fixated in a text. Accordingly, the text is the point of 
access to our self-understanding (389:141). Existence is understood or 
appropriated, not in the immediacy of the lived experience, but as said or 
inscribed in a text (396:354). Without this intermediation of the text, self-
understanding is effectively blocked. 
Ricoeur's text-theory, as we have seen, extends itself not only to 
the realm of perception but also to the realm of human action. In the latter 
sphere, however, the hold of the text is more tenuous. In the one article in 
which Ricoeur has dealt explicitly with the textuality of human action "The 
Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text" (370:529-562), 
he maintains that, both on the level of the object and of the methodology, 
human action displays similarities to the textuality of the world of human 
perception. In referring to Max Weber's definition of the object of the 
human sciences as sinnhaft orientiertes Verhalten (meaningfully oriented 
behaviour), he suggests that the "meaningfully oriented" ought to be 
translated into "readability characters" in order to emphasize the possibility 
of engraving meaningful action into a text that can be read (370:537). Also, 
in his more recent writings on fiction and history, he emphasizes the 
capacity of the fictional and historical text to redescribe human reality and 
human action. Since the theory of speech-acts has indicated that doing can 
be inscribed in language as the force of language (illocutionary act), it has 
opened up the further possibility of perceiving the other characteristics of 
textual writing in action. According to Ricoeur, these characteristics 
include 1. the autonomy of action vis-a-vis the author,* 2. the autonomy of 
the action vis-à-vis the initial situation in which it took place,^ and 3. the 
autonomy of the action vis-à-vis its original addressee.^ 
4. One might call it the social dimension of action. In the words of 
Ricoeur, "Our deeds escape us and have effects we did not intend" and they 
enter into social actions that leave an imprint in history (370:541). 
5. An action can become a paradigm and as such extend to a 
transhistorical relevance: the world of meaningful action. 
6. On the level of praxis this autonomy becomes evident when we 
realize that human action is not evaluated by its initial setting, but that its 
meaning is open to anyone who can re-enact it in a new praxis. 
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At first sight, this linkage of hermeneutics with the text theory 
could easily be interpreted as a limitation of the broad perspective that 
Heidegger and Gadamer brought to hermeneutics. Gadamer's hermeneutical 
key of history and the historicity of human existence is narrowed to that of 
the text. Ricoeur recognizes this. But he counters this charge by [jointing 
out that the return to the text is also a return to the hermeneutical 
concerns of Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Dilthey in particular concentrated 
on the text as the "expression of life fixed by writing" (406:16). Moreover, 
Ricoeur has not abandoned Gadamer's concern for historicity. However, he 
emphasizes that the text is not just a medium through which our historicity 
is alienated but a productive medium for the historicity of human existence. 
Yet, Ricoeur also admits, that the point of entry provided by the text is 
narrow. Hermeneutics and interpretation do not take in the total field of 
interpretation that comes into play in the question and answer dialectic of 
human existence. Hermeneutics is not the interpretative exercise called for 
in every human communication. For Ricoeur, it is the interpretation of 
written discourse: written discourse in the form of a text (388:142-143). 
If at first sight Ricoeur's hermeneutics appears limiting, his 
linkage of the text with self-understanding and human existence brings him 
back into the fold of a general hermeneutics (220:223). The catch word of 
this modern hermeneutics has been understanding in search of a victory over 
misunderstanding. By defining hermeneutics as "an inquiry about the act of 
understanding involved in the interpretation of texts" (406:16), Ricoeur has 
attempted to link up with this general hermeneutics from the perspective of 
the text. In his own inimitable way he has linked the hermeneutics of 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey and their concern with texts with the ontology 
of understanding of Heidegger and Gadamer. 
The productive distanciation of our participation brings into play 
the full theory of the text within hermeneutics. The immediacy of the 
experience of participation is interrupted in favour of the mediation of the 
text and its threefold autonomy. As we saw above/ the fixation of 
discourse in the text liberates the text from the original psycho-social 
condition of its production, from the dialogal context of its original 
situation (depsychologization of the text), and finally, from its original 
addressee (desociologization of the text). What the text confronts us with is 
not what lies before the text, or what surrounds the text, but the text itself 
and its production of reality (397:80). The object of the text is precisely the 
world of the text, where a new dwelling place of the self emerges. The 
reference of the text is not the tangible world but a possible world, a new 
way or orienting ourselves in existence (355:780; 381:107; 337:148; 389:140). 
The text hermeneutics of Ricoeur is, therefore, not merely "a hermeneutics 
of the text but a hermeneutics based on the problematics of the text" 
{406:16). 
7. p.35-41. 
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С. APPROPRIATION. 
If distanciation is the objectification of participation, 
appropriation is the subjectification of participation. Appropriation is the 
Zueignung, the making-one's-own, of the ground of one's existence, the home 
of the subject. Appropriation is the becoming of the self. Since the 
appropriation is by way of the text and in no sense a direct, unmediated 
work, the task of appropriation pertains to the hermenéutica! exercise or 
the work of interpretation. There is no appropriation without 
interpretation. In fact, appropriation is interpretation (337:145). 
1. All understanding is self-understanding. 
Ricoeur's indebtedness to Husserl's phenomenology crops up 
repeatedy in his hermeneutical theory. With Husserl, Ricoeur maintains 
that all understanding is self-understanding, i.e., the comprehension of the 
condition of the appearance of things is related to the structure of human 
subjectivity (186:317). For Ricoeur, this subjectivity is not the correlate of 
an objectivity, that is, a subjectivity that constitutes an objectivity, as 
Husserl had perceived it, but a subjectivity grounded in participation 
(398:227). All objectivity and constituting subjectivity is founded on the 
ontological participation of Being-in-the-world.' The subject can provide an 
epistemologica! justification and operate methodologically, only because it 
is grounded primordially in participation. All understanding flows out of this 
ontological constitution where the finite self dwells in Sorge and Dasein 
(398:228). 
To say, therefore, that all understanding is self-understanding is 
not to return to a self-constituting subject. In fact, a wedge exists between 
the self of self-understanding and the ego of self-consciousness (423:94-95). 
Consciousness has its meaning, not from the ego, but from something 
outside itself (398:235). Understanding at this primordial level is not 
epistemologica!, nor methodical but ontological, i.e., it attests to the fact 
that we belong to being. It is not the Diltheyan epistemologica! 
understanding of the Geisteswissenschaften but the Heideggerean Verstehen 
(434:165). 
2. All understanding is interpretation. 
This becoming of the subject in understanding is not, however, 
immediately obvious. Here again Ricoeur follows vintage Heidegger. He 
assigns the same breadth to the notion in interpretation as to understanding. 
Heidegger perceived Auslegung (interpretation) as the development of 
understanding according to the structure of "als" (as). In other words, 
8. Ricoeur prefers Gadamer's term, Zugehörigkeit (participation), 
over Heidegger's Being-in-the-world, because it expresses more directly the 
conflict of the relation of subject to object. It also makes the dialectical 
concept of distanciation, without which participation cannot be, more 
visible (389:228). 
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interpretation adds nothing to understanding except that it allows it to 
become itself. Interpretation is not a translation into another language but 
the bringing to itself of understanding (398:229). Interpretation is, 
therefore, like a second step in the process of the being-there of Being. 
Consequently, interpretation depends totally upon understanding, because 
both come forth out of our participation in Being (43^:165). Interpretation 
is not, first of all, a method of the Geisteswissenschaften, but a moment of 
the ontological constitution of human existence. Interpretation is as 
universal as the projection of meaning. 
Since interpretation flows from understanding, what Heidegger 
calls Vorhabe is operative in interpretation. One has a prior grasp or view 
of the object, not as a sovereign subject, but through an anticipation of the 
object. It is this that allows the interpretation to have the structure of 
"als". The 'as' of interpretation corresponds to the anticipatory grasp, the 
prepossession of the object in participation. The 'as' of interpretation only 
explicitâtes this pre-understanding (398:229;232-233). We understand 
ourselves by beginning with these anticipations, this pre-understanding 
(355:779). 
Where does interpretation manifest itself? Its favourite field of 
operation is that of intersubjectivity (WO: 11) or communication (398:232). 
In intersubjectivity one understands when one shares in the same meaning. 
This occurs in a conversation, when the dialogal and dialectical process of 
question and answer unfolds the field according to which the conversation is 
structured. Interpretation, accordingly, is the process through which this 
mutual understanding proceeds (398:230) and the original ambiguity is 
overcome. What needs to be stressed again is that it is not the subject who 
is in control of meanings; s/he is not the origin of the intersubjective 
meaning, but meaning comes to be in him or her. 
However, the model of conversation is not paradigmatic of 
interpretation. Conversation is too limited an intersubjective relation. It is 
bound by two interlocutors sharing a situation in the here and now. The 
dialogal intersubjective relation is only a 'short' relation. For Ricoeur to 
introduce the notion of interpretation, this relation must move out of its 
situation of immediacy and enter into the realm of the 'long' relation that 
encounters us in social, cultural, political and religious institutions. These 
long relations are basically historical relations. It is, therefore, at the 
intersubjective level with our contemporaries, our predecessors, and our 
successors that interpretation, properly speaking, manifests itself. 
3. Interpretation and the text. 
The third moment of the unfolding of Being for Heidegger is 
language. Here again Ricoeur follows Heidegger. As we saw in the previous 
paragraph, Ricoeur concentrates his efforts concerning the language 
dimension of interpretation, not upon the 'short' inter-subjective relation, 
but upon the 'long' relation. That long relation finds its point of identity in 
the text. What the text adds to the dialogal relationship is precisely the 
inscription of the discourse. Inscription fixates a discourse and produces for 
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us an autonomy of a text , not only vis-à-vis its author/speaker, but also vis-
à-vis its immediate estensive context and i ts addressee. This unmoored 
tex t , f loat ing through history toward whomever can read, is for Ricoeur the 
cardinal depository of meaning. 
The text is, therefore, the outlet of understanding in 
interpretat ion. It must not be divorced from the process of understanding 
and interpretat ion, because i t is not unmoored from part icipat ion. But in 
the text we do have the surfacing of part icipation in distanciation. As such 
the text is also the dialectical opposite of part icipat ion. But that does not 
permit us to forget that whatever object ivi ty the text can muster, i ts 
object iv i ty is grounded in the being of the text and ult imately in the 
dicibi l i té of l i fe itself (475:11). 
But, as inscribed discourse, the text has durabil i ty. The text 
displays a structure of meaning. For Ricoeur, this is a central moment of 
hermeneutics. I t is central because i t is the moment in which two types of 
hermeneutical practices meet. I t is the moment that Dilthey split into 
explanation and understanding, and which Heidegger and Gadamer were not 
able to bring together again in their attempt to renew hermeneutics. For 
Ricoeur, the text is, therefore, both an outf low of understanding and 
interpretat ion in the Heideggerean sense, and a structure of meaning that is 
open to analysis and to explanatory procedures. This means that, for 
Ricoeur, interpretation implies a dialectic of understanding and explanation 
(423:92). Understanding becomes enriched in that i t assumes, beyond the 
moment of the apprehension of our part ic ipat ion, a moment in the process 
of the science of interpretat ion. In that context, understanding is the non-
methodical pole, the dialectic opposite of explanation (434:165). As to 
interpretat ion, i t becomes the process that moves between the pre-
understanding and the exegesis of the text , between understanding and 
explanation (475: IV-VII). The dialectic of understanding and explanation is 
grounded in the dialectic of participation and distanciation. It states that 
the self of self-understanding is effected not by sharpening my subjective 
capacities intui t ively or without mediation, but by recourse to a more 
objective discourse that we believe to be the object i f icat ion of our Being-in-
the-world or of our 'forms of l i fe ' . The text as a form of l i fe permits an 
approach that has two poles. 
The f i rst pole is that of understanding. Contrary to all attempts 
to devise a method for understanding, Ricoeur maintains that understanding 
is non-methodical. Non-methodical understanding takes the form of a guess 
(423:75). We f i rst guess the meaning of the text , because at f i rst the tex t 
does not speak: i t is mute (423:75). Since we seek to understand our 'forms 
of l i fe ' , a hermeneutics of understanding refuses the challenge of Romantic 
hermeneutics which sought to restore the relationship between the author 
and the reader to a dialogue situation, to a genial communication. For 
Ricoeur, the text itself as a form of l i fe must be brought to understanding. 
The text as a form of l i fe must be moored, not to its original author or his 
or her Sitz im Leben, but to the l i fe of the reader. Understanding is the f i rst 
step of bringing back to l i fe a particular tex t . Consequently, understanding 
takes place in the semantic space of the text (423:76). Understanding as 
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guessing concerns this semantic space of the text. And as Ricoeur remarks, 
"There are no rules for making good guesses" (<f23:76), just as we must say of 
the empirical sciences that there are no rules for making good hypotheses. 
The second pole is that of explanation.' The guesses of 
understanding regarding the relationship of parts of the text to the whole, of 
the determination of the individuality of the text and of the possible 
actualizations of the text need to be validated. This is the task of 
explanation, but always as the dialectical counterpart of understanding. 
"Understanding precedes, accompanies, closes and thus envelops 
explanation" (434:165). The one cannot be thought without the other 
because "explanation develops understanding analytically" (434:165). 
Together they constitute the hermeneutical circle: one explains what one 
understands, and one understands what is explained (390:163). What breaks 
apart here is the Diltheyan epistemologica! dichotomy. Explanation is not 
the hegemony of the physical sciences. Structural analysis has clearly 
demonstrated that explanation pertains also to the realm of language 
(337:139). 
Of the two poles, only explanation is truly methodic. And 
although the validation of the guesses can hardly exceed, as E.D. Hirsch 
remarked, beyond probability (423:78) - Ricoeur calls it a method of 
'converging indices' (423:79) - the method of explanation is nonetheless 
methodical. For Ricoeur, this methodic pole is the necessary intermediation 
between pre-understanding and self-understanding. Together they form the 
hermeneutical arc (423:87;505:IV). Its most frequently mentioned form is 
that of structural analysis, provided by the semiotics of the Structuralist 
Schools.^ Structural analysis seeks to guard against a superficial, naive 
reading of a text. Its explanatory procedures can help uncover the depth-
semantics of the text and, therefore, a more critical reading of the text 
(423:87). By remaining within the oppositions and differences of the lexical 
entities of the text, structural analysis can help to determine whether one 
reading is more adequate than another. The explanatory procedures may not 
validate absolutely, but they validate nonetheless (337:146-148). 
Moreover, the interpretation of the text must refuse to 
hypostatize the text. Interpretation is not interpretation of the text, i.e., 
an application of a series of explanatory procedures. Rather, it is an 
interpretation based on the text (406:16). By this Ricoeur wants to warn the 
interpreter not to fall into the trap of remaining within the strictures of the 
code. It is not the code but the message that one is after. The 
9. See above p. 109-112. For an evaluation of Ricoeur's use of 
explanatory procedures - in Le volontaire et l'involontaire Ricoeur calls 
them diagnostics - see Mary Gerhart, "Paul Ricoeur's Notion of 
'Diagnostics': Its Function in Literary Interpretation" in Journal of Religion 
56, 1976, p. 137-156. 
10. Ricoeur does not intend to point exclusively to semiotics. Any 
approach that uses explanatory procedures can provide the methodic pole. 
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interpretat ion of the text presupposes that every text has a reference. 
Interpretation is in pursuit of the reference of the text , i.e., the world of 
the text . Ricoeur focuses on the "open state of the universe of signs" 
(320(247):65), their abi l i ty to say something about something, while 
recognizing at the same t ime that the reference is mediated by the sense 
(406:29). 
Here, too, the control of the conscious subject is l imi ted. The 
subject's task is to permit him/herself to be guided by the movement of the 
text toward its reference. The subject must seek to dislodge him/herself 
before the text . Explanation does not mean control . 
* . Interpretation and the world of the text. 
We saw that interpretation is a process in pursuit of the 
reference of the text . But Ricoeur's pursuit is l imi ted to the reference of 
poetic texts (357:533). The reference of these texts is properly described as 
a double reference or split reference. By abolishing reference at its 
ordinary level in descriptive or didactic texts, poetic texts forge a reference 
in the logical absurdity of a f i rst level reading. In the clash of the semantic 
fields one catches sight of the world of the poetic text . The referential 
visée of the poetic text provides a glimpse of an ontological sphere. It is 
f rom this sphere that a return to the subject can be made. 
By breaking wi th the surface of real i ty, poetic language show us 
a deeper mode of belonging to real i ty. In a paradoxical manner poetic 
language links us wi th that foundational reali ty through the very discourse 
that i t creates.^ 1 By its capacity to create mood i t reveals new ways of 
being in the world. These new ways of dwelling in i t have not originated 
wi th a subject, but are f i rs t of al l outpourings of the very real i ty that poetic 
texts express.12 i t is poetry that makes that reali ty appear for the f i rs t 
t ime (248:113). I t evokes 'the mythico-poetic ground of man' (408:174), 
which ordinary language tends to dissimulate. By tearing a fissure in 
language, i t forces a new world into view. It is the poet's task to let that 
real i ty speak to us. Outside of the poetic creation i t is not perceivable. It 
alone breaks open a world as a possible way of seeing and doing things. Into 
11. Ricoeur likes to quote the phrase of Bachelard in his La poétique 
de l'espace according to which the poetic image "Becomes a new being in 
our language; i t expresses us by making us what i t expresses." see 227:15-
16jl55:121; 417:214-215. 
12. See the text of "Le poétique" (278): "Elle est l'expressivité du 
monde; et parce que l'expressivité va des choses vers nous, et non l'inverse, 
on peut parler d'une signification de la poésie, dans une acception du mot 
signification qui, pour n'être pas logique, n'est pas pour autant 'subjective': 
la signif ication, c'est la venue à la parole de l'expressivité même du monde. 
C'est de cette manière anti-subjectiviste qu'il faut entendre le primat de 
l'expression sur la signification en poésie: loin d'éliminer la signification i l 
lui donne une assise." (248:109) 
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this world we can project new possibilities of becoming a self, or becoming 
"what one was" (422:363). 
The name attached to this world of the text varies immensely. 
Ricoeur borrows very freely from the words that have covered this reality 
for the major philosophers. Without clear preference we discover Husserl's 
Lebenswelt alongside Heidegger's Being-in-the-world (e.g. 397:79) and 'my 
ownmost possibilities' (e.g. 436:495), Nabert's 'originary affirmation' 
(93:101-124), Spinoza's 'conatus' (320(232):336), Freud and Plato's 'eros' 
(320(232):336), Lévinas' 'infini' (373:101), Aristotle's 'Being' (356:983У, 
Duf renne's 'Nature' or 'Go«?!!«: ! 11-112), Schelling's 'Grund' (248:112) and 
Plato's 'idea of the good' (373:95). 
But no matter what name we give to the realm out of which the 
poetic arises - the names of the previous paragraph are by no means the only 
ones - the poetic extends that source to us. It fuses a bond between us and 
the source. It touches us not by its description or didactic power but by the 
mood that the poem has shaped by its language. The mood affectively binds 
us to that world (423:60). It is a feeling that the world of the poetic text is 
not totally alien; in fact, that its 'space' and its 'time' is our originary space 
and time, thanks to which we can continue to exist (139:269i450:176). But it 
is only the poetic that extends that source to us. By following the 
movement of the poetic text, a fusion of our space and time with the 
originary space and time takes place. Gadamer calls this phenomenon 
Horizontverschmeltzung - a wiping away of horizons. In this fusion of 
horizons I am enabled to transgress my previous boundaries and limits 
towards a world of my ownmost possibilities as it is projected in the poetic 
text (362:23). 
It is evident that for Ricoeur the reference of the poetic texts 
bonds us to a world in which the split between subject and object has not yet 
occurred. Its reference towards a world of the text is not to a world of 
essences, but to a world in which I can dwell. The reference of the poetic 
text is, therefore, also auto-referential, without becoming subjective in a 
transcendental sense (381:100). The world which the text opens and 
discovers projects an increase of my possibilities of existing. 
The realm of the world of the text pertains to the power of the 
imagination. The imagining power enables or mediates the opposition 
between the world of ordinary discourse and the world of poetic discourse 
(463). It is the imagination that enters into the world of ordinary discourse 
and disrupts its tranquility, its self-assuredness, its logic, and seeks to 
reshape it in accordance with the images and signs that pertain to what is 
possible. More positively, the imagination is the dynamism of the ground as 
it surges into our language and into the concreteness of our human 
existence. It grants us a new reference after the breakdown of the first and 
thus opens the primordial reality for us. It is this capacity of saying that 
redescribes our reality (424:215). 
Hence, the poetic finds its source not in the subject but in this 
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ground. This ground manifests itself in the poetic.^ The ground itself is, 
therefore, perceived to be incapable of remaining unmanifested. The ground 
seeks to reveal itself, to let itself appear (2*8:116). With Hegel, Ricoeur 
says, "Art is that which makes matter sing" (399:3*5). Consequently, the 
ground which the poetic brings to expression, cannot be a passive essence, to 
be contemplated, but it must be, as Aristotle perceived already, an act. 
Being or the ground is dynamic. This means, moreover, that the emergence 
of the ground cannot remain solely at the level of perception but must find 
its expression in human action. The analysis of the symbolic language has 
hinted at this on several occasions. Poetic language is mimetic language. It 
not only redescribes reality but it is also an enhancement of human action. 
The emergence of this ground in poetic language lets the ground of the 
subject be seen as well. 
The reference of the text probes the Being-in-the-world, the 
realm of my ownmost possiblilities. It is this that attracts the 
interpretative quest (358:53). Interpretation presupposes that reality is 
possibility, that our world and ourselves are not ready-made. It presupposes 
that reality can be redescribed, that mimesis means not an Eternal Return, 
an amor fati, but an exploration of the essentially real. The interpretation 
of the world of the text is therefore an aggression against the so-called real 
and a subversion of the established order (*75:VIII). 
It is before this world of the text that the subject must make its 
appeal. It is in this world of refashioned visions and redescribed actions that 
the subject is beckoned to dwell and to become. To understand oneself 
before the text is to perceive the text as opening up the world of my 
possibilities. Interpretation is not an empathetic or congenial understanding 
of the psychic life of an author, but allowing oneself to be overtaken by the 
posibilities of the text J * To appropriate the meaning of the text by making 
one's own the signs sedimented in the written texts of our culture is, 
therefore, a becoming of the subject. Text-interpretation is not just a 
process of the subject and, therefore, arbitrary, because the subject does 
not control the world of possibilities. These are offered to me as the gift of 
the text. Instead of a projection of my subjectivity into the text, the 
subject receives a new possibility of knowing him/herself from the text. 
The self is not the foundation nor the condition of interpretation but its 
endpoint (406:30). "If the reference of the text is the project of a world, 
then, it is not the reader who primarily projects himself. The reader rather 
13. In "Religion, Atheism and Faith" he expresses this as follows, "In 
terms of its total extension and radical comprehension, poetry is what 
locates the act of dwelling between heaven and earth, under the sky, but on 
the earth, within the domain of the word" (320(Э25):*67). 
1*. In his "Cours sur l'herméneutique," Ricoeur writes, 
"L'interprétation consiste à produire le mode d'être qui donne à ce monde 
possible la dimension de ma propre existence. La capacité du texte d'ouvrir 
un nouveau monde, c'est-à-dire d'ajouter à mon existence de nouvelles 
possibilities, voilà sa référence." (374:30) 
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is enlarged in his capacity of self-projection by receiving a new mode of 
being from the text itself" (<>23:9Ό. 
Here too a hermeneutical circle is operative. The understanding 
of the world, projected by the text, is correlative to the understanding of 
oneself before the projected world (381:100:375:122-123). The Sache of the 
text must become the self: "Thus I exchange the "I", master of itself, for the 
self, disciple of the text" (398:236, my translation).^ For Ricoeur, it is the 
final defeat of the constitutive subject (Ό8:30;358:53;381:108-109). Human 
unity lies, therefore, not within the subject but without. It is purely 
intentional. As projected in the world of the text, that which brings 
together the object and the self, i.e., the self of oneself, can be presented 
only in the form of imaginative variations. The imagination as productive is 
the tenuous reach towards the unity that we are not yet except in the 
imagination. Our Self is the "art hidden in the depths of the human soul". 
The text as the inscription of this productive imagination thus becomes the 
source of self-understanding. 
5. The act of appropriation; reading. 
The act of appropriation which is the completion of 
interpretation passes far beyond a mere linguistic analysis of a text. For 
Ricoeur appropriation is an act whereby one is playfully seduced into letting 
go of the ego-subject, the narcissistic and imperialistic subject. It is 
accomplished through the act of reading. Interpretation is complete, when 
the objectivity and the autonomy of the text is transformed once again into 
an event of discourse for a reader. The accomplishment of reading is its 
power to transform the otherness of the text into an event of discourse for 
me (362:22;* 11:67;'>23:92). The event of discourse of the reader is a new 
event; that is, not a repetition of the original event, but a creation produced 
at the behest of the text. 
The unmooring of the text from its original situation also 
allowed the text to drift away from its original addressees. Gadamer 
proposes, therefore, that the text is addressed to anyone who can read. A 
text loses its restriction; it is basically open (337:14*). The text of the 
Letter to the Romans is mine to read just as at one time it was the Romans! 
The letter assumes a new time dimension. Paul's original writing takes on a 
universal dimension, always ready to take on new readers and to actualize 
its reference in new situations. 
This actualization of the textual discourse in reading bears a 
number of interesting characteristics. 
1. The possibility of reading lies in the text itself. The text is 
open to a new discourse and to a new actualization of its referent. It is not 
the subject projecting him/herself into the text or reading him/herself into 
15. "Alors j'échange le moi, maître de lui-même, contre le soi, 
disciple du texte." 
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the text. The reader is shaped by the act of the text (406:29). The 
invitation and the dynamic come from the text and not from the subject 
(337:1^-145). As Ricoeur remarks, reading as an interpretative activity is 
"a work of the text before being a work of the reader" (360:293). Or more 
strongly, "Interpretation is a prolongation of the work of the text on itself. 
It is a re-saying, the reactivation of the work of saying" (360:293). It is not 
the subject who activates the meaning of the text; it is an act of the text 
itself (337:148). Ricoeur's analysis has consistently called for this approach 
to the text. The act of the text is, in fact, the movement of sense to 
reference in the text. In accordance with its semiotic structure, the text 
calls for a "reader of codes", i.e., a reader awakened by the codification of 
the text, by the grammaticality of the text, and by the narrativity of the 
text (475:IX). The reader must have a competence that resembles that of 
the author in order to be taken by the dynamism of the sense of the text to 
its reference. But again these demands devolve from the dynamics of the 
text and not from the reader (371:93). 
2. Reading, as a re-enactment of the text as a discourse, links 
together two discourses: the text as discourse, and reading as a new 
discourse. Ricoeur borrows Gadamer's term, the fusion of horizons to 
describe the broadening of the understanding of the subject by his or her 
being taken up into the world of the text (371:93). In reading I am being 
taken where I was not before. I take up a new dwelling in the world of the 
text. Both my situation and the mute text are transgressed and interlinked. 
3. The third characteristic of reading attaches itself to the very 
activity of reading. Reading is a form of playing. When we read, the 
imaginative variations of the text have a way of capturing the reader in 
much the same way as the activity of a game engrosses the player. Even 
though we can be transformed by the play activity or, in the case of reading 
by the 'thing' of the text, we are not conscious of the transforming process 
until, in a reflective moment, we return to it. To read is to be taken up into 
the metamorphosis of reality (Gadamer's Verwandlung). In a playful fashion, 
the ego is transported by the metamorphosis of reality toward a deeper self 
(406:31). Hence the metamorphosis of reality by means of fiction is, at the 
same time, a metamorphosis of the reading subject. There is no esthetic 
judgment that accompanies the reader when s/he is absorbed by the to-and-
fro of a narrative. The reader is not the conscious subject; s/he is as much 
"being read" as being a reader (375:218). 
This ludic dimension of reading corresponds to the ludic 
dimension of reality brought about by the split reference of literary and 
poetic texts. The play of literary texts is a heuristic fiction. In its 
playfulness and seeming arbitrariness, it opens up a realm of meaning as a 
playspace for anyone who trusts enough to enter it. In the play within the 
space of the meaning of its imaginative variations, the really real displaces 
not only the ordinary real but also the ordinary conscious self (375:218). 
"The reader is this fictive I, created by the poem and a participant in the 
poetic universe" (375:222, my translation).16 
16. "Le lecteur est ce moi fictive, créé par le poème et participant à 
l'universe poétique." 
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6. The critique of the illusions oí the subject. 
If, as Ricoeur says, the world of the text metamorphizes the 
subject, the world of the text is also the source of the critique of the 
subject. The world of the text, as the heuristic fiction of the real and as the 
exploration of the truth in the very metamorphosis of the reader, also 
exposes the illusions of the subject. It is in reflection that these illusions 
are brought to consciousness. For Ricoeur, this despoliation of the subject 
of its illusions is today's great cultural task. Freud has made us realize that 
the critique of the subject is an arduous work - a Durcharbeiten - because it 
entails the overcoming of the narcissistic ego. The resistance to be 
conquered is the defence that the subject has mustered to ward off reality 
(Cf.320(21*):180). 
The introduction of this subjective critique is decisive for 
Ricoeur. It fulfills two functions. First of all, it presages a radical modern 
shift of emphasis. It veers the attention away from the object - the world -
which Descartes and Kant had placed under the radical question and directs 
it instead to the subject. What was so clear and unquestionable, the last 
stance of certainty for Descartes in a world distanciated from myself by the 
doubt, the subject, becomes now the question. Who is the subject? That is 
today's core question. Secondly, the critique focusses on the world and 
reality as an answer to the quest for the subject. But, as Aristotle reminds 
us, Being is said in many ways. What reality says and calls me to is 
ambiguous. In interpretation that ambiguity breaks into our world of 
consciousness. And the ambiguity becomes the conflict of interpretation. 
Reality itself is thoroughly symbolic, i.e., impervious to an absolutist or 
unique approach. Reality will not let go and unlock its ambiguity, Ricoeur 
admits, by a merely passive attentiveness to the world of the text. 
Ricoeur's introduction of a critique within interpretation is accompanied by 
the metaphor of conflict (Cf. Le conflit des interprétations). Understanding 
and self-understanding is to be won by wading right into the midst of the 
battle for understanding that is waged all around us. No one has the 
supreme vantage point for the conflict, because it is not a battle for points 
but the struggle for an authentic existence. 
Ricoeur's earlier hermenéutica! work made frequent references 
to the critique of the subject that was imparted as a cultural heritage by the 
three masters of suspicion: Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.17 Although 
Ricoeur has written about Freud, he has hardly elaborated the content of 
the critique of Nietzsche and Marx. Freud became paradigmatic for the 
dispossession of the constituting subject. I introduced this critique in 
Chapter One to orient our interpretative work of Ricoeur. Basically 
Ricoeur has retained this vision (see Mb). However, his writings since 1973 
gather this critique of the subject under the heading of the critique of 
ideology (398:233). While still referring to the masters of suspicion, the 
critique of ideology places its focus, according to Ricoeur, upon the 
17. See De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud and Le conflit des 
interprétations. 
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historicity of human existence and of the human subject. The critique of 
ideology incorporates the critique of the subject more adequately within 
Ricoeur's most fundamental concern, namely, human existence as existence 
within a limit. For Ricoeur, human existence, human truth, human self-
consciousness, human power, human freedom is only human (*14(95):86). 
Human existence is bound to time. It is always somewhere in the flow of 
the past, present, and future of time. It is without an absolute for its point 
of departure and for its future. Finitude is the measure of our existence 
(362:26). 
The critique of ideology is derived from a different cultural 
tradition than the hermeneutical rememoration of tradition. From Ricoeur's 
own perspective, it qualifies as a counterposition. The critique of ideology 
has its cultural roots in the Enlightenment, while the recovery of the self in 
prejudice, authority and tradition looks to Romanticism. As we saw above, 
Ricoeur recovers the contemporary clash of these two great cultural 
movements in the work of H.G. Gadamer and Л. Habermas (390:155). 
We have already briefly presented the critical theory of ideology 
of Л. Habermas. Our focus here will be the critique of the subject of the 
critical theory. Because Habermas' position runs counter to Ricoeur's own 
hermeneutical stance, Ricoeur has some difficulty in introducing the critical 
theory within a hermeneutical consciousness.^* But again Ricoeur feels 
impelled to listen to an antithetical tradition, and seeks to be healed by it. 
The point of intersection, where the critique of ideology 
questions a hermeneutics of reminiscence, is at the level of communication. 
Within a hermeneutics of finitude, the constitution of historical experience, 
according to Ricoeur, is intersubjectivity. I am consciously inserted into the 
historical becoming within a process of communication with my 
contemporaries, predecessors, and successors. The critique of ideology 
seeks to bring to consciousness the distortions that affect this 
communication. If the hermeneutical tradition is characterized by its 
attentiveness to the communication, the critique of ideology judges the 
present state of communication negatively as a disrupted and blocked 
communication that must be destroyed. 
What, according to the critical theory, is the source of the 
blockage and distortion? Habermas recognizes a dimension of human 
knowledge that the hermeneutical theory has often overlooked; namely, that 
18. Habermas does not dissociate himself from hermeneutics 
altogether. He is wary of a hermeneutics that recuperates past tradition. 
He operates with a meta-hermeneutics, derived from Freud's meta-
psychology. He perceives this meta-hermeneutics to be a critical science 
whose aim is to set free the distorted and violence-ridden communication. 
He thinks that Freud's meta-psychology is less dependent on the 
sedimentations of tradition and more upon a regulative idea of a 
communication without distortion. His meta-hermeneutics is a projective, 
rather than a recuperative hermeneutics. (See 386:59) 
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all knowledge is ruled by interests. According to Habermas, there are three 
governing interests: the technical, instrumental interest that governs the 
knowledge production of the physical sciences, the communicative interest 
of the historico-hermeneutical sciences, and the emancipative interest of 
the critical social science. Prior to any submission to authority, the 
historico-hermeneutical sciences must recognize that they are governed by 
a practical interest in communication. 
It is, however, to the third body of science, the critical social 
sciences, that Habermas extends the most dramatic task. It is their task to 
unmask the forms of the relations of dependence that have distorted 
communication. It is the task of the critical social sciences to unblock 
relations of dependence that have become "ideologically frozen" or reified 
(386:4*). According to Habermas, these relations can be transformed only 
critically, i.e., not hermeneutically. And this critical work is guided by the 
interest in emancipation or by what Habermas calls "self-reflection". The 
critical social sciences seek to set the subjct free from dependence upon all 
hypostacized powers - also from the ontology of Heidegger. For Habermas 
this critique is more primordial than the hermeneutical consciousness. Its 
task is to unmask the interests at work in the spheres of knowledge 
particularly since it will show that the theoretical subject is subject to 
institutional constraints which will distort his/her communicative 
competence (386:45). 
In Habermas' view the notion of ideology enters at this point. 
Ideology functions in the philosophy of Habermas in a fashion similar to the 
notion of misunderstanding in Gadamer's hermeneutics. In hermeneutics, 
understanding must overcome misunderstanding. In Habermas' philosophy, it 
is the ideological, i.e., the reified relations, that must be overcome and set 
free. For Habermas, ideology is connected with blocked or distorted 
communication. The distortion is not an epistemologica! misunderstanding 
but a political action of repression by an authority. In other words, 
distortion is the result of violence. This ideology and its violence 
particularly affects the area of work, power and language. Ideology 
enforces a type of domination in the realm of communicative action, where, 
because of the inverted relationships between work and power, the 
conditions of the use and the competence of communication are distorted 
(386:46). The lack of recognition of this changed relationship between work, 
power and language creates the ideological condition according to which the 
subject lives under an illusion, projects a false transcendence, and 
rationalizes this new arrangement of work, power and language. 
Accordingly, the communication of the subject is systematically distorted 
(386:46). 
In order to set the subject free from his or her ideological 
illusion, Habermas refuses to take the route of a hermeneutics of 
understanding. Instead he chooses the critical social sciences. The 
paradigmatic science that can break the hold that ideology has on the 
subject is psychoanalysis. But since psychoanalysis also remains in the 
sphere of understanding, a type of hermeneutics cannot be avoided. 
Habermas calls it a Tiefenhermeneutik, a depth-hermeneutics. But this 
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depth-hermeneutics of desymbolization and resymbolization can only 
achieve the goal of healing the self-consciousness of the patient by 
explanatory procedures. The competence of the critical sciences to 
overcome the communicative distortions by explanatory procedures becomes 
understandable in the light of the failure of ontological hermeneutics. For 
Habermas, ontological hermeneutics, based on the experience of 
participation, too easily overlooks that communication with that experience 
is blocked by ideology. One can hardly turn to the texts that inscribe our 
understanding if these same texts do no more than exteriorize our distorted 
com munication. 
Habermas seeks, therefore, not a hermeneutics of traditions but 
a regulative idea. That regulative idea does not come from a past heritage, 
but is a projected idea. The regulative idea is not behind us, but is projected 
ahead of us. the regulative idea operates as an interest in communication. 
It seeks a communication without bounds and constraints. This regulative 
idea of unlimited and unconstrained communication is more what ought to 
be than what is. As such, it appears as the diametric opposite of the more 
ontologically oriented hermeneutics (386:^8-^9). 
Ricoeur acknowledges the distance between Habermas and 
himself, but at the same time he discovers points of interpénétration. He 
mentions four. 1. Hermeneutics does not exclude a critical moment within 
the process of understanding. That is precisely Ricoeur's critique of 
Gadamer's inadequate dialectics of participation and distanciation. 2. 
Because of his notion of distanciation, the explanatory procedures are not 
foreign but indispensable to understanding. 3. The world of the text is not 
solely a recuperation of the past but is, at the same time, a projection of my 
possibilities. Central to Ricoeur's hermeneutics is his theory of the 
productive imagination. 4. And finally, the subjectivity of hermeneutics is 
released by the world of the text as an "imaginative variation of the ego.". 
The emancipative interest lies, therefore, within the confines of a 
hermeneutical theory (386:56). A critique of ideology as a type of meta-
hermeneutics, however, can safeguard the hermeneutics of traditions from a 
premature appropriation. 
However, for Ricoeur, the point of closest convergence between 
a hermeneutics and a critique of ideology lies in the concept of prejudice 
and ideology (386:57). Both concepts pertain, according to Ricoeur, to a 
hermeneutics of finitude. Both express that there is no escape from the 
historical conditions of understanding. Even the critique of ideology which 
seeks to operate from a principle prior to hermeneutics, namely, the 
interest of knowledge, is not immune from the insurmountable character of 
ideology (398:232).!* Habermas' theory of ideology addresses itself to the 
contemporary ideology, which he says is the dominating and intrusive 
19. Ricoeur maintains that the interest cannot be derived from an 
empirical description, but must have its origin in a philosophical 
anthropology. Otherwise what determines that there are three interests and 
not one? (See 386:57) 
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position of science and technology (389:59). However, to state that the 
sphere of instrumental action has ceased to be a subsystem but has instead 
begun to dominate the sphere of human communication, is to admit at the 
same time that the critique of ideology is situated somewhere and views its 
task from a specific perspective (396:35'>). Both hermeneutics and the 
critique of ideology themselves remain no more than an ideology (386:61). 
The quest for liberation is, therefore, not from some lofty, supra-historical 
position, but for emancipation that, according to Ricoeur, on the one hand 
listens to the Greek and Judeo-Christian story of freedom and liberation, 
and on the other projects a less distorted communication with 
contemporaries, predecessors and successors into the future (^12:37). The 
interest in communication is fundamentally a practical interest.20 In 
Chomsky's terms it is a competence for communication. Its charge is, not 
to reduce the immense numbers of temporal relationships into some type of 
reified form, but to keep open the communication which is history. As a 
competence, it is allowing ourselves to be affected by the effects of history, 
to remain open to intersubjectivity, and to the analogy of the ego (413:37-
38). 
Accordingly, both in hermeneutics and in the critique of 
ideology, the subject begins somewhere. 5/he has no absolute beginning, is 
never identical with her/himself, and will never complete the project 
(396:354). The subject is always inserted somewhere in the process of 
historical becoming (398:233). That is the finitude, proper to human 
existence and to human belonging (398:228). The possibility of a fusion of 
horizons toward an expansion of our self-understanding can never be so 
extensive that an absolute knowledge emerges. Ricoeur rejects 
Pannenberg's Universalgeschichte for the same reason (362:30).21 A 
universal horizon within which the events of history become understandable 
is not available. All that is available, according to Ricoeur, is the process 
of fusing the horizon of the text and the horizon of our experience. This 
process is one that must be undertaken again and again in a never ending 
search for our subjectivity. Our finitude does not allow us to go beyond this 
hermeneutical condition (362:31). To refuse our historicity is to seek to be 
totalitarian and ultimately to enforce the totalization by means of violence 
(83:10, 165-166). 
20. In other words, Ricoeur does not accept that this interest in 
communication must be placed outside of the historico-hermeneutical 
sciences. Because the historico-hermeneutical sciences can incorporate a 
critical and explanatory dimension, there is no need to sediment the 
emancipatory interest in the critical social sciences. For Ricoeur the 
interest in emancipation is principally a practical interest. 
21. See Pannenberg's "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte" in 
Grundfragen Systematischer Theologie, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and 
Ruprecht, 1967, p. 91-122. It is Pannenberg's thesis that only in a 
Universalgeschichte, i.e., in a horizon of all the events of history, that 
historical understanding becomes meaningful. 
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But Ricoeur insists, and this is essential, that our finitude also 
demands that we stand somewhere. Our doubt and our critique, after it has 
created a scission in our existence between our participation in its 
immediacy and the critical distance, cannot remain forever suspicious and 
separate. The distanciation is to be made productive. A stance somewhere, 
unguaranteed by the certainty of absolute knowledge, must be taken. After 
the critical distance, one must enter into a second naivete (319:15). 
Modernity no longer allows us an escape into immediacy. Modernity, 
however, has gambled that the subject can regain itself after it has first lost 
itself. 
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According to Ricoeur, the route of the despoliation of the 
Cartesian and modern subject has not yet run the full course of the 
destruction of the imperial subject. To complete Ricoeur's route one has to 
include the world of the poetics of the will: the world of transcendence. 
The world of transcendence is the ultimate world, the ultimate home of 
meaning. This chapter proposes to explore this world of transcendence in 
Ricoeur's writings. The task is delicate because Ricoeur himself has not 
provided a coordinated analysis. We are still in the prolegoumena of his 
poetics of the will, although something of its vista has been opened up. It is 
this vista and its corresponding self-understanding, despite the obvious 
limitations imposed by its incompleteness, that will round off our study of 
Ricoeur's textual world and the subject in that world. 1 
1. For an analysis of Ricoeur's earlier reflections on religion and 
salvation from a philosophical perspective see D. Vansina, "Het heil in de 
filosofie van Paul Ricoeur" in Bijdragen 27, 1966, p.484-510. 
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How does one gain entry into this world? If we are permitted to 
apply here what we have stated above, namely, that we do not forge our 
entry in any sphere f rom point zero, we must look for a start ing point r ight 
in the midst of things. AH understanding - also religious understanding - is 
historical understanding. One is inserted somewhere in the process of 
historical becoming. As Ricoeur remarks in La symbolique du mai , "The 
beginning is not what one finds f i rs t ; the point of departure must be 
reached, i t must be won... The f i rs t task is not to begin but f rom the midst 
of speech, to remember; to remember wi th a view of beginning" (153:348-
3*9). 
That "midst of speech" in the realm of transcendence is for 
Ricoeur our Western, Judeo-Christian and Greek t radi t ion. I believe, that 
one might say that i t is Ricoeur's own adherence to that t radi t ion. He 
makes no apologies for that. His own part icipation in this tradi t ion receives 
no grounding just i f icat ion other than the Anselmian credo ut intel l igam. He 
is a believer, a Christian believer, who proposes to think his fa i th 
(320(29*):389-390). But he proposes to think his fa i th not as a theologian, 
but as a philosopher. As he says in "Gui l t , Ethics and Religion", 
By sympathy and through imagination, the philosopher adopts the 
motivation and intention of the confessing consciousness; he does not 
" fee l " but "experiences" in a neutral manner, in the manner of "as i f ," 
that which has been lived in the confessing consciousness. 
(320(326):*26) 
This position requires a further explanation.^ 
Ricoeur's hermeneutical phenomenology proposes to take the 
histor ic i ty of human existence seriously. As we saw, that implies that every 
position is ideological - including Ricoeur's own hermeneutics. It is inserted 
somewhere, and the philosopher does not stand outside the process of 
historical becoming. Without his or her commitment and belief, no 
philosophy is possible. I t is only from this somewhere - this second naivete -
that the question of t ru th can be raised again. An absolute position, f rom 
whose lo f ty perspective history can be perceived to unfold according to 
some deterministic plan, is only destructive of existence. Throughout his 
philosophical career, Ricoeur has remained fa i th fu l to the combination of 
2. See cdso, H. Wells, "Theology and Christian Philosophy: Their 
Relation in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur," in Studies in Religion/Sciences 
Religieuses, 5, 1976, pA5-62. See also the ci tat ion of E. Schillebeeckx on 
the occasion of the conferral of an honorary Doctoral Degree in Theology by 
the University of Nijmegen in 1968, "Le philosophe Paul Ricoeur, docteur en 
théologie" in Christianisme Social 76, 1968, р.639-6Ь5, and R. Bergeron, op. 
c i t . , p.l 18-159; Н.Э. Heering, "Paul Ricoeur als Godsdienstwijsgeer" in 
Nederl. Theol.Tijdschr. 25, 1971; M. Gerhart, "Paul Ricoeur's 
Hermeneutical Theory as Resource for Theological Reflect ion" in The 
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histoire and vérité.3 That is also why the book of collected articles, 
Histoire et vérité (83) contains a number of articles that could only come 
from a deep awareness of and a personal commitment to the Christian faith. 
In checking the complete bibliography of Ricoeur one notes at least one 
hundred titles, averting to one or another dimension of 3udeo-Christianity. 
Here is what Ricoeur himself says about this situation, 
The task of the philosopher appears to me...to be distinguished 
from that of the theologian, in the following manner: biblical theology 
has the function of developing the kerygma according to its own 
conceptual system; it has the duty of criticising preaching, both by 
confronting it with its origin and by reorganizing it in a meaningful 
framework, in a discourse of its own kind, corresponding to the 
internal coherence of the kerygma itself. The philosopher, even the 
Christian one, has a distinct task; I am not inclined to say that he 
brackets what he has heard and what he believes, for how could he 
philosophize in such a state of abstraction with respect to what is 
essential? But neither am I of the opinion that he should subordinate 
his philosophy to theology, in an ancillary relation. Between 
abstention and capitulation, there is the autonomous way which I have 
located under the heading "the philosophical approach" (320(297):403). 
The issue is obviously of concern to Ricoeur. Time and again he 
returns to the issue to assure his readers that he has not departed from the 
philosophical fold.* He justified his listening to the texts of faith by 
insisting that Christian faith has sedimented itself in the religious texts of 
our culture as our heritage. And his encounter with them "gives rise to 
thought" (153:347). It is his wager, in other words, that in listening to the 
Christian and Jewish texts he can come, as he says, to "a better 
Thomist 39, 1975, pA96-527·, A. Dumas "Savoir objectif, croyance 
projective, foi interpellée" in Sens et existence; en hommage à Paul 
Ricoeur, G.Madison (ed), Paris, Seuil, 1975, p.160-169; P. Gisel, "Paul 
Ricoeur" in Études théologiques et religieuses 49, 1974, p.31-50; H.3. 
Dijkman, "De wijsgerige en wetenschappelijke mogelijkheidsvoorwaarden 
voor een verantwoord theologisch taalgebruik in het denken van Paul 
Ricoeur", in Vox Theol. 42, 1972, p.40-53. 
3. Thus, for example, his stance with regard to the symbols and 
myths of evil is determined by his own 3udeo-Christian reading of history. 
He admits that he believed in order to understand, "I entered that circle as 
soon as I admitted that I read the ensemble of the myths from a certain 
point of view, that the mythical space was for me an oriented space, and 
that my perspective angle was the pre-eminence of the Jewish confession of 
sins, its symbolism, and its mythology" (153:354). 
4. Cf. 79:292; 153:353;203:307-308;227:29;270:247, e.a. 
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understanding of man and of the bond between the being of man and the 
being of ali beings" (153:355). This "giving rise to thought" is for Ricoeur 
first of all a philosophical endeavour. 
But one cannot avoid wondering from time to time whether 
Ricoeur has not in fact passed beyond the boundaries of philosophy and 
entered into the world of theology. In explaining his philosophical approach, 
Ricoeur states his task to be an attempt, as a philosopher, to stay close to 
the kerygma and theology. He listens as an autonomous thinker: "If there is 
only one logos, the logos of Christ requires of me as a philosopher nothing 
else than a more complete and more perfect activation of reason; not more 
than reason; but the whole reason" (320(297):i>03). In listening to the 
kerygma of faith, Ricoeur seeks to take reason to its limit, by pressing it to 
think in accord with language in its greatest wealth and intensity. 
The first approximation of this thinking in accordance with the 
kerygmatic text is provided for Ricoeur by Kant's philosophical discourse of 
religion "within the limits of reason alone". It was Kant who first thought 
religion from the perspective of hope. For Ricoeur this approach of religion 
in terms of hope and promise in history coincides with a number of recent 
attempts to elaborate a philosophy and theology of hope. In this context he 
affirms his indebtedness to Jürgen Moltmann's Theologie der Hoffnung which 
permitted him to articulate the eschatological dimension of the kerygma in 
terms of hope.' Ricoeur is indebted to Karl Barth even more so than to 
Moltmann. Despite his early distaste for K. Barth, Ricoeur has been 
profoundly influenced by the verticalism and transcendentalism of Barth's 
theology.» He has not written any articles about K. Barth, but Barth is to 
him the theological giant of the 20th century who most clearly understood 
the avenues open to faith after the ravages of the radical critique of 19th 
century Liberalism. But, as we shall see, Ricoeur cannot accept Barth's 
extreme diastasis. He applies here what he recognized as the deficiency of 
Heidegger's lofty ontology: its lack of mediation. In the realm of faith 
which can never be the work of language, Ricoeur is more aware than 
K. Barth ever was of the intermediation and power of language. The 
5. Munich, Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1965. See also Ricoeur "Le Dieu 
crucifié de Jürgen Moltmann" in Les quatres fleuves. Cahiers de recherches 
et de reflections religieuses (Le Christ, visage de Dieu) b, 1975, p.109-11*. 
6. According to E. King (Interpretation of Pastoral Experience. A 
Study in Hermeneutical Theory and Practice, (unpublished dissertation 
defended at the University of Notre Dame, November 1980), Notre Dame, 
Department of Theology, 1980) Ricoeur posits a Barthian-type foundational 
faith-expression upon which all further expressions depend. Ricoeur, 
however, cannot go all the way with Barth. He refuses to recognize a free 
zone, where interpretation and critique cannot intervene. Cf. 411:109. On 
the other hand, he recognizes a similarity in aim in the Krisis-theology of 
Karl Barth. Barth's great contribution to this century was his effort to 
break the pretense of humanity to be its own foundation (cf. 233:390 and 
320(232):3W). 
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message oí hope is not located in a zone free from the turmoil of human 
language. But it must remain a language of hope, i.e., a language that 
comes as a gift over which the subject has no control. Accordingly, Ricoeur 
asks how the transcendent enters into our human realm as hope and how 
philosophy can think religion (faith) as hope.? 
A. RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE. 
The first aspect that needs to be clarified is to specify the type 
of discourse proper to religion. Since Ricoeur proposes to think religion in 
the light of the hope of the kerygma, while at the same time professing that 
this thought is an autonomous thought, he needs a philosophy that sets free 
the categories of hope and promise. The kerygma seeks to be thought, not 
along lines of a recuperation of past meaning or of a return of the same, but 
along the lines of "what never was before" (Is ^1:23). For Ricoeur, the 
kerygma deposits in our midst novelty and innovation of meaning 
(320(297):*! 1). Is it possible to link this innovation of meaning of the 
kerygma with the autonomous thought of reason? If it were impossible, 
Ricoeur says, then hope would be a 
flash without a sequel; there would be no eschatology, no 
doctrine of last things, if the novelty of the new were not made 
explicit by an indefinite repetition of signs, were not verified in the 
'seriousness' of an interpretation which incessantly separates hope 
from utopia (320(297):*! 1). 
By bringing it to thought, Ricoeur hopes to manifest what constitutes 
religious discourse and to avail himself of a critique of religious discourse. 
His thinking on hope is characterized by Ricoeur as a post-
Hegelian Kantianism (320(297):*Ι2;*11:138-139). His post-Hegelian 
Kantianism is basically a rethinking of the philosophical system of both Kant 
and Hegel in the light of hope. This thinking in the light of hope suggest a 
reading of Kant and Hegel that inverts their chronological order whereby 
the intelligibility of hope is more starkly exposed.* In this reading of Kant 
7. Ricoeur does not turn directly to the language of theology to 
manifest the power of the sacred. He writes, "What is more, it is an old 
conviction of mine that the philosopher's opposite in this type of debate is 
not the theologian, but the believer who is informed by the exegete; I mean, 
the believer who seeks to understand himself through a better understanding 
of the texts of his faith" (*38:2). 
8. Ricoeur borrowed this idea from Eric Weil. He insists, however, 
that the reasons for the inversion are not only theological but also 
philosophical. But the philosophical reason is not very cogent. Merely 
because we are post-Kantian and post-Hegelian can, of course, allow us to 
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after Hegel Ricoeur discovers an approach to hope that does not give 
content to hope but that gives us insight into the limits of reason or into the 
closing of the discourse of reason. According to Ricoeur, a post-Hegelian 
reading of Kant can give the contours of the farthest reach of philosophical 
discourse. Through the inverted reading, Ricoeur will take both Kant and 
Hegel a step beyond themselves. The inverted reading will allow him to 
interject his theory of the power of poetic or metaphorical language. The 
poetic approach not only confirms the limits of language proposed 
particularly by Kant, but it also affirms beyond Hegel's representation of 
religion, a power of representation by way of poetic language that is not 
absolute in Hegel's sense. The more poetic approach will not only confirm 
the limits of language as proposed by Hegel and Kant, but also reveal a 
power of language unknown to Kant and Hegel. 
Ricoeur begins with Hegel's horizon of philosophical discourse. 
For Hegel, the farthest reach of philosophy is absolute knowledge. Despite 
Hegel's openness to the future by means of the successive mediations, the 
mediations themselves are ultimately ruled by a closure. He proposes a 
final reconciliation of all oppositions. In the final analysis, it is Spirit that 
determines all the previous mediations. Hegel's universe is a closed 
universe. Within such a system hope is short-circuited by its entrapment 
within a totalizing Spirit. In the absolute knowledge of Spirit, Hegel's truth 
comes to itself. Truth is the final adequation that rules the system from 
beginning to end: "The Hegelian system is a system written from the end 
towards the beginning, from the standpoint of totality, towards the partial 
achievements of the system" (338:60). Consequently, for Hegel, the 
discourse of philosophy and religion are identical because there can be only 
one discourse of the absolute Spirit and in both discourses one reflects the 
ultimate return of the Spirit to itself as self-consciousness. 
Ricoeur seeks to salvage one unique contribution from this 
closed universe of Hegel. Hegel was the first to undertake to write the 
history of the stages of the representation of the absolute. He perceived a 
world of 'representations' that possessed a certain autonomy and a proper 
dialectic which, in his view, led to a speculative conceptualization. Hence, 
the world of religion also presents a certain 'representation': a process of 
forms and their negations, leading toward a concept. Like all 
representations the religious representations are recognizable as forms that 
must first be overcome in order that they may become a concept. What 
Hegel proposes, in other words, is a speculative content to religion whose 
moment of truth lies in the final mediation of absolute knowledge (*11:140-
Ш ) . The religious realm is not totally cut off from the speculative. 
Ricoeur's critique of Hegel focusses on Hegel's linkage of the 
process of religious representation with absolute knowledge. The 
philosophers of suspicion have seriously jeopardized such a linkage. Thus, 
while he accepts Hegel's analysis of religious representation, he asks 
read the one through the other, but that does not indicate that we ought to 
read the one in the light of the other. 
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whether one cannot posit a religious representation that refuses the claim of 
an absolute totalization of reality by knowledge, and nevertheless retain a 
level of knowledge or conceptualization. To give hope an outlet, Ricoeur 
must break through the absoluteness of the process of Hegel and re-establish 
the dynamism of reality, that is, reality as possibility, without, at that same 
time, abolishing everything of Hegel's speculative dimension. If he were not 
to succeed, Ricoeur thinks that he would have to identify religion with the 
absolute point of convergence of the movement of history. If unsuccessful, 
a religion of hope would have to be banished as illusory. 
It is to Kant's philosophy of limit that Ricoeur constantly turns, 
whenever he legitimates his aversion to totalizing systems. But it is a post-
Hegelian Kant. Moreover, Ricoeur is drawn to Kant because he defined 
religion by the question, What may I hope? 
But we cannot understand the Kantian philosophy of religion, 
unless we first comprehend the two questions that precede the religious 
quest. Prior to the question of hope lies the question of pure reason, What 
can I know?, and the question of practical reason, What must I do? And 
underlying these questions is Kant's revolutionary distinction between 
Verstand (understanding) and Vernunft (reason), between Erkennen (to know) 
and Denken (to think). 
Kant's Vernunft is a function of the unconditioned, while 
Verstand remains a function of conditioned knowledge. When Kant speaks of 
the limits of knowledge, according to Ricoeur, he implies "not only...that 
our knowledge is limited, has boundaries, but that the quest for the 
unconditioned puts limits on the claim of objective knowledge to become 
absolute" QUI; 142). Vernunft functions as a limit and not as an absolute in 
the area both of knowledge and of action. In the realm both of pure reason 
and of practical reason, reason seeks to be total, but simultaneously 
recognizes the impossibility, even the prohibition, of this totality. In pure 
reason, the object - das Ding-an-sich - is sought but is unattainable, except 
as the conditioned of the unconditioned. In practical reason, God, 
immortality, and freedom is sought but they too are not practically 
attainable. Theoretically and practically, according to Kant, humanity is 
limited. And yet, despite the limitation, humanity is also the exigency of 
totality. It is out of this tension that religion emerges as a hope for 
completion and fulfillment. 
On the level of knowledge, pure reason exposes a transcendental 
illusion. The self, freedom and God are not absolute objects. In fact, 
knowledge destroys the absolute object. Religion, therefore, stands under 
the critique of the transcendental illusion. The nouminal order is closed off 
to pure reason. For Kant this order is not an order of knowledge, since 
sensibility does not reach into the noumenal. The realm of hope is closed 
off to knowledge, and, for that reason, what I hope I must first despair of 
reaching and grasping through knowledge, in order that a true hope may 
emerge. What I hope is not subject to the conditions of space and time. 
Speculative reason cannot achieve the thought of the unconditioned. 
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For Ricoeur, this critique of absolute knowledge through the 
theory of the transcendental illusion is central to his perception of a 
thinking in the light of hope. The limit of knowledge operates as a closure 
on a number of attempts to organize a metaphysics or an onto-theology 
(365:XIV). At the other extreme, even atheism's attempt to set up the 
human individual as an absolute is subject to the same critique. For 
Ricoeur, a rational and speculative theology - onto-theology - cannot 
maintain itself against the critique of the transcendental illusion (338:65; 
320(297):^ 15; 320(325):W5). Hence the God, who is supreme being, ultimate 
intelligibility, the watchmaker, the first mover, falls before the onslaught of 
the critique of the transcendental illusion (373:96; ^36:^96; 186:51; 367:68). 
The God of metaphysics is dead, so is the God as moral legislator, and the 
God whose existence must be justified in the face of evil (320(325):M8 
438:19; 436:495-497). For Ricoeur, in this context, the usurping of God by 
Being is a dangerous but subtle seduction (436:496). 
In addition, on the level of practical reason, our reason is 
confronted with an illusion similar in nature to the illusion of pure reason. 
While pure reason seeks totalization on the level of knowledge, practical 
reason seeks to be completed on the level of practical moral living. Its goal 
for the will is the supreme good. The will asks that it be completed in 
happiness, but happiness must coincide with the achievement of the duty and 
law of the moral life. But the desire for totalization, i.e., for the complete 
nexus of happiness and morality, is frustrated by the critique of the 
transcendental illusion. Totalization is not granted here either. And for 
Kant there is the added problem that if happiness is to coincide with 
morality, morality is no longer free of desire. Because the goal of the will 
is happiness, morality itself is invaded with an interest, which Kant's 
objective morality had excluded in principle (320(297):416-17).' 
However, the coincidence of morality and happiness is not 
attainable under the conditions of practical reason. While the expectation 
for a nexus is there, happiness and morality can only meet in a term that is 
transcendent and heterogeneous and which lies at the horizon of rationality 
(338:66; 324:175). It is, as Ricoeur remarks, "necessary yet not given, but 
simply demanded, expected" (320(297):417). For Kant, happiness is not our 
achievement. It is a gift. Hence, here too the totalization, as an 
actualization of my freedom, is not available to my power. Here Kant 
differs radically from Hegel, who saw the actualization of our freedom 
realizable in the ideal State. 
On this point Ricoeur agrees with Kant. While acknowledging 
Hegel's successful mediations in history, and the measure of freedom which 
has emerged out of the negations, he says "Are they not rather sorts of 
islands of rationality, surrounded by irrationality? Is not the Hegelian 
philosophy of action a kind of extrapolation based on the limited experience 
of the fulfilled achievements of mankind?" (338:63). Hegel's claim of 
totalization, of fulfilled achievement, must not be allowed to overshadow 
9. See above, p. 154. 
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the sea of unfulfilled claims. Hegel's failure to convince makes Ricoeur 
return to Kant. 
Kant's awareness of the gap between the exigency of totalization 
and its lack of fulfillment is much more respectful of reality. But the 
antinomy of practical reason can also make us recognize the illusions of the 
will. For Ricoeur, this illusion of the will of an actualized happiness can 
form the basis for a further critique of religion. On the practical level, this 
critique confronts the instinctual aspects that attach themselves to religion, 
such as security, protection, consolation, fear of punishment, and 
accusation.Ю For practical reason, the nexus between morality and 
happiness is a transcendent synthesis that excludes all premature and violent 
syntheses on the part of institutions either of Church or of State. 
While both the realm of pure reason and the realm of practical 
reason operate out of an exigency of hope in so far as they demand a 
reconciliation of a desire and its achievement, it is particularly religion 
that, for Kant, is governed by hope. Religion is the area of the question, 
What may I hope? Ricoeur approaches Kant's question. What may I hope 
for? from two angles: from the angle of Kant's postulates of practical 
reason, and from the angle of radical evil. 
The Kantian postulates of practical reason are beliefs, 
theoretical in character, but dependent upon practical reason. In fact, they 
flow directly from practical reason. What our theoretical reason and 
practical reason seek by way of totalization demands a transcendent realm 
to which we know we belong and which installs the totality that we seek. 
But the transcendent realm is a postulate, not an object. That it be an 
object has been excluded by theoretical reason. There is no new access to a 
rational theology. For Kant there are three postulates: freedom, 
immortality, and God. 
The freedom postulated here is the freedom of a being who 
effectively can realize the willed good. It is freedom objectively capable of 
actualizing itself. Freedom is postulated as a real causality. As Ricoeur 
says, "But that our capacity be equal to our will, that we exist according to 
this supreme vow, that is what can only be postulated" (320(297):^ 19). 
Immortality as a postulate only confirms the concreteness of the postulate 
of freedom. Immortality is a condition for the possibility of the 
actualization of freedom. It specifies that our postulated freedom can only 
be real, if there is temporality, if there is continued existence. Like 
freedom, this need to persist in existence is not ours to give. It can, 
however, find us. That is the hope that religion holds out to us like a 
philosophical equivalent of the hope of the resurrection (320(297):420). 
Equally the postulate of God attaches itself to the postulate of immortality 
and freedom as the power to effect what is not in our power to realize, 
namely, immortality and freedom. As Ricoeur says, God is "a concept for 
10. For a brief reflection on the work of démystification, see below 
р.2*5-2*6. 
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the origin of a synthesis which is not in our power" (320(297):^21). In God 
the highest good of a realized freedom is postulated. But the postulate must 
remain a postulate, that is, it must remain an exigency of our will in its 
search for the fulfillment of the highest good. In this search Ricoeur 
recognizes in Kant a fellow Christian, who postulates philosophically the 
practical possibility of the highest good. This hope is articulated out of the 
analysis of the practical and theoretical reason, which indicates that the 
hope of religion lies beyond the dimension of knowledge and praxis. 
But the question, What may I hope? of religion must also 
confront itself with the question of evil. Kant opens his Religion Within the 
Limits of Reason Alone with the problem of evil, because it is the greatest 
threat to the realization of freedom. Our freedom is only a powerless 
freedom. In the words of Ricoeur, 
Evil makes of freedom an impossible possibility. In spite of the 
fact that evil proceeds from our freedom, it is no longer within our 
power to change the maxims of our actions, we cannot change the 
nature of our freedom. Here we reach the bottom of the abyss. As 
Karl Jaspers has noticed, Kant carries to termination his philosophy of 
the limits; not only our knowledge but our power has limits (338:68). 
Where we think we have power in our freedom, we encounter the 
powerlessness of the power of freedom. This is the crisis of practical 
reason, because real freedom is available only as hope. Freedom in its true 
nature manifests itself only when it has passed through the powerlessness 
both of theoretical reason and of practical reason. The negation manifests, 
that the thwarted totalization of our knowledge and of our power can be 
overcome by a transformation of the will that is neither ethical nor 
political. For that reason, radical evil, according to Kant, appears not as a 
transgression of a law - what we might have expected from an ethics of duty 
- but as a work of totalization (320(232):345). In other words, evil in its true 
visage appears with religion in the tension between the desire for totality 
and its illusion, in the perversion of premature syntheses both of knowledge 
and of power. For that reason, a totalizing system of knowledge is a 
seductive temptation to be resisted at all costs. Also the institutions of 
recapitulation and totalization, the state and the Church, must be 
safeguarded from the radical evil of totalitarianism (320(297):423). 
Kant has provided Ricoeur with the lower boundary beyond which 
a religious discourse can take place. By way of his critique of hope, the 
delimitation of that discourse by theoretical and practical reason provided a 
good critical instrument in determining the perimeters of an authentic 
religious discourse. 
A good example of such a critique of religious language is found 
in Ricoeur's analysis of the concept of Original Sin (320(16Ό:269-286). For 
Ricoeur, the concept of Original Sin is the farthest probing of thought of 
Israel's confession of sin. But to the extent that Original Sin is presented as 
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a concept, as theoretical knowledge, to explain our human condition, or to 
explain the origin of evil, it looses its power to reveal and it becomes a 
gnosis - an illusory knowing in the realm of the transcendent. Similarly, a 
totally practical, ethical approach to Original Sin is invalidated by Kant's 
critique. Kant's critique breaks with a purely ethical vision of the world, 
since it readmits a moment in evil that is not reducible to the ethical. Kant 
linked this moment with the serpent in the Adamic myth. Evil is something 
which is begun b^ freedom and is, simultaneously, the 'always already there' 
for freedom. Evil has always already been chosen by freedom. For Kant, 
evil takes us beyond the ethical into the realm of the failure of our power to 
be free, where hope brings us to the expectation of a regeneration 
(320(173):306-309). It is in this new realm "where everything can begin 
again...where freedom discovers itself as something to be delivered - in 
brief ...where it can hope to be delivered" (320(326):434-Ψ36). 
В. THE LANGUAGE OF THE SACRED. 
Kant's postulates of God and the problem of radical evil do not 
yet constitute religion. Kant himself realized as much, when he indicated 
that real religion is born with, what he called, representation. The total 
object of the will, the good principle, sought by practical reason finds 
expression in religion in an 'archetype', i.e., a representation of the totally 
good. For Kant this archetypal representation must be a man according to 
the heart of God, the Christ. 
At this level Ricoeur's entry into the realm of the transcendent 
turns away from Kant and returns to Hegel. Kant still belongs to the 
metaphysical age. While Ricoeur is appreciative of the close approximation 
of Kant's analysis of religion to the kerygma of hope, Kant's religious 
representation allows no room for any epistemic content outside of the 
practical or ethical. While not wishing to fall back to Hegel's absolute 
knowledge, Ricoeur seeks to find a mediation between knowledge and 
thought. Must the thought of the unconditioned remain empty, or, may we 
seek at least a partial entry into the realm of the transcendent? As has 
become evident from the analysis of poetic and symbolic language, Ricoeur 
does not leave the space between knowledge and thought completely empty. 
He postulates that the space is invaded not by a direct discourse but by an 
indirect discourse. It is the discourse of the sacred in the form of the 
symbol, the myth, and the biblical forms of discourse. As we saw above, 
Ricoeur infused this indirect discourse with the ontology that originated 
with Heidegger. However, he inverted Heidegger, principally to underline 
that we are not dealing here with some type of objective language, but with 
a figurative, metaphorical language. It is first of all this language that can 
reach out to hope. Before we can examine what sort of self emerges from 
the realm of hope, we must examine the language of hope (cf. ί» 17:142-
l « ) . l l 
11. Ricoeur's ontology of hope is inspired by the work of Gabriel 
Marcel, who gave Ricoeur his first hunger for a return to the ontologica! 
(«26:68; cf. also 373:101). 
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1. Hope and language. 
a. Beyond ontology? 
After the Kantian delimitation of religion beyond knowledge and 
morality, the question must be raised whether, in fact, Ricoeur can retain 
the ontology that ruled his hermeneutics of perception and action at the 
level of religion?*2 Can an indirect ontology, patterned upon Heidegger in 
reverse, be an adequate approximation of the realm of hope? Is religion also 
an outflow of Being? May we equate Being with God? To avoid falling into 
the pitfall of an onto-theology must we not seek this God beyond Being? In 
the conclusion of this article, "Ontologie" (cf. 373:100-101), Ricoeur refers 
to the contemporary philosophers, such as Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, 
who, after having re-introduced the ontological discourse begin, in their 
final positions, to break down what they themselves built up. Being, or that 
which lies beyond being, is for Merleau-Ponty that "to which no name can be 
given" (373:101). Heidegger, too, seeks to break with his earlier position by 
no longer referring to the 'da' of Dasein which humans are, but to an 
exigency of Being with no direct reference to the Being that we are. In this 
context, Ricoeur refers to Heidegger's return to the pre-5ocratics and their 
pre-metaphysical ontology and to the strange act of Heidegger's Zur 
Seinsfrage of crossing out the word Being (373:101).^ Ricoeur asks with 
Леап Wahl: "What is the meaning of this crossed-out Sein? Either no name 
fits being, or else being is only a name. And both views are tenable" 
(373:101). Is the 'beyond' Lévinas' infini, which the latter opposes to the 
totalizing word Being?, or, is it Derrida's Difference? 
From what we have seen of Ricoeur's philosophy, he hardly can 
take that step. For how can he identify the 'beyond' without at the same 
time abandoning the indirect approach to which he had committed himself? 
And yet, on the other hand, the position of a 'beyond' being seems to follow 
logically from Ricoeur's acceptance of Kant's critiques and of the category 
of hope. But Ricoeur does not let being off the hook that easily. In the 
same article, "Ontologie", he makes a remark that more than any other 
expresses Ricoeur's own position: "And must we say one thing? In the same 
12. For this and a further reflection on the contribution that Ricoeur 
makes to the issue of the philosophical underpinning of evil and salvation see 
Chr. Depoortere, "Mal et liberation. Une étude de l'oeuvre de Paul Ricoeur" 
in Studia Moralia 1*», 1976, p.337-385. 
13. In the preface which Ricoeur wrote for В. Rioux' L'être et la 
vérité chez Heidegger et St. Thomas d'Aquin, (Montréal, Paris, Presses de 
l'Université de Montreal. Presses universitaires de France, 1963) he 
acknowledges that Heidegger is not a theologian but a radical thinker in the 
face of all theology and perhaps even of philosophy. But Heidegger, for all 
that, does not know how to pass from being to God. Ricoeur, while unable 
to surpass Heidegger, seeks another route to being, without letting go of the 
decisive contribution that Heidegger made toward a theology of revelation 
(198:111). 
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way as we spoke in the beginning with regard to Platonic Ideas of a 
polytheism of being, so one could conceivably speak of the post-ontological 
polytheism" (373:101). For Ricoeur, we must assume that being still 
encompasses the realm of the transcendent, that God and being are not 
outside each other (cf. 87:1938). That if being is polytheistic, or, in 
Aristotle's words, Being is said of many things, it is not necessary to assume 
an univocal concept of being. We have insisted above,!* that Ricoeur 
rejects such an univocal concept of being, that in fact, there are multiple 
discourses of being. As a consequence of this multiplicity he is forced to 
examine at length whether the discourses of being are not so disparate that 
all communication between them is to be excluded. As an avenue to a 
solution he insists that an interpénétration of discourse occurs, but that the 
principle, guiding such an interanimation, is lacking. Even the famous 
analogia entis does not serve as a true bonding power that keeps the 
discourse of being from scattering irretrievably (cf. 227:22). 
If, for Ricoeur, God is not beyond being, it must be admitted, 
however, that God strains the concept of being almost to the breaking point. 
And yet, when he admits with 3. McQuarrie that there is more meaning in 
the word God than in the word being, he does not wish to move the word 
God into an incomprehensibility that blocks all reference to him (299:348). 
Without an analogia entis to regulate and properly control the discourse 
about God, Ricoeur hypothesizes that we must search in language and in the 
semantic aim of language for the key to the proper discourse of hope . l ' 
In other words, as he has done all along, Ricoeur backs away 
from the lofty heights of a direct ontology and speculation and proposes the 
long route of an indirect ontology. He seeks to penetrate the realm of 
religion with the power of language. Here too, discourse is "like an army 
fighting on a moving battlefront: fighting to conquer the not yet expressed 
on behalf of the expressed" (448:127). 
b. Hope and event. 
Before we can explore the power of creative language in the 
realm of religion, we must overcome a hurdle presented by a prominent 
trend in theology. In their theology Pannenberg, Metz, and Moltmann 
assume the precedence of event - the historical event - over the word. 
They concentrate on the events of history, namely, the Exodus event and the 
Resurrection event as moments par excellence of the revelation of God. 
For them, history is the basic source of meaning. God is first of all event 
and manifests himself in the events of history (320(294):394). He is not 
primordially a word and, therefore, it is not the word that is first in 
meaning, but the event. The historical event in which God reveals himself is 
a historical fact before it is a word or a proclamation. What comes first is 
14. See p.85-87. 
15. Cf. A. Cipollone, "Religious Language and Ricoeur's Theory of 
Metaphor" in Phil. Today 21, 1977, p. 458-467. 
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an otherness that has the nature of an event. And in order to keep the event 
of history from being drawn too quickly into an existential application, these 
theologians insist, moreover, that the event of history must first be placed 
into a larger historical framework. The event is said to obtain its meaning 
by way of its nexus with other events or with their consequences. An 
example of such a nexus is Jürgen Moltmann's linkage of the death of Jesus 
with the solidarity with the oppressed of history (362:28). 
A second dimension of the revealing event, according to these 
theologians, is the eschatological character of the event. The temporality 
of the Exodus event and of the event of the Death and Resurrection of Jesus 
is not encompassed by the past of the event but it is determined by its 
openness toward the future. Even as having taken place, the event is not 
exhausted but remains an event of hope as the future of the fulfillment of 
the promise. Thus, Moltmann, for instance, speaks of the future of the 
resurrection of Jesus (cf. 362:32). As future, it determines that the 
possibilities that propose themselves to me are not dependent upon my 
decision and power. For him, that is the Christian Kairos, the favorable 
time, in which a new epoch of being can emerge (362:3^). Where hope is 
accomplished or is regrounded, it is done through an event in history, where 
the hope and the promise took place. 
What Ricoeur retains of the reading of these theologians is the 
event-character of Christianity. That which manifests itself in our history, 
they maintain, is God as event, or, more strongly, what is manifested is 
history in God. In Ricoeur's view this confirms the modern acceptance of 
being as act (417:276). It corresponds to his own discovery of an active 
notion of being. It predisposes him favourably to their point of departure 
(362:25). 
But Ricoeur departs from Pannenberg, Metz and Moltmann in 
their assessment of the meaning of the event. They insist that the meaning 
follows from the historical nexus of events and lies in the historical 
consequences of the event. Ricoeur's proposal is more tangible. The 
meaning of the event lies in the conjoining of these events with language. In 
other words, he proposes that the dialectic of event and meaning in the 
theory of discourse also apply to the revealing event of history (375:31). 
The event is a crystallization of meaning (251:504). The event passes into 
the meaning; it becomes inscribed in the meaning, and, thereby, escapes the 
illusiveness and evanescence of the event. The event is captured in 
significations and preserved. Through the interpretation of the discourse, 
one can re-activate the deposit into a new event of meaning. But without 
its sedimentation in meaning, and, beyond oral discourse, in a written text, 
no retaking of the event is possible. 
What we gain from this analysis is that the realm of hope, for 
Ricoeur, is first of all founded upon and grounded in a dynamism, an event. 
But, secondly, this event is mediated by the word. In fact, language must be 
said to be co-original with event, although language draws its power from 
the event (362:25). And, thirdly, the word must take on the tension of the 
event toward the future of the promise. 
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с. Hope and language. 
The word that flows from the event of God, as co-original with 
the event, is first of all the word (parole) that says God (271:132). Before 
God enters into human language, it is presupposed that there is a 
languagistic dimension or a dicibilité of r ea l i ty .^ Here too the influence of 
Heidegger continues to be felt (267:36-38). The language of the texts of 
religion - the texts of the Scriptures -are an inscription, an exteriorization, 
of the reality prior to the external word. If the Bible is called the word of 
God, the fixation of this text bespeaks a word prior to the text. In line with 
Christian tradition and under the more immediate influence of G. Ebeling, 
Ricoeur calls it the Word of God or God as word (251:499).17 
What is meant by Word of God or God as word? Following 
Ebeling, Ricoeur makes a number of precisions. 
1. The Lutheran tradition of sola fide, according to Ebeling, 
allows nothing to intervene between the original event and the present event 
in which the original event is interpreted. The interpretation of the word is 
an event that is homogeneous with the first event. Ebeling, as a church 
historian, perceives the history of the Church as a history of the continuous 
exegesis and actualization of the original event. The Church is the history 
of interpretation, a history of the reactivation of the original event (267:^2-
« ) . 
2. Ebeling understands this word itself to be dynamic. He calls 
it a Wortgeschehen, not in the sense of an instantaneous event, but as a 
process, an unfolding, a development, a maturing.^* It is a word that 
matures in time. To the extent that the word has become text, this 
unfolding in time is the event in which what has become text becomes word 
once again. The text must continuously open up to a new proclamation. The 
16. In his "Préface à Bultmann" he says of this approach, "There is 
no shorter path for joining a neutral existential anthropology, according to 
philosophy, with the existential decision before God, according to the Bible. 
But there is the long path of the question of being and of the belonging of 
saying to being" (320(294):400). 
17. In his presentation Ricoeur attempts to bridge the Reformed and 
Catholic categories. The Reformed position, in wishing to escape the more 
realistically oriented ontology of Catholicism, centered its vision on a 
theology of the word. Ricoeur's position shows that although the 
orientations differ, the respective positions can be correlated with one 
another in a Heideggerean style of ontology that safeguards both an 
ontology and the power of the word. It is significant, however, that Ricoeur 
distanciates himself from a theology of the word that attempts to be too 
directly linked to an existential decision (cf. 267:48). 
18. Ricoeur translates the German Wortgeschehen with the French 
échéance. 
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word exists only in this movement - this Geschehen (267:43-^: 332:5). 
3. The word is, therefore, not an object either in this world or in 
another world but a movement, a becoming. It is a word that says nothing 
about our world as it is. It does not describe; it is not didactic. It does not 
give a cosmology, nor a physics, a biology, a psychology, or a politics. It is a 
word that is completely given over to the event of God: God as word or the 
word of God. An onto-theology cannot find a point of access here (267:M). 
And yet, the word of God is not to be situated in a world beyond, having a 
separate existence, attainable only by a sacred knowledge. 
4. For Ebeling, there is only one point of access and that is the 
general hermeneutic of the word. The word of God is of God, that is, it is 
not my word. But it must become my word, incorporating human language, 
to be word of God (332:16). Therefore, it requires no supra-human method 
to approach it. It is structured as human language is structured: it does not 
escape the dialectic of sense and reference. Moreover, the word is not for 
the sake of itself. Through the word we are deposited in something beyond 
language (267:^5). The word is for the sake of that to which it refers. That 
is its power. It effects an encounter with that reality by making it word-
present. But it obeys the 'laws' of language and the process of a general 
hermeneutics such as we have worked out above (cf. 299:334). 
5. A fifth and final point brings us to the heart of the issue. To 
speak of the word of God, in accordance with this line of reflection, is far 
removed from an objectified or even subjectified word of God. The word is 
not a person. The word of God for Ebeling is a fulfilled word: 
a word which creates communication, which creates existence, 
which creates lucidity. We might say that we are before a word of 
God to the extent that we are before a word that instigates a self-
understanding and an understanding of another, that generates a 
history, and, consequently, is alive, efficacious, because it is a word 
that generates man (267:47). 
It is an active, dynamic word that addresses itself to humanity, 
as to the source of its existence (251:506). It touches us at the core of our 
very desire and effort to be (320(232):336). A word of God is a word that 
fully gives birth to humanity. It is a word that is an effective 
communication. Hence, a full word: our language at the point of its full 
potential. God's word is not opposed to the human word. It is the 
accomplishment of this word. For Ebeling, the moment in history, where 
this human word was God's word, occurred in Christ and occurs again and 
again in the Christian kerygma (299:333; 267:48). Here the word becomes 
flesh. A true word is spoken. The word of God or God as word means, 
therefore, that God is the source from whom or from which a 
Wortgeschehen is possible. 
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For Ricoeur, the movement, the event of hope as not our 
creation is a movement that is thoroughly immersed in the movement and 
the power of language itself. It is not originally our word. It is a word that 
is addressed to us and interpellates us. Over it I have no power (251:499). 
But it is captured by us in another word that seeks to re-activate the power 
of the original event, and as such is homogeneous with the event. It is the 
original word that finds us and reactivates us at our act-centre by granting 
us a new understanding and a new self-understanding and thus changing us 
(251:506). It is this word that accompanies our existence and draws us to 
that which is essential in us (220:224). The word that speaks or says us is 
also in the deepest sense the power that gathers us. But this word that 
gathers us, that speaks us before we speak it, must pass through the word 
that we speak, in order that the power of the word to bond us with being and 
with our hope may be experienced (299:346). For that is Ricoeur's 
presupposition: the experience of hope is experienced in language, a 
language that has a cognitive, practical, and emotional dimension (436:490). 
The mediation of the human spoken or written word to the gathering word 
must be examined in greater detail, for it is this human word in its fulness 
that captures and preserves for us the hope that is addressed to us. 
d. Hope as Kerygma. 
The event of hope does not have its origin in us, but by the 
language that accompanies it, it is addressed to us, to our very source or 
ground. Taking Heidegger as the closest philosophical approximation of the 
process of the word, Ricoeur says that the language of being is not what is 
first said by us but primordially constitutes us. It touches our knowing, our 
willing, our action, and our existence at the point where we become 
(232:75). Our first relation to that language is, therefore, not one of speech 
but of listening. Since all control over this word is denied us, the attitude 
before this word can only be that of a common and communal listening and 
hearing (251:499). That is the reason why for Ricoeur the problematic of 
faith finds its home in a poetics of the will, in the word addressed to me 
that touches the radical origin of existence. Ricoeur calls this word a word 
of sollicitation (227:525). 
Hope comes to us, therefore, as a kerygma, as a 'good news'. It 
enters our sphere as a proclamation that seeks our listening obedience. It is 
in the silent space of our attentiveness, where a listening and hearing can 
take place, that we are formed and shaped by what comes to us 'of God' 
(332:15). The Kerygma is the God-event that in our language and time has 
become sedimented in the proclamation and the history of the proclamation 
of the ecclesial community (291:249). The proclamation does not devolve 
from our experience. It is like "an eruption of something from the other 
side, from the totally other into our culture" (220:210)J9 And yet this 
19. Here the Barthian side of Ricoeur shows itself. But one cannot 
extend the parallel too far. Ricoeur's theory of discourse intervenes too 
decisively to retain the diastasis between God and the human being of Barth 
in the same measure. 
226 
kerygma and proclamation is also a cultural fact. For Ricoeur, it is very 
concretely the Christian kerygma. Hence, the language of hope is the 
language of Christian proclamation. The primary activity of hope for 
Ricoeur is preaching (20:52; 109:640; №'.177; 396(236): 15). By means of 
preaching, the kerygma of hope enters into the concrete history of human 
existence, right into the midst of the 'forgetfulness of being'. By means of 
preaching, the word that gathers and constitutes us establishes the historical 
community of the word. In the deepest sense, preaching is the activation of 
the event that constitutes us in the fullest measure in an historical and 
ecclesia! context. In the language of preaching what is 'of God', the Wholly 
Other, becomes discernible and immanent in our language and structures. 
But since hope cannot enter our history and language in a directly 
discernible fashion, because its meaning is necessarily hidden, the texture of 
that language needs further examination. 
e. Hope and history. 
Riceour perceives an inalienable relationship between faith and 
religion. He is attracted by the suggestiveness of Bonhoffer's religionless 
Christianity, because of the latter's insistance upon the centrality of faith 
and h o p e , " but he refuses to subscribe to a notion of faith that has no point 
of exteriorization (320(228): 185). Ricoeur's reservation about Bonh'óffer is 
similar to his difficulties with the viewpoint of Barth and Bultmann. For 
Bultmann, for instance, the objectivation of faith is, of necessity, a 
reification. His demythologization process brings him to a non-mythical 
core of faith which, he said, was God as act, the word of God, the call of 
summons of the word of God, the future of God, or justification by faith. 
Since this core is an existential and personal summons that is not 
mythological, this core is pure faith which is meaningful only in the context 
of the surrender of the will. For Ricoeur, there is no such free zone of 
faith. Also faith enters human language and human history (320(29*0:39*-
396). Faith enroots itself in religion (291:246). Religion is the historical and 
cultural expression of faith, or, as Ricoeur says aptly, the disposable 
believable (291:246). Religion is faith's historical dimension, dialectically 
related to it. Thus there is a discourse of faith due to a distanciation from 
the participation in the act of God. Faith enters the polyvalent realm of 
human discourse, where the interanimation and the delimitation of the 
variety of human discourses take place (396:338). 
But religion must always be overcome by faith (324(331):441). A 
critique of religion is indispensable, because in its historical articulation 
religion is endangered by the seduction of mystification and illusion 
(452(220):213-218). Faith can never be fully made into an object, because 
the transcendent, as hope, cannot be encompassed by its historical 
dimension (216:96; 235:143). This surplus of the meaning of faith over its 
historical forms manifests itself whenever the critique destroys one 
20. The influence of K. Jaspers is also evident here. Religious faith 
for Jaspers is a betrayal of the world. Only transcendence respects the 
world. Cf. 109:620-621, and 101:377ff. 
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historical form only to have faith resurface in another form (235:143). 
Here, too, the content regulates the language and the form, and not vice 
versa (320(200):48). In the 3udeo-Christian tradition the tension of the 'now' 
of religion and the 'not yet' of faith and hope is expressed by the insertion of 
the 'Last Day.' Thoroughly eschatological it is, Christianity's faith is a hope 
that proclaims a yes to history as the primary focus of the manifestation of 
hope, but, at the same time, a no to any attempt to equate the moment of 
history with totality. Accordingly, the "Church is the place where religion 
endlessly dies, where this death is lived as an auto-suppression" (235:142). 
And yet this community is itself a religious form where this tension of faith 
and religion is lived where "the death of religion is lived as a religious form" 
(235:142-143). Hence, for Ricoeur, faith is the source of the constant 
uprooting of religion by means of eschatology (430:68). The eschatological, 
as the invasion in our history of the beyond history, demolishes the 
structures and language that might otherwise become totalitarian or gnostic 
(357:535). Religion is ever under the critique of premature totalization 
(20:59). Religion must be constantly safeguarded from the transformation 
of faith into a relic.21 A relic makes of religion an object that can be 
manipulated. Religion as relic deprives religion of its power to evoke the 
possible. For Ricoeur, the same movement that condemns any attempt to 
objectify religion into a stable configuration as irreligion also forces the 
religious discourse to stretch human discourse to its limit (227:530). 
In the realm of religion language remains the focal battle-
ground, where religious hope calls humanity forth to open up new life, to 
perceive a new time, a new creation, a new existence. Theology's first task, 
according to Ricoeur, is that the language of the proclamation be kept as a 
proclamation, so that it does not deteriorate into an accusation or into an 
undue search for security and consolation (cf. 291:250-251). 
The paradox of Christianity for Ricoeur is its confession that its 
hope and the language that expresses that hope are linked to contingent 
events of history: the Exodus, the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, the 
Christ (436:490). The uniqueness and the contingency of these events does 
not run counter to what we might call the universal unveiling of being. 
21. In a text of De l'interprétation, Ricoeur expresses this at some 
length, "Thus there is a never-ending task of distinguishing between the 
faith of religion -faith in the Wholly Other which draws near - belief in the 
religious object, which becomes another object of our culture and thus a 
part of our own sphere. The sacred, as signifying separation or otherness, is 
the area of this combat. The sacred can be the sign of that which does not 
belong to us, the sign of the Wholly Other; it can also be a sphere of 
separate objects within our human world of culture and alongside the sphere 
of the profane. The sacred can be the meaningful bearer of what we 
described as the structure of horizon peculiar to the Wholly Other which 
draws near, or it can be the idolatrous reality to which we assign a separate 
place in our culture, thus giving rise to religious alienation. The ambiguity 
is inevitable: for if the Wholly Other draws near, it does so in the signs of 
the sacred; but symbols soon turn into idols" (227:531). 
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Though our reason may find this impossible to prove and though it may 
appear to contradict our experience, Christianity confesses nonetheless that 
the hope is carried by the fragility of events, the ambiguity of language, the 
tenuousness of the lives of people. The power of these contingent events 
and words is not easily fathomed. But what seems impossible to prove in the 
court of knowledge, the power of its expression manifests a wealth of 
meaning that has the capacity to reshape reality. These central moments of 
faith and hope assure a force that appears inexhaustible. These events have 
the gathering force of symbols that permit a rereading of existence and of 
our communal history (see 220:210). In that sense, even events in history 
can have the force of the 'Last Day'. 
2. Biblical hermeneutics. 
With the prohibition of an onto-theology and a metaphysics of 
the sacred, Ricoeur peceives only one avenue to be open to a philosophical 
approximation of the realm of hope. And that is the hermeneutical one. 
The realm of hope comes to language in our discourse. The gospel itself has 
become a text (320(29*0:387). -it offers itself to our discernment as any 
discourse. Our hope, then, becomes an interpreted hope. The rest of this 
chapter proposes to examine this hermeneutics of the sacred in the texts of 
the 3udeo-Christian tradition. It is in these texts that Ricoeur proposes to 
discover the mediation of our attachment to the God of hope. 
Ricoeur's exegesis of hope is applied to the constitutive texts of 
the Judeo-Christian tradition: the Bible. He refuses to start with 
theological propositions such as a number of Anglo-Saxon theologians have 
done. He believes that before one can undertake to analyse theological 
propositions, one must first examine the more originary expressions of these 
theological propositions. Theological propositions are second-order language 
in relation to the first-order language oi the biblical text. Ricoeur believes 
that in the hermeneutical quest of the biblical texts one can arrive at the 
"most originary expression of a community of faith" (397:73). 
But how does this biblical hermeneutics differ from a 
philosophical hermeneutics? On a formed level, biblical hermeneutics 
appears as only a particular case of a general hermeneutics. At the formal 
level there is no talk of a subordination of one hermeneutics to another. 
Biblical hermeneutics is subject to the same procedures as a general 
hermeneutics. For that reason, philosophical hermeneutics is not an ancilla, 
the handmaid, to a biblical hermeneutics. But because of the uniqueness of 
the world of the biblical text, since it seeks to express the unnameable, 
Ricoeur calls biblical hermeneutics the limit of all hermeneutics, the non-
hermeneuticai origin of all hermeneutics (397:8*0. As such, biblical 
hermeneutics is unique. It has a point, where it gathers all its texts. It has 
one reference that it forges that can never be complete. The reference is a 
name that is given as not given, a name that is refused as a name 
(320(309):<*85-486).22 It is the power of the hope that issues from this name 
22. Ricoeur accepts the statement of G. Ebeling concerning the 
Bible as the word of God, "It is only in listening to this book to the very 
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that creates the space of a biblical hermeneutics. In line with this, biblical 
hermeneutics borrows the hermeneutics, based on the problematics of the 
text, from philosophical hermeneutics. But, because of the unique referent, 
Ricoeur perceives theological hermeneutics to be more encompassing than 
philosophical hermeneutics, transforming it according to its own exigency 
9406:17). 
a. From oral proclamation to the Scriptures. 
The 3udeo-Christian proclamation, which we have described 
above as a Word-event, has, however, not only found its way to language but 
also to writing. As inscribed in language, the discourse of hope becomes 
subject to the structures and procedures of all language (360:285-288; 
358:36-46). In being transformed into a written text, the discourse of hope 
accrues the same characteristics as any written text.23 it is significant, 
however, that from the beginning the Christian proclamation has had a 
strict relationship with the Writings. The Christian proclamation is 
fundamentally a hermeneutic. Thus, it is, in the first instance, a 
hermeneutics of the law and the prophets of Israel's covenant. Also the 
proclamation of 3esus as the Christ by the first community is a 
hermeneutics of the figures of the written Hebraic and Hellenic cultures. 
What is novel in 3esus is made available to a community through an 
interpretation and an exegesis of what had already become sedimented in a 
written culture. Furthermore, the proclamation as interpretation became a 
new written text - the New Testament - at a certain stage of its 
development (406:19-20). 
A number of points ought to be made regarding the Bible as 
written text. 
(1) The distanciation, made by writing, permits the insertion of 
all the explanatory procedures that we have examined earlier. The 
interpretation of the proclamation must be mediated by its code and the 
theory of language (406:20). 
end, as one book among many, that we can encounter it as the Word of God" 
(397:82). 
23. Ricoeur's text-theory cuts a swath through the exegetical 
practices of today. Because of the decontextualization of the text from the 
author, the original situation, and the original addressees, he relativizes the 
historico-critical method. Instead, he accepts structural exegesis, but only 
to the extent that it help us read the narrative structure better. With 
regard to the historico-critical method, he recognizes its irreplaceable value 
because by retaining an historical accent, the method remains a formidable 
protest against the Hegelian totalization of history in the absolute spirit 
(see 358:36). See also the introductory article of L. Dornisch, "Symbolic 
Systems and the Interpretation of Scripture: an Introduction to the Work of 
Paul Ricoeur" in Semeia 4, 1975; L.5. Mudge, "Paul Ricoeur on Biblical 
Interpretation" in Biblical Research, 24-25; 1979-1980, p.38-69. 
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(2) The interpretation which these writings give of the Word-
event is not univocal. The variety of writings open up a multiform 
interpretation of the event of Jesus Christ. The Christian New Testament 
provides as many interpretations as there are distinct documents (406:20). 
(3) Ricoeur accepts a closure upon the writings of the Bible. 
The closure made by the ecclesial community is proposed by Ricoeur as the 
horizon of the proclamation. The Church imposed the closure when it closed 
the canon of the scriptures. All other testimonies and writings are of lesser 
stature and are not perceived as primary sources of preaching (406:20). 
(Ό The interpretative chain does not end, however, with the 
closure of the scriptures. The interpretation becomes tradition and forms 
the history of the Church, which is best described as the insertion of the 
proclamation in time. It is as this power of the word in history that the 
original word-event reaches our time (406:20;403:57;320(200):47). 
(5) This power of a text to infuse and orient a living tradition 
does not create a closed universe. On the one hand, Ricoeur refuses to 
hypostatize the text. It is not the text as text that is its force, but the 
power of the text to say out a world. The reference is the issue, not the 
literary hypostasis. On the other hand, the gathering power of the text 
brings the text into contact and communication with other texts. Ricoeur 
calls this the play of intertextuality. By this he means that every text 
inserts itself somewhere in historical becoming. Every text relates to other 
texts that precede it, accompany it, and succeed it. A text is part of a 
communicative chain (436:491-492). Hence, no text is absolute, because no 
text is solely for the sake of its sense, but every text exists for its reference 
that breaks this self-enclosedness. 
b. The configuration of biblical discourse. 
(1) The work of discourse of the Bible. 
In Ricoeur's view the interlinking of the realm of hope with 
language, and, through the Bible, with texts, brings about a very specific 
bonding of the confession of faith with the variety of literary configurations 
that are found in the text of the Bible. The biblical text presents the reader 
with all the complexities of composition, literary genres, and s t y l e . ^ As 
produced texts, as a work on language, they present us with a number of 
styles and genres. 
For Ricoeur, the number of forms or genres of texts found in the 
Bible are not accidental. They are determined by and issue forth from what 
is the issue of the text. Here too Ricoeur perceives a certain closure. He 
would like to view the closing of the Canon of the Bible as a "fundamental 
structural act" which delimits the space and the variety of the forms of 
discourse and their possible interplay (397:760). The number of forms of 
24. See above, p.41-44. 
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discourse are factually limited to the forms found in the complete text of 
the ВіЫе.25 The total configuration of the text of the Bible forms the 
space of the full interpretation. However, Ricoeur is careful not to 
absolutize this closure of the canon. As he says, 
But perhaps this hypothesis is unverifiable and confers on the 
closing of the canon a sort of necessity which would not be appropriate 
to what should perhaps remain a historical accident of the text 
(397:78). 
Two further presuppositions needs to be mentioned. 
First, Ricoeur proposes that certain forms of discourse are more 
suited than others to express certain modalities of the confession of faith. 
Again with caution he states, 
Perhaps an exhaustive inquiry, if one were possible, would 
disclose that together all these forms of discourse constitute a 
circular system and that the theological content of each of them 
receives its signification from the total constellation of the forms of 
discourse. Religious language would then appear as a polyphonic 
language sustained by the circularity of forms (¿06:24). 
Second, certain forms of discourse form binary pairs and require 
one another to complement the reference of their texts. Ricoeur makes 
specific reference along these lines to the complementarity of the narrative 
and prophetic genres of the Old Testament (406:22-23). 
The total rationale of these characteristics cannot be given until 
one has considered the reference of these texts. As we saw above, for 
Ricoeur, it is the backward influence of the power of the Name that 
determines the forms and the interplay of forms (438:26). But the forms of 
discourse themselves are traditional, recognizable forms. Thus we discover 
narratives, parables, proverbs, gospels, letters, hymns, etc. All these forms, 
however, are infected with the power that they seek to say out. In what 
follows we shall state briefly which forms Ricoeur has found in these texts 
and how they interrelate. 
25. Ricoeur's indebtedness to Von Rad's Theologie des Alten 
Testaments (München, Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960, 2 vol.) is apparent in all his 
references to the Old Testament. It is Von Rad who introduces Ricoeur to 
the close link between the literary genre and theological content 
(406:23j358:43;332:59-760;20(200):45; 222:93). The centering of Von Rad's 
Old Testament theology on the narrative mode of Dt. 26 has become a 
central perspective for Ricoeur's own approach to the narrativity of the Old 
Testament. 
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(2) The literary genres of the Bible. 
Ricoeur's enumeration of the biblical genres is not intended to be 
exhaustive. His concern is rather to establish the principle that the 
religious experience which these texts articulate has a specific form and 
that this form is counterbalanced by other forms. These other forms are 
either their dialectical counterparts or their extensions, communicating 
with that form by disrupting or delimiting it. Whether there are more 
literary forms than the ones he has examined is not discussed. The closure 
of the literary forms of the biblical text may be more extensive than these 
which Ricoeur has analysed. 
The biblical polyphony to which Ricoeur has listened includes the 
symbolic and mythical discourse,26 narration, prophecy, legislation, 
proverbs, prayers, hymns, liturgical formulas, and sapiential writings of the 
Old Testament. In the New Testament his attention has been mainly 
focussed on the parables, proverbs and Kingdom sayings of the Synoptic 
Gospels (see 400, 406, 410, 411, 427, 436, 438, 470, 476). In their own way 
each of these forms are confessions of faith or name God in an originary 
way, but they do not carry equal weight. The literary form that organizes 
this polyphony of point and counterpoint into a fragile analogical unity is the 
narrative genre. For Ricoeur the starting point of his entry into the naming 
power of both testaments is the narrative, upon which he believes the 
testaments are built (332:59-60). 
(a) Narrative discourse. 
Von Rad's theology of traditions based on the Hebrew credal 
story of Deuteronomy 26:5b-10b serves to lead Ricoeur to the insight of the 
centrality of the narrative. The traditions of the Old Testament, Von Rad 
believes, are founded on a few key transcendent events, such as, the call of 
Abraham, the Exodus, the anointing of David. These stories name the 
reality of God through the historical drama as a God covenanted with a 
people and their ancestors. God is the great Actor of the call and of the 
deliverance of a community of people. He is a God who both established and 
rooted the community and protected it in the moments of danger. God is 
named in and through the very narration of the great events that grounded 
the community (436:496). This also applies to the New Testament. The 
gospels and the Acts of the Apostles are stories of the same nature. The 
stories of the resurrection, for instance, name God in the story of the 
raising of Jesus from the dead. This narrative is the story of the 
establishment and the grounding of a community. For Ricoeur, the 
narrative mode of naming God confirms the position outlined above of the 
event-character of God. The narrative is first of all a narrative of the 
26. The symbolic and mythical discourse of the Old Testament was 
examined in La symbolique du mal. Le conflit des interprétations, and Les 
incidences theologiques des recherches actuelles concernant le langage 
ТШТ. 
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event. I t points beyond its language to history (438:6).27 In their 
transcendence, these events have become the gathering points oí a new 
history. 
In the story's tel l ing is effected not only the founding of the 
community, but also the active insertion of the hearers into the movement 
and t ime of the story. As the story expresses the originary participation of 
what i t names, my belonging to the community of the story is redescribed by 
the very reading of the story in the community (W8: l 5^; 411:73). Here the 
narration becomes a confession of fa i th in God as the great Actant - to use 
Greimas' phrase. The theology that such a forms allows can only be a 
theology that is respectful of the narrative structure. Ricoeur calls i t a 
theology in the form of a Heilsgeschichte (397:77; cf. also 87:1928-1930). 
The name of God is linked wi th the structure of an historical drama. A 
theology that seeks to bypass the historical drama, in order to arrive at a 
generalized concept of God, can only do so at its own per i l . 
The power of the fa i th of God as event in Israel's history was so 
incisive that i t drew to itself the mythological strain borrowed from Babylon 
and in the process transformed i t . In i tself, this is not surprising, for, 
according to Ricoeur, the function of the myth is to install historical t ime 
(357:536). Ricoeur accepts, therefore, the thesis of Von Rad that the 
history of God's deeds incorporated the Babylonian creation myths and, by 
inserting them in Isreal's history, allowed them to become events of 
salvation (332:65;357:534). Hence, the narrative even touches and remakes 
cosmology (358:43-46). But the narrative does not total ly overcome the 
cosmologica! and the mythical . Mythic t ime returns in the feast and in civic 
l i fe , in the celebration of the Pasch and of the Sabbath, where i t is placed in 
constant tension wi th the narrative (332:89). On the other hand the re-
introduction of the myth, as well as our recognition that the events 
recounted are not necessarily chronologically as they took place, shows the 
temporal i ty of these events to l ie at a level deeper than mere l inearity 
(332:81). 
(b) Prophetic d iscourse.^ 
The God of narrative discourse threatens, however, to become 
immanent to history. The God, who establishes a people by inst i tut ing them 
in freedom, could easily be absorbed into the past of a people as a memory. 
The confession of this God is bound to the structure of the story. A God of 
memory dissipates the tension of hope. As Ricoeur says, "The God of the 
exodus must become the God of the exile i f he is to remain the God of the 
27. To date Ricoeur has not expl ic i t ly linked the structure of the 
narrat iv i ty of the bible to a specific temporal i ty. The eschatological 
dimension of the biblical narrative is mentioned but hardly exploited. 
28. Von Rad has also been instrumental here part icularly in Volume 
II of his Theologie des Al ten Testaments., op. c i t . , ent i t led, Die Theologie 
der prophetischen Oberlieferungen" 
234 
future and not merely the God of memory" (406:24). He perceives among 
the forms of discourse one that radically disrupts the story of God as the 
Actant of history. It is the prophetic oracle with its resounding 'no' to an 
excessively narrow identification of Yahweh with Israel's story. The 
prophetic oracle re-infuses the tension into Israel's existence. The prophetic 
oracle dislocates the time of Israel's story and places it under the threat of 
death and extinction as a people (397:77-78;153:50-99;357:534-535). In the 
midst of Israel's story with God, the prophets hurl the Day of Yahweh, the 
judgement and the wrath of God. The prophet's time is not a time of events, 
but the time of discourse. In their discourse, they propose another time. 
But in order to propose a time of Yahweh other than the historical one, the 
prophets presuppose the God of history. The prophet cannot speak as he 
does, unless the historical time had already been established (332:89). In his 
words these times collide: the time of the imminent threat and the memory 
of the founding events. Time and history become both a time to relive and a 
threatened time. 
There is, however, another distinctive trait of prophetic 
discourse. The narration speaks of God in the third person. The prophetic 
discourse has God speak as the I behind the prophet's voice. The prophet 
does not speak; he speaks in Yahweh's name. The prophet knows himself as 
called and sent. Behind his voice is the voice of God. As Ricoeur remarks, 
"God is named in a double first person, and as the word of another in my 
word" (436:498, my translation).29 The danger of misunderstanding the 
prophetic oracle, when dissociated from the narrative, is great. The naming 
of God can be lost in the search for a God behind the voice and in search of 
a plan for history that such a voice proclaims. Prophecy's insertion of the 
Last Day into the process of history can become a divinatory instrument, a 
manipulative word, that claims to know the path of history, if one does not 
remember that prophecy's task is to prevent the relationship of Yahweh to 
history from becoming thingified or petrified (4378:3-4). Only by keeping 
this tension alive can the dimension of a new time emerge. Prophetic time 
becomes eschatological time. The time, beyond the threat that destroys 
this time, is the time of the 'perhaps' of Goid, the 'not-yet' of the Day of 
Yahweh, which is also a day of deliverance and promise for his elect 
(332:82;153:68-70). Drawing on Israel's events with God, the prophets call 
for a new exodus, for a return to Israel's days in the desert, etc. The 
prophetic oracle, therefore, both déstructures the narrative, and, in 
recalling the narrative theme, trans-structures it in a new time as an 
immeasurable promise. In Ricoeur's words, 
The action of the prophecy on the story is its complete 
metaphorisation of the events themselves since they do not saturate 
them with accomplishment; that is why, moreover, every occupation 
of the Promised Land is ultimately eschatological (332:83). 
29. "Dieu est nommé en double première personne, comme parole 
d'un autre dans ma parole." 
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In fact, for Ricoeur, the prophetic dimension attached to the 
narrative and, through the narrative, to the mythical, metaphorizes the 
whole tradition into a story of the promise. The end becomes the focal 
point. The story becomes eschatologized. It is prophetic. The historical 
events become events from the perspective of the God who comes 
(332:83,86). Beyond the dislocation of the events through the prophetic 
oracle, therefore, there is a relocation through the eschatological infusion. 
(c) Prescriptive discourse. 
A third type of discourse which attaches itself to the two 
previous is the prescriptive discourse of the Torah. Ricoeur designates it as 
the practical, ethical discourse of revelation (438:8). In this discourse, God 
is named as the giver or author of the law. And to the extent that it is 
addressed to me, Ricoeur says, I perceive myself as designated by God in the 
second person: You shall...(436:499). On the practical level the prescriptive 
discourse places my existence and my life in a new type of relationship with 
God: a relationship of dependence. But what sort of dependence? Is it to 
be understood along the line of Kant's imperative or as heteronomy, or as 
divine law? 
Ricoeur makes a lengthy meditation of the Torah and its history 
in La symbolique du mal.^e There he qualifies the heteronomy of the Torah 
by linking it with the other forms of discourse. The Torah does not stand on 
its own. It is the instruction of Yahweh in the perspective of the story of 
Israel's liberation and the prophetic menace (153:119). The instruction is 
thoroughly historical: it is intended to be the ethics of a liberated people. 
The negative connotation of heteronomy is dispersed by the covenantal 
context of Isreal's dependence upon Yahweh. Life in the convenant is 
Israel's promise; its breakdown is Israel's menace. Moreover, the link of the 
Torah with Moses - it is the law of Moses - retains for the Torah its 
narrative basis in Israel's founding events. The giving of the Torah takes 
place in the Exodus event from Egypt. The narrative and prophetic 
discourse interfere, therefore, with too narrow an interpretation of the 
divine imperative according to a prescriptive discourse. In Ricoeur's words, 
If we may still apply the idea of God's design for humans to it, it 
is no longer in the sense of a plan that we could read in past or future 
events, nor is it in terms of an immutable codification of every 
communal or individual practice. Rather, it is the sense of a 
requirement for perfection that summons the will and makes a claim 
upon it (438:10-11). 
Accordingly, because this discourse also speaks out the name of 
God, but as the holy one, the prescriptions of the Torah have become both 
innumerable commandments that fracture that holiness in human living and 
30. Op. cit., p. 118-150. 
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the supreme commandment of love: "Be perfect as your heavenly Farther is 
perfect." (Mt 5:48) The new law or covenant is built upon the old according 
to an ethics of prophecy: "I shall give you a new heart and place a new 
spirit within you, taking from your bodies your stony hearts and giving you 
natural hearts" (Ez 36:26). 
(d) Wisdom discourse. 
Wisdom discourse adds a universal dimension to those already 
mentioned. The wisdom discourse addresses itself to the sense and nonsense 
of human existence in general. It is not specifically Jewish, as Ricoeur 
notes; it overflows the framework of the covenant, because it touches a 
core of human living that no one people can capture completely. Wisdom 
views the great variety of human situations in which humanity is touched in 
its misery and greatness. It is the struggle of humanity to keep alive the 
hope that in the sea of the meaninglessness of life's tensions, suffering and 
death, meaning dominates. According to wisdom, humans are faced with 
life's incomprehensibility; wisdom shifts that incomprehensibility towards 
God. Wisdom discourse names God as the silent and absent one, especially 
in the dichotomy experienced between justice and happiness in human 
suffering (W8:l l-12;«6:W9-500). 
The suffering of human existence can stand as paradigm of the 
accomplishment of wisdom. Suffering lies not in the realm of 
ethos - especially when it is unjust. Rather it links the ethical order with 
the order of things: the ethos with the cosmos. The whole of the book of 
3ob and especially its conclusion, orients the reader to seek for a horizon of 
meaning, where suffering actively assumed ties together the cosmos with 
human action. It does not prescribe what Job must do, but how he must 
endure. Nor does the response of God provide him with a vision of a justice 
or an order of the world, where suffering can be understood or justified. 
This wisdom asks Job to repent even his questioning. For this wisdom, 
existence makes sense and for Job to dare to question it is an offense. The 
book of Job places existence within a context of meaning that human 
intelligence and language cannot fathom. 
How does this discourse interanimate with the previously 
mentioned narrative, prophetic and prescriptive discourses? Ricoeur's key 
notion is the incomprehensibility of God. When wisdom tries to fathom an 
impenetrable world of suffering, it refuses to see a clearly visible plan or 
design of God in human affairs. If there is a design - and here it rejoins the 
narrative, but as a broken narrative - it is a secret design of God. It is the 
wisdom of God - a wisdom that the book of Proverbs personifies in a 
feminine figure who is with God as the accompaniment of creation. Wisdom 
is similar to prophecy, according to Ricoeur, because the sage like the 
prophet speaks as an inspired human of the way of things with God. 
Prophecy and wisdom have a further parallel in the eschatological 
breakthrough of language. The prophet often speaks of the Day of Yahweh 
in apocalyptic terms. In the later stages, e.g. the book of Daniel, and much 
of the writings of the intertestamentary period, wisdom too speaks of a Day 
of Yahweh, when the apokalupsis, the revelation, of the design of God will 
take place (438:13). 
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(e) Hymnic discourse. 
The psalms and hymns of praise, supplication and thanksgiving, 
are the final form or genre of the Old Testament which Ricoeur examines. 
The hymnic discourse affects the other discourses, inasmuch as here God is 
addressed in the second person. Humans are a You before God. It is as a 
You that they respond. Narration in the context of hymnic discourse is 
transformed into an invocation. The Exodus story and the creation are 
celebrated in such a manner, for instance, in the ritual celebration of the 
Pasch. And without the supplication of the psalms, the suffering of the just 
person would be left in mute imcomprehensibility. Through the invocation, 
the mute world of affairs is pierced by the cry of the sufferer addressed to a 
transcendent and incomprehensible You (438:1^-15)· 
How do these hymns name God? Ricoeur warns against a false 
hypostatizing of the hymn. He urges that we must look for a way of naming 
God that takes place in accordance with feelings: 
The sentiments expressed here are formed by and conform to 
their object. Thanksgiving, supplication, and celebration are all 
engendered by what these movements of the heart allow to exist and, 
in that manner, to become manifest... The word forms our feeling in 
the process of expressing it. And revelation is this very formation of 
our feelings that transcend their everyday, ordinary modalities 
(438:15). 
(f) Parabolic discourse. 
Nowhere has Ricoeur shown more clearly the quality of language 
used in religious discourse than in his analysis of the Hebrew maschal 
(parable) in the text of the New Testament gospels. If in the text of the Old 
Testament he discovered, through Von Rad, a number of forms of discourse 
and their interpretation, it is in studying the genre of parable that Ricoeur 
clarifies the texture of religious discourse.^! 
Ricoeur defines the parabolic discourse according to three traits: 
(1) it has a narrative form; (2) it makes use of the metaphorical process; and 
(3) its religious quality is governed by a qualifier. On the level of the genre 
a parable is a form of discourse, which applies a metaphorical process to a 
narrative form. But this linguistic genre requires a specific qualifier in 
order to bring it to the limit of the possibilities of language and thus make it 
a religious discourse. This qualifier, according to Ricoeur, is not provided 
31. Cf. Л.О. Crossan, "Paradox gives Rise to Metaphor: Paul 
Ricoeur's Hermeneutics and the Parables of Jesus" in Biblical Research 2Ψ-
25, 1979-1980, p.20-37; Л. Alexandre, "Notes sur l'esprit des paraboles en 
réponse à P. Ricoeur" in Études théologiques et religieuses 51, 1976, p. 367-
372. 
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by the parable itself, except in conjunction with two other modes of 
discourse of the New Testament that attempt to bring the Kingdom of God 
to language: the proclamatory statements and the proverbial statements. 
This third trait of the parable: the ultimate referent of the parable, will be 
examined below. I will concentrate here on the literary genre of the 
parable, because, according to Ricoeur, it can serve as a model of a form 
that mediates the Christian existence (411:30). 
Since both the narrative form and the metaphorical process, as 
Ricoeur perceives them, have been worked out extensively, we only need to 
elaborate how the parable is a conjunction of these two forms.^^ 
1. Parables are, first of all, stories with a surface meaning that 
is obvious. They are stories about ordinary people, doing ordinary things: 
selling and buying, fishing, loosing and finding, sowing... They are narratives 
of normalcy (452(410):239). This narrative structure of normalcy, however, 
is invaded by the metaphorical process, that is, a transfer of meaning is 
forced upon the text by means of a semantic clash that bids the narrative of 
apparent normalcy to deliver another, non-literal, figurative meaning. It is 
Ricoeur's thesis - following the parable research of 3.D. Crossane 
N. Ferring* A. Wilder,35 and W. Beardsley,^ that parables are fictional 
compositions with a unique metaphorical tension that appear to retain their 
semantic tension longer than regular metaphors. The power of the parabolic 
genre is that, by means of the tension in the fiction, it gives a glimpse of 
another reality which is not accessible to us, except in the release of that 
reality by way of the imagination in the moment of the semantic tension. 
But what constitutes the abnormalcy, the shock, in the parabolic narrative 
that unleashes another world into our existence? 
2. The shock is provided by the invasion of another world into 
the narrative structure. But where does this other world display itself? In 
his answer, Ricoeur diverges somewhat from Crossen, who immediately 
passes to the reference. For Ricoeur, there must be traces of metaphoricity 
within the very structure and the process of the story text itself. However, 
he is aware that these traces of a symbolic reference of the narrative text-
structure are not so convincing that they impose themselves upon us. 
32. See above p.134-137, and 57-69. 
33. In Parables, New York, Harper and Row, 1973. 
34. "The Parables of Jesus as Parables, as Metaphors, and as 
Aesthetic Objects: A Review Article", in The Journal of Religion 47, 1967, 
p.340-347. 
35. The Language of the Gospel, New York, Harper and Row, 1964. 
36. Literary Criticism of the New Testament, Philadelphia, Fortress 
Press, 1097, p.30-41, and "Uses of the Proverbs in the Synoptic Gospel" in 
Interpretation 24, 1970, p.61-76. 
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Ricoeur calls the inner clues implicit and elusive. Nevertheless, he remains 
faithful to the principle of the dialectic between sense and reference. In 
addition to looking for traces of the metaphoricity in the text, he will also 
look for clues that lie outside the parabolic text in the larger text in which 
the parables are found. He calls these contextual clues (411:97). 
The inner clues of metaphoricity must be provided by the 
narrative plot (434:501). For Ricoeur, the plot is not an epiphenomenon of 
the code, as we saw, but it is the very temporal structure of the narrative. 
We must search for the metaphoricity in the action of the narrative - what 
happens in the story.37 A plot's center is the crisis and its denouement; 
there existence is said to be found or lost. In other words, Ricoeur suggests 
that within the closure of the narrative form, i.e., in the setting, crisis, 
denouement, there is a dimension that breaks open the closure toward a 
metaphorical reference (434:152;436:501). That dimension he calls the 
extravagance of the parable. Every parable has a critical, surprising 
moment either tragic or comic that is unexpected: the mustard plant in 
which birds nest, a Samaritan who is 'good'...the abandonment of 99 sheep in 
the desert for the one lost sheep, this moment of excess, of extravagence, 
introduces the extraordinary into the story of the ordinary and creates the 
metaphoric tension and surplus (427:17). This tension transforms the 
closedness of the narrative structure into a figurative referent (411:99). 
But according to Ricoeur this inner clue would hardly be 
recognizable without a number of contextual clues. Of these he gives four. 
a. The narrative impertinence is heightened first of all by the 
whole corpus of the parables which are introduced in the gospel text by an 
enigmatic word concerning the teaching in parables ("To others outside it is 
all presented in parables, so that they will look intently and not see, listen 
carefully and not understand, lest perhaps they repent and be forgiven." (Mk. 
4:12) and with the injunction, "let those who have ears hear". Ricoeur 
proposes that parables make sense only in the whole network of 
intersignification produced by the whole corpus of parables. The closure of 
the corpus of the parables by the early ecclesia! community provides a 
network of clashing significations among the parables. The network forces a 
metaphorical interpretation. 
b. In addition to the parabolic discourse the sayings attributed 
to Jesus also include the eschatological sayings and the proverbial sayings. 
According to N. Perrin, all of them have a common horizon, provided by the 
symbol Kingdom of God. For Ricoeur, this means that the parabolic 
discourse communicates with and can be translated into the eschatalogical 
Kingdom sayings or the proverbs. Once again, this intensification of the 
parable strengthens its metaphoricity at the expense of the narrative 
closure (411:102,109-114;404:67-69). The proclamatory, or Kingdom, 
37. The parables are not stories about persons, such as, the father, 
the judge, the mother, the woman, the sower, but about the action of the 
story. The Kingdom is like a father, who... 
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statements, for instance, assume a very pronounced temporal tension. Thus, 
Mark's saying, "The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; 
repent and believe the Gospel" (1:15), is said in the apocalyptic genre which 
presumes a certain temporal order. If taken into a literal temporal schema, 
the statement breaks apart at a chronological level. Here a new time 
invades the present time and shatters it: the fullness of time is now. By 
their interaction with the parables the proclamatory statements infect the 
extravagance of the parables with a singular type of intensification. The 
same can be said about the proverbs. The proverbial wisdom sayings of the 
New Testament offer a similar type of intensification. While wisdom 
sayings generally seek to create a continuous human project of existence, 
the New Testament proverbs seek to shatter any such attempt. This is done 
by making use of paradox ("The last shall be first, and the first shall be last" 
(Mk. 20:16) or of hyperbole ("whoever loses his life will preserve it" (Lk 
(17:33). Through the interanimation with the other sayings of 3esus, the 
proverbial sayings offer their intensification of life to the understanding of 
the parables. 
с A further extension of the intersignification is given by 
situating the parabolic discourse within the text of the 'deeds' of 3esus. 
These texts of the deeds of Jesus speak not only of Jesus "going around 
doing good" but also of Jesus' extraordinary deeds: the miracle stories. 
These, too, introduce a rupture of extravagance into ordinary life. The 
deeds manifest the possibility of the impossible. The intersignification 
inserts a similar structure of expectation into the sayings of the parables 
011:102-103). 
d. The insertion of the parables within the gospel as a narrative 
also sets a context for the intersignification. The gospel provides the total 
framework and sets the limit of interpretation. The parable is a 
metaphorical narrative within a metaphorical narrative. Ricoeur calls the 
parables quotations within a text (411:104), that is, they are parables of 
Jesus. This factor creates a unique intersignification of the parables with 
the text of the words and deeds of Jesus, including the narrative of the 
passion. This intersignification is mutually reinforcing: the metaphoricity 
of the parabolic narrative is intensified by the larger context, but the 
subsequent metaphoricity of the parable intensifies the metaphoricity of the 
Gospel narrative, particularly of the passion. The parables are the parables 
of the crucified one. For Ricoeur, a new space of intersignification is 
thereby opened which allows one to perceive the parables not only of Jesus 
but also of God. They are proclamations of Jesus about God (411:105). But 
at this point we have introduced the point of highest tension, to which we 
must return. 
3. Following this line of thinking, it is not surprising that as the 
metaphor is the paradigm of poetic discourse, the parable becomes the 
paradigm of religious discourse for Ricoeur. Ricoeur compares the parable 
to the function of the scientific model as perceived by Mary Hesse." The 
38. See above, p.79-83. 
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parable explores the reality beyond language as a model explores an 
uncharted scientific realm. It is a heuristic fiction, redescribing the field of 
human experience, where the originary reality is brought within the 
momentary glimpse of the imagination (^10:95). As a redescription of 
human experience, the parable might be only one form of discourse among 
others, were it not for its aggregation of the supreme referent. Because of 
the intrusion of the religious realm beyond language, it redescribes human 
language, experience, and existence at its deepest level (404:66-70). 
But as an existential model, its exploration of the realm called 
the Kingdom of God can be said to operate on a threefold level. The story 
in orienting our existence by the very normalcy of what it proposes in its 
images, disorients us in the crisis and in the impertinence of the semantic 
clash. But in the very tension of the orientation and the disorientation, the 
imagination reorients our existence in line with the experienced tension. It 
is through this strategy of discourse that our imagination is directed toward 
new possibilities according to Ricoeur. The parables exemplify the fact that 
religious language is "a word addressed first to our imagination rather than 
our will" (410:245). 
C. THE BIBLICAL WORLD OF THE TEXT. 
After the examination of the biblical forms of discourse and 
their interanimation, we must examine what, in Ricoeur's view, gathers 
these texts into this specific polyphony. How can we qualify the language 
that says out its source, and what is its logical or epistemic status? 
1. The language of revelation. 
For Ricoeur, the variety of forms of biblical discourse function 
as a type of generative poetics of the name of God. God is the ultimate 
referent of the totality of the discourses: their naming of God is 
homogeneous to a specific genre and, at the same time, challenged and 
negated by another genre. According to Ricoeur, it is this notion of a 
generative poetics in the interplay of genres that governs the idea of 
revelation (406:26-27). What is revealed is what is displayed before the 
text. Revelation is not what lies behind the text along the lines of a source 
of inspiration, but what lies before the text, as opened by the text, or, as a 
letting-be of that which the text displays. As we have seen, what the text 
displays is a world proposal, a realm of my own-most possibilities (436:495). 
Hence, the forms of discourse which we have examined are not forms where 
truth is verified in some type of process of adequation, but forms where one 
manifests what lies prior to language (438:20). Revelation, accordingly, is a 
"feature of the biblical world proposed by the text" (438:26). It is the force 
of the text that makes it epiphanous. 
We have noted above, that, for Ricoeur, the various forms of 
biblical discourse are related analogically. That means that no form is 
absolute and that the idea of revelation cannot be elevated to the level of 
knowledge. It remains in the tension of the forms. Revelation also remains 
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its negation, in the sense, that, like the burning bush, the God who reveals 
himself in it is a hidden God. In the revelation of the name of God in Ex 
3:14-15, the God who reveals his name, and the God whose name signifies 
the act of deliverance is simulaneously the God who refuses to give his name 
(436:501). Ricoeur calls this a flight to the infinite of the God-reference of 
the text. But, because these texts do signify something, it can be said that 
revelation takes place "between the secret and the revealed" (438:18). 
Accordingly, in a parabolic fashion, God is 'like'...that is, he 'is' and he 'is 
not.' God, as referent of all these texts, is the religious name that gathers 
all these texts and coordinates them. He is, at the same time, the reality 
that is never totally captured by them. That is why Ricoeur can say that if 
"God is the religious name of being, still the word 'God' says more... To 
understand the word 'God' is to follow the 'direction of meaning' of the 
word" (406:25). The name God is the opening up of an horizon that discourse 
tends to close. 
When Ricoeur qualifies this revelatory language, he calls it a 
variety of poetic language. Revelatory language is poetic in the sense that 
it brings to speech the fictions of the imagination, whereby reality is 
redescribed. But not all poetic language is revelatory in the religious sense. 
Not all poetic language lays open the New Being (Tillich). Religious 
language is a peculiar intensification of poetic language. In other words, it 
is not because it is metaphorical or poetic that it is religious, but because of 
the intensification (411:108). In the parables, for example it is because the 
parabolic discourse is contextualized by the ultimate referent of the 
Kingdom of God and the eschatological dimension of the Kingdom sayings 
and the paradox and hyperbole of the proverbial discourse that it becomes 
religious language. The intentional aim of religious discourse appears to 
take language itself to its limits of expressabiliy. Within the normalcy of 
life, it inserts the extraordinary, the paradoxical, the disruptive. As a first 
approximation of religious language, Ricoeur characterizes it as a limit 
expression (411:108). 
How does such a limit expression function? Ian Ramsey 
describes the process through his theory of models and qualifiers." 
According to Ramsey, there is a mode of intervening in the use of language 
which qualifies the language. In biblical New Testament language it might 
be said, that the paradoxical, the hyperbolic, the extravagant, and the 
eschatological are qualifiers of traditional wisdom, the apocalyptism, and 
the discourse of ordinary living of the Hebrew maschal. The qualifier 
forces, what Ricoeur calls, a logical scandal upon the text. Thus, for 
example, the proverbs of Jesus, in their destructuring of our life project, 
leave us with the enigma of how to create a wholeness of life beyond the 
disorientation. The New Testament qualifier is logically scandalous. If God 
is the ultimate qualifier of all these texts, i.e., their ultimate referent, it is 
39. See Religious Language, New York, MacMillan, 1957, p.l05-122. 
Ramsey applied the process of qualifiers only to theological language. 
Ricoeur, however, transfers the process to biblical language, because it is 
more primordial than theological language. 
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suggested that his reality is logically scandalous (411:120-121). Limit 
expressions are expressions that by means of the logical abuse shatter the 
normalcy of discourse and reorient language to a hyperlogical dimension. 
For Ricoeur, the functioning of the New Testament religious language is 
determined by what it tries to bring to language, namely the Kingdom of 
God. The Kingdom of God becomes the limit referent of all these limit 
expressions (411:122). The Kingdom-of-God symbol is the primordial 
qualifier of the religious language of the New Testament. The naming of 
God, through this qualifier, gathers the variety of the sayings of the New 
Testament (436:505). 
It is at this level that the uniqueness of biblical hermeneutics 
becomes most evident. We noted above that, for Ricoeur, biblical 
hermeneutics is one hermeneutic among others. Yet, it is also a unique 
hermeneutics. It is unique, because the bible is not only one of the great 
poems of existence, but also "because all its partial forms of discourse are 
referred to that Name which is the point of intersection and the vanishing 
point of all our discourse about God, the name of the unnameable" (438:26). 
The centrality of Jesus in the New Testament does not in any 
way remove the God-reference of the biblical texts (397:83j406:28). The 
poem of Christ is as much as any a poem of God (436:503). But the poem of 
Jesus acts as a qualifier of the poem of God. Jesus himself is a parable of 
God. He is the extravagance that shocks the traditional understanding of 
God as all-powerful, as immutable and impassible. The cross of Jesus is a 
shock of a God abandoning the just man, a God of weakness and kenosis. 
The God, who raised Jesus, is the power of God revealed in the 
powerlessness of the cross, or the power of powerlessness, also referred to 
in other God-references. 
2. Symbolic language. 
As a unique poetic and symbolic language, religious language also 
functions to create resemblance. In bonding us with the sacred, it also 
brings the sacred near by the creation of a fruitful tension between the 
archaism of our existence and the projection of our possibilities. Without 
repeating what has been said above about the symbol, I wish to touch on two 
of Ricoeur's points. 
a. The sacred and human existence. 
The parable, we said, presupposed the normalcy of life or the 
myth of human existence. The same must be said of the proclamatory and 
proverbial statements. They touch the ordinary understanding of human 
existence. The work of resemblance toward the imaginative variations in 
the realm of religion does not lead to supernaturalism. But the poetics of 
New Being aims to be a harbinger of true human existence within an 
ordinary, profane self-understanding. The analogates are derived from ways 
of inhabiting space and time and from human activity (423:62-63;406:26-27). 
But in their weighing of this existence, no specific world is privileged: the 
religious text speaks of a cosmic creation, of a people, of a history and 
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culture, and of individual joys and hopes and trials. But at the same time 
the religious text draws these experiences to the moments of their greatest 
intensity. In other words, the world that these texts project is not the world 
of ordinary experience, even though it uses ordinary experience to express 
it. In his La symbolique du mal, Ricoeur proposes three symbolic realms, 
the cosmic, the oneiric and the poetic.*" Humans, he maintains, express 
their existential dimension by expressing their world. They project their 
ownmost possibilities in the cosmic dimensions of the sky, earth, water, 
vegetation, or stones and in fragments of their own past. By drawing 
humans to their origin, they become at the same time prophets of 
consciousness (320(191):332-33;271:133). For Ricoeur, a correlation or a 
correspondence exists between the structure of the sacred universe and the 
logic of meaning. It is the sacred time and space of the cosmos, manifested 
in the human psyche that enables us to explore both our origin and our limits 
through symbolic language (ίί23:61;Μ4:58-63). 
For Ricoeur, this forces upon us a discussion of the role of the 
sacred in our time which is so characterized by desacralization. Moderns no 
longer relate to the cosmos, and the sacred manifests itself nowhere in 
consciousness except in substitutes. Ricoeur suggests that the relationship 
of the sacred and the power of the word must be correlated. But it is not 
sufficient to relegate the sacred solely to the kerygma, as Bonhöffer has 
done. Ricoeur insists on a sacral residue elsewhere, but he insists at the 
same time, that it be placed in relation to the kerygmatic word that is 
addressed to us. For him, the word is the sacred power par excellence. The 
word of the Bible will assume the cosmic symbolism - our originary 
orientation - but it informs and transforms it by the word (404:75). Thus 
Ricoeur will point to the language of the synoptic parable, proverb, or 
proclamatory saying as rooted in a sacred symbolism of the Kingdom of God, 
and of God as shepherd, father, and king, but this sacred symbolism receives 
its religious intensity in Christianity by its being taken up into the cycle of 
words that derive from the death and resurrection, new birth, new creation, 
the coming of new being and of a new world, that the proclamation says out 
(404:76). The proclamation retakes the cosmic images and transforms them 
into a proclamation. 
b. The critique of religious symbolism. 
The cosmic and the oneiric aspect of the symbol thus become 
subject to the power of the poetic word. The poetic imagination expressed 
in the symbol transforms the symbol from being solely a manifestation of 
the sacred - a reverting to the psychic archaic or to the cosmic - to a power 
of the future and an exploration of the possible. The stress is constantly 
placed upon the poetic power of the imagination over the cosmic and the 
oneiric. In line with 3. Moltmann's differentiation between Greek religion as 
a religion of manifestation or epiphany and Hebrew religion as a religion of 
hope and a word of promise, Ricoeur seeks the power of the religious symbol 
in the projective power of the poetic to put us in touch with human 
wholeness. 
40. Op. cit., p.10-14. 
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The power of the religious word is at the same time a critique or 
a cleansing of the cosmic and the oneiric. Ricoeur has provided an 
extensive coverage of a number of archaisms which stand under the critique 
of the kerygmatic word. The grounding of the religious in the cosmic, 
psychic, and poetic has, therefore, its counterpart in a number of 
prohibitions that the kerygma places upon a cosmic, purely ethical, archaic, 
infantile, or neurotic expression of religion. Thus, for example, in the name 
of a kerygma of hope, he distinguishes the religion of proclamation from a 
religion in which too great an emphasis is placed upon the cosmic 
manifestation of the sacred (see Wt). Similarly, to liberate religious 
discourse from the archaic, infantile, regressive and neurotic, Ricoeur has 
examined guilt (256,326), fear (320(232):347-353), consolation (256;227:550), 
punishment (273;232;325), the father as phantasm (325,309,227:549). In all 
these instances, it may be said, "An idol must die so that the symbol of 
being may begin to speak" (320(325):409). 
Ricoeur believes that the religious philosopher and theologian is 
forced to undertake this labour, because Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, and other 
philosophers of suspicion show convincingly that religion as discourse can be 
illusory discourse (367:64-65). In listening to them, Ricoeur detected a 
conflict in the interpretation of the same phenomenon. It is a conflict not 
only from without brought on by unbelievers and atheists, but, he insists, 
also from within by the Christian's own self-understanding. As he says of 
Freud, "He has already reinforced the belief of unbelievers; he has scarcely 
begun to purify the faith of believers (256:36). In the article, 
"L'herméneutique de la sécularisation. Foi, Idéologie, Utopie" 9430), he 
affirms that the need for a critique of religion becomes inevitable when 
religion begins to be described, as it is done today, in the alternative terms 
of either ideology or utopia. However, Ricoeur reminds us that the critique 
of religion that has come forth from this tradition is overshadowed by the 
more original critique that the Wholly Other places upon our religion when it 
enters our sphere and grasps hold of us (227:530). 
The question that needs to be asked in this context of a conflict 
about the interpretation of the world of religion is whether one can 
transcend the alternatives. Ricoeur believes this to be possible, because for 
him the critique of religion and the complementary functions of ideology 
and utopia are themselves founded upon the much more constitutive reality 
of faith itself. Religion may be called ideological and utopie, and, in some 
ways, rightly so, because, for example, it gives identity to faith. But 
religion needs to be constantly infused with the eschatological dimension of 
faith, in order to prevent it from distorting and reifying hope. Here too the 
eschaton breaks into human language and structures and makes it the 'odd' 
language and structures of the Kingdom to come. Accordingly Ricoeur 
remarks, faith enroots in the manner of religion and unroots in the manner 
of an eschatology (430:68). 
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CHAPTER NINE: THE WITNESS OF HOPE. 
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While we discovered the qualities of the world of the religious 
text in the previous chapter, we will now attempt to expose the 
characteristics of the appropriation of that world in the view of Paul 
Ricoeur. The limit-expressions, by which that world is brought near, call for 
an existence in the light of hope. The appropriation of the religious text in 
a self-understanding of faith and hope will consider four aspects of Ricoeur's 
text-theory in the realm of hope. 1. Religious existence as a limit-
experience; 2. speculative religious self-understanding; 3. practical or 
ethical recovery of self in religious discourse; 4. the subject as gift. We 
hope to show that the I that emerges out of the politics of hope is an I that 
is not just and free by its own power, but is an I that is justified and set 
free. It is an I who becomes in hope despite contingency and despite an 
immersion in the human history of sin. In short, we seek to grasp what 
Ricoeur means by understanding ourselves before the religious text. 
A. EXISTENCE AS A LIMIT-EXPERIENCE. 
Correlative to the limit-expressions which we encounter in 
religious language, Ricoeur posits what he calls limit-experiences at the 
level of existence. Limit-experiences are the existential response of the 
individual to the singular intensification of language that strains to capture 
the infinite. The language of hope does not leave existence untouched. We 
might call it, with Ricoeur, a performative language. Confronted in the 
text with the absolute and infinite, human experience undergoes an 
intensification, comparable to the intensification of religious language. The 
limit-expressions unleash a limit-experience. The ultimate referent of 
religious language of the New Testament, the Kingdom of God, not only 
affects human language, straining it to its limits, but also works upon our 
human experience (271:130-131). 
Borrowing the language of Ian Ramsey,! Ricoeur holds that this 
intensification of religious language brings about an 'odd discernment' 
experience. It is an 'odd discernment' experience, because its effect is the 
bonding of the individual with the referent of the religious text, i.e., with 
God, in a manner that is beyond language. Its power can find its human 
outlet only in a total commitment. The commitment is total not only in its 
assumption of the whole of existence but also in the perception that it is 
universally valid (411:124). The religious limit-experience is both a total 
involvement of the individual and a universal meaning. 
1. Op. cit. See 411:124. 
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For Ricoeur, these limit-experiences remain within the ambit oí 
language. The experience occurs in the power of the word to say out the 
Kingdom of God. It remains, therefore, within the power of the symbol to 
effect and to coordinate the relationship with God (271:131). The 
intensifying qualifier of religious language brings about in the heart of 
ordinary experience a disorientation of that ordinary experience, releasing it 
toward a new referent. In the disruptive overturning of ordinary 
experiences by means of the word, a new way of being is disclosed. But, just 
as the referent is metaphorically indicated in the limit-expression of 
religious language, so also the new way of being of the limit-experience is 
shown metaphorically. It is not mapped out; it is not described, but is 
rendered open to the imagination. 
The disruption or the dislocation of ordinary experience by the 
limit-expressions of religious language accomplishes two aims. First of all, 
it intercepts the normal attempt of human existence to create a whole out 
of life. The human project to tell a continuous story of its own existence is 
interrupted by the extravagance of religious language. The limit-
experience, for that reason, is not an extension of normal experience, but a 
questioning of such an experience. It brings an element of discontinuity into 
the human project. The limit-experience extends toward us a wholly new 
life-project. That is why, secondly, limit-expressions bring about a new 
orientation of existence right in and through the breach in our normal 
experience. This re-orientation, touching the 'heart of our heart' (152:160), 
is called conversion (251:506).2 This conversion, or re-orientation through 
disorientation, can only be a total commitment. In L'homme faillible, 
Ricoeur describes this feeling of the infinite as joy, happiness, and the 
'vehemence of the Yes' before existence.' 
This re-orientation affects every experience and project. It 
touches the speculative, as well as the practical, ethical and political. No 
human project is left undisturbed by this paradox (436:508). But, at the 
same time, no human project can lay claim to encompassing or satisfying 
the power of the symbol of the Kingdom of God. It is a realm of the 
impossible demand, calling forth the limit of human existence. No program, 
no praxis, can exhaust it, because religious language redirects every 
program and experience (411:125-127, cf. also 220:221). The human 
experience that is intercepted is intercepted with all the broadness of the 
world of the religious text. If the biblical text projects a world that is 
cosmic, ethical, political, as well as individual and personal, the 
reorientation of experience by that text will have the same amplitude. The 
religious touches all. It calls for total commitment (cf. 152:209). 
2. In the article, "La Parole, instauratrice de liberté" Ricoeur gives 
a psychological description of conversion in the following terms, "Une 
nouvelle 'articulation significative' de notre manière de nous comprendre 
dans le sentiment de notre situation" (251:506). 
3. See 152:120-161, and 207-224. 
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What seeks to come to existence, therefore, is the new being of 
the text. The new being is a matter of 'ultimate concern' (Tillich), because 
the new being of the text is, according to Ricoeur, the completion of my 
desire and effort to be. The new being invades my life through the text as 
the foundation of my life (^06:31-32). This means, however, that the 
ultimate referent of the text of the Bible is not God or the Kingdom of God, 
but a dimension of human reality. In the reading of the biblical text the 
God-reference of the text ultimately signifies human experience (411:128). 
And since it touches the 'heart of the heart' of human existence, the text 
signifies our human wholeness (360:72). 
This human wholeness is also called faith. For Ricoeur, faith is 
linked to the self-understanding that emerges out of the text. As Ricoeur 
says, "Faith is the attitude of one who accepts being interpreted at the same 
time that he interprets the world of the text" (397:84). Faith is the 
existence modelled on the re-orientation of the text. Faith is the existence 
of the larger, more complete self, opened up and founded on the text. Faith 
is the reality of the possible self (397:82: 220:224). Faith is 'ultimate 
concern', the 'feeling of absolute dependence (397:84; see also 435:12), the 
mytho-poetic core of existence (408:174). 
This faith is beyond the power of conscious subjectivity. For 
Ricoeur, this revelation of the possible in the text of the Scriptures delivers 
the severest critique of self-constituting subjectivity. God cannot become 
an object of my subjectivity, or, obversely, I an object to God's subjectivity, 
(438:30). Where the power to manifest the realm of the possible touches the 
human individual is not there where the subject is in control. Where one is 
grasped by the poetic, religious word, is in the imagination. The imagination 
is the power of the possible. As Ricoeur says, "Imagination is the dimension 
of subjectivity which corresponds to the text as a poem" (406:33). The 
imagination is the place where the figurative power of the word captures 
the realm of hope and existence (367:72). The power of the imagination is 
precisely the power to bring near the inexpressible (271:134). 
For Ricoeur, then, a deep link exists between faith and the 
imagination as the power of the possible. Faith, too, is not an instrumental 
power, but an openness to listen and to be transformed by the New Being 
that is announced to us by the word, in whose power we exist (367:72). 
Faith, imagination, the word: three aspects which are inseparable for 
Ricoeur. Instead of being master, the human individual is borne and created 
by a generative word which 'says' me rather than is controlled by (220:224). 
The foundation of the I is to be discovered more by silence, therefore, than 
by speech, since by the imagination we are placed at the boundary-line of 
silence and the word (271:133). It is poetic language that breaks into that 
realm of silence and becomes the word for our listening.* Here is language 
at its most non-violent level. I do not dispose of it; it has me at its 
4. See also L. Dornisch, "Symbolic Systems and the Interpretation 
of Scripture: An Introduction to the Work of Paul Ricoeur," in Semeia, 13, 
1975, p.3-4. 
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disposition. It invites me to listen, to hear. It opens up an experience of 
reality as a gift. In a deep sense, it reveals (438:25). Revelation is the gift 
of the text. It is not a knowledge, nor a praxis; perhaps, it can best be 
expressed in such terms as imagination, feeling and mood (406:32; 436:495).5 
As a consequence, faith becomes a mode of dwelling according to that gift. 
Or, as Ricoeur puts it, faith is "the experience of being created by the word" 
(367:72). Elsewhere, Ricoeur calls this existence a 'love of creation' 
(320(325):467). It is the gift that searches in me by means of my 
imagination for the self that is most open to dwell in this world according to 
my ownmost possibilities. 
B. CONCEPTUAL RECOVERY OF THE SELF OF FAITH. 
If the explorative power of existence lies mainly in the 
imagination and not in knowledge or praxis, is there any space left for a 
speculative recuperation of the self of faith? This is a highly sensitive 
problematic for theology, the scientia fidei. Ricoeur discusses this issue of 
the relationship of faith and knowledge along lines similar to the discussion 
of the relationship of the truth of the imagination and speculative 
knowledge.6 We said above, that, for Ricoeur, the work of the imagination 
and the dynamism underlying it seeks not only to express itself on the level 
of the glimpse provided by the semantic clash, but also seeks to be explored 
by speculation and theoretical conceptualization. What the imagination 
constructs as similar, speculation wishes to gather in the sameness of the 
concept. Ricoeur suggests that there is a type of interanimation between 
these two discourses of the imagination and of speculation, whereby, what 
the imagination has brought within our reach, the speculative power seeks to 
gather into the concept. That same dynamic is a work in the religious 
realm. What our imagination explores and brings near in the religious text, 
speculation seeks to bring to knowledge. In Chapter Three we indicated, 
that, for Ricoeur, there is an intermediary discourse between imagination 
and speculation, namely the hermeneutical discourse. 
A number of points might be recalled here: 
1. Any speculative knowledge of the self as gift remains a 
second-order discourse. It reflects the work of interpretation that shaped 
it. It only seeks to transfer to another order of discourse what primordially 
belonged to the work of the imagination. As Ricoeur proposes with regard 
to the 'concept' of Original Sin, what we might ultimately arrive at is most 
adequately called a rational symbol/ It should not be permitted to become 
5. Ricoeur calls this feeling or mood the philosophical 
approximation of revelation. See 436:495. 
6. See above, p.85-93. 
7. See his "Le 'péché originel' étude de signification" in Le conflit 
des interprétations, op. cit., p. 265-282. 
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hypostatized into something objective, cut off from the process that gave 
shape to it. In other words, the attempts at conceptuality and speculation 
must not be divorced from their original enrootment in the symbolic order 
of which they are no more than a speculative interpretation (320(16^):282). 
2. In line with Ricoeur's post-Hegelian Kantianism one should 
shun any attempt at the great symbiosis of religion and philosophy. Hegel's 
absolute knowledge has crumbled under the onslaught of the philosophers of 
suspicion. Hegel's system will remain, however, the constant seduction that 
must ever be resisted. The work of the concept can only be a work of 
interpretation. The move toward knowledge by way of indirect discourse 
which seeks interpretation may not let go of the tension between the poetic 
representation of God and knowledge (411:129-1W). 
3. That such a knowledge is not objective is equally obvious 
from the logic of this indirect discourse of the unconditioned as we find it in 
the Bible. Ricoeur calls the logic of the gospel the logic of 
superabundance.* It is a logic of extravagance, of the 'how much more' of 
the parables and of Paul's hymn of the grace of Christ Jesus (Rom 5:12-20). 
The gospel presents a logic of existence that breaks through our ordinary 
logic by promising an excess of sense over nonsense. In breaking apart a 
logic of identity and equivalence, it is not sameness that rules reality, but 
disruption and dislocation. Any conceptual approach seeking objective 
knowledge would disintegrate before this logic. 
b. The self-understanding that flows out of the understanding of 
the religious text is, therefore, not a knowledge. It assumes the form of a 
theologia negativa. The human individual is 'not this' and 'not that'. But 
beyond this negation, Ricoeur recognizes a language about ourselves that is 
metaphorical: it says that we are like this and we are like that, much like 
the way of eminence proposed by Medieval theology (438:35). The indirect 
discourse of the biblical text gives us no more than a hermeneutical self-
understanding. The act of faith that constitutes us is the ultimate limit of 
such an hermeneutics (406:32; 436:490). This faith precedes every scripture, 
but would remain mute without the word of the Bible. The textuality of 
faith must not be interpreted as a new power of control. Since it is 
ultimately a manifestation of the highest despoliation of the self in favour 
of a new self. For Ricoeur, such a self-understanding is poetic or 
metaphorical, inasmuch as the self of the biblical text intersects and 
interacts with the self that comes from the text of our own contemporary 
situation and experience (cf. 411:130-131). This correlation of two texts, 
whether fought out in conflict, as is increasingly the case today, or 
experienced as a mutual deepening, is an indispensible process for the 
religious self-understanding. As Ricoeur says, 
8. Cf. 227:528;320(191):312;320(273); 366-368;338:57;367:70; and 
404:66. "The Logic of Jesus the Logic of God." in Anglican Theological 
Review 62, 1980, p.87-42; "La Logique de Jésus" in Et. theol et rel. 55, 1980, 
p.420-425. 
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The ceaseless movement of interpretation begins and ends in the 
risk of a response which is neither engendered nor exhausted by 
commentary. It is in taking account of this prelinguistic or 
hyperlinguistic characteristic that faith could be called 'ultimate 
concern', which speaks of the laying hold of the necessary and unique 
form from which basis I orient myself in all my choices (ЬОбіЮ. 
С. THE ETHICAL RECOVERY OF SELF IN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE. 
If a speculative recovery of the self in a conceptual onto-
theology must be denied, may we shift the weight of religious discourse 
from the realm of knowledge to the ethical realm? Here again, Ricoeur's 
response is qualified. An ethical religious response at any rate would have 
to transcend Kantian moralism and absorb the more Spinozistic ethics based 
on the desire and effort to be. As we have seen above,' such as ethics, 
linked as it is with the originary affirmation, is also a hermeneutical 
exercise. Ricoeur's ethics, including his gospel ethics, manifests itself in 
symbols, parables, and myths. The gospel project for existence is not 
directly given but implicit. Here too, we are given only the 'figures' of our 
authentic existence which need to be deciphered by a hermeneutics 
The fragility of the ethical 'figure' and hence of the ethical 
wager is best exemplified in the notion of testimony. For Ricoeur, this 
notion, borrowed from Л. Nabert's philosophy, Ю captures the ethical 
itinerary, whereby the individual comes to grips with the absolute. 
Philosophically, the notion of testimony provides a prolegoumenon to what 
theology calls revelation. The notion is necessary, because, on the one hand, 
the absolute or the transcendent cannot be encompassed or exhausted by 
either knowledge or praxis, and, on the other hand, the absolute is 
ultimately meaningful to human existence and, therefore, seeks a 
contingent, historical expression. In other words, testimony is the 
contingent, historical expression of the absolute. 
For Nabert, testimony is indissolubly linked with the deepest 
constitution of myself in originary affirmation. In originary affirmation I 
9. See above, p.162-164. 
10. Nabert elaborated this theme in a work of research that he had 
not yet completed at the time of his death. The incomplete manuscript was 
published, with a preface of Paul Ricoeur under the title, Le désir de Dieu 
(Philosophie de l'esprit), Paris, Aubier, 1966. Outside of this preface, 
Ricoeur has meditated on testimony on two other occasions. The first 
article, "L'herméneutique du témoignage" in Archivio di filosofia, kl, 1972, 
p.35-61, deals exclusively with the notion. In the second article, 
"Herméneutique de l'idée de révélation" in La Révélation, Bruxelles, 
Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 1977, p.15-54, he speaks of testimony at 
the conclusion of his reflection on revelation. 
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am most myself and at the same time least a possession. Although it 
coincides with my real consciousness, it cannot be called an experience: it 
is preconscious. It is the origin from which I am separated. But this 
originary affirmation is at the same time an affirmation of the absolute. 
And it is to this generosity of the absolute of the originary affirmation that 
testimony bears witness. More than an example, or a symbol, testimony is 
an aspect of self-understanding in which the dynamism of the original 
affirmation enters upon its external journey towards the realization of 
freedom. This becoming of the self of the originary affirmation can only 
assume an historical and finite route (438:31). 
On the philosophical level, for Ricoeur and Nabert, testimony is 
the point of reflection. It is the point where reflection becomes concrete, 
where the understanding of the absolute in the interpretation of its signs 
becomes self-understanding. The meditation on God becomes concrete to 
the extent that it signifies the self-implication of the subject (438:30-31). It 
is concrete to the extent that the interiority of the act of the originary 
affirmation obtains the exteriority of testimony by means of an intellectual 
and moral asceticism (380:36). Only in its concreteness can the absolute be 
raised to the level of a self-consciousness. Testimony is principally the 
external action, whereby humans attest to their interiority, their 
convictions and their faith (380:43). 
Let us examine this in more detail. The originary affirmation of 
reflective philosophy, to which an ethics of the desire and effort to be seeks 
to return, is available not directly, but only indirectly. For that reason, 
reflective philosophy is a hermeneutical philosophy. Nabert proposes that 
the originary affirmation lets go of itself into some type of distanciation. 
The affirmation expresses itself in testimony, so that a plumbing of the 
depths of the originary affirmation is achieved only by a hermeneutics of 
testimony. 
This hermeneutics of testimony implies two basic acts: 1. an 
act of the self-consciousness upon itself, and 2. an act of historical 
understanding exercised upon the signs of the absolute (380:53). These acts 
are not separable, the one implies the other: "The signs which the absolute 
displays of itself are at the same time the signs in which consciousness 
recognizes itself" (380:53).** This means that acts of self-consciousness can 
be probed only indirectly, or hermeneutically (438:32-33;245:8-9). And the 
signs in which self-consciousness recognizes itself are the contingent signs 
of historical testimony. The absolute externalizes itself only in 
contingency. The contingent signs are the witness of the primacy of the 
absolute, the primacy of the founding events (438:35). 
But the attestation of the absolute in the contingent and the 
historical introduces simultaneously the notion of contestation. A witness 
testifies in a contested area. And contestation seeks out a judgment. In 
11. "Un acte de la conscience de soi sur elle-même et un acte de la 
compréhension historique sur les signes que l'absolu donne de lui-même." 
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this context, Nabert speaks of a criteriology of the divine (2^5:13;380:55). 
By this criteriology he means two things. There is a criteriology of the 
divine, because the divine is a contested area of existence. For that reason 
testimony calls upon our judgment to judge the validity of the narrative of 
the witness. Thus in the struggle between Yahweh and Baal for the prophets 
of the Old Testament, the prophets called for a discernment between God 
and an idol and a decision and a commitment by the people. There is a true 
witness and a false witness. Because the absolute does not enforce itself 
upon existence incontestably, the prophets called for a decision between 
Yahweh and the idols. But there is also a criteriology of the divine in 
another sense. The taking hold of the originary affirmation means also to 
sort out the predicates whereby the divine might be signified. This is what 
the medievals undertook in their naming of God by way of negation and 
eminence. But Nabert adds to this that we can only take, for example, 
justice and goodness to their eminence to the extent that the words, deeds 
and lives in our history testify to that eminence by their excellence. In 
sifting out the true witness to the absolute, we also sift out the predicates 
of the divine and lay open the route towards true self-understanding. In 
both instances of the criteriology of the divine, interpretation alone can 
provide the mediation. The predicates of the divine are not immediately 
available. They are only delivered in an intense commitment to signs, act 
and events. Our finitude allows no other avenue (380:57). 
Perhaps the greatest scandal of testimony is that it is 
dialectically attached to the historical. In testimony the historical is 
invested with an absolute character (i38:33). Such an admission requires the 
renunciation of any attempt to perceive ourselves as source and ground. 
Our consciousness cannot arrive at the admission that the divine is 
dependent on the historical testimony. But without this historical initiative 
the absolute would remain forever Wholly Other. Through the interpretation 
of the historical, contingent signs, acts, and events, we gain indirect access 
to the absolute and to self-understanding. 
As a further delimitation of this ethics of the absolute Ricoeur 
frequently adduces, from his earliest writings onward, the distinction 
introduced into ethics by Max Weber between an ethics of conviction and an 
ethics of responsibility. The ethics of conviction is the ethics of what is 
absolutely desirable. The ethics of responsibility is the ethics of the 
relatively possible in the political realm. Ricoeur recognizes the need in 
ethics for a healthy tension between the ideal and the realistically possible. 
In an early article, he identified it as the tension between the yogi and the 
commissar (see 24). The ethical quest cannot bypass the violence that 
comes with the political institution, and yet the political institution with its 
ethics of responsibility should not squelch the ethics of conviction. By 
retaining the tension, Ricoeur advocates a 'wounded' ethics. An ethics of 
the poetic of the will must co-exist with an ethics of power.12 
12. Cf. the following texts, 124;23*;270:251;291:2'»3-2<><»І367:74; 
405:192. 
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As a final note on the notion of testimony, it must be 
remembered that in an evangelical ethics there is no immediate correlation 
between testimony in the historically contingent and our conscious 
experience. As we saw above, the paradoxical and the hyperbolic force 
themselves into our consciousness. The gospel witness is a paradoxical 
testimony. We wish to conclude this work with a reflection of that paradox. 
D. THE SUBJECT AS GIFT. 
Ricoeur has located the ultimate recovery of the self at the 
limit of reason and at the limit of ethical endeavour. Religious existence is 
boundary-existence. It is living at the limit of normal, ordinary existence, 
where the paradoxical invades the normalcy and intensifies existence. 
Faith-existence keeps, what Ricoeur has called, the schematism of hope 
intact (kl 1:145). It continues to ask what is the 'perspective of the 
prospective' (235:140)? Faith's concern with what is and what was is only to 
help fuel an existence that probes what is possible. The religious self is 
fundamentally a prospective self. Here the non-coincidence of the self with 
the self is raised to its most fundamental level. If religious language infuses 
this non-coincidence, it is to present it with the promise of reconciliation. 
The self that one must lose in order to gain it is a self under the sign of hope 
(320(326):437). 
The non-coincidence with oneself is heightened by the existence 
of evil. Kant's radical evil was his gate of access to the realm of hope in 
religion. God is, for him, the condition of the realization of human freedom. 
Ricoeur's approach is less transcendental. But for him too, human freedom 
is a threatened freedom.13 it ¡s a freedom that must be set free from its 
incapacity in the face of evil (405:189-190). The community of free human 
beings that is projected in the symbol Kingdom of God is a symbol of hope 
only to the extent that it breaks into the experience that Ricoeur has 
described as the amor fati, an experience filled with the sound and fury of 
great undertakings that seek to totalize human existence on the level of 
theory and praxis. 
It is impossible, but also unnecessary, to retrace Ricoeur's 
trajectory of the historical and human stages in the symbolization of the 
evil that threatens human existence. The symbols of defilement, the sin and 
guilt of Israel's history and the myths of the theogonie creation drama, of 
the fall, of the exiled soul, and of tragic existence of Ricoeur's La 
symbolique du mal make for a fascinating and sensitive reading of the 
problematic of evil. Only the conclusion need detain us. 
What interests us is how Ricoeur arrives at a characterization of 
evil that is closely related to the total project of a poetics of the will. 
According to this reading of the exemplary history of the confession of sin, 
13. See G. Mainberger, "Die Freiheit und das Böse" in Freib. Z. 
Philos.Theol. 19, 1972, ρ A10-430. 
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sin, that is, evil in the Judeo-Christian sense, is the dialectical opposite of 
faith (227:528). Sin is incomprehensible without faith (320(232):342). The 
history of evil cannot be read and understood except in the light of its 
opposite: the history of faith. Only in the exemplary history of Israel and 
the story of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus can we begin to 
understand the radicalness of sin. But the concern of the history of faith is 
not to explain sin, but to indicate the end of evil (320(326):439). As Ricoeur 
says, "We do not believe in sin, but in salvation" (83(45):93). It is in the 
proclamation of the death and resurrection of Jesus or in the proclamation, 
"The Kingdom of God has come near to you", that we can begin to 
understand where we ought to situate evil in the Christian sense (227:526). 
The privileged symbol of the history of faith, however, remains 
St. Paul's doctrine to justification (cf. 320(273):Э59-360;372-375). Here 
Ricoeur has remained heir to the hermeneutical key of the Protestant 
Reformation, which has read the New Testament tradition through Paul's 
justification by faith alone. It is the experience articulated by justification 
by faith alone that mediates most completely the situation of the self 
before God (153:1*7). 
The symbol of justification by faith is for Ricoeur the limit-
expression, whereby the religious person realizes the despoliation of the 
conscious self as the core entity (320(29*):398).1'> For the justice that we 
seek is not an ethical quality. It is not a virtue at our disposal. Justice is an 
eschatological gift, that overtakes humanity through God's initiative. 
Justice for St. Paul is to be justified by another. To be just is to be declared 
just. The future of God's justice declares us to be just even now, making the 
present participate in the justice that is to be imputed to humanity. The 
justice is eschatological, yet a present reality. It is God's justice, yet it 
becomes humanity's. It is other, yet mine. As mine, it creates the new 
creature of liberty (153:1*7-148). It is read to me in the history of the 
death and resurrection of Jesus. 
It is through the symbol of justification by faith that one can 
begin to understand the past of existence, which Paul called sin. The 
supreme sin is no other than the attempt to make oneself the ground and 
source of justice. St. Paul read his own past history as sin in the light of the 
history of Jesus because of the role that the Judaic law played in his efforts 
to be pleasing before God. The pretense of the law to institute the reign of 
1*. In his article, "Biblical Hermeneutics", art, cit., p.l37-138, the 
extent of his identification with Paul is accentuated when Ricoeur assumes 
the hypothetical thesis of E. Jlingel, who shows a similarity between the 
symbol of the Rule of God and the concept of God's justice. Ricoeur says, 
that whereas Jiingel indicates only the similarity of the two discourses, he 
himself would see the concept of the justice of God as a translation of the 
symbol of the Kingdom of God. In the justice of God Ricoeur sees then a 
concentration of the message of the New Testament. This relationship of 
the symbol of the Kingdom and its translation into the concept of the justice 
of God has interesting repercussions for a hermeneutics based on the Bible. 
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justice is shown to be an illusion and a hypocrisy in the light of the mercy of 
God manifested in Christ 3esus. Faith is diametrically opposed to a justice 
that is the work of my accomplishment: "For we hold that a man is justified 
by faith apart from observance of the law" (Rom 3:28). 
This view of justice as a being justified, or of freedom as a being 
set free dominates Paul Ricoeur's recovery of the self. It might even be 
correct to call Ricoeur a philosopher of justification. He is Pauline in 
perspective not only in his reading of the history of sin in the scriptures, but 
also in his reading of contemporary culture. Evil is not first of all 
transgression or disobedience." Religious evil is not immorality 
(320(2Э2):3«>7). Sin is not the opposite of virtue (202:297). It is the opposite 
of faith. In the contemporary context, Ricoeur translates sin into the 
illusion of every attempt to totalize either knowledge or existence 
(320(297):Ή<0. The evil of evil has its origin for Ricoeur in the search for 
totality and absoluteness. Today's evil is a pathology of hope because it 
touches the problematic of our completion. The Pauline notion of 'law' as 
sin is interpreted as the hubris of the subject who thinks that he or she is a 
self-constituting subject (186:32). It pertains to a pathology of hope for 
humans to perceive and act as source and ground of existence. Paul's sin, as 
the moment of human death, takes on a deep cultural quality in Paul 
Ricoeur's writings. Thus he says, 
Truly human evil concerns premature syntheses, violent 
syntheses, short circuits in the totality. It culminates in the sublime, 
with the 'presumption' of the theodicies and their numerous successors 
in modern politics (320(232):3«; 227:526). 
Ricoeur has brought the issue of evil in the religious sense right 
into the midst of the contemporary debates and struggles of ideology and 
historical existence. His most anguished warnings are directed against the 
great institutions of church and state, where the danger of totalitarianism is 
most deeply entrenched.16 And in his own philosophy he is most wary of 
establishing new absolutes and new totalitarian systems. His philosophy has 
remained a history of philosophy, ever open to be challenged by new schools 
of thought, and ever willing to be transformed by them. Ricoeur viewed the 
last of the great philosophical systems, that of Hegel, as at once symbolic of 
15. See his "Culpabilité tragique et culpabilité biblique", Revue 
d'histoire et de philosophie religieuse 33, 1953, p.285-307. "Morale sans 
peche ou peche sans morale?", Esprit 22, 1954, p.266-282. "Kierkegaard et 
le mal," in Revue de théologie et de philosophie 13, 1963, p.292-302. 
16. This concern for the totalitarianism of both the church and state 
is expressed in a number of articles. See, for example, the articles 
collected in Histoire et vérité (Esprit), Paris, Seuil, 1955, Political and 
Social Essays, Coll. and ed. by David Steward and Joseph Bien, Athens, Ohio 
University Press, 1975, and Politiek en geloof, Utrecht, Ambo, 1968. 
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the great human thrust toward wholeness and totality, and, at the same 
time, as the great temptation, as the possible harbinger of the totalitarian 
systems of this century (227:526). For Ricoeur, human historical existence 
must be able to say Yes in a history that remains open. Or as he says in 
L'homme faillible, "Man is the Лоу of Yes in the sadness of the finite" 
(152:215). 
The joy of Yes must be sought not in the vain attempt of 
knowledge and will to gain totality but in the home of hope, in the passion 
for what is possible according to the signs of the end, which we decipher in 
interpretation (362:33). The reality into which these signs throw us is the 
reality of the possible. In scriptural language, according to Ricoeur, this 
reality of the possible translates "The Kingdom of God is Coming" (397:82). 
This home of hope invites us to live our ownmost possibilities, living the 
symbol of the Kingdom that does not come from us (397:82). The symbol of 
justification may be perceived, therefore, as both the apex of the 
despoliation of the self and as the reality of the self. The self is, in 
religious terms, the gift. In Ricoeur's words, "Our God is a God-Act, a God-
Gift, who makes man a creator in his turn in the measure in which he 
receives and is willing to receive the gift of being free" (115:131). Faith is 
the invasion of the future of God into my present, the gift of self as an 
eschatological gift (78:397). 
For Ricoeur -the philosopher, Jesus, the Christ, belongs to the 
schema of hope. It is his witness, the narrative confession of his name, that 
has opened up the realm of the imagination of a new justice and new 
freedom (320(232):341). His death and the proclamation of his resurrection 
from the dead are the proclamation of hope and freedom that is, in spite of 
death, beyond any effort to explain it this side of death (320(297):397). In 
him is revealed the new meaning of existence in which freedom is my 
present gift. But that freedom can be lived authentically only out of that 
future. But it is not freedom as ordinarily understood, for it is a "capacity 
to live according to the paradoxical law of superabundance, of denying death 
and of asserting the excess of sense over non-sense in all desparate 
situations" (338:59). 
But if there is to be a final appropriation for Ricoeur, it must be 
an appropriation of the subject in love (320(21*): 192). He has hardly 
developed the theme, although he acknowledges this lack as a weakness on 
his part (320(232): 352). A theology of love is not an extension of an ethical 
love, for a philosophy of love is a questionable exercise (75:397). A theology 
of love is a suspension of ethics and the emergence of a love that has 
renounced desire, according to Augustine's dictum, ama et fac quod vis. For 
it is in the death of desire that love comes to itself and the self comes to its 
full measure (320(232):352). To return a final time to Ricoeur, 
Charity towards the other and towards oneself is like the 
imagination which, through the overgrown landscape, perceives the 
original contours; such a loving imagination is at the same time a view 
of the very heart of reality (80:350). 
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22, p.7. 
1967 
263. Husserl. An Analysis of His Phenomenology (Studies in 
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy). Translation and 
introduction by E.G. Ballard and L.E. Embree, Evanston, Illinois, 
Northwestern University Press, 1967, XXII-238p. 
The book contains the following articles: 
"Introduction; Husserl 1859-1938 (Appendix)" (73) p.3-12. 
"Introduction to Husserl's Ideas I," (30) p. 13-3*. 
"Husserl's Ideas II: Analysis and Problems," (39) p.35-81. 
"A Study of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations I-IV," (76) p.82-11*. 
"Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Mediation," p. 115-142. 
"Husserl and the Sense of History" (22) p. 1*3-17*. 
"Kant and Husserl" (78) p. 175-201. 
"Existential Phenomenology" (108) p.202-212. 
"Methods and Tasks of a Phenomenology of the Will" (53) p.213-233. 
26*. "Philosophy of Will and Action" (a conference followed by a 
discussion with F. Kersten etc.) in Phenomonology of Will and Action 
(The Second Lexington Conference on Pure and Applied 
Phenomenology, 196*) edited by E.W. Straus and R.M. Griffith, 
Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1967, p.7-33, 3*-60. 
also in: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (*52) p.61-7*. 
265. "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language" in Phenomenology and 
Existentialism, edited by E.N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum, Badtimore, The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1967, p.207-217. 
266. "R. Bultmann" in Foi-éducation (Foi et langage) 37, 1967, no. 78, 
Зап.-March, p.17-35. 
292 
also as: "Foi et langage" (Bultmann-Ebeing) in Foi-éducation 37, 1967, 
Oct.-Dec, p. 17-35. 
267. "Ebeling" in Foi-éducation (Foi et langage) 37, 1967, no. 78, Лап.-
March, р.36-53, 53-57. 
268. "Démythologisation et herméneutique" (text transcribed from a 
tape) Nancy, Centre européen universitaire, 1967, 32p. (polycopy) 
269. "Préface" in St. Strasser, Phénoménologie et science de l'homme. 
Vers un nouvel esprit scientifique (Bibliothèque philosophique de 
Louvain). Translated from the German by A.L. Kelkel, Louvain-Paris, 
Publications universitaires de Louvain et Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1967, 
p.7-10. 
270. "Postscript" in 3.M. Paupert, Taizé et l'église de demain (Le 
signe) Paris, A. Fayard, 1967, p.2^7-251. 
271. "Langage religieux: Mythe et symbole" (a conference by 
P. Ricoeur followed by a discussion with M. Corbin e.a.) in Le langage. 
II. Langages. Actes de XIIIe Congrès des Sociétés de philosophie de 
langue française, Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1967, p.129-137, 138-145. 
272. Ricoeur P., Benveniste E., Hyppolite 1., Eliade M., 
"Discussions" (on the reports: Benveniste, 'La forme et le sens dans le 
langage'; Hyppolite, 'Langage et être. Langage et pensée') "Discussion 
générale" in Le langage. H. Langages, Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 
1967, pAl-it7, 56-65, 183-199. 
273. "Interprétation du mythe de la peine" (a conference by 
P. Ricoeur followed by a discussion with C. Bruaire) in Archivio di 
filosofia 37, 1967, p.2-3, 23-42, 53-62. 
also in: Le mythe de la peine (Philosophie de l'esprit) Actes du 
colloque international, Rome, 1967, Paris, Aubier, p.23-42, 53-62. 
also in: Le conflit des interprétations (320) p.348-369. 
and as: "Interpretation of the Myth of Punishment" in The Conflict of 
Interpretations (320) p.354-377. 
and as: "Interpretatie van de mythe van de straf" in Kwaad en 
bevrijding (354) p. 146-169. 
274. Ricoeur P., Lyonnet S., Scholem G., Nédoncelle M., 
"Discussione" (on the conferences: Lyonnet, 'La problématique du 
péché originel dans le Nouveau Testament'; Scholem, 'Quelques 
remarques sur le mythe de la peine dans le Judaïsme'; Nédoncelle, 
'Démythisation et conception eschatologique du mal') in Archivio di 
filosofia 37, 1967, p.2-3, 109-120, 147-164, 213-222. 
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also in: Le mythe de la peine (Philosophie de l'esprit) Paris, Aubier, 
1967, p. 109-120, 147-16*, 213-222. 
275. "La structure, le mot, l'événement" in Esprit (Structuralisme. 
Idéologie et méthode) 35, 1967, May, p.801-821. 
and in: Le Conflit des interprétations (320) p.79-96. 
and as: "Structure-Word-Event" in Philosophy Today 12, 1968, no. 2-*, 
p . m - 1 2 9 . 
and in: The Conflict of Interpretations (320) p.79-96. 
and in: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (»52) p.109-119. 
and as: "Structuur, woord, gebeurtenis" in Wegen van de filosofie (333) 
p.l16-136. 
276. "Violence et langage" in Recherches et débats (La violence) 16, 
1967, no. 59, ρ.86-94. 
also as: "Violence and Language" in Political and Social Essays (»14) 
p.88-101. 
277. "Urbanisation et sécularisation" in Christianisme social 75, 1967, 
ρ.327-341. 
also as: "Urbanization and Secularization" in Political and Social 
Essays (41»)ρ.176-197. 
and as: "Urbanisatie en sekularisatie" in Politiek en geloof (284) 
p.116-131. 
278. "New Developments in Phenomenology in France: The 
Phenomenology of Language" in Social Research 34, 1967, p. 1-30. 
partially as: "La question du sujet: le défi de la sémiologie" in Le 
conflit des interprétations (320) p.233-262. 
and in: "The question of the Subject; The Challenge of Semiology" in 
The Conflict of Interpretations (320) p.236-266. 
279. Crespin R., "En écoutant Paul Ricoeur: l'homme à l'âge de la 
ville" in Cité nouvelle 1967, no. 446, p . l , 4-5. 
280. "Autonomie et obéissance" in Cahiers d'Orgement (Autonomie de 
la personne et obéissance à un autre) 1967, no. 59, p.3-22, 23-31. 
281. "Mythe et proclamation chez R. Bultmann" in Les cahiers du 
Centre Protestant de l'Ouest 1967, no. 8, p.21-33. 
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282. "L'affaire Casamayor D." (with 3.M. Domenach) in Esprit 35, 
1967, p.1-3. 
1968 
283. Ricoeur P., and Marcel G., Entretiens Paul Ricoeur-Gabriel 
Marcel (Présence et pensée) Paris, Aubier, 1968, 131p. 
also as: "Gespräche." Translated by Α. Ahlbrecht, Frankfurt-am-
Main, Knecht. 1970,110p. 
284. Politiek en geloof. Essays van Paul Ricoeur, ingeleid door 
Α. Peperzak, Utrecht, Ambo, 1968, 199p. (2nd edition, 1969). 
contains the following articles: 
Medemens en naaste (74) p.18-31. 
De paradox van de macht (112) p.32-58. 
Vereisten voor een politieke vorming (233) p.56-76. 
Hoe staat de kristen in de staat? (124) p.77-88. 
Het socialisme in onze tijd (176) p.89-98. 
Ekonomie en ethiek (238) p.99-115. 
Urbanisatie en sekularisatie (277) p.l 16-131. 
Universele beschaving en nationale kuituren (175) p.132-147. 
Van natie naar mensheid: een taak voor de kristenen (236) p.148-165. 
Techniek op interplanetaire schaal (122) p.l66-179. 
Beeld van God en gang van de mensheid (162) p.l80-199. 
285. "Liberté: responsabilité et décision" in Actes du XIVe Congrès 
International de Philosophie, Vienne, Herder, 1968, p. 155-165. 
286. "L'art et la systématique freudienne" (a conference followed by a 
discussion with A. Green e.a.) in Entretiens sur l'art et la psychanalyse 
(Décades du centre culturel international de Céristy-la-Salle) under 
the direction of A. Berge, A. Clancier, P. Ricoeur, L.H. Rubenstein, 
Paris, The Hague, Mouton, 1968, p.24-36, 37-50. 
also in: Le conflit des interprétations (320) p.195-207. 
also as: "Art and Freudian Systematics" in The Conflict of 
Interpretations (320) p.196-208. 
287. Ricoeur P., Abraham Ν., Elkin H., Kanter V.B., Green Α., 
Rubinstein L.H., Aigrisse G., Flocon Α., "Extraits de la discussion" (on 
the reports: Abraham, T-e temps, le rythme et l'inconscient'; Elkin, 
'Les bases psychiques de la créativité; Kanter, 'La psychanalyse et le 
compositeur'; Green, 'Oreste et Oedipe. Essaie sur la structure 
comparée des mythes tragiques d'Oreste et d'Oedipe et sur la fonction 
de la tragédie'; Rubinstein, 'Les Oresties dans la littérature avant et 
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après Freud'; Aigrisse, 'Hommage à Charles Baudoin Résumé de l'essai 
sur Racine'; Aigrisse, 'La jeune parque de Paul Valéry à la lumière de 
la psychanalyse'; Flocon, 'Clio chez la peintre') in Entretiens sur l'art 
et la psychanalyse (Décades du Centre Culturel international de 
Cerisy-la-Salle, Paris-la Haye, Mouton, 1968, p.68-75, 151-155, 170-
172, 216-223, 239-2*1, 2M-2k(>, 290-294, 309-356. 
288. "Post-scriptum: une dernière écoute de Freud" in Entretiens sur 
l'art et la psychanalyse, Paris-la Haye, Mouton, 1968, р.Эб 1-368. 
289. "Philosophie et communication" (a round-table discussion) in 
Entretiens sur l'art et la psychanalyse, Paris-la-Haye, Mouton, 1968, 
p.393-«l . 
290. "Aliénation" in Encyclopaedia universalis. I., Paris, 
Encyclopaedia Universalis France, 1968, ρ.660-66Ψ. 
291. "Tâches de la communauté ecclésiale dans le monde moderne" in 
La théologie du renouveau. II. (Actes du congrès international de 
Toronto) published under the direction oí L.K. Shook and 
G.M. Bertrand, Montréal-Paris, Fides-Cerf, 1968, p.49-58. 
also as: "Tasks of the Ecclesial Community in the Modern World" in 
TheoloRy of Renewal. II. Renewal of Religious Structures, edited by 
L.K. Shook, New York, Herder and Herder, 1968, p.242-250. 
292. "The Critique of Subjectivity and Cogito in the Philosophy of 
Heidegger" in Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, edited by 
M.S. Frings, Chicago. Quadrangle Books, 1968, p.62-75. 
also as: "Heidegger et la question du sujet" in Le conflit des 
interprétations (320) p.222-232. 
and as: "Heidegger and the Question of the Subject" in The Conflict 
of Interpretations (320) p.223-235. 
and as: "Heidegger und die Frage nach dem Subjekt" in Hermeneutik 
und Strukturalismus (320). 
293. "Die Zukunft der Philosophie und die Frage nach dem Subjekt" in 
Die Zukunft der Philosophie, Olten-Fribourg-en-Brisgau, Walter-
Verlag, 1968, p. 128-165. 
also as: "La question du sujet: le défi de la sémiologie" in Le conflit 
des interprétations (320) p.233-262. 
and as: "The Question of the Subject: The Challenge of Semiology" in 
The Conflict on Interpretations (230) p.236-266. 
294. "Préface" in R. Bultmann, Jésus. Mythologie et 
démythologisation, Paris, Seuil, 1968, p.9-27. 
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also as: "Préface à Bultmann" in Le conflit des interprétations (320) 
p.373-392. 
and as: "Preface to Bultmann" in The Conflict of Interpretations (320) 
ρ.381-Μ1. 
and as: "Inleiding tot Bultmann" in Kwaad en bevrijding (354) pAl-60. 
295. "Préface" in 3. Drèze and 3. Debelle, Conceptions de l'université, 
Paris, Éditions universitaires, 1968, p.8-22. 
partially reprinted in: 'Trois ripostes à la crise universitaire" in Le 
monde 26, 1969, no. 7469, Jan. 17, p.9. 
296. "Préface" in J. Schwoebel. La presse, le pouvoir et l'argent, 
Paris, Seuil, 1968, p.7-12. 
297. "Approche philosophique du concept de liberté religieuse" (a 
conference of P. Ricoeur followed by a discussion with C.L. Bruaire 
e.a.) in Archivio di filosofia 38, 1969, p.2-3, 215-234, 235-252. 
also in: L'herméneutique de la liberté religieuse (Actes de colloque 
international, Rome 1968) Paris, Aubier, 1968, p.215-234, 235-252. 
and as: "La liberté selon l'espérance" in Le conflit des interprétations 
(320) p.393-415. 
and as: "Freedom in the Light of Hope" in The Conflict of 
Interpretations (320) p.402-424. 
and as: "Die Freiheit im Licht der Hoffnung" in Hermeneutik und 
Strukturalismus (320). 
and as: "Vrijheid in hoop. Filosofische benadering van het begrip 
godsdienstvrijheid" in Kwaad en bevrijding (354) p.170-194. 
298. Ricoeur P., Pattaro G., Vergete Α., Brun 3., "Discussione" (on 
the conferences: Pattaro, 'Le kérygme et la liberté de l'écoute'; 
Vergete, 'La liberté religieuse comme pouvoir de symbolisation'; Brun, 
'Christianisme et consommation') in Archivio di filosofia 38, 1968, p.2-
3, 348-352, 378-379, 476. 
also in: L'herméneutique de la liberté religieuse, Paris, Aubier, 1968, 
p.348-352, 378-379, 476. 
299. "Contribution d'une réflexion sur le langage à une théologie de la 
parole" in Revue de théologie et de philosophie 18, 1968, p.5-6, 333-
348. 
also in: Exégèse et herméneutique (Parole de Dieu) Paris, Seuil, 1971, 
p.301-319. 
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and as: "Bijdrage van een reflexie over de taal van de theologie van 
het woord" in Wegen van de filosofie (33Ό p.137-158. 
300. "Lénine et la philosophie" (P. Ricoeur and L. Althusser e.a.) in 
Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie 62, 1968, pA, 161-168. 
301. "Réforme et révolution dans l'université" in Esprit 36, 1968, 
3une-3uly, p.987-1002. 
also as: "Rebâtir l'université" in Le monde 25, 1968, no. 7279, 3une 9-
10, 1 and 9; no. 7280, June 11, p.9; no. 7281, Липе 12, p.lO. 
also in Portugese. 
302. "Christianisme et révolution" (a communiqué co-signed by 
Christianisme social on behalf of the participation of Christians in the 
revolutionary struggle) in Christianisme social 76, 1968, p. 12-2, 119. 
also as: "Les chrétiens peuvent participer à la lutte révolutionnaire" 
in Cité nouvelle 36, 1968, no. 490, April, p.3.3 
303. "À nos abonnés, à nos amis" (an appeal for support for the 
movement 'Christianisme social') in Christianisme social 76, 1968, no. 
1-2, p.127-128. 
30*. "Déclaration du Congrès National du Mouvement du 
'Christianisme social' (in favor of the just investigations of the 
students' revolutionary movement) in Christianisme social (Imagination 
et pouvoir. Reflections et documents, Мау-Зипе 1968) 76, 1968, no. 3-
4, p.221. 
also in: Cité nouvelle 36, 1968, no. 492, June 13, p.3. 
305. "Appel à tous les chrétiens" (on behalf of the just aspirations of 
the students' revolutionary movement) in Christianisme social 76, 
1968, no. 3-4, p.223-224. 
also as: "Appel aux chrétiens" in Cité nouvelle 36, 1968, no. 492, June 
13, p.7. 
306. "Faire une nouvelle société" (a communiqué of a group of 
catholics and protestants in favour of the transformation of society, 
May 22, 1968) in Christianisme social 76, 1968, no. 3-4, p.225-227. 
also in: Cité nouvelle 36, 1968, no. 492, June 13, p.7. 
307. "Au lecteur" (concerning the intercelebration of the eucharist) in 
Christianisme social 76, 1968, no. 7-10, p.385-387. 
308. "Commentaire eucharistique de Paul Ricoeur" in Christianisme 
social 76, 1968, no. 7-10, p.400-410. 
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309. "The Father Image. From Phantasy to Symbol" in Criterion. A 
Publication of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, 8, 
1968-69, no. 1, Autumn-Winter, p.1-7. 
also as: "La paternité: du fantasme au symbole" in Archivio de 
filosofia 39, 1969, no. 2-3, p.221-246. 
and in: Le conflit des interprétations (320) p.458-¡»86. 
also as: L'analyse du langage théologique. Le nom de Dieu (Actes du 
colloque international, Rome, 1969) Paris, Aubier, 1969, p.222-246. 
and as: "Fatherhood: From Phantasm to Symbol" in The Conflict of 
Interpretations (320) р.*68-*97. 
310. "Lettre d'information des participants" in Le monde 25, 1968, no. 
727*, 3une *, p.*. 
also in: La croix 88, 1968, no. 25980, June 5, p.7. 
and in: Informations catholiques internationales 1968, no. 313-31*, 
June, p.22-23. 
and in: La documentation catholique 50, 1968, no. 1520, July 7, col. 
1212. 
and in: Christianisme social 76, 1968, no. 7-10, рА05-Ь06. 
and partially in: Serrou R., Dieu n'est pas conservateur. Les chrétiens 
dans les événements de mai, Paris, Seuil, 1968, p.58-59. 
and in: Katholiek Archief 23, 1968, no. 37, Sept. 13, col. 913-91*. 
311. "Semaine de l'unité: un appel" (in favor of justice in the world 
and peace in Vietnam) in Réforme 1968, no. 1191, Jan. 13, p . l l . 
also in: "Pour la 'Semaine de l'unité'" in Cité nouvelle 36, 1968, no. 
*85, Jan. 23, р.З. 
312. "La concélébration eucharistique" in Réforme 1968, no. 1212, 
June 8, p.2. 
also in: Réforme, the supplement to no. 1212, June 8, p.*-5. 
(polycopy) 
and as: "Le jour de la pentecôte, ils étaient tous en un même lieu" 
(Livre des actes) in Cité nouvelle 36, 1968, no. *92, June 13, p.2. 
and as: "La concélébration eucharistique de la pentecôte" in 
Christianisme social 76, 1968, p.*23-*25. 
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and in: Lettre 1968, no. 11-119, p.43-W. (polycopy) 
and in: La documentation catholique 50, 1968, no. 1529, July 7, col. 
1216. (partial text) 
and in: Le monde 25, 1968, no. 7283, 3une 15, p. 16. 
and in: "Verklaring van Prof. Paul Ricoeur naar aanleiding van de 
interconfessionele eucharistieviering te Parijs, 2 juni 1968" in 
Katholiek Archief 23, 1968, no. 37, col. 915-916. 
313. "La crise des rapports hiérarchiques" in Cité nouvelle 1968, no. 
495, Oct. 3, 1,4, and 5. 
314. "Être protestant aujourd'hui" in Cahiers d'études du Centre 
Protestant de Récherches et de Rencontres du Nord 1968, no. 26, 
Apr il-3 une, p. 1-14. 
315. "Présence des églises au monde" in Cahiers d'études du Centre 
Protestant de Récherches et de Rencontres du Nord 1968, no. 26, 
April-3une, p. 15-37, 58-75. (mimeographed) (uncorrected notes) 
316. "Sens et langage" in Cahiers d'études du Centre Protestant de 
Récherches et de Rencontres du Nord (sens et fonction d'une 
communauté ecclésiale) 1968, no. 26, April-3une, p.38-57, 58-75. 
(mimeographed) 
317. "L'événement de la parole chez Ebeling" in Les cahiers du Centre 
Protestant de l'Ouest 1968, no. 9, p.23-31. (mimeographed) 
318. "Structure et signification dans le langage" in Pourquoi la 
philosophie? edited by Georges Levoux, Montreal, Les editions de 
Sainte Marie, 1968, p.101-120. 
319. "Interrogation philosophique et engagement" in Pourquoi la 
philosophie? edited by Georges Levoux, Montréal, Les editions de 
Sainte Marie, 1968, p.9-22. 
1969 
320. Le conflit des interprétations. Essais d'herméneutique (L'ordre 
philosophique) Paris, Seuil, 1969, 506p. 
contains the following articles: 
Existence et herméneutique (220) p.7-28. 
Structure et herméneutique (200) p.31-63. 
Le problème de double-sens comme problème herméneutique et 
comme problème sémantique (247) p.64-79. 
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La structure, le mot, l'événement (27Ό p.80-97. 
Le conscient et l'inconscient (243) p.101-121. 
La psychanalyse et le mouvement de la culture contemporaine (228) 
p.122159. 
Une interprétation philosophique de Freud (246) p.160-176. 
Technique et non-technique dans l'interprétation (214) p.177-194. 
L'art et la systématique freudienne (286) p. 195-207. 
L'acte et le signe selon Jean Nabert (185) p.211-221. 
Heidegger et la question du sujet (292) p.222-232. 
La question du sujet: le défi de la sémiologie (278-293) p.233-262. 
Le "péché originel": étude de signification (164) p.265-282. 
Herméneutique des symboles et réflexion philosophique I., (164) p.283-
310. 
Herméneutique des symboles et réflexion philosophique II., (191) p.311-
329. 
Démythiser l'accusation (232) p.330-347. 
Interprétation du mythe de la peine (273) p.348-369. 
Préface à Bultmann (294) p.373-392. 
La liberté selon l'espérance (297) p.393-415. 
Culpabilité, éthique et religion (297) p.416-430. 
Religion, athéisme, foi (325) p.431-457. 
La paternité: du fantasme au symbole (309) p.458-456. 
translated as: 
The Conflict of Interpretations. Essays in Hermeneutics, edited by 
Don Ihde, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1974, 5І2р. 
contains the following articles: 
Existence and Hermeneutics (220) p.3-24. 
Structure and Hermeneutics (200) p.27-61. 
The problem of Double Meaning as Hermeneutic Problem and as 
Semantic Problem (247) p.62-78. 
Structure, Word, Event (275) p.79-96. 
Consciousness and the Unconscious (243) p.99-120. 
Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporatory Culture (228) 
p.121-159. 
A Philosophical Interpretation of Freud (246) p.l 160-176. 
Technique and Nontechnique in Interpretation (213) p.177-195. 
Art and Freudian Systematics (286) p.196-208. 
Nabert on Act and Sign (185) p.211-222. 
Heidegger and the Question of the Subject (292) p.223-235. 
The Question of the Subject: The Challenge of Semiology (278-291) 
p.236-266. 
Original Sin?' A Study in Meaning (164) p.269-286. 
The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection I., (173) 
p.287-314. 
The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection II., (191) 
p.315-334. 
The Demythization of Accusation (232) p.335-353. 
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Interpretation of the Myth of Punishment (273) p.354-377. 
Preface to Bultmann (29it) p.381-401. 
Freedom in the Light of Hope (297) p.if02-^24. 
Guilt, Ethics and Religion (326) p.*25-f 39. 
Religion, Atheism and Faith (325) рАЧО-Ш. 
Fatherhood: From Phantasm to Symbol (309) р.*68-497. 
and as: Der Konflikt der Interpretationen II: Hermeneutik und 
Psychoanalyse, translated by H. Rutsch, Kosel, Munich, 197^, 359p. 
and as: Hermeneutik und Strukturalismus. Der konflikt der 
Interpretatonen I. Translated in part from Le conflit des 
interpretations by 3. Rutsch, Munich, 1973, 321p. 
321. "Philosophie et langage" in Contemporary philosophy. A Survey 
III. Metaphysics, Phenomenology, Language and Structure, La 
philosophie contemporaine, Chroniques ΠΙ. Métaphysique, 
Phénoménologie, Langage et Structure edited by R. Kilbansky, 
Florence, La nuova Italia Editrice, 1969, p.272-295. 
322. "Le philosophe et la politique devant la question de la liberté" (a 
conference followed by a discussion with J. Hersch e.a.) in La liberté 
et l'ordre social (Rencontres internationales de Genève 1969) 
Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1969, p.41-65, 185-205. 
323. "Pour une prédiction au monde" in L'église vers l'avenir, Paris , 
Cerf, 1969, p.1^7-156. 
324. "Croyance" in Encyclopaedia universalis V. Paris, Encyclopaedia 
Universalis France, 1969, p.171-176. 
325. "Religion, Atheism and Faith" in The Religious Significance of 
Atheism, edited by A. Maclntyre, Ch. Aladair, and P. Ricoeur, New 
York-London, Columbia University Press, 1969, p.58-98. 
and in: The Conflict of Interpretations (320) p.425-439. 
also as: "Religion, athéisme, foi" in Le conflit des interprétations 
(320) р.Ш-457. 
326. "Guilt, Ethics and Religion" in Talk of God (Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Lectures. II. 1967-68) London Melbourne-Toronto-
New York, MacMillian-St. Martin's Press, 1969, p.100-117. 
and in: The Conflict of Interpretations (320) ρ.425-Ψ39. 
and in: Concilium (Moral evil under challenge) 1970, no. 56, p. 11-27. 
and in: Conscience. Theological and Psychological Perspectives, 
edited by C. Ellis Nelson, Newman Press, 1973, p.11-27. 
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also as: "Culpabilité, éthique et religion" in Le conflit des 
interprétations (320) ρ A 16-^30. 
and in: Concilium (Problèmes frontières) 1970 , no. 56, p.l 1-23. 
and as: "Schuld, Ethik und Religion" in Concilium (theologische 
Grenzfragen) 6, 1970, no. 6-7, p.384-393. 
and as: "Schuld, ethiek en religie" in Concilium (Grensvragen) 6, 1970, 
no. 6, p.8-25. 
also in Spanish and Italian and Portugese and Polish. 
327. "Préface" in Ph. Secretan, Autorité, Pouvoir, Puissance, 
Principes de philosophie politique reflexive (Dialectica) (Lausanne). 
L'âge d'homme, 1969, p.IX-XIV. 
328. "La paternité: du fantasme au symbole" (a discussion on the 
Conferences of P. Ricoeur with К. Kerenyi e.a.) in Débats sur le 
langage théologique, Paris, Aubier, 1969, p.71-88. 
329. Ricoeur P., De Waelhens Α., Vergete Α., "Débats" (on the 
conferences: Waelhens, 'La paternité et le complexe dOedipe en 
psychanalyse': Vergote, 'Le nom de Dieu et l'écart de la topographie 
symbolique') in Débats sur le langage théoiogique. Paris, Aubier, 1969, 
p.89-101, 103-122. 
330. "Appel du Comité français de la Conférence chrétienne pour la 
paix" in Christianisme social 77, 1969, no. 1-2, p.125-126. 
331. "Perspectives de la réforme universitaire" in Réforme 1969, no. 
12i>9, Feb., no. 1250, March 1, pA. 
332. Les incidences théologiques des recherches actuelles concernant 
le langage, Paris, Institut d'études oecuméniques, 1969 (1972), 9frp. 
(mimeographed). 
333. "Bultmann: Une théologie sans mythologie" in Cahiers 
d'Orgemont (Importance de la théologie de Rudolf Bultmann) 1969, no. 
72, March-April, p.21-3, 38-Ψ0. (polycopy) 
1970 
33*. Wegen van de filosofie: Structuralisme, psychoanalyse, 
hermeneutiek. Essays van P. Ricoeur, selected and introduced by 
A. Peperzak, Bilthoven, Amboboeken, 1970, 169p. 
contains the following articles: 
303 
De toekomst van de filosofie en de vraag naar het subjekt, (293) p.17-
55. 
Hermeneutiek en structuralisme (200), p.59-96. 
Het probleem van de 'dubbele' zin als hermeneutisch en semantisch 
probleem (2^7) p.97-115. 
Structuur, woord, gebeurtenis (275) p. 116-136. 
Bijdrage van een reflexie over de taal tot de theologie van het woord 
(299)p.l37-158. 
Het bewuste en onbewuste (2^3) p.161-186. 
De psychoanalyse in de hedendaaagse cultuur (227) p. 187-23*. 
Het vaderschap, (309) p.235-269. 
335. "L'institution vivante est-ce que nous en faisons" in Les 
professeurs pour quoi faire? (L'histoire immédiate) edited by 
M. Chapel and M. Manceaux, Paris, Seuil, 1970, ρ.127-142. 
also as: "Les professeurs de droite à gauche. Les libéraux. M. Paul 
Ricoeur" in L'express 1970, no. 975, March 16-22, p.132, 137-138, 1*1, 
1*3-14*, 1*9, 151-152. 
336. "Psychanalyse et culture" in Critique sociologique et critique 
psychanalytique (Études de sociologie de la littérature) Bruxelles, 
Editions de l'Institut de Sociologie. Université Libre de Bruxelles, 
1970, p.179-185, 185-191. 
337. "Qu'est-ce qu'un texte? Expliquer et comprendre" in 
Hermeneutik und Dialektik. Aufsatze II. Sprache und Logik. Theorie 
der Auslegung und Probleme der Einzelwissenschaften, edited by 
P. Bubner, К. Cramer, and R. Wiehl, Tubingen, 3.C.B. Mohr, 1970, 
p.181-200. 
also as: "What is a Text? Explanation and Interpretation" in Mythic-
Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology, by 
D.M. Rasmussen, Le Haye, M. Nijhoff, 1971, ρ.135-150. 
338. "Hope and Structure of Philosophical Systems" in Proceedings of 
the American Catholic Association, (San Francisco 1970, Philosophy 
and Christian Theology), edited by G.P. McLean and P. Dougherty, 
Washington, The Catholic University of America, 1970, p.55-59. 
339. "Lettre de protestation contre le licenciement injuste de 
personnel au centre de Saclay" (co-signed by P. Ricoeur) in 
Christianisme social 78, 1970, no. 1-2, p.99-101. 
3*0. "Lettre de 3. Beaumont et de P. Ricoeur, présidents du 
christianisme social, dénonçant l'oppression politique au Brésil" in 
Christianisme social 78, 1970, no. 3-6, p.286-287. 
3*1. "Vers une éthique de la finitude: quelques remarques" (on the 
article 'Le ver dans le fruit' by R. Simon) in Christianisme social 78, 
1970, no. 7-8, p.393-395. 
30* 
3*2. "André Philip" in Christianisme social 78, 1970, no. 9-10, p.563-
566. 
3*3. "Il faut espérer pour entreprendre" in Jeunes femmes (Une 
société pour tous: aujourd'hui, demain, comment? Congrès d'Orleans, 
mai 1970) 1970, no. 119-120, Sept.-Oct., p.19-26. 
3*4. Ricoeur P., Blanquart P., Schwartz В., "Table ronde" (sur la 
société actuelle) in Jeunes femmes, 12970, no. 119-120, Sept.-Nov., 
p.37-*7. 
3*5. "Problèmes actuels de l'interprétation" (d'après Paul Ricoeur) in 
Centre Protestant d'Études et de Documentation. (Dossier "Nouvelles 
Théologies"), 1970, no. 148, March, p.51, 163-170, 182. 
3*6. "Tendenze principali della vicerca in filosofia" (a conference of 
P. Ricoeur followed by a discussion with F. Battaglia, e.a.) in Filosofia 
21, 1970, p.*63-*71, *79-508. 
3*7. "Une mise au point du doyen Ricoeur" in Le monde 27, 1970, no. 
7-78, Feb. 7, p.9. 
3*8. "Déclaration de M.Ricoeur" in Le monde 27, 1970, no. 7815, 
Feb. 27, p. 10 and no. 7816, Feb. 28, p.2*. 
partially reprinted in: Le Figaro 1**, 1970, no. 7918, Feb.27, p.2*. 
3*9. "Un communiqué du doyen Ricoeur" in Le monde 27, 1970, no. 
7819, March *, p.9. 
350. "Une lettre du doyen Ricoeur" in Le Monde 27, 1970, no. 7820, 
March 5, p.32, and no. 7821, March 6, p.10. 
351. "M. Ricoeur: Les étudiants ont l'Université qu'ils méritent et 
l'Université mérite les étudiants qu'elle a" in Le monde 27, 1970, no. 
7827, March 13, p.9. 
partially reprinted as: "Le doyen Ricoeur dénonce la fuite de la 
majorité silencieuse devant ses responsabilités" in La Croix 90, 1970, 
no. 26518, March 13, p.5. 
352. "La lettre de M. Ricoeur" in Le monde 27, no. 7830, March 18, 
p.16. 
partially reprinted in France-soir 1970, March 18, p.7. 
also in: La croix 90, no. 26522, p.5. 
and in: Le figaro 1**, 1970, no. 7933, March 18, p.12. 
353. "Rencontre avec le doyen Paul Ricoeur. Universités nouvelles: 
un périlleux apprentissage" in Réforme 1970, no. 1320, Feb. 28, p.16. 
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1971 
35*. Kwaad en bevrijdinR. Filosofie en theologie van de hoop. 
Hermeneutische artikelen. Introduced by A. Peperzak, Rotterdam, 
Lemniscaat, 1971, 19<φ. 
contains the following articles: 
Existentie en hermeneutiek (229) p.20-40. 
Inleiding tot Bultmann (294) p.41-60. 
Interpretatie van symbolen en wijsgerige reflectie I., (173) p.61-87. 
De 'erfzonde' (164) p.88-106. 
Interpretatie van symbolen en wijsgerige reflectie II., (191) p.107-125. 
Demythisering van de aanklacht (232) p. 126-145. 
Interpretatie van de mythe van de straf (273) p. 146-169. 
Vrijheid in hoop. Filosofische benadering van het begrip 
godsdienstvrijheid (297) p.170-195. 
355. "Langage (Philosophie)" in Encyclopaedia universalis IX, Paris, 
Encyclopaedia Universalis France, 1971, p.771-781. 
356. "Liberté" in Encyclopaedia universalis IX, Paris, Encyclopaedia 
Universalis France, 1971, p.979-985. 
357. "Mythe 3. L'interprétation philosophique" in Encyclopaedia 
universalis XI, Paris, Encyclopaedia Universalis France, 1971, p.530-
537. 
358. "Du conflit à la convergence des méthodes en exégèse biblique" 
in Exégèse et herméneutique (Parole de Dieu) Paris, Seuil, 1971, p.35-
53. 
359. "Sur l'exégèses de Genese 1,1 - 2,4," (a conference followed by a 
discussion with F. Bussini e.a.) in Exégèse et herméneutique (Parole de 
Dieu) Paris, Seuil, 1971, p.67-84, 85-96. 
360. "Esquisse de conclusion" (of the Congress, 'Exégèse et 
herméneutique') in Exégèse et herméneutique (Parole de Dieu) Paris, 
Seuil, 1971, p.285-295. 
361. "Le philosophe" in Bilan de la France 1945-1970 (Colloque de 
l'Association de la presse étrangère) Paris, Pion, 1971, p.47-59. 
362. "Événement et sens dans le discours" in Ricoeur où la liberté 
selon l'espérance, by M. Philibert, Paris, Seghers, 1971, p.177-187. 
also as: "Événement et sens" in Archivio di filosofia 41, 1971, no. 2, 
p. 15-34. 
and in: Révélation et histoire. La théologie de l'histoire (Actes du 
colloque international, Rome 1971) Paris, Aubier, 1971, p. 15-34. 
306 
363. "Le conflit: signe de contradiction ou d'unité?" in Contradictions 
et conflits: naissance d'une société? (Semaines sociales de France, 
Rennes, 1971), Lyon, Chronique sociale de France, 1971, p. 189-204. 
also in: Chronique sociale de France 80, 1972, p.77-93. 
36*. "Préface" in André Philip par lui-même ou les voies de la liberté. 
Avant-propos by L. Philip, Paris, Aubier, 1971, p.27-34. 
365. "Préface" in O. Reboul, Kant et le problème du mal, Montréal, 
Les Presses de l'Université de Montreal, 1971, p.IX-XVI. 
366. "Forword" in D. Ihde, Hermeneutic Phenomenology. The 
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Studies in Phenomenology eind Existential 
Philosophy) Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1971, p.XII-XVII. 
367. "La foi soupçonnée" (a conference followed by a discussion with 
R. Garaudy and É. Borne) in Recherches et Débats (Foi et religion. 
Semaine des Intellectuels Catholiques 1971) 19, 1971, no. 71, p.6*-75, 
76-89. 
368. "D'où vient l'ambiguïté de la phénoménologie"? (discussion on a 
conference of A. Lowit) in Bulletin de la Société française de 
Philosophie 65, 1971, no. 2, April-June, p.55-68. 
369. "Communiqué de comité directeur du mouvement du 
'Christianisme social'" (on behalf of the hunger strikes against the 
penitentiary system in France) in Christianisme social 79, 1971, no. 1-
2, p.66-67. 
370. "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a 
Text" in Social Research 38, 1971, no. 3, p.529-562. 
371. "From Existentialism to the Philosophy of Language" in Criterion 
10, 1971, Spring, ρ.Ιΐ-18. 
also as: "A Philosophical Journey. From Existentialism to the 
Philosophy of Language" in Philosophy Today 17, 1973, no. 2-4, 
Summer p.88-96. 
and in: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (452) p.86-94. 
372. "'Timoléon, réflexions sur la tyrannie', d'Amédée Ponceau" in Le 
monde 28, 1971, no. 8165, April 14, p.10. 
373. "Sémantique de l'action" (a course taught at Louvain 1970-1971) 
Louvain, Université Catholique de Louvain-Cercle de Philosophie, 
1971, p.1-148. (polycopy) 
also as: La sémantique de l'action, prepared under the direction of 
Dorian Tiffeneau (Centre d'histoire des sciences et des doctrines. 
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Phénoménologie et herméneutique, I.) Paris, Ed. du Centre National de 
la Recherche Scientifique, 1977, 137p. 
contains the following articles: 
Le discours de l'action, p.1-20. 
Le réseau conceptuel de l'action, p.21-63. 
L'analyse propositionelle des énoncées d'action, p.65-84. 
Phénoménologie et analyse linguistique, p. 113-132. 
37*. "Cours sur l'herméneutique" Louvain, Institut Supérieur de 
Philosophie, 1971-1972, 288p. (mimeographed) 
375. "The Problem of the Will and Philosophical Discourse" in 
Patterns of the Life-World, Essays in honor of 3ohn Wild, edited by 
Л. Edie, F. Parker, and C O . Schray, Evanston, Northwestern 
University Press, 1970, p.273-289. 
376. "Discours et communication: La communication problématique" 
in La communication. Montréal, Editions Montmorency, 2, 1971, p . l -
25. 
also as: "Diskurs und Kommunikation" in Neue H. Philos II, 1977, p . l -
25. 
1972 
377. "Ontologie" in Encyclopaedia universalis. XII, Paris, 
Encyclopaedia Universalis France, p.9*-102. 
378. "Signe et sens in Encyclopaedia Universalis. XII, Paris, 
Encyclopaedia Universalis France, 1972, p.1011-1015. 
379. "Remarques sur la communication de Karl Lowith" in Truth and 
Historicity. Vérité et historicité ( Entretiens de Heidelberg 1969) 
edited by H.-G. Gadamer, La Haye, M. Nijhoff, 1972, ρ.22-28. 
380. "L'herméneutique du témoignage" in Archivio di filosofia 42, 
1972, no. 1-2, p.35-61. 
also in: Le témoignage (Actes du colloque international, Rome 1972) 
Paris, Aubier, 1972, p.35-61. 
also as: 'The Hermeneutics of Testimony" in Anglican Theological 
Revue 51, 1979, ρ.435-461. 
381. "La métaphore et le problème central de l'herméneutique" in 
Revue philosophique de Louvain 70, 1972, Feb., p.93-112 (Resumé and 
Summary, p.115). 
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also as: "Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics" 
translated by 3eff L. Close, in Philosophy Journal 3, 1973-197*, pA2-
58. 
and as: "Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics" in New 
Literary History 6, 197^-75, p.95-110. 
and in: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (452) p. 13»-1*8. 
382. "Les aspirations de la jeunesse" in La foi et le temps 2, 1972, no. 
5, Sept.-Oct., p.539-554. 
383. "Foi et philosophie aujourd'hui" in Foi-éducation 42, 1972, no. 
100, Лиіу-Sept., p.1-12, 12-13. 
384. "Sprachwissenschaftliche Analyse und Phänomenologie des 
Handeln" in Wissenschaft und Weltbild 25, 1972, no. 4, p.254-260. 
1973 
385. "Volonté" in Encyclopaedia Universalis XVI, Paris, Encyclopaedia 
Universalis, France, 1973, p.943-948. 
386. "Herméneutique et critique des idéologies" in Archivio di 
filosofia 43, 1973, no. 2-4, p.25-61. 
also in: Démythisation et idéologie (Actes du colloque international, 
Rome 1973) Paris, Aubier, 1973, p.25-61. 
387. "Creativity in Language. Word. Polysemy. Metaphor" in 
Philosophy Today 17, 1973, no. 2-4, Summer, p.97-111. 
also in: Language and Language Disturbances (the 5th Lexington 
Conference on Pure and Applied Phenomenology 1972) edited by Erwin 
W. Straus, Pittsburg, Duquesne University Press, 1974, p.49-71. 
388. "The Task of Hermeneutics" in Philosophy Today 17, 1973, no. 2-
4, Summer, p. Π 2-128. 
also in: Heidegger and Modern Philosophy (critical essays) edited by 
Michael Murray, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1978, p. 141-160. 
also as: "La tâche de l'herméneutique" in Exegesis, Neuchâtel, Paris, 
1975, p. 179-200. 
389. "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation" in Philosophy 
Today 17, 1973, no. 2-4, Summer, p.129-141. 
also as: "La fonction herméneutique de la distanciation" in Exégèsis, 
Neuchâtel, Paris, 1975, p.201-215. 
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390. "Ethics and Culture. Habermas and Gadamer in Dialogue" in 
Philosophy Today 17, 1973, no. 2-4, Summer, p.166-175. 
also in: Political and Social Essays (41*) p.243-270. 
391. "A Critique of B.F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity" in 
Philosophy Today 17, 1973, no. 2-4, Summer, p.166-175. 
also in: Political and Social Essays (414) p.46-67. 
392. Marcel G. and Ricoeur P., Tragic Wisdom and Beyond, translated 
by St. Jolin and P. McCormick, Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern 
University Press, 1973, 256p. 
393. Ricoeur P., and Lévinas E., "In memoriam: H.L. van Breda" in 
Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie 67, 1973, p.179-183, 
Paris, Armand Colin, p.149-187. 
394. "Préface" in G.B. Madison, La phénoménologie de Merleau-
Ponty, Klincksieck, Paris, Publications de l'Université de Paris X 
Nanterre, Lettres et sciences humaines, 1973, p.9-14. 
395. "Le 'lieu' de la dialectique" in Dialectics/Dialectiques, 
International Institute of Philosophy, edited by Ch. Perelman, the 
Hague, Nijhoff, p.92-108. 
1974 
396. "Science et idéologie" in Revue Philosophique de Louvain 72, 
1974, p.328-356. 
also as: "Can There be a Scientific Concept of Ideology"? in 
Phenomenology and the Social Sciences: A Dialogue, edited by Joseph 
Bien, The Hague, Boston, London, Nijhoff, 1978, p.44-59. 
397. "Philosophy and Religious Language" in Journal of Religion 54, 
1974, p.71-85. 
also as: "La philosophie et la spécificité du langage religieux" in 
Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuse 55, 1975, p. 13-26. 
398. "Phénoménologie et herméneutique" in Man and World 7, 1974, 
p.223-253. 
also in Phänomenologie heute. Grundlagen-und Methodenprobleme. 
Redaktionelle Vorbemerkung, Freiburg, Verlag Karl Alber, 1975, p.31-
75. 
399. "Hegel aujourd'hui" in Études théologiques et religieuses 49, 
1974, p.335-355. 
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Φ00. "Stellung und Funktion der Metapher in der biblischer Sprache" in 
Metapher. Zur Hermeneutik religiöser Sprache, a Special Issue of 
Evangelische Theologie, edited by P. Ricoeur and E. Jüngel, Munster, 
Kaiser, 1974. (See nos W5 and ¡КЭ6). 
•01. "Recherches phénoménologiques sur l'imaginaire: Séminaire 
1973-197Ψ" Paris, Centre de Recherches Phénoménologiques 1974, p . l -
8. 
402. "L'itinéraire husserlien de la phénoménologie pure à la 
phénoménologie transcendentale, Exposé: Père Herman Leo 
van Breda" in In Memoriam H.L. van Breda, E. Lévinas and 
P. Ricoeur, Paris, Armand Colin, 1974, p. 149-187. 
403. "Conclusions" in Vérité et vérification (Wahrheit und 
Verifikation) Actes du quatrième colloque international de 
phénoménologie, Schwabisch Hall, 1969, edited by H.L. van Breda, Den 
Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, p.l90-209. 
404. "Manifestation et proclamation" in Le Sacré. Études et 
recherches. Actes du colloque organisé par le centre international 
d'études humanistes et par l'institut d'études philosophiques de Rome, 
edited by E. Castelli, Paris, Aubier, 1974, p.57-76. 
1975 
405. "Le problème du fondement de la morale" in Sapienza 28, 1975, 
Р.313-Э37. 
and as: "The Problem of the Foundation of Moral Philosophy" 
(adapted and enlarged version) in Philosophy Today 22, 1978, p.175-
192. 
406. "Philosophical Hermeneutics and Theological Hermeneutics" in 
Studies in Religion/ Sciences Religieuses 5, 1975-1976, p.14-33. 
also as: "Herméneutique philosophique et herméneutique biblique" in 
Exegesis. Problèmes de méthode et exercises de lecture. Ed. 
F. Bovon and G. Rouiller, Neuchâtel, Paris, Delachaux et Niestlé, 
1975, p.216-228. 
407. "The Metaphorical Process" in Semeia 4, 1975, p.75-106. 
408. "Puissance de la parole: science et poésie" in La philosophie et 
les savoirs (Coli: L'univers de la philosophie 4) Montreal, Bellarmin, 
1975, p. 159-177. 
409. "Phenomenology of Freedom" in Phenomenology and 
Philosophical Understanding, edited by E. Pivevic, London, Cambridge 
University Press, 1975, p. 173-194. 
311 
Ψ10. "Listening to the Parables of Jesus" in Criterion 13, 1974, p.18-
22. 
also in: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (448) p.239-245. 
and in: Christianity and Crisis 34, 1975, p.304-308. 
»11. "Biblical Hermeneutics" in Semeia 13, 1975, p.29-148. 
also in Spanish. 
412. "Phänomenologie des Wollens und Ordinary Language Approach". 
Authorized translation by Alexandre M ét raus, in Die Münchener 
Phänomenologie. (Vorträge des Internationalen Kongresses in München 
1971) edited by H. Kuhn, Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, und Reinhold 
Gladiator, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, p. 105-124. 
413. "Objectivation et aliénation dans l'expérience historique" in 
Temporalité et aliénation. Actes du colloque organisé par centre 
international d'études humanistes et par l'institut d'études 
philosophiques de Rome, edited by Enrico Castelli, Paris Aubier-
Montaigne, 1975, p.27-38. 
also as: "Objektivierung und Entfremdung in der geschichtlichen 
Erfahrung" in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 84, 1977, p.1-12. 
414. Political and Social Essays, collected and edited by David 
Stewart and Joseph Bien, Athens, Ohio University Press, 1975, 293p. 
contains the following articles: 
Nature and Freedom (183) p.23-45. 
A critique of B.F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity (390) p.46-67. 
What does Humanism Mean? (95) p.68-87. 
Violence and Language (276) p.88-101. 
Ye are the Salt of the Earth (118) p.105-124. 
Faith and Culture (115) p. 125-133. 
From Nation to Humanity: Tasks of Christians (236) p.134-159. 
The Project of a Social Ethic (254) p.160-175. 
Urbanization and Secularization (277) p.176-197. 
Adventures of the State and Tasks of Christians (124) p.201-216. 
From Marxism to Contemporary Communism (142) p.217-228. 
Socialism Today (176) p.229-242. 
Ethics and Culture. Habermas and Gadamer in Dialogue (390) p.243-
270. 
The Tasks of the Political Educator (234) p.271-293. 
415. "Au Carrefour des cultures" in Les cultures et le temps. Studies 
prepared for Unesco, Payot, Paris, Unesco Press, 1975, p. 19-41. 
also in Spanish. 
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416. "Parole et symbole" in Le symbole (Coll. international, held from 
Feb. 4-8, 1974) edited by Jacques E. Menard, Strasbourg, Palais 
Universitaire, 1975, p.l42-161. 
also in: Revue des sciences religieuses 49, 1975, p.142-161. 
417. La métaphore vive (L'ordre philosophie) Paris, Seuil, 1975, 414p. 
also as: The Rule of Metaphor. Multidisciplinary Studies of the 
Creation of Meaning in Language, translated by Robert Czerny and 
Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 1977, VIII-384p. 
418. "Le Dieu Crucifié de Jürgen Moltmann" in Les quatres fleuves. 
Cahiers de recherches et de reflection religieuses (Le Christ visage de 
Dieu) 4, 1974, p. 109-114. 
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